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Preface
This book has its origins in my doctoral thesis (2002) at Bar-Ilan University, Israel.
Since then, developments in research on the art of rhetoric have required significant
modifications to be made to my position prior to publication. Two studies above all
have affected the subject matter, form, and conclusions of the present work. Winter-
bottom and Reinhardt’s Quintilian: Institutio Oratoria Book 2 (2006) was for me an
eye-opener. I am indebted to the authors for providing me with a copy of their type-
script prior to publication. Their work on Quintilian, II, the second half of which is
one of the main sources I discuss, obliged me to rewrite much of the book in light of
their findings. The second study I should mention actually appeared before I had be-
gun my thesis, but was unattainable at the time. This is an article by Jonathan Barnes,
“Is Rhetoric an Art?” (1986). I am deeply grateful to Prof. Barnes for sending me a
personal copy. The article deals mainly with Sextus Empiricus, but also looks at paral-
lels in Quintilian and Philodemus, among others. I have gained most profit, however,
from the astonishing originality of Barnes’ notes, as the reader will be able to discern.
This book is not an easy read, and is not intended to be dipped into. The argu-
ment is cumulative, and pays close attention to the sources; the reader would be well
advised to have the sources at hand while reading the book. It is the complex char-
acter of the sources themselves which has obliged this approach, and every effort
has been made to facilitate reading within these strictures.
A study of ancient rhetoric is particularly significant at a time when departments
of rhetoric and media studies, not to mention advertising and public relations agen-
cies, are increasingly commonplace. Unlike research on the debate over rhetoric in
the Classical period, drawing on the extensive sources of Plato and Aristotle, there
has been little discussion of the great debate over rhetoric in the Hellenistic period,
primarily because of the difficult nature of the sources for this later debate. It is the
aim of this book to rectify this omission.
Many have aided me in bringing this book to publication, but I would like to thank
two in particular. My great teacher and mentor, Prof. John Glucker, has accompanied
me at almost every stage, from the preparation of the doctoral dissertation, and through
many consultations during the writing of this book, he has given generously of his time
and expertise. My thanks also go to my good friend Dr. Ivor Ludlam who read through
the entire typescript with the eye of a true expert in the field of Hellenistic philosophy
and made many important remarks. Finally, I would like to thank Bar-Ilan University,
my home for over twenty years, and especially my colleagues in the departments of
Philosophy, History and Classics who have always given me support and good advice.
Yosef Z. Liebersohn Jerusalem, January 2010
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1. Introduction
1.1. Foreword
The status of rhetoric as an art (técnv) was a matter of dispute ever since its practi-
tioners and teachers began to lay such claims for their profession.
Rhetoric began, so the ancients tell us, in Sicily in the fifth century B.C.E., to
meet the new demands of democracy, then making its appearance in that area. In
theory anyone could be elected to the various offices of the democratic polis, but in
practice only the eloquent succeeded. The demand for teachers of public speaking,
of course with commensurate rewards, encouraged the growth of rhetoric to meet
the need. Tradition names Corax and Tisias as the first to engage in rhetoric. Rheto-
ric reached Athens through their pupil Gorgias, who participated in the embassy to
that city in 427 B.C.E.,1 and from there it spread to the rest of the Greek-speaking
world.2 However, the development and spread of rhetoric during this first period
was accompanied by a growing opposition. The most famous testimonia for all this
are of course Plato’s Gorgias and Aristotle’s Rhetorica.3 The accusations against
rhetoric in this, the Classical period, have received extensive attention in the sec-
ondary literature and are not the subject of this study.
The title of the present work is The Dispute Concerning Rhetoric in Hellenistic
Thought,4 but a few more words need to be said before we proceed to this subject.
For 150 years after the death of Aristotle, while the practice of rhetoric was cer-
1 Diodorus Siculus, XII. 53.
2 This theory originates with Aristotle, although Plato must have been aware of it when he wrote
the Phaedrus. It was universally accepted until the middle of the twentieth century. There are those
nowadays who date the origin of rhetoric earlier or later, and in many of these cases the matter
hinges on how rhetoric is defined, and this differs from one scholar to the next. For some of this de-
bate, see Schiappa (1990) and the responses by O’Sullivan (1992) and Pendrick (1998). The debate
is essentially about the participle kalouménvn which appears in Plato’s Gorgias with the noun
r vtorikv́n (448d9). Schiappa argues that the term r vtorikv́ originates in Gorgias, which would
mean that Plato himself “invented” it in his attack on the sophistic profession. If this were the case,
the term would need to be considered rather late, originating some time in the fourth century
B.C.E. The position has aroused serious controversy up to the present day. See also Kennedy
(1994) 7 n.3.
3 To this we should add the testimonia concerning the activities of the sophists, some of the
writings of Isocrates and other teachers of rhetoric such as Alcidamas. These and many others are
well documented in the secondary literature and do not need to be mentioned here.
4 The decision to use “thought” rather than “philosophy” rests on the simple fact that the rhetori-
cal schools are also party to the debate.
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tainly a matter of controversy, none of the philosophical and rhetorical schools5
seems to have held any significant metarhetorical6 debate over the legitimacy of
rhetoric.
In the middle of the second century B.C.E., however, we witness an explosion of
negative criticism against rhetoric, headed by the philosophers, who in the words of
Cicero attacked una paene voce (De Oratore I. 46). This strong opposition of philo-
sophical teachers and their pupils included Critolaus the Peripatetic, Diogenes of
Babylon the Stoic and (a little later) Charmadas the Academic. It is difficult to set
the time limits of this debate. The outbreak may have had antecedents and later
champions now unrecorded but who are nonetheless part of the debate. This said,
the debate may tentatively be restricted to the second century, and even to the sec-
ond half of the second century. I shall call this “the Second Period” (the First Period
being the controversies in the Classical period), and this is the subject of our study.
1.2. Methodology
The method followed in this study is philological-philosophical, and needs to be ex-
plained in some detail. While whole texts have reached us from the First Period,
from the Second Period none by any of the philosophers involved has survived. We
are dependent upon the testimonia of later authors. For our purposes, these texts are:
Cicero’s De Oratore, published in 45 B.C.E., and a work by Cicero’s contempor-
ary, Philodemus, De Rhetorica, dated to the 70’s B.C.E.,7 both of which are at least
fifty years later than the second stage8 of the Second Period; the second book of
Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, written more than a century after the death of Ci-
cero; Sextus Empiricus’ Adversus Rhetoricos, written more than a century after the
death of Quintilian; and Lucian’s satirical work, De Parasito, written more than
fifty years after the death of Quintilian. None of these later works is devoted to the
debate of the Second Period, but they each contain sporadic hints, arguments and
shreds of arguments, often garbled to a certain degree, reflecting the style and edi-
torial method of each of these late authors and indeed of their sources back to the
second century B.C.E. It is our task to recover as much as possible these earlier
sources so far as they pertain to the metarhetorical debate.
5 For a detailed survey of the pursuits of the Hellenistic philosophical and rhetorical schools,
see pp.24–38 below.
6 I use “metarhetoric” to refer only to discussions on the very nature of rhetoric, while “rhetoric”
deals both with the theory and the practice of how to speak. See further my article, Liebersohn
(1999) 108 n.1.
7 On the dating, see Hubbell (1920) 259.
8 Here I anticipate a conclusion of the present study, that the Second Period constists of two
stages, the first being around the middle of the second century, and the second towards its end; see
pp.38–46 (esp.45) below.
14 Introduction
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Cicero’s work deals with the nature of the ideal orator, but unwittingly provides
us with some information on the background to the debate;9 some of Cicero’s im-
mediate predecessors visiting Athens were able to witness at first hand the Second
stage of the debate. Philodemus was an Epicurean, and Epicureans did not regard
rhetoric as a legitimate occupation.10 His work on rhetoric was discovered on a pa-
pyrus scroll in Herculaneum, blackened by the eruption of Vesuvius. The scroll was
opened carelessly, and for many years also read carelessly. The text was in any case
fragmented, and today it is hard to say what the context for any particular fragment
was. The texts of Quintilian and Sextus Empiricus, on the other hand, are complete,
so far as those authors are concerned. They are not, however, concerned with a his-
torical description of a long forgotten debate. Any references to it, such as the
names of antagonists, are incidental to their actual aims. Quintilian was a teacher of
rhetoric, and his discussions of arguments against rhetoric were not simply in order
to reconstruct them, but rather to refute them in defence of his own profession. Sex-
tus Empiricus was a Pyrrhonian Sceptic, and his aim in the present work, as in all
his works, is to undermine any claim to knowledge; thus here he proves with philo-
sophical arguments that rhetoric is not an art, and there is no real knowledge behind
it. He follows his usual procedure, discovering in his sources any argument which
will serve his purposes, whether he uses them as they were historically intended or
not. Lucian was a satirist, and would at first sight appear to be even less of an
authority than the others; in fact, as we shall later see, on certain critical issues he is
more exact than some of the “more serious” authors.11
The main point is that all our testimonia are from sources not dealing primarily
with the debate which occurred decades or centuries before their time. Yet with sen-
sitive and careful philological work it is possible to identify their origins in one or
other stage of the debate.
The examination is therefore to be not only philosophical but also philological.
The international language of science and philosophy in the Second Period was still
Greek; but most of the Greek sources have been lost, and we must supplement our
surviving Greek testimonia with Latin authors, such as Cicero and Quintilian, who
were proficient in Greek, indeed often thought in Greek even when they wrote La-
tin. The significance of various terms in our Greek testimonia would often escape
us, were it not for our Latin sources which provide us with explanations and illustra-
tions. The task of reconstructing the original arguments and terminology is compli-
cated by the linguistic developments in Latin and Greek over the centuries between
the Second Period and the latest sources, in grammar, syntax, vocabulary, style and
regional variations. Another complication is of course the problem of transmission,
9 For a discussion of this background, which is essential for the reconstruction of the arguments
themselves, see pp.38–46 below.
10 Apart from what they called “sophistic rhetoric”; see p.29 below.
11 See pp.169–172 below.
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with all that is involved in the recension and editing of texts. Sometimes the text
will need to be emended, according to content and context, but with a philological
sensitivity to the many ways in which errors are known to have crept into the manu-
script tradition.12
The necessary philological work involved is complemented by a philosophical
sensitivity to the arguments being uncovered, just as the philosophical endeavour to
reconstruct the arguments is aided by a philological awareness. There are, for exam-
ple, arguments which appear to be similar to other arguments but for a small but sig-
nificant difference in terminology or formulation. Some similar arguments are used
for very different purposes: for example, an argument dealing in one place with the
goal of rhetoric and the possibility of attaining it may in another place deal with the
question whether rhetoric has a subject matter (materia). Only the combination of
philosophy and philology can lead us through the complex maze of testimonia, ter-
minology and arguments.
The very nature of the difficulties may well be the reason why so few scholars
have dealt with this issue so far. Yet the few who have dealt with the issue – includ-
ing the great scholars of the 19th. and 20th. centuries – have not examined the con-
troversy itself, but have regarded it rather like an appendix to other subjects.13
While discussions of this type do have some value, the general picture will always
remain at best partial, at worst entirely distorted. What is required is a concerted
and thorough examination of all the evidence regarding the controversy in its own
right.
It is perhaps not surprising that all the references in the secondary literature even-
tually make do with the presentation of a few parallels between the various sources.
The present study begins where all other studies have left off. The fact that there are
similar arguments in Sextus Empiricus, Quintilian, Philodemus, Cicero and others
should not be the conclusion but rather a starting point for the investigation. Each
argument needs to be analysed with care, taking into account the contexts of the var-
ious works in which it is found, and the rationale behind it in each one, with a view
to reconstructing the original arguments as they were used in the controversy for
and against rhetoric in that period, and if possible, identifying their authors.14
12 For an example of an emendation see p.205 n.95 below.
13 For a detailed critical survey of the secondary literature dealing with this issue, see §2.4 be-
low.
14 The natural tendency of scholars researching other subjects only touching on the debate over
rhetoric is to avoid the intricacies of source criticism, with the result that their findings are to be
treated with extreme caution; e.g., Charles Brittain (2001) devotes the last chapter (ch. 7, pp.296–
342) of his book on the Academic sceptic, Philo of Larissa, to Philo’s understanding of rhetoric. To
this end, Philo’s teacher, Charmadas is also discussed. Since Charmadas, who lived towards the end
of the second century B.C.E., participated in the attacks of the philosophers against the orators,
Brittain has to address the problem of the debate: yet his introduction to the chapter already bodes
ill: “Sections (i) and (ii) examine the general context of the dispute between late Hellenistic philoso-
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1.3. A Survey of the Sources
We shall end this introduction with a survey of the sources. The main problems with
the sources at our disposal have been mentioned above in general terms, but apart
from these general problems, each source has individual characteristics which need
to be taken into account when attempting to glean information from them about Hel-
lenistic rhetoric and metarhetoric. The following survey will treat the sources in
chronological order, apart from Cicero who is dealt with before his older contem-
porary, Philodemus.15
1.3.1. Cicero
Cicero (106–43 B.C.E.) is our earliest source for arguments about rhetoric in the
Hellenistic period. The greatest orator of his generation, he was well-versed in
Greek philosophy and literature as well as Latin literature. He spent the years 79–78
studying philosophy in Athens with Philo of Larissa,16 the last head of the Aca-
demic school, and Antiochus of Ascalon, a former pupil of Philo, in addition to
rhetoric with Apollonius Molon in Rhodes. His works include, beside speeches,
books on rhetoric and philosophy. The significance of these books lies not only in
the proximity of their author to the period under discussion, but also in their
author’s mastery of the Greek language and Hellenistic philosophical terminology.
He may occasionally be seen struggling to provide an adequate Latin translation for
a Greek philosophical term.
phers and rhetoricians and, in particular, the thought of Philo’s Academic colleague Charmadas” (p.
297, italics mine). Section (i) begins: “The nature of the primary sources for this philosophical on-
slaught against rhetoric. . . is such that it is difficult to determine the specific arguments and their
precise origination. . . it will suffice here to summarize the principal lines of criticism (italics mine).”
Brittain does indeed discuss the debate, with important and helpful remarks which I shall refer to
during the course of this study; but the fact that he approaches the subject as an adjunct to his re-
search on Philo places his conclusions in limbo until they are checked against the results of an en-
quiry into the debate per se. There is a more reliable alternative to discussing the “general context”
and the “principal lines of criticism”, and it is that alternative which is taken in this book.
15 The surveys will not consider bibliographies, the subjects of compositions, secondary litera-
ture and other items which may be found in any encyclopaedia.
16 Academic scepticism required the opposition of one plausible dogmatic argument to another
in order to justify withholding judgement. To this end, pupils would be encouraged to learn all they
could from the various dogmatic schools. Philo himself advised Cicero to study with Zeno of Sidon,
the head of the Epicurean school, which he did during his stay in Athens; cf. Cic. ND I. 59.
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1.3.2. Philodemus
Philodemus (110–40 B.C.E.) was a famous Epicurean philosopher, but his works
had been lost before the modern era. In Rome he had been greatly respected by the
youth, especially of the Piso family, one of whom provided him with a luxurious
villa in Herculaneum, complete with a large library. The eruption of Mt. Vesuvius
in 79 C.E. buried Herculaneum under a heavy layer of ash. Excavations begun in
the eighteenth century revealed parts of the town, but it was only in the following
century that papyri began to be recovered from the library. Identifying and recon-
structing the texts has been proceeding at a slow pace ever since. Among the
charred papyri were found a few scrolls containing the lost Philodemean text on
rhetoric (De Rhetorica, or Perì r vtorikṽß), most probably a part of a larger compo-
sition dealing with the various branches of philosophy. Although Philodemus was
an Epicurean philosopher, his writings indicate a tendency to popularize the philo-
sophical systems of all the schools, hence his great importance as a source on philo-
sophers whose own works have been lost.17 The main problem with Philodemus is
the woeful physical state of the material. During the century between the discovery
of the papyri and the establishment of satisfactory scientific procedures for preser-
ving them, they received further damage from unscientific attempts to open them,
various parts fell into private hands, and the fragments lost all semblance of order.18
There is no agreement today among scholars as to the proper sequence, and the
many lacunae may be supplemented in various ways in order to provide a minimally
readable text.19 Yet the significance of the text is twofold: firstly, the author lived
soon after the period under discussion; secondly, he wrote in Greek.20
17 Siegfried Sudhaus was the first to produce a critical edition of the rhetorical writings of Phi-
lodemus which had so far been brought to light. His edition comprised two volumes (1892, 1896)
and a supplement (1895). On this edition see also Hubbell (1920) 252–253; Reinhardt-Winterbottom
(2006) 395 n.1.
18 Cf. the praefatio of Sudhaus.
19 On the history of the discovery of this work, see Hubbell (1920) 247–253, whose attempted
reconstruction and reordering of the text of Sudhaus indicates the complexity and seriousness of the
problem, as does the 1977 edition with Italian translation by Francisca L. Auricchio.
20 Sextus Empiricus (see below) also wrote in Greek, but some three centuries after the Second
Period, while our authors closer to the period, apart from Philodemus, wrote in Latin. It is the com-
bination of his proximity and his writing in Greek which makes Philodemus so important.
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1.3.3. Quintilian
Quintilian (c.35–c.100 C.E.) was a Roman rhetorician. His great work Institutio
Oratoria never served as a handbook (ars, técnv) of rhetoric,21 but its great popular-
ity put all the other handbooks in the shade.22 This would indicate that the work ap-
pealed not only to those engaged in rhetoric but also to educators at large and litera-
ti in general.23 Quintilian was rightly considered a model educator. What matters to
us, however, is the value of Quintilian as a source for his predecessors. Fortunately
for us, Quintilian was not an original thinker but a teacher concerned with transmit-
ting the ideas of others. This does not mean that he is orderly in his presentation. He
began writing the Institutio after he had already retired from teaching, and during
the course of writing he lost both his wife and his two sons. His field of expertise
was rhetoric per se. It seems that in metarhetoric he was mainly familiar with var-
ious summaries and prefatory sections of técnai which touched on arguments for
and against rhetoric.24 It is therefore not surprising that his metarhetorical writing is
not always methodical. Wherever possible, he prefers a Latin source to a Greek
one,25 even a Latin translation to a Greek original.26 With all his faults, Quintilian
is one of the most important sources for research; in fact, his very lack of organiza-
tion often facilitates the reconstruction of his sources.
One of the main problems with the text of Quintilian is the identification of its
target audience: the teacher or the pupil? There are undoubtedly subjects in the com-
position relating only to the teacher, such as the best method of teaching, metarheto-
ric, and corporal violence. On the other hand, there appear to be passages written
21 The reason is simple: pupils wanted a rule book with all the answers, while Quintilian repeat-
edly emphasized that rules were insufficient, and that one had to know when to be flexible (cf. II.
13. 1–2). This advice stems from Quintilian’s view of the perfect orator, a man educated from in-
fancy to be an orator. Speech would be natural for such a man, and it is clear that a speech delivered
exclusively according to strict rules would be unnatural.
22 Following Poggio’s discovery of a complete text of this work in the fifteenth century, it
quickly became the Renaissance authority on education in all its aspects; Cf. Kennedy (1994) 181.
The most comprehensive survey of Quintilian’s influence on later generations is that of Colson
(1924) xliii-lxxxix, summarized in Murphy (1965) xx-xxvi.
23 The first book of the composition is devoted to education, while the tenth book deals with La-
tin and Greek literature recommended for pupils.
24 Regarding the image of the orator, Cicero was undoubtedly his main source of inspiration.
His description of the ideal orator is identical to that of Cicero in De Oratore. Furthermore, under
the new Flavian regime, it was politic to adopt Ciceronian style in preference to that of Seneca who
was identified with the regime of Nero. On the criticism against this oratorical model whose time
had passed, see Winterbottom (1964).
25 Cf. esp. II. 16. 7. This tendency occasionally helps to explain parallels in Quintilian, and
Greek sources such as Sextus Empiricus.
26 Yet Quintilian certainly knew Greek; cf. I. 1. 12–14; Quintilian recommends teaching Greek
as the primary language in basic education.
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for the pupil, with subjects arranged just as they would be in handbooks on the study
of rhetoric per se. It has been claimed that the composition has parts aimed either at
the teacher or at the pupil.27 My own opinion is that the entire work is written for
the teacher, although the teaching material is to a large extent the same as the mate-
rial studied by pupils. The teacher must learn not only how to teach, but also what
to teach. Quintilian goes out of his way in the prooemium (23) to emphasize the ad-
dition of the ratio docendi (“teaching method”) in the requisite places.
In light of the unusual character of the composition, it is not surprising to find
that the secondary literature on Quintilian’s text is extremely selective.28 There is
very little secondary literature, for example, on the second book which is the main
part dealing with metarhetoric, especially sections 15–21.29 In fact, the only work
devoted to the second book is that of Reinhardt-Winterbottom (2006),30 and a few
words about this important commentary should be made here,31 so far as it is perti-
nent to the present study on the reconstruction of the charges against rhetoric. Quin-
tilian was not interested in reconstructing a metarhetorical debate and, having his
own ends in view, arranged his material as he saw fit.32 Reinhardt and Winterbot-
27 The first two books are clearly aimed at the teacher (cf. Kennedy (1994) 183), but there is
some question over books 3–11. Colson (1924) xxxviii claims that here the pupil is the intended
audience. Cf. Little (1951) II. 41, who divides the composition into four parts: one on education, a
guide to rhetoric, a guide to the informed reading of literature, and a guide to the ethical obligations
of the orator.
28 On this secondary literature cf. Kennedy (1994) 182 n.11 to which should be added Murphy
(1965), whose selectivity is particularly instructive. His work provides commentary and notes only
to the first book of Quintilian and the first ten chapters of the second book. The title of his book, On
the Early Education of the Citizen-Orator, provides an explanation for this limitation. In general,
the first one and a half books, the tenth, and the twelfth, have enjoyed special treatment because of
scholars’ interest in education (I), literary criticism (X) and the ideal citizen (XII). There are how-
ever, two books which provide a running commentary throughout the whole text. The first is the cri-
tical edition of Spalding (1798) comprising six volumes including an index. This great work pro-
vides the reader with a text, a critical apparatus, a source apparatus, and notes (in Latin, of course)
which do not, however, stray far from linguistic matters and references to additional sources. This
commentary has been of much assistance on technical issues, but it does not provide the sort of dis-
cussion on particular subjects which is expected of a modern commentary. The second running com-
mentary is that of Cousin (1975–80), a critical edition of the whole text of Quintilian with a French
translation and extensive notes which Kennedy (ibid) says are “to be used with caution”.
29 There are other metarhetorical sections throughout the composition, especially in the intro-
ductions to the various books; cf., e. g., the introduction to the third book (§§1–4) which provides a
historical survey of the origins of técnai. The division into books is by Quintilian himself (cf. the
proeomium, 21–22); the division into sections is the work of modern editors.
30 Apart from the running commentaries on the whole text of the Institutio such as those of Cou-
sin and Spalding (see n.28 above).
31 I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the authors who were kind enough to send
me a typescript of their book prior to its publication. I have made much use of their comments, as
the reader will be able to judge from the following pages.
32 See pp.146–150; 176–179 below.
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tom’s commentary on Book II naturally follows the course of the text and attempts
to elucidate the motives, intentions and sources of Quintilian. A reconstruction of
the metarhetorical debate, however, requires a reorganization of relevant material,
be they arguments, parts of arguments, or incidental comments, only taking into ac-
count Quintilian’s purposes insofar as they may have affected his presentation of
the relevant material. The commentary was not intended to reconstruct the metarhe-
torical debate, but even on this subject it has been helpful at many places, as may be
seen later on.33
1.3.4. Sextus Empiricus
Sextus Empiricus (late second/early third centuries C.E.) is something of an enig-
ma. Even his name is debatable. From the little that is known about him, it seems
that he was a doctor and a Pyrrhonean Sceptic.34 The term “Sceptic”, however, de-
veloped several meanings over the years. It originally meant simply “enquirer”, but
later came to be associated with philosophers who opposed dogmatism.35
In the second book of Adversus Mathematicos,36 Sextus Empiricus attacks ora-
tors and rhetoricians. The text contains a collection of arguments against rhetoric,
and this fact alone makes Sextus one of our most valuable sources. There are, how-
ever, not a few problems to resolve, such as the attitude of the author to his material.
Some scholars regard Sextus as a mere collator of arguments, which, if true, would
permit an examination of the arguments without a consideration of the context and
the author. Further examination reveals a collator who, unfortunately for us, can
think. His imprint is on the arguments which he manipulates for his own purposes.37
33 See also §2.4.5 below.
34 For a discussion, see House (1980).
35 Dogmatism came to refer to any system in which positive opinions were held. In the Helle-
nistic philosophical schools, a dogma was an impression which had been assented to as reflecting a
true state of affairs. Stoics asserted that the wise man would assent only to those impressions which
really did reflect true states of affairs. Their fiercest critics, the Academic Sceptics, claimed that one
could not distinguish between an impression reflecting a true state of affairs and one which did not,
so that the wise course of action was never to assent to any impression as true. Pyrrhonian Sceptics
took the argument one step further, claiming that impressions never reflected a true state of affairs.
36 The works of Sextus Empiricus comprise three groups: 1. a summary of Pyrrhonean philoso-
phy; 2. (often appended to the third group) a critique against the dogmatic philosophers: a book each
against the logicians, physicists, and the ethicists (following the Stoic division of philosophy into
the interrelated branches of logic, physics and ethics); 3. a critique against the learned (traditionally
called Against the Professors, Adversus Mathematicos), of which the second book is against the ora-
tors, one of the most important texts for our study. On the works and the aims of Sextus Empiricus,
see Sluiter (2000).
37 Even had Sextus been a mere copier of his sources, these would still have to be recognized as
summaries and summaries of summaries of the original arguments. The originality of Sextus merely
adds yet another layer of complexity.
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It is also worth noting that while there are commentaries on other works of Sextus,
there is not even one on the book against the orators. The present study, insofar as it
touches upon Sextus, may be regarded as a contribution towards such a commen-
tary.
1.3.5. The Prolegomena Literature
The prolegomena or introductory handbooks38 to rhetoric occasionally contain me-
tarhetorical discussions, as is the nature of introductions. It is most likely that tea-
chers of rhetoric had already been introducing their courses with a little information
on rhetoric itself, from which the written prolegómena developed. Our first known
example of such a written introduction is the first chapter of Aristotle’s Rhetorica,
dealing with the techne itself, its relationship with other technai (especially dialectic
and politics), its advantages and disadvantages.39 Another outstanding example is
Quintilian, II. ch.15–21, where the author explains to the teacher how to answer a
potential pupil with doubts about signing up. The youth is likely to ask about the ne-
cessity of this techne, and may request answers to criticism of rhetoric which he has
heard elsewhere; he may even ask the simplest question: “What is this techne?”
Such useful information would have become an integral part of any teacher’s intro-
duction to a course on rhetoric.
Aristotle and Quintilian notwithstanding, the term prolegómena is reserved in
scholarly research for the introductions prefaced to commentaries on rhetorical
works, especially those of Hermogenes. These commentaries with their introduc-
tions were widespread in the fourth and fifth centuries C.E. and their popularity
continued throughout the Byzantine period. The text to be commented upon is di-
vided into small extracts a line or so in length, and each is followed by comments
and elucidations of varying length, sometimes of several pages. This, the body of
the commentary, is of less interest to us, since it is for the most part on rhetoric per
se. We are more concerned with the introductions. From the Rhetores Graeci,40
Hugo Rabe located thirty-three such introductions which he re-edited and provided
with a critical apparatus and source apparatus.41 Common to all of them is a Neopla-
tonic background, which has its advantages and disadvantages. The Neoplatonists,
at least so far as concerns rhetoric, made no innovations; but attempted to synthesize
38 For a survey of this literature, see Kennedy (1994) 217–224; Reinhardt & Winterbottom
(2006) 396 comment: “We shall cite evidence from the prolegomena for comparison, but do not
suggest that they reflect the common source of Sextus and Q[uintilian] closely.”
39 On this chapter and its special importance in Aristotle’s Rhetorica see Schütrumpf (1990).
40 An immense collection of rhetorical works of various types and from various periods, edited
by Walz, 1832–36 (rep. 1968).
41 For an extensive critical survey of the structure and sources of this collection, see Wilcox
(1942); id. (1943).
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the material of their predecessors, especially Plato and Aristotle who were consid-
ered authoritative (if not always followed on every point). They wrote mainly com-
mentaries on previous works, without innovating, and hence their great value to us
as a source. They preserve very many details which would otherwise have been lost
to us.42 At the same time, some of the theories presented seem to have been fig-
ments of the Neoplatonic imagination. Certainly these teachers are not to be judged
by the standards of scientific truth, since they were only concerned here with the or-
derly exposition of rhetoric and its place within the larger context of education in
general.43
The main value in the introductions from our point of view is that they offer us
the opportunity to reconstruct criticisms launched against rhetoric. It is a well-
known phenomenon that criticism is sometimes dealt with by incorporating re-
sponses to it into the theory. For an example from the ancient world, in the Hippo-
cratic treatise On art44 there is a definition of medicine as that art which can heal,
but not in all cases. This suggests that an original claim that a doctor simply heals
was modified following objections that a doctor does not always heal; the objection
was incorporated into the definition of medicine. The phenomenon is also to be
found in the prolegomena. Sometimes metarhetorical definitions or theories are
found together with reservations, often in a way which does not affect the original
definition.45 At other times, the reservation has been better integrated into the text,
but a careful examination can still uncover it, especially by comparison with similar,
earlier, discussions in which such additions do not appear (such as Sextus Empiricus
or Philodemus). In such cases, it is sometimes possible to date the criticism and
even trace it to its source.46
42 It is in the nature of the reworking of material in the ancient world that many details could
survive the passage of four or five centuries from one work to another (with or without scribal errors
creeping in). In any case, the Neoplatonists also had direct access to Hellenistic literature and to la-
ter works which had had direct access to Hellenistic literature.
43 The standard number of main subjects (usually ten) or the division of every genus into three
clearly obliged the authors of some of the introductions to take extreme measures to make the mate-
rial fit. An example of a late invention, developed in several theories to be found in the introduc-
tions, is that Phalaris was the originator of rhetoric; the inventor must have known that there was a
link between Sicily and the origins of rhetoric.
44 De Arte discusses the techne of medicine. It appears to be sophistic in origin. For further in-
formation, see Gomperz (1910).
45 The reservation may, for example, be inserted into the Greek formulation as a genitive abso-
lute without affecting the rest of the sentence.
46 In this survey I have not touched on Lucian’s De Parasito, a composition which does not deal
with rhetoric at all. It is a satire pretending to prove that parasitikv́ is an art; but Radermacher (see
§2.4.1 below) proved that this work was based on or made extensive use of arguments and lines of
thought originating in the debate over rhetoric centuries before. The significant contribution made
by the Lucian’s satire will be discernible throughout the course of this study.
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2. The Background to the Debate
2.1. Preliminary Considerations
In order to reconstruct and understand the various arguments for and against rhetoric
in the Hellenistic period, they must be placed, so far as is possible, in their historical
context. There are two main aspects to this context. Firstly, the position of the philo-
sophical schools towards rhetoric, and secondly the more material historical back-
ground to the debate. Both aspects taken together provide the context with which
the various arguments can be put in proper historical perspective, even sometimes
allowing the identification of individual advocates or opponents, or at least of a cer-
tain school, and, ultimately, permitting us to reconstruct the arguments themselves.
Our starting point will be Cicero, De Oratore I. 46:
multi erant praeterea clari in philosophia et nobiles, a quibus omnibus
una paene voce repelli oratorem a gubernaculis civitatum, excludi ab
omni doctrina rerumque maiorum scientia, ac tantum in iudicia et con-
tiunculas tamquam in aliquod pistrinum detrudi et compingi videbam.
This testimonium indicates that around1 the middle of the second century B.C.E.
there was a general philosophical movement against rhetoric and the schools of
rhetoric.2 This movement, its origins, motives and the contribution of each school to
it form the subject of the present study.
The schools of rhetoric were a recent phenomenon which requires a brief expla-
nation. Rhetoric had developed since Plato’s attacks on it in his dialogues, espe-
cially the Gorgias, to become a permanent presence, albeit an unwelcome one to
some in the Hellenistic period, a time of considerable change following the con-
quests of Alexander the Great. Entrance to Greek society and a higher standard of
living for the residents of the newly conquered lands, throughout which rose many
Hellenistic cities and monarchies, was acquired through Greek culture, and particu-
1 The dating is deliberately vague. At this point we are not entering the complexities of the case,
but it is worth anticipating briefly here that there seem to have been two stages in the opposition to
rhetoric: the first was around 150 B.C.E. and the second towards the end of that century (see also
p.14 n.8 above). The hypothesis will be proved throughout the analysis of the various problems sur-
rounding the debate, including a thorough analysis of the present testimonium and others in the
course of this chapter.
2 The need for a distinction between rhetoric and the schools of rhetoric will become clearer
during the course of this work. See esp. §§2.2–2.3 below.
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larly the Greek language, and these in turn were to be acquired through rhetoric.
Hence the rise in popularity of schools of rhetoric.3 Rhetoric in the Classical period
was regarded as a means to political advancement and the winning of high office,
especially for the offspring of the ruling elite; in the Hellenistic period, rhetoric
came to be regarded by ordinary people as the means to acceptance in a polis, with-
out necessarily entertaining high political aspirations. Rhetoric in the Classical peri-
od was used by leaders to persuade the citizens; in the Hellenistic period, it was
used by the citizens to understand their leaders.4 Rhetoric now touched the very ci-
vil foundation of the polis. Its disadvantage – its exclusion from matters of state –
came to be its advantage as an essential tool of Hellenization. Rhetoric was no long-
er a luxury but a necessity, no longer of the few but of the many. It became the
goose that laid very many golden eggs, a fact that should not be lost sight of,5 even,
or especially, when we are considering the philosophical arguments against rhetoric.
Economic considerations may well have been the only motivation, or the main moti-
vation, for the philosophical attacks.6
Both rhetoric and philosophy have pretensions to being educational. The connec-
tion between rhetoric and education is more than understandable; it is a clear ex-
pression of the term paideia. Philosophy (Socratic-Platonic) was already struggling
with rhetoric (the sophistic) in the Classical period, but there is an essential differ-
ence between that debate and the one which broke out in the second century, and
this difference is connected of course with Rome.
Greek affairs in the second century B.C.E., whether political or cultural, were
under the shadow of Rome. The rising power in the west was being inexorably
drawn into matters to its east. Rome’s ties with the Greek world were well estab-
lished, going back to the fifth century, at least, according to certain traditions. Ties,
however, do not necessarily entail influence. Indications of a cultural influence on
the Roman world, may be discerned from around the beginning of the third century,
3 The Greek settlers in these lands always availed themselves of teachers of rhetoric for the edu-
cation of their children.
4 Cf. Kennedy (1994) 81–84.
5 Sudhaus in his preface to the supplement of 1895 (p.18 n.17 above) linked the debate between
rhetoric and philosophy to the education of the youth (p.xxvi), but made no mention at all of
the economic aspect. One is left with the impression that all the participants in the debate were ide-
alists.
6 The first to suggest this cause, accepted to some extent by most scholars today, was von Arnim
(1898). He claimed that the rise of technical rhetoric, esp. the publication of Rhetorica ad Herma-
goram by the second century B.C.E. rhetorician Hermagoras of Temnos, led to the outbreak of hos-
tilities when the philosophers began to realize that the Roman elite (see immediately below in the
text) were preferring to send their sons to study with the rhetoricians. The financial motive is also
raised by Barnes (1986) 8, although he emphasizes written rhetoric and the “sophistic” rhetoric of
some of the Epicureans. On the other side, Brittain (2001) 301–310 emphasizes the philosophical as-
pect of the debate, at least with regard to Charmadas. This problem also has a bearing on the dating
of the stages of the debate; cf. Barwick (1963) 51–56.
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reaching a peak at the end of the second century. During this time, Greek culture be-
came a major element in the higher education of Roman intellectuals. Among the
first Latin translations was that of the Odyssey by Livius Andronicus, a Greek cap-
tured in the first Punic war in Sicily.7 The new spirit of Greek culture had its Roman
proponents, such as the conquerors Titus Flamininus and Scipio in the second cen-
tury B.C.E.,8 but it also had its adversaries, the most outstanding of whom was Cato
the Censor. This representative of the Roman conservative faction took every op-
portunity to condemn anything tainted by the Greeks,9 but despite his opposition
was himself quite influenced by Greek culture.10 Cato’s death in 149 B.C.E. may
have saved him from witnessing the peak of Greek influence in Rome, but by then
he had been exposed to it for decades.
Greek culture is a term covering a wide range of subjects, among them philoso-
phy and rhetoric, all of which were vainly opposed by the Roman conservative ele-
ment.11 Roman interest caused not only Greek intellectuals to come to Rome, but
also rich Roman youths to visit the Greek speaking world. It was only natural that
the various Greek schools would begin to compete for these potential students, espe-
cially the schools of philosophy and rhetoric, the self-proclaimed purveyors of what
we would call higher education. Since Roman inclination was towards practice
rather than theory, the majority of students preferred rhetoric to philosophy. By the
7 The exact date of the translation of the Odyssey is unknown, but Livius Andronicus was al-
ready producing comedies and tragedies on the stage in 240 B.C.E.
8 The so-called “Scipionic Circle”, cultivated men patronized by Scipio, included many Greek
intellectuals.
9 Cato dedicated a work to his son (see next note), of which two sentences on rhetoric have sur-
vived. The first defines the orator: vir bonus dicendi peritus (Quintilian, XII. 1. 1; Seneca, Contro-
versiae I. pr. 10); the second gives advice: rem tene, verba sequentur (Julius Victor in Rhetores Lati-
ni Minores, 374 [ed. Halm]). The polemical tone of these sentences is unmistakable, and the target
is undoubtedly Greek rhetoric. The question whether a Greek source lies behind the first sentence is
discussed by Sohlberg (1972) 261–262. He reaches the conclusion apparently already reached by
Pohlenz and Radermacher (ibid. nn. 15–16) that the word bonus in the sentence reflects the Roman
ideal of the gute Bürger. He contrasts this meaning with the morally Good (sittlich Gut) which ap-
pears in the Greek source of this sentence, Diogenes of Babylon (second century B.C.E.), followed
by Cicero, Quintilian and others. In my opinion, however, the Stoic morally good man is not con-
trary to Cato’s politically good man, and Cato may in fact be siding with the philosophers against
rhetoric as espoused by Greek rhetoricians. For a recent discussion of the problem, see Reinhardt &
Winterbottom (2006) xlvi-l, who essentially accept the opinion of Sohlberg with a few reservations.
10 In his composition dedicated to his son Marcus, Libri ad Marcum filium, Thucydidean and
Demosthenean influences are clearly discernible, as was demonstrated long ago by Mommsen (see
Wilkins (1895) I. 50). Cato visited Athens in 191 and may well have met Diogenes of Babylon and
other intellectuals. On Cato’s relationship with Greek culture cf. also Plutarch, Cato 2. 4.
11 In 161 B.C.E., an edict was issued against the philosophers (Suetonius, De Rhetorica I), but
seems not to have been executed. After this time, Greek culture flourished with only sporadic voices
raised ineffectually in protest, such as that of Cato against the speeches of the three visiting Greek
philosophers in 155 B.C.E. (cf. Gellius, NA VI. 14. 8; Pliny, HN 7. 112; Plutarch, Cato 22. 4).
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middle of the second century B.C.E. the philosophers set out to fight for their share
of the Roman market.12
The schools of philosophy and rhetoric were not entirely at odds with each other.
Most of the leading philosophers were famous for their rhetorical skills.13 Schools
of philosophy taught rhetoric as an integral part of philosophy.14 Educated men
were deemed to have some grasp of rhetoric, and schools of philosophy supplied the
demand.15 This is particularly true of Stoic schools, but Peripatetics also embraced
rhetoric. Even the Academics may have accepted it. Only the Epicureans, opponents
of “logic” in general, seem to have rejected rhetoric. Whether the philosophical
schools teaching rhetoric had a theoretical grounding for the de facto acceptance of
rhetoric in their systems is a question which will be addressed later.
If most of the schools incorporated rhetoric into their philosophical systems, it
would appear at first sight that they were not averse to rhetoric, indeed, regarded it
favourably. If this were the case, on what grounds could the schools of philosophy
attack the schools of rhetoric? Furthermore, since the debate appears to have boiled
down to the question of the status of rhetoric as an art, if the philosophers claimed
that rhetoric was not an art and was consequently unteachable, how could they justi-
fy their own teaching of it? A clearer picture will gradually emerge during the
course of this study, but some outlines may already be given.
The existence of a debate between the philosophers and the rhetoricians is unde-
niable, but interestingly most of the testimonia actually refer to a debate between
the various philosophical schools. The inescapable conclusion is that rhetoric was a
point of contention not only between the schools of philosophy and of rhetoric, but
also between the schools of philosophy themselves. It may also be tentatively con-
12 This might explain the 150 years since the death of Aristotle during which time no metarhe-
torical debate seems to have taken place (see pp.13–14 above). The schools of rhetoric had been on
the wane, and the schools of philosophy had incorporated rhetoric into their teaching. Hence the
schools of philosophy had had no pressing reason during this time to launch an attack on the schools
of rhetoric.
13 This is especially true of Carneades, the second century head of the Academic school (Ci-
cero, De Oratore I. 45), and of a slightly earlier Stoic, Chrysippus, whose rhetorical skill was said to
be because of his refusal to learn rhetoric (ibid., 50); Carneades was one of the three philosophers
(along with the Peripatetic Critolaus and the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon) who gained fame (or no-
toriety) on their embassy to Rome due to the speeches they gave (ibid. II. 155), with some regarding
them as representing the three kinds of speaking (tria genera dicendi), just like the three Homeric
parallels (Gellius, NA VI. 14).
14 See the survey of schools of philosophy, §2.2 below.
15 On the teaching of rhetoric in schools of philosophy, see Quintilian, XII. 2. 25, and in Peripa-
tetic and Stoic schools in particular, ibid., III. 1. 15. On the Academy and rhetoric, Cicero claims
that he owed more to the Academy than to the schools of rhetoric (Quintilian, XII. 2. 23; Cicero,
Orator 12). Quintilian (ibid., 22) attributes to the great Athenian orators, Pericles and Demosthenes,
teachers of philosophy, Anaxagoras and Plato respectively. Plutarch attempted the same in his bio-
graphies, and such attributions must have appeared in his sources; cf. Plutarch, Pericles 4. 1–6 (ed.
Ziegler); id., Demosthenes 5. 7; id., Themistocles 2. 5–6.
Preliminary Considerations 27
ISBN Print: 9783525252949 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647252940
© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen
cluded that each debate mutually influenced the other, making this debate somewhat
more complex than others of the same period.
For the sake of clarity, I shall call the debate among the philosophers themselves
internal, the one between them and the rhetoricians external, and the phenomenon
as a whole I shall refer to as the “double debate”. On this subject, one question to
consider is which testimonia pertain to the internal debate and which to the external.
Another is how these testimonia relate to each other. Yet another is who produce
which arguments against whom. All these questions will be discussed in due course.
2.2. The Philosophical Schools and Rhetoric
The sorry state of our evidence is one of the main reasons for the difficulties we face
in reconstructing the arguments against rhetoric raised in the Hellenistic period.
Most of our testimonia derive from later sources, especially Quintilian, Sextus Em-
piricus and Philodemus whose own sources were not always acknowledged or iden-
tified, sometimes because the name was not known even to them, or because it was
assumed that the reader already knew who was being referred to.16 However, in
some cases, names do appear along with arguments or various opinions on rhetoric,
while in other cases, if not an individual then at least a school may be identified by
the way an argument is formulated.17 This requires an acquaintance with each
school’s attitutde towards rhetoric.18 We shall attempt to trace not only the status of
rhetoric in the various schools, but also its connections with other parts of the sys-
tem, so far as this is relevant to understanding the place of rhetoric in each school.
This philosophical survey19 will be followed by a description of the historical and
material side of the debate. Both surveys are required in order to put the arguments
in proper perspective.
16 It was not considered obligatory to name one’s sources as it is today. A question worth rais-
ing is why they did name who they did when they did.
17 With the proviso that the style and terminology of one’s opponent was occasionally used for
greater effect; this and other similar reservations must be taken into account when establishing the
identity of the source of an argument.
18 For other surveys on this subject, see Barnes (1986) 2–4 and Kennedy (1957) 29–31. Barnes’
survey is brief but factual, while Kennedy’s is more detailed but concentrates on the claim that rhet-
ors were already to be found in Homer. Kennedy’s survey does uncover some of the sources for The
Exclusivity of Teaching Argument, on which see pp.72–73 below.
19 The survey by no means exhausts the problem of rhetoric in the various systems. It is in-
tended primarily to facilitate our entry into the maze of various arguments. Various issues men-
tioned will be treated more fully in later chapters, and a more comprehensive picture should emerge
only towards the end of the book.
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Of the four main Hellenistic schools, the Epicurean, Peripatetic and Stoic were
dogmatic, while the Academic school in this period was sceptical, suspending jud-
gement on all matters.20 We shall begin with the dogmatic schools.
2.2.1. The Epicureans
We begin with the Epicureans, not because they have anything of value to say about
rhetoric, but precisely the opposite.21 As Quintilian observes (XII. 2. 24): nam in
primis nos Epicurus a se ipse dimittit, qui fugere omnem disciplinam navigatione
quam velocissima iubet.22 It would not be a mistake to understand rhetoric to be one
of the disciplines which Epicurus advises fleeing from. In De Oratore III. 61, Cras-
sus surveys the discidium linguae atque cordis. Turning to the schools, ex illis au-
tem quae remanent, he begins with the Epicureans and gives them short shrift. They
have nothing serious to say on the subject of rhetoric, and they claim that the wise
man should refrain from politics. This statement suffices to remove them from the
discussion in De Oratore.
It should be noted, however, that some Epicureans did have a favourable view of
rhetoric. The Epicureans, Zeno of Sidon and Philodemus, both claimed that the epi-
deictic part could constitute an art, and this they called “sophistic rhetoric”, actually
to do with defined and established rules of literary style.23
2.2.2. The Peripatetics
The Peripatetics may be divided into two groups, the first including Aristotle and
Theophrastus, the second all the rest. Aristotle’s rhetorical writings, just like his
other works which are known to us today, disappeared for a couple of centuries until
they were rediscovered and sent to Rome in the 90’s B.C.E. where they were pub-
lished by a certain Andronicus. The same happened to Theophrastus’ discussions on
20 On the distinction between dogmatic and sceptical, see p.21 and n.35 above.
21 Surveys of issues in the Hellenistic schools frequently began with the view of the Epicureans
since it was usually the easiest to describe and to refute; thus the first and shortest of the speeches in
Cicero’s De Natura Deorum (I. 18) is the one Velleius supplies on the Epicurean position, and again
in Cicero’s De Finibus (I. 13) it is the Epicurean position which is first presented, this time by
Torquatus; and Crassus in Cicero’s De Oratore begins with the Epicureans.
22 Cf. also II. 17. 15. For the Greek source, cf. Diogenes Laertius, X. 6. On the attitude of Epi-
curus towards sciences, cf. also Cicero, De Finibus I. 26. For recent bibliography, see Reinhardt &
Winterbottom (2006) 326.
23 This is beyond the scope of the present work; for a survey of this subject, see Hubbell (1920)
250–251.
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rhetoric.24 Both these philosophers concentrated primarily on rhetoric per se, and
less on metarhetoric, and this is especially the case with Theophrastus.25 Aristotle’s
Rhetorica discusses metarhetorical issues mainly in the first chapters.26 Only Aris-
totle’s lost work Gryllus appears to have been mainly metarhetorical, discussing the
question whether rhetoric is an art. It seems that even Quintilian had no first-hand
familiarity with this text.27
After Theophrastus, few Peripatetics down to the first century B.C.E. seem to
have engaged in rhetoric. Our testimonia mention only Lyco, Eudemus and Deme-
trius. They too were mainly concerned with rhetoric per se.28 The outstanding ex-
ception is Critolaus,29 the Peripatetic scholarch around the middle of the second
century. He is mentioned in all our sources as a strong opponent of rhetoric,30 and
one gains the impression that he was one of the leaders of the philosophical attack
against rhetoric as an art.31 The question immediately arises how a Peripatetic could
oppose rhetoric.
The question could be answered in a number of ways. The first, already hinted at,
is based on the fact that Critolaus was unaware of the rhetorical tradition of Aristotle
and Theophrastus. This reply, however, is only partial, since Aristotle’s Gryllus was
24 Cf. Strabo, XIII. 1. 54.
25 For a general survey of Theophrastean rhetoric, see Kennedy (1994) 84–87. The rhetorical
fragments of Theophrastus are in Fortenbaugh (1993) II. 508–559.
26 Cf. Cicero, De Oratore I. 43, according to which, the Peripatetics wrote more than any other
school on rhetorical matters: Peripatetici autem etiam haec ipsa, quae propria oratorum putas esse
adiumenta, atque ornamenta dicendi, ab se peti vincerent oportere: ac non solum meliora, sed etiam
multo plura Aristotelem Theophrastumque de his rebus, quam omnes dicendi magistros, scripsisse
ostenderent. The testimonium clearly refers to rhetoric per se. On the metarhetorical nature of the
first few chapters of Rhetorica, see Schütrumpf (1990) 99–116. Just how different these chapters are
from the rest of the work may be appreciated by the fact that these were the only chapters to be para-
phrased by Cope (1867), in accordance with his criterion for paraphrasing (p. xii.): “In some parts,
where the obscurity of the text or the especial importance and difficulty of the immediate subject
seemed to require it.”
27 See n.32 below.
28 See the testimonia in Wehrli (1944) IV. 34–37 (Demetrius); VI. 13–15 (Lyco); VIII. 20–21
(Eudemus); cf. also Kennedy (1994) 87–88.
29 And perhaps his pupil, Ariston, but this is somewhat problematic: see Brittain (2001) 308;
Reinhardt-Winterbottom (2006) 252–253.
30 See e.g., Cicero, De Oratore II. 160; Quintilian, II. 15. 23; Sextus Empiricus, Math. II. 12,
20; Philodemus, De Rhetorica II. 71, 97. Critolaus was not an ill-informed bigot, but actually well-
versed in rhetoric (Cicero, De Oratore II. 160). On Critolaus see also Reinhardt-Winterbottom
(ibid.) 252, 258, 325 and the note there on Quintilian, II. 17. 15, where they adduce Philodemus, II.
102 attributing to Critolaus pròß toùß r v́toraß filotimı́a; they regard this as an exceptional remark
which is difficult to square with Radermacher’s hypothesis that Critolaus was the source for the at-
tack on rhetoric (see next note). Philotimia, however, may express a negative sentiment such as
“competition” rather than a more positive sense such as “emulation”.
31 This is the hypothesis of Radermacher (see §2.4.1 below) and I shall be adopting it in this
study.
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known to him, a dialogue which seems to have had a positive conclusion regarding
rhetoric, even if it contained arguments for and against.32 In light of this, the true
reason must be found elsewhere. Cicero describes Critolaus as somewhat indepen-
dent of his Peripatetic roots.33 What survives of his works34 indicates that he was
very familiar with the Stoic system and applied some elements of it to his own phi-
losophy. If we add to this the problem common to all the schools of philosophy, the
loss of students to the schools of rhetoric, then Critolaus’ opposition to rhetoric may
become more comprehensible. Critolaus and his doctrine, his sources and his attacks
on rhetoric will be discussed in more depth in the following chapters as each argu-
ment is dealt with in turn.
We turn now to another point which needs to be taken into consideration when
dealing with the Peripatetic attitude towards rhetoric. The close relations between
rhetoric and dialectic are well known. It should suffice to observe that lógoß and tò
légein are common to both, and that dialectic also serves the speaker’s aim to per-
suade, as a method which works through the intelligence rather than the emotions of
the audience. Furthermore, the part where the opponent’s arguments are refuted re-
quires a modicum of dialectic thinking. This is a point on which the Peripatetics
prided themselves, as may be seen from the testimonia of Cicero and Quintilian.35
32 The Gryllus is a dialogue dedicated to the memory of Xenophon’s son who was killed at the
battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C.E. The secondary title of the dialogue is On Rhetoric (Diogenes Laer-
tius, V. 22), from which it is already clear that the dialogue was metarhetorical. Our main source for
the Gryllus today is Quintilian, II. 17. 14; the dialogue seems to have included arguments and coun-
ter-arguments with a view to determining the nature of rhetoric (deducible from the phrase quaeren-
di gratia, or its Greek counterpart zvtv́sewß cárin). Cicero (De Oratore III. 80; Att. XIII. 19, 4) de-
scribes his own dialogue form as following the Aristotelian style (Aristotelius mos), which is that of
speeches for and against, with the opinion of the author, appearing in his own person, being pre-
sented last. Lossau (1974) 20 argues that Aristotle’s conclusion was in favour of rhetoric being an
art, and this is also the opinion of Hubbel (1920) 366. Only Kennedy (1957) 29–30 argues that Aris-
totle’s conclusion was negative, which he infers from the testimonium of Quintilian at face value.
Yet Quintilian does not seem to have been acquainted first hand with the dialogue (neither had Ci-
cero before him), and his source may have supplied him only with the dialogue’s arguments against
rhetoric.
33 Cic. De Finibus V. 14 ac tamen =ne? is quidem in patriis institutis manet (supplement by
Bremius), and cf. Quintilian, II. 17. 2 sed cum iis (sc. oratoribus) philosophi et Stoici et Peripatetici
plerique consentiunt (sc. rhetoricen artem esse). The word plerique pertains only to the Peripatetics,
thus “the philosophers, both the Stoics and most of the Peripatetics agree [that rhetoric is an art]” as
Barnes (1986) 2 translates it (my italics); cf. too Reinhardt-Winterbottom (2006) 308. “Most of the
Peripatetics” because Critolaus was notoriously of the opposite opinion. Wehrli claims that Crito-
laus’ pupil, Ariston, was also opposed to rhetoric, but Reihardt-Winterbottom (ibid.) 252 are more
circumspect: “Ariston’s attitude to rhetoric was an ambiguous one, i. e. less straightforwardly hostile
than that of his teacher Critolaus.” I shall argue that the testimonia indicate that his position was
clearly positive (see pp.167–168 below).
34 Wehrli (1944) X. 49–58.
35 Quintilian, XII. 2. 25; Cicero, Tusc. II. 9. The latter refers to the Peripatetic and Academic
custom (consuetudo) of arguing for and against on every issue (de omnibus rebus in contrarias
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Aristotle himself makes the mutual connection between dialectic and rhetoric expli-
cit in the first sentence of his Rhetorica, where rhetoric is said to be the
a ntı́strofoß of dialectic.
Rhetorical exercise trained the students to discover arguments for and against
every subject, whether a specific case, a hypothesis, or a general subject, a thesis. It
is easy to see how a thesis would be a factor common to rhetoric and philosophy
alike. One possible thesis could be the assertion that rhetoric is an art, and this was
indeed the thesis of Aristotle’s Gryllus. To the extent, then, that the Peripatetics in-
dulged in arguing for and against everything, they engaged in rhetoric.
2.2.3. The Stoics
The Stoics taught both dialectic and rhetoric.36 Their teaching of the subjects per se
would have differed little from that of other teachers of these subjects.37 Yet the
Stoics differed from others in their view of the status of rhetoric because of its inte-
gration into the Stoic system. The Stoics regarded political involvement as one of
the activities of the wise man. That is, his wisdom was expressed, among other
things, in politics. Since rhetoric was an essential implement for the politician, it
also became a positive aspect of the wise man’s behaviour,38 indeed, nothing less
than a virtus (a retv́).39 This is an unusually extreme position, and needs to be un-
derstood in the context of an additional aspect of the Stoic sage and the Stoic atti-
tude towards a retaı́.
partes disserendi). The structure of the sentence allows us to understand that the two schools are gi-
ven different reasons for this dialectical behaviour. For the Academics it is epistemological, namely,
because aliter non posset quid in quaque re veri simile esset inveniri, while for the Peripatetics, it is
rhetorical, quod esset ea maxima dicendi exercitatio. Hence dialectic was employed at least in part
in rhetoric. Cicero notes that the first to use this method was Aristotle.
36 When Zeno presented philosophy as comprising the fields of logic, physics and ethics, his lo-
gic appears to have consisted purely of the two previously existing arts dealing with words, namely
dialectic and rhetoric. By the time of Chrysippus, logic was the branch dealing with the connection
between logos as language and logos as the creative cosmic force, and dialectic had come to the
fore. In the middle of the second century B.C.E., Antipater of Tarsus seems to have regarded philo-
sophy as the practice of the ideal wise man, with the fields of philosophy expressing the various
spheres of behaviour of this Stoic sage. He regarded rhetoric as an aspect of dialectic, which was it-
self an aspect of logic; see further Ludlam (1997) 409–413.
37 Cf. SVF II. fr. 288–298, esp. 288 where we learn that Cleanthes and Chrysippus wrote hand-
books on rhetoric and taught rhetoric per se. A harsh opinion of their handbooks is to be found in
Cicero, De Finibus IV. 7: quamquam scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes, Chrysippus etiam, sed
sic, ut, si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat.
38 For the Stoics’ contribution to the development of rhetoric per se, see Diogenes Laertius,
VII. 42; Quintilian, II. 15. 20.
39 Cf. e.g. Quintilian, II. ch. 20; Cicero, De Oratore III. 65; SVF II. fr. 117.
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A position common to all the Stoics is that all the a retaı́ have mutual depen-
dence (a ntakolouXı́a). It is impossible to have one a retv́ without the others; con-
versely, to lack one is to lack all.40 The Stoic sage by definition possessed all vir-
tues, including rhetoric.41 The unavoidable conclusion was that only the Stoic sage
could be – and was – an orator, while an orator would necessarily be a Stoic sage.42
Thus far the positive attitude of the Stoics towards rhetoric. The extreme, uncom-
promising Stoic position, however, demands a high price. Stoic rhetoric is alien to
the common people, although they are naturally the target audience of the orator.43
The reason lies in the nature of the Stoic sage. Among other things, the Stoic sage
has complete control over his emotions, which, if left unchecked, would adversely
affect his good thinking and good behaviour.44 Emotions are, however, one of the
most effective means of persuasion at the disposal of the orator; Aristotle actually
devoted a considerable part of his Rhetorica to what he called tò páXoß. Thus the
self-contained Stoic sage, deprived of the emotional juice, is left with dry words that
fall somewhat flat on the ears of the mob.45 He is unconcerned by this, since his
aim, in his capacity as an orator, is to persuade simply by teaching the truth.46 The
ancients were well aware of this position and criticized the Stoics heavily for their
unrhetorical rhetoric.
40 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, VII. 125 (= SVF III. pp. 72–73 fr. 295); Cicero, De Oratore I. 83.
41 Cicero, De Oratore III. 65 (= SVF II. fr. 291); ibid. III. 55; Quintilian, II. 15. 20.
42 See Cicero, De Oratore I. 83. The Stoic orator would necessarily be good (cf. esp. Quintilian,
XII. 1. 3). Thus the Stoics neatly avoided one of the criticisms launched against rhetoric, namely the
misbehaviour of orators. The Stoics could argue that such orators were, strictly speaking, not orators
at all, since by definition a morally bad person cannot be an orator at all. This Stoic position seems
to be the butt of a joke in Lucian, De Parasito 54, where the parasite, free from all worries and
cares, is furthermore claimed to be not even susceptible to hunger, since, it is argued, that which
lacks food is not a parasite (see also ibid. 56).
43 See Cicero, De Finibus IV. 7; Sextus Empiricus, Math. II. 53; cf. also Cicero, De Oratore I.
81–82 where Antonius has correctly identified the ideal speaker portrayed by Crassus with the Stoic
sage/speaker. In the following section (83), the speech of the Stoic Mnesarchus is described: haec
erat spinosa quaedam et exilis oratio, longeque a nostris sensibus abhorrebat. This might be the
best place to note that what Spengel calls the “scholastic rhetorical school” was heavily influenced
by the Stoics. The school, apparently originating in Pergamum, where there was significant Stoic in-
fluence, emphasized the methodological and logical aspect of rhetoric, whence its occupation al-
most entirely with inventio and its endless divisions. The outstanding proponent of this system was
Hermagoras of Temnos. The criticism of his composition for its impracticality in daily life (Quinti-
lian, III. 6. 21) may therefore be applied to the Stoics as well.
44 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 9. 1–3; id. De Ira II. 3–4.
45 The Stoics emphasize simple and direct discourse. Even “ornamentation” is interpreted by
Chrysippus as “simplicity of words” (Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1047A–B).
46 Quintilian, V. 1. 1: fuerunt et clari quidem auctores, quibus solum videretur oratoris officium
docere. That the Stoics are intended is clear from the context (e.g., adfectus is subsequently identi-
fied with vitium and animi perturbatio); cf. also ibid. IV. 5. 6.
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Another problem with the Stoic attitude towards rhetoric stems from the similar-
ity of rhetoric to dialectic. The sophists, Academics, and Peripatetics were all aware
of the proximity of the two (we have already seen the first sentence of Aristotle’s
Rhetorica), but the Stoics took the similarity to an extreme. Some of their defini-
tions of rhetoric and dialectic were almost identical, with rhetoric being the knowl-
edge/understanding of speaking well (= epistv́mv toũ eu légein),47 and dialectic the
knowledge/understanding of speaking correctly (epistv́mv toũ o rXw̃ß légein).48 It
seems that the Stoics themselves did not always make the distinction clear.49 The
founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium, is said to have distinguished between rhetoric
and dialectic only according to their external form: long unbroken speech as op-
posed to broken speech in the form of question and answer.50
Despite the many confusions in the testimonia, it is clear that the Stoics formally
granted rhetoric the status of an art, while in practice they neutralized it, so far as
the usual target audience for rhetoric was concerned. The Stoic strict criterion of
knowledge, that of the Stoic sage,51 was naturally applied to rhetoric, or rather to
the rhetor. This sort of rhetoric would have been inapplicable in the setting of a peo-
47 Quintilian, II. 15. 34, and see next note.
48 The distinction is clearly stated in Diogenes Laertius, VII. 42, but somewhat blurred in Quin-
tilian, II. 15. 34: huic eius substantiae =Cleanthis? maxime conveniet finitio “rhetoricen esse bene
dicendi scientiam”. nam et orationis omnes virtutes semel conplectitur et protinus etiam mores ora-
toris, cum bene dicere non possit nisi bonus. idem valet Chrysippi finis ille ductus a Cleanthe,
“scientia recte dicendi”. Kiderlin’s supplement (see SVF I. fr. 491, critical apparatus on line 14) at-
tributes the “well” definition of rhetoric to Cleanthes, which seems to be correct considering the
mention of Cleanthes at the end of the testimonium. Whether Chrysippus really equated “well” with
“correctly” (thereby apparently removing the distinction between rhetoric and dialectic, if he used
“correctly” also in one of his definitions of dialectic) is a matter for debate. As Quintilian goes on to
say in the very next sentence, Chrysippus had many definitions of rhetoric. The apparent difference
between Cleanthes and Chrysippus may have been inferred from a Chrysippean argument rather
than a simple statement. Diogenes Laertius, VII. 42 and Sextus Empiricus, Math. II. 6 attribute to
the Stoics in general the “well” definition of rhetoric. Spalding (1798) ad loc., makes the unfounded
claim that the Stoics in general used the “correctly” definition of rhetoric. As for dialectic, Stoics
are occasionally said to have used the “well” definition, but this may be the interpretation of the re-
porter: e.g., Alexander (CAG II. 2, p.1, 10 W) attributes the e pistv́mv toũ eu légein definition to
dialectic, but glosses eu légein as tà a lvXṽ kaì tà prosv́konta légein, suggesting that he carelessly
paraphrased “well” as “correctly”.
49 Cicero, Top. II. 6, presenting the distinction between the Stoics and Peripatetics on the matter
of ratio disserendi, observes that Aristotle treated the two arts comprising it, una inveniendi, altera
diiudicandi, equally, while the Stoics emphasized the second, which they of course called dialectic.
What is interesting is that the first they did not call rhetoric, but “topic” (topikv́).
50 Quintilian, II. 20. 7; Sextus Empiricus, Math. II. 7.
51 This strict criterion of knowledge, which is connected with the fantası́a katalvptikv́, is
opposed to what I shall call later the relaxed criterion of knowledge by which the rhetor is expected
to be acquainted with the subjects he speaks about, but without having the knowledge of an expert.
Aristotle advocated this second criterion, and found later supporters in Cicero and Quintilian. On
this subject, see Leeman-Pinkster (1981) 190–194.
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ple’s assembly or other such public gathering. The tension in Stoic rhetoric is well
exemplified by Crassus in Cicero’s De Oratore (III. 65), during his discussion of
discidium linguae atque cordis (beginning at III. 61). He praises the Stoa for holding
rhetoric in high esteem, being the only school which treats it as a virtue and knowl-
edge.52 Yet he cannot accept the Stoic model of the orator, since such a man is di-
vorced from daily discourse.
Crassus, we should remember, was not a philosopher but a Roman orator,53 and
as such, he scorned theoretical arguments about rhetoric.54 Greek philosophers had
no such qualms. It seems that the Stoic positive attitude towards rhetoric attracted
the ire of all other Greek schools of philosophy in the second century B.C.E. Yet,
unlike other issues where the Hellenistic schools attacked each other from purely
philosophical considerations, here in rhetoric, a practical motive also came into
play. It might well have seemed to the other philosophers that the Stoics on this
point were playing into the hands of the schools of rhetoric who were threatening
all of them.55 Here was the most prominent school of philosophy confirming that
rhetoric was indeed an art. The metarhetorical debate, therefore, was not only be-
tween the schools of philosophy and of rhetoric (the external debate), but between
the Stoics and the other schools of philosophy (the internal debate).56 The Stoics
were in a double bind, both attacking the schools of rhetoric, and defending their
own position against the attacks of the other schools of philosophy.57 These com-
ments are currently no more than speculations, but they will be borne out by the
source analyses in the following chapters.
52 Cf. also §55: est enim eloquentia una quaedam de summis virtutibus.
53 The Roman intellectuals and statesmen influenced by Stoic philosophy may have accepted
the Stoic treatment of rhetoric in theory, but in practice they rejected it.
54 Cf. Cicero, De Oratore I. 47; 102, where Crassus calls the Greeks indulging in such argu-
ments Graeculi.
55 The Stoics did participate in the general attack on the schools of rhetoric (Philodemus, I. 356;
II. 204); but on this point they were perceived to be letting the side down. On the Stoic defence of
their position, see pp.41–42 below.
56 The connection between the two debates will be demonstrated throughout this study as the
various arguments concerning rhetoric are uncovered and reconstructed.
57 This would explain why so much Stoic terminology is to be found in the metarhetorical de-
bate as a whole. Not only the Stoics used it, but also the Academics, who specialized in formulating
their attacks in terms used by their opponents, and others could have adopted similar tactics. Quinti-
lian and Sextus Empiricus use Stoic terminology and context in many of their references to the me-
tarhetorical debate. Even other sources such as Philodemus express this tendency, which may have
been one of the reasons why Sudhaus and Radermacher traced the text of Philodemus to a debate be-
tween the Peripatetic Critolaus and the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon; cf. Radermacher (1895) xvii;
even Lucian’s De Parasito, which Radermacher proved to reflect the metarhetorical debate (ibid.
xxiii-xxvi) is steeped in Stoic terminology.
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2.2.4. The Academics
The Academic school saw a number of changes of direction during the course of its
history (c.380–c.80 B.C.E.).58 The most significant change occurred when the third
century scholarch Arcesilaus decided that Plato’s teachings were essentially scepti-
cal rather than dogmatic, and henceforth the previously dogmatic (later known as
the “Old” or “Early”) Academy developed an increasingly sophisticated sceptical
philosophy.59 It is with this marked change in direction that the Academy finds re-
newed interest in rhetoric which last received significant Academic treatment in
Plato’s dialogues, especially the Gorgias. Arcesilaus and later Carneades and his
followers brought the study of rhetoric into the Academy, although it was not al-
ways called rhetoric.60 Arcesilaus instituted the practice of arguing both for and
against any position.61 This dialectic exercise would certainly have drawn the Aca-
demics into the practice of rhetoric; but would this be enough to justify attributing
the study of rhetoric to the Academics? Kennedy (1994) 146–147 argues that it is
not,62 claiming that the Academics study dialectic which, according to Cicero, is ne-
cessary for the acquisition of the art of rhetoric. It is Cicero, however, who writes
(Partitiones Oratoriae 139):
expositae sunt tibi omnes oratoriae partitiones, quae quidem e media
illa nostra Academia effloruerunt.
And a little later (ibid.):
. . . subtiliter disputandi et copiose dicendi ars.
Dialectic and rhetoric are treated as one art, and, so far as Cicero is concerned,
rhetoric flourished in the Academy.63
58 The last official Academic scholarch was Philo of Larissa, who died in Rome in the 80’s
B.C.E., while in Athens the last Academic exponent, Charmadas, was dead by 79 B.C.E.
59 See Glucker (1978) 98–107; 111 n.42; 345–346 on the various divisions – both ancient and
modern – of the life of the Academy into periods.
60 Cf. Cicero, De Oratore I. 45, where we learn that Crassus met Metrodorus of Scepsis, a pupil
of Carneades, in Asia around 110 B.C.E. At this point Crassus calls the man an Academic philoso-
pher, but at III. 75 he refers to him as a rhetor from the Academy. Metrodorus may have considered
himself a dialectician, but his practice may have been close enough to rhetoric for Cicero to consider
him a rhetor. Cf. also Brittain (2001) 316–319, 323 who attributes the teaching of rhetoric to Char-
madas as well.
61 Cicero, De Oratore III. 80.
62 This is also the opinion of Brittain (2001) 310–311 and n.28. For an opposing view, see
Barnes (1986) 16 n.14.
63 Brittain (2001) 323–234 and n.53 reaches a similar position, but through a consideration of
the aim of Carneadean dialectic, which, according to him, is the piXanón or “persuasive” which he
identifies with the aim of “Classical” rhetoric, peiXẃ (“persuasion”). Quite apart from this formal
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It is interesting, therefore, to find among the leaders of the movement against
rhetoric in the second century B.C.E. Academics, of whom the most prominent had
studied with Carneades.64 Cicero’s Crassus names several Academics active at the
time that he was in Athens, just before he describes the attacks of the philosophers
against the rhetoricians (De Oratore I. 45):
audivi enim summos homines, cum quaestor ex Macedonia venissem
Athenas, florente Academia,65 ut temporibus illis ferebatur, cum eam
Charmadas et Clitomachus et Aeschines obtinebant; erat etiam Metro-
dorus, qui cum illis una ipsum illum Carneadem diligentius audierat.66
There were two main reasons for the Academics to oppose rhetoric. The first was
the rise of the schools of rhetoric, a threat common to all the schools of philosophy.
The second reason was peculiar to the sceptical Academy, namely, the opposition to
accepting rhetoric as an art, which was akin to accepting a dogma.67 The sceptical
Academic position is well-known, and boiled down to the suspension of judgement,
a refusal to accept anything as true, but at the most, as something like the truth, or
as persuasive. They could present inconsistent positions, since none was considered
by them to be true, and we find that their attacks on rhetoric were also inconsistent,
taken from or inspired by any source, with the sole aim of obliging the recipients of
the attack to renounce their dogmatic positions and suspend judgement. Thus they
might use Peripatetic arguments against the Stoics, and Stoic arguments against the
Epicureans, or even the arguments of one Stoic against another Stoic, a particularly
effective strategy.68
demonstration of the connection between the Academics and rhetoric, it may also be noted that at
least Carneades and Charmadas were accomplished orators (Cicero, De Oratore I. 45, 85 respec-
tively). Furthermore, Cicero portrays Crassus in De Oratore as an Academic, and it is this character
who represents the ideal orator. The first and third books, in which Crassus is the main speaker,
clearly echo Plato’s Phaedrus. Although in the third book, Crassus examines the opinions of the riv-
al schools (62–68) and prefers that of the Academy, he adopts the Stoic ideal with regard to the sta-
tus of the orator and the scope of his fields of knowledge.
64 Carneades resigned from the Academic scholarchate in 137/6 B.C.E. and died in 129/8
B.C.E. See Dorandi (1991) 15; Ludlam (1997) 150.
65 This phrase may not necessarily emphasize the fact that the Academy had since then ceased
to exist, but that it was prominent in the attack on the rhetoricians, at least at this particular stage of
the controversy. On the various stages, see pp.44–46 below.
66 The year seems to be 109 B.C.E., at the end of which Clitomachus died. Crassus returned to
Rome in 108. On this passage in detail, see pp.38–42 below.
67 On the Academic suspension of judgement with regard to rhetoric, see e.g., Cicero, De Ora-
tore I. 63, 84; III. 80; and with regard to anything, ibid., II. 67 nihil esse certi; cf. also Cicero, Lucul-
lus 74; SVF III. p. 246 fr. 21.
68 Since the Academics studied the dogmatic philosophies in any case for their own benefit,
namely to argue for and against all positions in order to reach a suspension of judgement, they were
already well prepared for their attacks on their rivals, and used the same methods.
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The Academics were still teaching rhetoric after the movement against rhetoric.
Thus Cicero, referring to the teaching of Philo of Larissa, the last Academic scho-
larch, writes (Tusc. II. 9): alio tempore rhetorum praecepta tradere, alio philoso-
phorum. Furthermore, at the end of Partitiones Oratoriae, Cicero attributes the con-
tent of that work on rhetoric to the Academy without which, he claims, he could not
have uncovered all the characteristics required of the orator (such as the discovery
of arguments, the distinction between truth and falsehood, and other items which he
lists there).
2.3. The Historical Background
The brief and far from exhaustive survey of the various Hellenistic philosophies and
their attitudes towards rhetoric leads us to the following survey which outlines the
milieu in which the Hellenistic anti-rhetorical movement operated; it deals with the
period, the places and the social circles involved.
For this discussion, our main source is Cicero, and De Oratore in particular.69
This text is somewhat unusual. It does not deal with rhetoric per se, and it is cer-
tainly not a handbook.70 Nor does it deal with pure metarhetoric using arguments
for and against rhetoric, and it is quite different from the sort of material written by
Sextus Empiricus. What it does contain is a discussion of the ideal orator and the
conditions required for his existence. Such a discussion will certainly contain traces
of metarhetorical arguments on the status of rhetoric as an art. The status of the ora-
tor should after all involve the relation between his natural ability and his training,
the need for higher education, theory and practice, and even the question whether
rhetoric is an art (I. 90; 102ff.). All these matters are indeed to be found in De Ora-
tore, if not always in the form of arguments, attacks and defences.71
69 Cicero is also the earliest source we have for this period. He was acquainted with many of
the people involved in the movement. As for the participants in the dialogue, all were known to him
personally (Crassus, the main participant, was his teacher; II. 2). The dramatic date of the dialogue
prevented Cicero from participating in it himself, since at that time he was still very young.
70 The second and third books do deal with matters of rhetoric per se (Cicero refers to these
books by the term tecnologı́a in Att. IV. 16. 3) but Cicero refrains from the use of technical termi-
nology which is expected of a handbook (cf. Fam. I. 9. 23) and does not keep to the strict divisions
and subdivisions of the exposition of rhetoric. Moreover, long and elaborate speeches such as those
of Antonius and Crassus in De Oratore are never to be found in rhetorical handbooks.
71 Cicero intended the ideal orator to be the one portrayed in the speeches of Crassus, and he
turns out to be a sort of Presocratic living before the outbreak of the discidium linguae atque cordis.
It is apparent that Cicero wishes to unite philosophy and rhetoric by returning philosophy to its nat-
ural place within rhetoric. Cicero may be thinking of this when he writes to Lentulus that De Ora-
tore embraces et Aristoteliam et Isocratiam rationem oratoriam (Fam. I. 9. 23): the rhetoric of Iso-
crates is technical-professional, while that of Aristotle is more philosophical. At any rate, this
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The dramatic date of De Oratore is the beginning of September 91 B.C.E.72 The
dialogue comprises three conversations taking place over two days. The main parti-
cipants are Lucius Licinius Crassus, and Marcus Antonius in whose Tusculan villa
the conversations take place. Both are in their fifties, old enough to be eye witnesses
to the events of the late second century B.C.E. that they describe. The other partici-
pants will be mentioned wherever relevant during the course of our discussion.73
Crassus and Antonius are presented as providing eye-witness accounts of the
milieu at the time of the controversies surrounding rhetoric in Greece.74 This is not
to say that Cicero’s dialogue records actual conversations,75 but the information it-
self may be taken as reliable.
The first to testify is Crassus (I. 45–57).76 He is reacting to Scaevola who has ar-
gued that the orator needs no wide education or mastery of all the higher arts. At I.
45, Crassus says that he has already heard elements of Scaevola’s speech from
Greek philosophers. Cicero is clearly hinting here that he put into Scaevola’s speech
opinions on rhetoric which had been voiced by Greek philosophers. We should,
therefore, backtrack to Scaevola’s speech (I. 35–44), and even to the previous re-
marks of Crassus (I. 30–34) which Scaevola interrupted. There, Crassus was prais-
ing rhetoric as the most exalted of all the arts, claiming that orators were the first to
found cities, and that the ideal orator would be an expert in every art, in private and
in public; he would be able to speak with authority on every subject. Scaevola ob-
intention would lead the author to deal with the various philosophical schools and their opinions on
rhetoric.
72 The dialogue was written in 55 B.C.E.; cf. Cicero, Att. IV. 13. 2.
73 The other participants are Quintus Mucius Scaevola, Publius Sulpicius Rufus, Gaius Aurelius
Cotta, Quintus Lutatius Catulus, Gaius Julius Caesar Strabo. Cicero presents Cotta as the one who
reports these conversations to him (III. 16).
74 On the dates of the visits of Crassus and Antonius to Athens, see n.89 below. It was quite
common for Romans on various political missions abroad to mix their business with a little sightsee-
ing, including visiting the philosophers in their natural habitat, in those places most noted for philo-
sophy, such as Athens, Tarsus, Rhodes and Alexandria. Cicero thus lends the account a plausible
context while also honouring Crassus and Antonius. On the dates and activities of the philosophers
mentioned in the two passages of De Oratore, see also Dorandi (1991) 59–64.
75 Cf. III. 16. Although the dialogue is a fiction, it was important for Cicero to provide authori-
tative sources (cf. Cicero, Att. IV. 16. 2). As for the veracity of the reports, Cicero may well have
heard Crassus and Antonius talking about their experiences while he was still young, and to these he
could have added from his own experiences in Athens in 79 B.C.E., twenty four years before he
wrote the dialogue, not to mention any written material he may have had to hand while writing this
work. While in Athens he could have heard more about the controversies between the philosophers
and the rhetoricians then already three or four decades past. The first to argue, on the strength of I.
94, that one of Cicero’s sources may have been a dialogue written by Charmadas was Hubbell
(1920) 373–374, on which speculation see §2.4.2 below.
76 The paragraphs relating to his visit to Athens are I. 45–48.
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jects both to the view that the orators were the first founders of cities and continue
to preserve their integrity, and to the notion that the orator can be an expert on mat-
ters outside the political arena of the senate, public assemblies and lawcourts. He ar-
gues that the sound advice of wise men rather than speeches by orators were respon-
sible for the founding and preserving of cities, while the orators actually aided in
the destruction of the state. Titus Sempronius Gracchus made a great contribution to
the state, but his two sons, both orators, destroyed what he had accomplished. At I.
41 Scaevola turns to the second objection, claiming that the orator’s pretensions to
mastery of fields outside the political arena would attract the ire of those who regard
that as trespassing. The people he has in mind are the philosophers, from those
nowadays called Presocratics, such as Pythagoras and Democritus, down to the late
Hellenistic schools of his time. They all share a common objection against rhetoric,
that the orator has no knowledge of what today is called ethics, namely the problems
of good and bad, the goal of life, and the nature of emotions, which all belong to the
field of philosophy.77 After presenting this general objection, Scaevola passes over
to the particular objections of each school. The Academy would cause Crassus to
deny what he had previously agreed upon. The Stoa would ensnare Crassus in the
minutiae so typical of that school. As for the Peripatetics, and here Scaevola is a lit-
tle more discursive, they would simply claim that all these subjects belong to them,
proving this by observing that Aristotle and Theophrastus together wrote more and
better than all the rhetors taken together both on rhetoric and its relations with
ethics/politics. Scaevola would restrict the rhetor to the legal field alone.
The response of Crassus to Scaevola, beginning at I. 45, includes the names of a
few individuals involved in the debate, known also from other sources. Crassus
gives an account of the philosophical side of the debate in Athens in 109 B.C.E. It
is worth noting the order in which he treats the schools. Firstly the Academy, then
the Stoa, then finally the Peripatos.78 This is the same order used by Scaevola in I.
43. Secondly, the term florente Academia depicts the Academics at their peak, led
by Charmadas, Clitomachus,79 and Aeschines.80 Thirdly, all the philosophers appear
as pupils while the teacher is explicitly mentioned. The Academic philosophers
mentioned, including Metrodorus, are labelled as pupils of Carneades; the Peripate-
tic Diodorus is mentioned as a pupil of Critolaus; the Stoic Mnesarchus is the pupil
of Panaetius (and more on him in the next paragraph).81
77 These subjects, however, are considered pertinent to the orator in Aristotle’s Rhetorica; and
cf. the detailed criticism of the Peripatetics at I. 43.
78 The absence of the Epicureans is unsurprising, given their scorn for any art whatsoever; cf.
§2.2.1 above.
79 Clitomachus died in 109/8, the year to which Crassus refers; see n.66 above.
80 Metrodorus appears as an outsider, probably because his interpretation of Carneades was not
accepted by Clitomachus and his followers; see Glucker (1978) 75–81, 316–317, 395–396.
81 Carneades is called homo omnium in dicendo acerrimus et copiosissimus, ibid I. 45.
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I shall be arguing that we have here evidence for a debate begun by the teachers
of these philosophers which their pupils continued.82 We might have expected the
Stoic teacher contemporary with Carneades and Critolaus to have been Diogenes of
Babylon or Antipater of Tarsus, but we are given Panaetius, who was in fact a pupil
of Diogenes and Antipater.83 The reason why Crassus mentions Panaetius rather
than Diogenes or Antipater may be because Scaevola himself was on good terms
with Panaetius. This impression is strengthened by Crassus referring to the Stoic as
“your Panaetius” (vigebat auditor Panaetii illius tui Mnesarchus).
These and many other philosophers attack not rhetoric but the rhetor. One might
assume that attacking the artist would involve attacking the art, but it seems that the
emphasis is correct, since the philosophers are most concerned with the practical ef-
fects, namely their own loss of students who prefer to learn how to become orators.
The emphasis on the rhetor rather than on rhetoric is important for distinguishing
this attack from another emphasizing rhetoric and attacking that school of philoso-
phy which alone regarded rhetoric as a virtue, namely the Stoa.
Indeed, we must ask ourselves what was the place of the Stoa in this attack, being
the only philosophical school openly to regard rhetoric favourably at this time, ac-
cording to Cicero.84 While the other philosophical schools indulged in rhetoric in
practice, but in part or under another name, the Stoics explicitly made rhetoric one
of the arts of the wise man. Only the Stoics called rhetoric a virtue (which they had
to if it was to be an art of the wise man).
De Oratore I. 46 has been quoted at the beginning of §2.1. above. We learn from
it that the orator was exiled from political affairs almost unanimously by the philo-
sophers (in their philosophical systems). The word “almost” (paene) hints at two al-
ternatives. Firstly, that the Stoics did not participate at all in the general attack on
the schools of rhetoric. This is unlikely, since the Stoics had as much to lose materi-
ally as the others schools of philosophy had, and they also had their private war with
the rhetors over the nature of the true orator.85 Furthermore, the Stoic Mnesarchus
appears explicitly attacking the rhetors, even refusing to call them rhetors; in his
opinion they are merely operarii lingua celeri et exercitata (I. 83). The second alter-
native seems more plausible, that the Stoics participated in the general attack, but
that the Stoics had some reservations. Note that paene qualifies “with one voice”,
not “all [the philosophers]”.86 In other words, all the philosophers attacked, and they
attacked almost with one voice.
82 See p.44 below.
83 Mnesarchus appears in the Stoicorum Index in a list von Arnim considers to be of pupils of
Diogenes of Babylon, SVF III. fr. 11, n. to line 30; cf. Ludlam (1997) 171, 183–184; id. (2003) 44.
84 Cicero, De Oratore III. 65.
85 See immediately below.
86 . . .a quibus omnibus una paene voce. . .
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The Stoics were in a difficult position. While they supported rhetoric in principle,
in practice they advocated an impractical form of rhetoric quite unlike anything fa-
miliar to a rhetor or his students. Stoic rhetoric was very close to dialectic, using
language alien to the political arena of everyday life.87 The rise of the schools of
rhetoric threatened the Stoics just as much as the other philosophers, and the Stoics
had the additional task of defending their view of rhetoric against that of the rhetori-
cians. Yet the Stoics could not align themselves entirely with the other schools of
philosophy whose main line of attack against the rhetors was that rhetoric was not
an art. The legitimacy which the Stoics gave to rhetoric as an art required them to
join the general philosophical attack against rhetoric only with great reservations
which it is not hard to guess at. They may have claimed that although they opposed
the rhetoric propagated by the schools of rhetoric, they were not opposed to rhetoric
in principle, regarding it even as a virtue.88 Would the other philosophers, especially
the Academics and the Peripatetics, accept such a position? Before answering this
question, we should move to the second testimonium, that of Antonius (I. 80–93).
On his way to serve as proconsul in Cilicia, Antonius passed through Athens and
was held up there for many days. He met almost the same people whom Crassus
had met earlier (eos fere ipsos),89 and he reports, without naming names, on both
sides of the debate de officio et ratione oratoris. At I. 83, however, he concentrates
on the Stoic Mnesarchus, perhaps because Crassus identifies with the ideal Stoic
orator.90 Whatever the case may be, his report, unlike the general one provided by
Crassus, reveals a little more of the content of the controversy. It also provides a
speaker for the opposition, the rhetors, in the person of Menedemus.
The arguments of Mnesarchus summarize what we know of the Stoic position.
The only orator is the wise man, and only the wise man is an orator. Rhetoric (elo-
quentia) is one of the virtues, and as such is dependent upon the others. To have one
is to have all, and to lack one is to lack all. The so-called orators one meets every
day are not wise men since they lack perfect knowledge/understanding, and should
87 Cf. the remarks of Antonius which appear to be directed at the Stoic orator, perceived to be
the ideal orator of Crassus: deinde illud etiam verendum est ne abstrahamur ab hac exercitatione et
consuetudine dicendi populari et forensi. . .(I. 81); cf. also the end of I. 83; see p.33 n.43 above.
88 On the Stoics’ double game see Sextus Empiricus, Math. II. 43–45.
89 The visit of Crassus to Athens (I. 45) seems to have been in the spring of 109 B.C.E., on his
way from Macedonia to his province of Asia. Antonius visited Athens (I. 82) seven years later, in
102 (it should be borne in mind that men of the status of Crassus and Antonius would most probably
have visited Athens more than once). Antonius reports that he met almost the same learned men
(eos fere ipsos) as Crassus had. Cicero may be hinting at the fact that between the two visits, Clito-
machus had died (end of 109). For the information at the beginning of this note, I am obliged to
Prof. John Morgan of the Department of Physics, the University of Delaware, and member of the
American School of Classical Studies in Athens. See also Wilkins (1895) 14 n.1. On this visit, with
an emphasis on Charmadas’ novel view of rhetoric, see Brittain (2001) 319–328.
90 See also n.71 above.
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be considered no more than operarii lingua celeri et exercitata (83). It is noticeable
that the Stoic arguments do not attack the notion that rhetoric is an art, but concen-
trate rather on the teachers and practitioners of rhetoric themselves. Antonius’ opi-
nion of Stoic rhetoric is made clear in his closing remark: sed haec erat spinosa
quaedam et exilis oratio longeque a nostris sensibus abhorrebat. Thus Antonius/Ci-
cero neatly indicates what is problematic in the Stoic position.
Academics do not suffer from the problems plaguing the Stoics. Their representa-
tive, Charmadas,91 appears in I. 84:92 Charmadas vero multo uberius eisdem de re-
bus loquebatur. It is the representative of the Academy, one who does not regard
rhetoric as an art, who is presented as a better orator than the Stoic who does consid-
er rhetoric an art.93 Here, however, Charmadas does not enter into the argument
over the status of rhetoric as an art, but restricts himself to the practical aspect,
namely, the impossibility of knowing how to speak without philosophy.94 The sig-
nificance is clear. The schools of philosophy should not be overlooked. The argu-
ments of Mnesarchus and Charmadas so far are to be located within the external de-
bate with the schools of rhetoric. For all their differences, the Stoic and the
Academic both emphasize the importance of philosophy for the orator.
This practical point continues to dominate with the entry of Menedemus into the
discussion. He is an orator, and his testimony is one of the very few we have from
an orator of that period. He attempts to carve out for rhetoric its own special field,
namely politics. This raises the ire of Charmadas, who fails to find any reference to
political matters in the rhetorical handbooks. Education, the relationship between
men and gods, the founding of cities, and virtues, are all subjects discussed by the
philosophers. Furthermore, the rhetoricians lack any real knowledge of the laws of
speaking beautifully, such as the way to manipulate the emotions of the audience to
a particular end, or how to create a good impression.95 Menedemus adduces De-
mosthenes who displays in his speeches an ability to manipulate the emotions of his
audience. Charmadas sidesteps Demosthenes by regarding him as an exception
91 For the most up-to-date discussion of this Academic philosopher, especially in the context of
rhetoric, see Brittain (2001) 312–328.
92 Brittain (ibid.) 320 is interested in Charmadas insofar as he is the teacher of Philo of Larissa,
the subject of his book. His discussion of Antonius’ testimonium begins with I. 84, and he ignores I.
80–83. This is understandable given the nature of his subject, but he does thereby overlook the fact
that the attack is not only external, between Charmadas and Menedemus, but also internal, between
Charmadas and Mnesarchus (although the latter is mentioned in n.49).
93 Charmadas would not be a better orator from the Stoic point of view, but could be only more
experienced; this is precisely the problem of the Stoics; their strange manner of speech which is
alien to everyday language (cf. also Sextus Empiricus, Math. II. 52ff.).
94 See Brittain (ibid.) 312: “. . . that Charmadas took rhetoric to be a capacity that, while it could
not be technically taught, could be effectively improved by an appropriate philosophical training.”
95 The aims of the orator mentioned here suggest that Charmadas is basing himself on Aristotle
and Theophrastus. Here we encounter the v Xoß and páXoß. The lógoß will appear in §92.
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which proves the rule, although suggesting that his knowledge may have been ac-
quired during his studies with Plato.
There is no need to detail here all the arguments presented by Charmadas, the re-
sponse of Menedemus and the response of Charmadas to that. Enough will be said
about them in the following chapters. Only one point needs to be made here with re-
gard to the context for these arguments. The arguments of Charmadas up until I. 89
are not purely metarhetorical. They are rather practical, arguing that philosophy is
better suited to deal with the topics rhetoric is claiming for itself. It is only from I.
90 that Charmadas moves onto metarhetorical arguments, now claiming that rheto-
ric is not an art at all, and even reconstructing its creation. This makes clear to us
the context in which the debate is taking place, namely, the struggle for pupils and
income. The metarhetorical arguments appear only to support the practical aims of
the philosophers.
The descriptions appearing in the testimonies of Crassus and Antonius are data-
ble to the end of the second century B.C.E. and pertain to the second generation of
the controversy. The leading figure in the movement of the philosophers against the
rhetors is Charmadas, from which we may infer that the school leading the move-
ment at this time was the Academy.
However, there are a few reasons for positing a first generation of the debate da-
table to the middle of the second century B.C.E. There are almost no references to
it in Cicero apart from the names of teachers appearing in I. 45.96 Cicero may have
concentrated on the second generation because of the main characters participating
in the dialogue, who would not have been able to provide eyewitness accounts of
the first generation. Yet, the influence of Greek culture on Rome was already great
during the middle of the second century, enough to arouse the ire of prominent sta-
tesemen such as Cato the Censor. It is likely that pupils would already have been
streaming to schools of rhetoric, and that this would already have caused the schools
of philosophy to react. Being the professionals they were, those philosophers would
not have waited decades before voicing their protests. In addition to these reasons,
there are late sources attesting to this first generation of the debate, although they
tend to reflect an internal debate, between the philosophical schools themselves
(Academics and Peripatetics against Stoics), while no name of a rhetor is to be
found. The arguments in these sources are nearly all philosophical in form and ter-
minology, to an extent which may have been unintelligible to the majority of rhet-
ors. Finally, the object of the attacks is not the orator but rhetoric itself.
The nature of this internal philosophical debate has already been hinted at. The
Stoics were uncomfortably positioned in the general attack on rhetoric since they
themselves gave rhetoric a place in their philosophical system. Two points in the la-
ter sources, such as Sextus Empiricus, Philodemus, Quintilian and Lucian, indicate
96 To which may be added II. 155ff., describing the embassy of the philosophers to Rome in
155 B.C.E., although the context has nothing to do with the controversy over rhetoric.
44 The Background to the Debate
ISBN Print: 9783525252949 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647252940
© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen
that the Stoics set themselves apart from the general debate as presented in Cicero’s
De Oratore, the first point being the question of the status of rhetoric as an art, and
the second point being the almost exclusively Stoic terminology used in arguments
and especially in definitions of arts. These and other points, all to be discussed later,
lead us to the following hypothesis. Throughout the last half of the second century
there took place a debate over rhetoric. There were two main fronts. The first in-
volved all the philosophical schools against the schools of rhetoric, and the second
involved the Stoics defending themselves against all the other philosophical schools,
especially the Academics and the Peripatetics who regarded the Stoics on this point
as betraying their camp to the enemy. It may be expected that the rhetors were hap-
py to use the legitimacy granted their art by the Stoics, and that this did not go down
well with the other philosophical schools. The testimonia in De Oratore emphasize
the external debate during the years 109–102, between the philosophers and the
rhetors, with the orator as the object of the debate. The later sources97 emphasize
the internal philosophical debate, between the Stoics and the other philosophical
schools, with rhetoric itself as the object of the debate.98 It should be made quite
clear, however, that in no period is there one front without the other.
We have called this controversy on two fronts the double debate (p.28 above).
This double debate must now be divided into two stages, the middle and the end of
the second century B.C.E. The “two-staged double debate” will become a familiar
idea during the course of the rest of this study.99
The near inseparability of the two fronts may be seen in De Oratore. Charmadas’
attack beginning at I. 84 continues the arguments of the Stoic Mnesarchus against
Menedemus. There is no mention of the problem of rhetoric as an art until I. 90.
This is because the context until then includes the Stoics on the side of the attackers.
Yet, at I. 90, Charmadas suddenly argues that rhetoric is not an art. This claim is
very strange given the context where Mnesarchus is still a part of the opposition.
The answer may be found in the way this new attack is presented: Saepe etiam in
eam partem ferebatur oratione, ut omnino disputaret nullam artem esse dicendi. At
97 Such as Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian who will be distinguished in later chapters; Sextus
Empiricus reflects more the later debate led by Charmadas, while Quintilian reflects the earlier one
led by Critolaus.
98 Cf. also the way in which Crassus avoids the question of rhetoric as a craft in I. 102. He
passes it off as a hairsplitting exercise worthy of Greeks. There seems to be no mention of rhetors in
the whole passage, apart from the allusion to Gorgias in I. 103. The context has everything to do
with the philosophers.
99 The notion of a two-staged double debate is absent from previous literature on the subject.
For example, in his survey of the Stoic position regarding rhetoric as a craft, Barnes (1986) 3 con-
trasts supporters such as Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus with opponents such as Ariston of Chios,
Posidonius and Mnesarchus. He seems to have confused opposition to rhetoric with opposition to
rhetors, thereby missing the existence of a double debate. The Stoics supported rhetoric (that of their
own system) while opposing the rhetors of the schools of rhetoric.
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I. 84–89, Charmadas belongs to a group of philosophers which includes the Stoic
Mnesarchus, and is unwilling to threaten this unity. The common enemy is Menede-
mus and what he represents. At I. 90 we are told that he occasionally gets carried
away,100 and raises a claim which exposes an additional debate, this time with his
erstwhile ally, Mnesarchus. This argument against rhetoric as an art is not, therefore,
an integral part of the philosophers’ attack on the schools of rhetoric, but a central
argument used by Academics and perhaps Peripatetics in the internal debate with
the Stoics.101
For another example of Charmadas arguing two different positions, we may be-
gin with I. 84:
eos, qui rhetores nominarentur et qui dicendi praecepta traderent, nihil
plane tenere neque posse quemquam facultatem adsequi dicendi, nisi
qui philosophorum inventa didicisset.
The argument is not dressed in philosophical terminology, but states quite plainly
that, according to Charmadas, the orators and rhetors are dependent upon the dis-
coveries of the philosophers. Contrast this with I. 92:
artem vero negabat esse ullam, nisi quae cognitis penitusque percep-
tis102 et in unum exitum spectantibus et numquam fallentibus rebus
contineretur; haec autem omnia, quae tractarentur ab oratoribus, dubia
esse et incerta; quoniam et dicerentur ab eis, qui omnia ea non plane te-
nerent, et audirentur ab eis, quibus non scientia esset tradenda, sed exi-
gui temporis aut falsa aut certe obscura opinio.
This criticism, appearing near the end of Charmadas’ speech, uses a Stoic definition
of art, which an Academic would use when attacking the Stoics. This argument for
internal consumption has found its way into the external debate. The later chapters
will discuss the two-staged double debate in much greater detail, but enough has
been said to allow us to survey previous secondary literature with some perspective.
100 Cf. his being depicted as homo promptus at I. 85.
101 Leeman-Pinkster (1981) felt that there was a problem with Charmadas arguing in this way
(cf. their note to ferebatur oratione on pp.182–183), but attributed the problem to the philosophical-
rhetorical position he presented in I. 87. Antonius has already reminded us, however, at I. 84, that
the Academic does not necessarily hold the positions he presents. It would be more correct to attri-
bute the problem of Charmadas to the Stoics’ ambiguous position in the double debate.
102 perceptis is to be read instead of perspectis. The emendation is that of Spalding (1798) ad
loc.; cf. Hubbell (1920) 376 n.10.
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2.4. Common Assumptions in the Secondary Literature
As was noted above in the introduction, the little secondary literature dealing with
this controversy has always treated it as an aside or as an appendix to other enqui-
ries, with all the drawbacks that such an approach entails. In this section I shall sur-
vey these studies in detail and stress in particular assumptions common to them all.
2.4.1. Ludwig Radermacher
Interest in the controversy began with the discovery of the Herculaneum papyri,
among them the works of Philodemus, including De Rhetorica. The edition of this
text by Siegfried Sudhaus in the years 1892–1896 provided the groundwork for the
first piece of research on the subject by Frank Olivier, a Berlin dissertation of 1895
entitled De Critolao Peripatetico. The sources used were Philodemus and Sextus
Empiricus. Significantly, he did not use Quintilian,103 a lack which was supplied by
Radermacher in his research. We have already had occasion to mention his article
which appeared in the introduction (pp. ix-xxvi) to the supplementum to Sudhaus’
great work.104 In this article, Radermacher attempts to trace the source or sources of
the various attacks against the legitimacy of rhetoric and its status as an art. The
mainly philological argument identifies the source for a number of arguments
against rhetoric appearing in later literature as a lost work by Critolaus, the second
century B.C.E. Peripatetic philosopher. The method adopted in the article is based
on a comparison of similar sources – those of Sextus Empiricus, Quintilian and Phi-
lodemus. The main reason for Radermacher’s identification of Critolaus as the
source is the explicit or implicit reference to him in every one of the texts.
2.4.2. Harry Hubbell
Three decades later, in 1920, the American scholar Harry Hubbell published a re-
construction of the fragments of the same book of Philodemus.105 Again, it is only
in an excursus to the work (pp. 364–382)106 that some attention is given to the Hel-
103 This was only one of many problems Radermacher found in the work; cf. Sudhaus (1892)
suppl. IX. I have noted Olivier’s work only because it is the first treatment of the subject which uses
Philodemus; the absence of Quintilian makes the research almost worthless.
104 See p.23 n.46 above.
105 This was not a critical edition of the text, but an attempt to reconstruct the entire book. Hub-
bell arranged the fragments of Sudhaus in a different way and speculatively filled in all the lacunae.
106 Hubbell’s excursus is mainly a criticism of Radermacher and a way of tying up loose ends
in his own work (p. 368).
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lenistic debate on rhetoric as a whole. Hubbell was the first to notice the relevance
of some passages in Cicero’s De Oratore which had somehow escaped the attention
of Radermacher. These passages did not merely supplement the picture, but entirely
changed the direction of the research. It was now becoming clear that the debate
over the legitimacy of rhetoric was still continuing at the end of the second century
B.C.E., with the philosophers championed by Charmadas of the Academy.107 The
relevant point in De Oratore is the speech of Antonius at I. 83–93,108 where Char-
madas features prominently. Hubbell rightly understood that the controversy could
no longer be entirely attributed to Critolaus, since Charmadas had also to be reck-
oned with. Furthermore, it was now apparent that different versions existed of the
same arguments, each being attributed to a different philosopher, including Crito-
laus and Charmadas. Sometimes the same argument appears after a list mentioning
both Critolaus and Charmadas.109 Hubbell’s solution was simple. He surmised that
there was one work from which all our sources had derived. This work was a dialo-
gue by Charmadas, the dramatic context being the embassy of the three philoso-
phers, Critoloaus, Diogenes of Babylon and Carneades, to Rome in 155 B.C.E. In
the dialogue, the Peripatetic Critolaus took the lead in attacking the Stoic Diogenes
for his support of rhetoric.110 Thus references to Critolaus would be to the character
in the dialogue, while references to Charmadas would be to the author of the dialo-
gue.
The solution is simple but certainly not easy. A glance at the sources is enough to
show that they are in no condition to allow any decisive conclusions. Often the ar-
guments are frustratingly similar, and there is a strong temptation to ascribe them to
a common source or sources. Our texts (Quintilian, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero and
Philodemus) reflect summaries, and summaries of summaries, further exacerbating
the situation. Hubbell may have had all this on his mind when he suggested the fol-
lowing:111
A comparison of the arguments used by our four authorities will reveal
that they drew from common sources, some of which can be identified,
107 See also the review of Barnes (1986) 15 n.8.
108 This does not imply the irrelevance of other important passages, such as the speech of Cras-
sus beginning at I. 45. What is particularly relevant about the present passage is that it presents a
complete argument attributed explicitly to a well-known philosopher, Charmadas.
109 A good example is Sextus Empiricus, II. 20.
110 Carneades the Academic Sceptic would have had to attack at least one of his dogmatic com-
panions in any case, but would have shared a common cause with Critolaus in the present case
against the spread of the schools of rhetoric.
111 Hubbell (1920) 368. This may also be why he does not claim to analyse all the sources or
their problems; cf. his remark (356–357): It is my purpose in this excursus to discuss merely certain
phases of that part of the controversy which deals with the question whether rhetoric deserves to be
called an “art”. [my emphasis]
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but most of which must be classed as part of a store of commonplaces
which were familiar to all educated people.
If it is problematic to posit one source for all the arguments, the problem is com-
pounded by the identification of this source with a dialogue by Charmadas. Firstly,
there is no evidence for any written work by Charmadas. Hubbell points to De Ora-
tore I. 94, where Antonius is said to have written down some notes from that con-
versation, but this proves nothing.112 Hubbell also argues unconvincingly that when
Antonius mentions the arguments he heard in Athens between the rhetors and their
opponents, this is Cicero’s way of hinting at his own reliance on the writings of
Charmadas in his description of the controversy.113 Even were we to accept that
Charmadas left written work,114 there is nothing to prevent the additional supposi-
tion that Critolaus also left written work. They are separated by only a few decades.
This raises a few questions. Even if Charmadas did leave a text, would the dialogue
with its characters of the preceding generation reflect their concerns or rather his
own? Was there more than one controversy? If so, did they differ, and in what way?
Further reasons prevent the putative dialogue by Charmadas from serving as a suffi-
cient explanation: the names of Charmadas and Critolaus appear alternately, and the
arguments themselves appear in different versions, which would not happen were
they all to have a common source.
The main problem, however, so far overlooked by everyone, is the object or ob-
jects of criticism in each of the texts. Antonius’ speech in De Oratore mainly de-
scribes an argument with a rhetor,115 a point repeatedly emphasized. The attacks ap-
pearing in Quintilian and Sextus Empiricus are directed against the Stoics.116 They
reflect the internal debate between the philosophical schools. The controversy,
therefore, is complex, with all the philosophers united against the rhetors, while the
Stoics are criticized by the other philosophers for approving of rhetoric and thereby
providing the rhetors with ammunition. Hubbell overlooked the latter component of
the controversy and saw only a concerted philosophical attack on rhetoric.
Another point overlooked by Hubbell was the fact that Charmadas was an Aca-
demic, a pupil of Carneades, while Critolaus was a Peripatetic. What sort of connec-
112 Furthermore, had the dialogue by Charmadas existed, Antonius would not have needed to
write down his own notes in order to remember it. Cicero occasionally mentions Greek works which
may well have been his source for the dialogue in which he mentions them: e.g., Lucullus 11 (Sosus
of Antiochus) and De Natura Deorum I. 16 (another, unnamed, work of Antiochus).
113 Hubbell (ibid.) 372 n.8, following Hendrickson.
114 Charmadas was the pupil of Carneades. It was actually Hagnon and Clitomachus who pub-
lished their master’s lectures and arguments; see Der Kleine Pauly, s.v. “Hagnon 3”.
115 Had Charmadas been the source for this speech in Cicero, he would surely have presented
himself arguing against Menedemus; for this possibility, cf. Leeman-Pinkster (1981) 173.
116 Cf. also De Oratore I. 83 where Charmadas appears as an ally of the Stoic Mnesarchus. On
the complexity of the debate over rhetoric, see pp.45–46 above.
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tion existed between them, if any? What of the pupil of Critolaus, Ariston?117 Why
should he not write a dialogue? Why does he not appear as the heir to his master’s
arguments? The testimonia suggests that he was in favour of rhetoric, and somewhat
influenced by the Stoics on this point.118
2.4.3. Leeman and Pinkster
In the early 1980’s, Anton Leeman and Harm Pinkster began to publish what pro-
mised to be a great commentary on Cicero’s De Oratore.119 They briefly refer to
the debate in their first volume (1981), in the introduction to one of the passages in
the book (I. 96–112). While Hubbell regarded a dialogue by Charmadas as the com-
mon source for all our information on the controversy, with Critolaus’ contributions
deriving from his appearance in the dialogue, Leeman-Pinkster treated Charmadas
himself as the source for the second century attacks on rhetoric, without any refer-
ence to Critolaus.120 Their view becomes clear from the long summary concerning
the status of rhetoric as an art to be found in their notes on De Oratore I. 96–112.121
They also criticize Radermacher for concluding “voreilig” that Critolaus is the
source. Yet their conclusion that Charmadas is the source adds nothing, as it is no
more than a simple exchange of names. Their criticism of Radermacher actually
works against them, since their own argument, that Charmadas is occasionally men-
tioned, may also be applied to Critolaus, with similar conclusions. Radermacher un-
derstandably preferred Critoloaus as the source, since he used those sources in
which Critolaus is more prominent, namely Quintilian, Sextus Empiricus and Philo-
demus. Leeman-Pinsker, more aware of Charmadas thanks to Cicero’s De Oratore,
had no compelling reason to retain the simplistic position of identifying a single
source for the controversy, be it Critolaus or Charmadas. Leeman-Pinkster effec-
tively transferred to Charmadas all that had been concluded by Radermacher about
Critolaus as the source for the controversy. The problems regarding the arguments
were also transferred, and all given an Academic hue (192):
er {Charmadas} hatte offenbar der alten platonischen Kritik der Rhet-
orik in Anschluß besonders an den Gorgias eine neue, skeptische Prä-
gung verliehen.
117 In order to distinguish him from Ariston of Chios, Wehrli calls him Ariston der Jüngere.
118 Sextus Empiricus, Math. II. 61; see also p.31 n.33 above.
119 Four volumes have been published.
120 No reference is made to Hubbell either.
121 Leeman-Pinkster (ibid.) 189–194. The aim of the authors, as seen from their conclusion to
the discussion, is to demonstrate that Cicero used an intermediate source dealing with art, and that
this source held a view somewhere between the extreme Stoic position and that of the schools of
rhetoric.
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This discussion of the source of the arguments in De Oratore I. 96–112 turns out to
be incidental to their analysis. They interpret the reaction of Crassus to the speech
of Antonius as a presentation of the moderate approach of Cicero to the art of rheto-
ric whereby it is defined using the more relaxed conditions of knowledge (193).
2.4.4. Jonathan Barnes
In 1986, Jonathan Barnes published an article entitled “Is Rhetoric an Art?” The ti-
tle might give the impression that the article is devoted to the debate over rhetoric,
but this is not the case. Barnes chooses five arguments from the text of Sextus Em-
piricus, accepts them as they are presented by Sextus, and discusses them in those
terms.122 While he does refer to parallels for each argument, mainly from Quintilian
and Philodemus, Barnes treats every parallel as independently devised by its author.
The failure to address the problem of sources is problematic. Barnes does warn the
reader in many instances when something does not quite square with the text. These
many reservations123 are indicative of the need for source criticism. This no doubt
is one of the factors leading to Barnes’ dissatisfaction with the article: “even so the
thing remains pretty rude; and although I have been persuaded that it may be worth
publishing, I should like it to be read as a report of ‘work in progress’ rather than as
a finished essay” (n. 67).
This said, Barnes’ contribution to our understanding of the sources is immense.
In many cases he has offered suggestive and often persuasive readings and emenda-
tions. His article has been a useful aid throughout the writing of this book.
2.4.5. Reinhardt and Winterbottom
The last view to be considered in this survey is that of Reinhardt-Winterbottom. We
have already had occasion to mention the commentary on the second book of Quin-
tilian by Tobias Reinhardt and Michael Winterbottom in the survey of sources.124
These authors do not claim to be dealing with the debate over rhetoric per se. They
have written a commentary on Quintilian’s second book, and their remarks are al-
ways in the context of elucidating Quintilian. In the preface to section 17, to a lesser
122 Barnes actually uses a number of arguments against rhetoric in ancient literature as a spring-
board for a discussion on the status of rhetoric today. His conclusion (pp. 13–14), based partly on
his understanding of Aristotle, is that rhetoric today cannot be considered an art. Cf. Reinhardt &
Winterbottom (2006) 302 n.52 commenting on this article: “. . . with an independent appraisal of
how one might today, but in terms of the ancient discussion, answer the question.”
123 Esp. in nn. 23, 33, 48, 50, 53, 55.
124 See pp.20–21 above.
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extent in the preface to section 15, and in part of the appendix, the authors discuss
the debate itself.125 Unlike Radermacher, Hubbell, and Leeman-Pinsker, they do not
identify any one source for the various testimonia. Instead they provide a list of par-
allels to Quintilian, Sextus Empiricus and Philodemus (aided by the prolegomena
literature) in the appendix.126 While their restraint in identifying one text or another
as the ultimate source may be seen as progress in a field requiring extreme caution,
merely indicating parallels to the testimonia may be viewed as a return to the first
article by Radermacher. It is in fact not surprising that nothing has essentially chan-
ged in over a century, between Radermacher and Reinhardt-Winterbottom, since no
concerted research has been attempted on the debate itself, using all the sources at
our disposal and subjecting them to meticulous scrutiny with a view to discovering
their sources. In lieu of this, all that remains is to point to similarities and parallels.
As has already been noted, their view of the debate appears mainly in three
places, in the introductions to chapters 15 and 17, and in the opening note of the Ap-
pendix.127 RW are well aware of the previous surveys and their faults (304–305).
125 The discussion is of course limited to a number of places, and the emphasis everywhere is
naturally on Quintilian and his rhetorical method. See e.g. that part of the introduction (xxiii-l) de-
voted entirely to understanding the purpose of Quintilian in the second book and his conception of
the essence and role of rhetoric. In their introduction to chapter 15 (beginning on p.227), the authors
consider the source of the survey of the various definitions of rhetoric appearing in this chapter,
where, by a process of elimination, the list concludes with the Stoic definition of rhetoric. RW dis-
agree with Radermacher who traced the survey back to Diogenes of Babylon, arguing instead that
the source is a doxography originating in a school of rhetoric, organized by Quintilian to suit his
purposes. While RW do not discuss the sources for the arguments against rhetoric, they do refer in-
directly to the question of sources.
126 The authors emphasize that the prolegomena literature is provided merely for comparison;
see p.22 n.38 above.
127 The second half of the Introduction (“Defining Rhetoric”: xxxiv-l) considers Quintilian’s
conception of rhetoric. Quintilian’s argument is twofold. The first claim is that the aim or definition
of rhetoric is not to persuade but to speak well; the second is that only the (morally) good man can
be an orator. The authors detect conscious Stoic influence (following Sohlberg (1972), they con-
clude that the source is Diogenes of Babylon, although with the reservation that a similar description
of the orator could have come from another Stoic source), although Quintilian plays down his source
since Stoic rhetoric was considered “dry”, and of course because in his day it was commonly ac-
cepted that philosophy was not a requirement for a good orator. Towards the end of the Introduction
it is speculated that Quintilian intuited that the orator needed to be a good man and an expert at
rhetoric, only after which he found supporting evidence from a Stoic source which he had to hand,
choosing Stoic principles suited to Roman ones, especially to Cato’s famous definition of the orator
as vir bonus dicendi peritus. RW are concerned not so much with the actual arguments against
rhetoric as with the general claim of Quintilian himself regarding his conception of rhetoric, yet one
might wonder whether the Stoic text Quintilian putatively used might also have supplied arguments
pertaining to the status of rhetoric as an art. Without entering the question of the plausibility of
Quintilian alighting upon a Stoic text in this fashion, I would say that Quintilian in any case did not
understand the point of the Stoic arguments, and this may in fact strengthen the claim of RW. Quin-
tilian simply took the Stoic aim and status of rhetoric as an art at face value and used them for his
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They rightly claim that no one text or thinker is to be regarded as the source for all
the information on the controversy (304):128 “There is, however, no reason to as-
sume a source in the form of a single text with an identifiable author . . . such agree-
ments may have more complex reasons.” Since even the existence of a specific
source is uncertain, the authors in their Appendix concentrate on finding parallels
and attempting to gain a general impression. There (397–401) they bring thirty-one
parallels between the four sources: Sextus Empiricus,129 Quintilian, Philodemus,
and the prolegomena. RW write (395): “The following list of correspondences has
the purpose of documenting overlaps, similarities, and points of contact (as well as
relevant material peculiar to each of the three texts) and of giving an idea how the
authors treat the same source material in different ways.”
2.5. The Present Study
Our partial survey130 has demonstrated that Critolaus and Charmadas are prominent
characters in our sources, but that any attempt to identify a particular text as the
source, let alone reconstruct it, has so far met with little success. Our main sources
– Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, Quintilian and Philodemus – are too problematic to
give us a detailed picture. It may be no accident that until now there has been no
study devoted to the reconstruction of the debate in all its complexity. The debate,
from Radermacher in 1892 to RW in 2006, has been referred to incidentally in
works dealing with other topics, be it an edition of a text or a commentary. The de-
bate has always been addressed on the sidelines, in an introduction, for example, or
own purposes, while failing to understand Stoic terminology and the general system in which their
rhetoric was grounded, not to mention the nature of the debate with the other schools. This claim
will be borne out in the analyses of the arguments.
128 RW (2006) 305 n.54 even refute the position of Leeman-Pinkster that a composition of
Charmadas was a source for arguments against rhetoric.
129 RW always regard Sextus Empiricus as the primary source whose arguments may find par-
allels in the other sources, since he reflects, in their view (396), the original organization of the ma-
terial used also by the other sources. I should point out at once that although Sextus does present his
material methodically and logically, this does not necessarily reflect the state of his sources or their
trustworthiness, but his own style, which might well have changed the character of the arguments
which he found in his sources.
130 We have not mentioned, for example, the treatment of Lucian’s De Parasito in the second-
ary literature (see pp.15; 23 n.46; 33 n.42 above). Radermacher was the first to identify in this work
a structure based on the controversy over rhetoric. Sudhaus in the second part of his article devel-
oped the argument with parallels between Lucian and Philodemus (xxvi ff.). Hubbell mentions the
work in one line (it is not one of the four main sources he mentions on p.367) to show how familiar
in the second century C.E. were the arguments for and against rhetoric. Common to all these scho-
lars is their assumption that nothing can be learned from Lucian’s work (a parody after all) on the
arguments themselves or their sources. Lucian may, however, inadvertently reveal information
which is not to be obtained from the other texts discussed in this survey.
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an appendix. A general discussion of the controversy in the second century B.C.E.
is understandable in such circumstances, but it is unsatisfactory.
Each argument falls either under the internal or the external debate, and this must
be established in order to understand the import of the argument.131 Furthermore, it
needs to be asked whether the double debate developed over time during the second
century B.C.E. The accepted notion of a simple controversy between rhetoric and
philosophy in the second century leads to serious inaccuracies, to say the least.
The present study will demonstrate by submitting the relevant texts to a thorough
comparative examination that there was a two-staged double debate. The first stage
was led by Critolaus the Peripatetic in the mid-second century. The second stage oc-
curred towards the end of the century and was led by Charmadas the Academic. In
both stages the debate was two-fold: the philosophers against the rhetors, and the
Peripatetics and/or the Academics against the Stoics.132
Any attempt to reconstruct this complex controversy with its arguments and
sources is fraught with difficulties, not least because the sources are confused with
regard to the arguments and seem to be unaware of the two-fold nature of the de-
bate. It must be recalled that our texts are not first-hand accounts, but are often at
quite some remove from the original sources.133 They had a tendency to combine
131 A good example of this is in Barnes’ discussion of the definition of art. Barnes (1986) 6
identifies the definition of art appearing in Sextus Empericus II. 10 and Quintilian II. 17. 41 as
Stoic, but relying on the words of Quintilian, ab omnibus fere probatus, regards the argument as one
against rhetoric as an art rather than against the Stoic conception of rhetoric as an art: “The dispute
concerns the standing of rhetoric as a técnv not its standing as técnv in some specifically Stoic
sense of the word.” This despite referring in n.30 to Radermacher’s article which does in fact hint at
arguments directed against the Stoics. Barnes’ statement is typical of the approach which refrains
from a deep analysis of the complex of arguments, preferring to make do with the way they appear
in the sources. We shall prove throughout the course of this study that a considerable number of the
arguments appearing in our sources were explicitly levelled against the Stoics, precisely for which
reason they used the Stoic definition of art.
132 Wehrli (1944) 70, commenting on fragments of Critolaus claimed, “[Diogenes] prinzipielle
Übereinstimmung mit K[ritolaos] schließt die Polemik zwischen beiden Philosophen, die Sudhaus
bei Philodem zu finden glaubt, aus.” While it is true that Diogenes of Babylon and Critolaus may
have presented a united front against the rhetors, this does not preclude an internal debate between
them as is reflected in Philodemus. Brittain (2001) 307 touches on the second stage of the debate;
he posits three stages, the middle stage being the rise in the influence of the handbook of Herma-
goras, but so far as attacks on the rhetors are concerned, he agrees on two stages. Barnes (1986) 4
sees only one stage in the second century, and sets it in the middle of the century with the embassy
of the three philosophers to Rome in 155 B.C.E.
133 Quintilian, I. 1–2 (prooemium) testifies to the great number of books in Greek and in Latin
dealing with rhetoric, for which very reason he was requested by his acquaintances to impose some
order on the often conflicting material. Of these works, probably mostly handbooks, many would
have had an introduction concerning the nature of rhetoric, its definition and its uses – in short, me-
tarhetoric. Quintilian would have made his selection from among these works, keeping in mind his
aim of showing that the orator needs to be a morally good man who has enjoyed a methodical edu-
cation (see p.19 n.24 above). He would have been able to integrate into his work various opinions
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arguments into one, or separate one argument into different parts, thus adding to the
difficulties of reconstructing the original arguments. The tendency to pile on the ar-
guments is motivated by the notion that more is better. Quintilian and Philodemus
both observe that in many instances the arguments presented are merely versions of
one and the same argument.134 Cicero’s De Oratore may for the time being be as-
sumed to reflect the second stage of the debate, while Quintilian, whose text makes
no mention of Charmadas, reflects the first stage.135 Sextus Empiricus seems not to
have drawn from sources of one stage exclusively.
After the stages of the controversy, the objects of the debate must also be consid-
ered. The context for De Oratore I. 45 ff. and 83–93 is the external debate between
the philosophers and the rhetors, but the picture is a little more complicated. As we
have already seen at I. 90, there is also some reference to the internal debate, here
between Charmadas and the Stoics.136 The other texts at our disposal are no less
complex. Quintilian may well reflect the internal debate in some way, but this does
not automatically rule out the possibility that some of the arguments are connected
with the external debate.
Our working hypothesis might be summarized thus: the first stage material con-
centrates more on the internal debate, while the second stage material concentrates
more on the external debate. Quintilian is greatly influenced by the Stoa,137 suggest-
ing that his text will reflect in particular the debate between Critolaus and Diogenes
of Babylon. De Oratore presents the external debate between Charmadas and Mene-
demus.138
A careful philological analysis accompanied by a philosophical analysis of the
internal logic of each argument and its object may aid our unravelling of the debate,
without necessarily attributing a particular author to each argument. There are
strands of thought common to more than one source. Sometimes part of an argument
in a most manipulative way to achieve his ends. We must bear in mind that Quintilian would not
have been the first to do so, but that his sources would also have had their axes to grind. It follows
that while each argument may be reconstructed, there is no point attempting to identify the source if
it is not given. The same may be said about Sextus Empiricus. It is clear from his discussion that he
relies on sources which have reworked their sources.
134 Cf. Quintilian, II. 17. 16; Philodemus, II. 102, fr. VII.
135 Charmadas is mentioned once by name at Quintilian, XI. 2. 26, in a context which has noth-
ing to do with the debate.
136 See pp.45–46 above.
137 As seen already in Quintilian’s introduction with the ideal of the orator (I. 9) which he de-
tails further in the last book. This ideal effectively identifies the perfect orator with the Stoic sage.
A separate section on the question whether rhetoric is a virtue, answered in the positive, is Stoic
through and through (II. ch. 20). Additional evidence will be considered in due course. See also the
introduction to chapter 15 in RW (2006).
138 It must, however, be again emphasized, that Quintilian and Sextus Empiricus reflect sum-
maries of summaries of summaries, with all that that entails.
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is found to be an entirely self-standing argument in another source.139 In other
cases, such a process leads to a logical distortion which actually allows us to recon-
struct the original argument.
The context of the authors is also significant. The grouping of arguments may
shed light on the nature of the source. In most cases, arguments are piled up on top
of other arguments without much intelligence, as may be seen when the same argu-
ment is seen in its proper context in another source.140 It must be stressed that such
research must be satisfied occasionally with reaching some degree of probability
without ascertaining complete certainty. In some cases it will not be possible to de-
cide between two possibilities. As for the rest, I leave it to the reader to decide.
This chapter ends with a comment regarding all the following chapters. We shall
often encounter the word “exclusive” in one or other of its forms. This is a charac-
teristic cutting across all the arguments against rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period,
and it is worth special mention before we proceed to the individual arguments. Then
as now, art was not considered omnipotent. Being a natural human phenomenon
with a limited scope, art is not always successful. A doctor who fails to save all his
patients does not thereby lose his title, just as a general who loses one or two battles
is considered no less a master of the art of warfare. This is already pointed out in
the fifth chapter of the Hippocratic De Arte and many other places. No one would
think of suspecting the expertise of an expert (the “art” of an “artist”) just because
of the occasional failure.141 Yet the philosophers of the Hellenistic Period, finding
their livelihood threatened by the rise of the schools of rhetoric, suddenly find all
sorts of reasons to discredit rhetoric as an art.142 The fact that the aim of rhetoric –
139 In such cases there is the primary problem of deciding whether one version is a summary of
the other, or whether the second is an expansion of the first. The decision often rests with external
evidence.
140 One criticism against all the secondary literature is the common assumption that the authors,
especially Quintilian and Sextus Empiricus, are no more than neutral media through which their
sources pass. Their arrangement of the material is considered significant for the understanding of
the arguments. To take one outstanding example, Radermacher’s collection of parallels from Sextus
Empiricus, Philodemus and Quintilian (X–XV) is designed to find arguments already well-known,
and this requires stripping away the contexts in which the arguments are found. Thus Radermacher
can present and correctly connect between two claims. The first is that there are orators who learned
rhetoric, but who despite this failed to attain their goal of persuading (b1); the second is that there
have been great orators who managed to persuade despite never learning rhetoric (b2). These two
claims follow one another in Sextus Empiricus (II. 13–15; 16); but in Quintilian they are reversed
and not found together (17. 11; 17. 22). Radermacher also failed to consider the surrounding argu-
ments, author’s section headings or bridging sentences, assuming that the claims spoke for them-
selves. I hope to show that the context is usually highly significant.
141 Were the failures to be a common occurrence, these would be a cause for concern, but we
shall stay clear of this problem for now.
142 In the third chapter of the Hippocratic De Arte, the author notes during the definition of the
art of medicine that part of the art is the doctor’s knowing when medicine cannot heal. That some
patients cannot be healed by the doctor does not therefore mean that he does not possess the art. The
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persuasion – is not always achieved by the orator suffices to throw the art of the ora-
tor into question. The fact that the materia of rhetoric is common to additional arts
is considered reason enough to remove rhetoric from the family of arts. If the orator
on occasion harms his audience, again, the fate of rhetoric has been determined.
These are just a few of the examples of the arguments based on the principle of the
exclusivity of arts. The outstanding example, however, is the way in which any defi-
nition of the art of rhetoric is subjected to an exhaustive examination of all its ele-
ments.143 One element out of place and rhetoric is demoted to a tribv́, empeirı́a or
even a kakotecnı́a. This general tendency to place art out of the reach of rhetoric
by setting extreme standards for art is what we call the exclusivity of the arts.
We have now come to the end of our survey of the background to the controversy
over rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period. The following chapters aim to reconstruct a
number of arguments connected with the controversy. The choice of arguments is
not random. Quintilian, supported by Cicero and Philodemus, testifies that the oppo-
nents of rhetoric availed themselves of any argument they could find, even argu-
ments which originally have nothing to do with the controversy; they even make
cosmetic changes to an existing argument, add new examples, etc. Our choice for
the five arguments examined here is based on two main criteria: firstly, because of
the state of the sources, each of the arguments must appear in more than one
source;144 secondly, these arguments are not borrowed from other fields but are
based on the claim of rhetoric to be an art. These arguments reflect substantial pro-
blems pertaining not only to rhetoric per se but also to rhetoric as an art representing
all arts. These arguments, therefore, clarify not only the controversy surrounding
rhetoric, but also the attitude towards art in general in that period. Art itself comes
under scrutiny by the very nature of the arguments, touching as they do on: the tea-
cher-pupil relationship; the possibilty of using the art for bad ends; its aim; and the
materia of rhetoric.
very mention of this possibility shows that the criticism was made (and is indeed made in the fourth
chapter of the same work), but of more interest to us is that this criticism did not unduly worry the
author. He actually incorporates this deficiency of the art into the definition of the art. Such a proce-
dure is not followed by anyone in the second Period of the debate over rhetoric. In the case of the
doctor, where the context is natural and authentic and the target audience is the whole populace, all
sane people recognize that the doctor cannot be expected to perform miracles. The doctor is only hu-
man, and working among humans. As such, not everything is possible, and the author of De Arte
can insert the reservation about the art into the definition of the art. In the case of the second Period
of the debate over rhetoric, the context is artificial. It is only pedants arguing in a circle who could
demand from the artist of rhetoric what is hardly ever demanded even of the gods.
143 This is the method of Sextus Empiricus, beginning at Math. II. 10.
144 The similarity between the versions in different sources is too great to be coincidental, while
the differences between them require some serious philological and philosophical groundwork be-
fore the original argument can be arrived at in each case.
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3. The Exclusivity of Teaching Argument
3.1. General Points
The Exclusivity of Teaching Argument is as follows. If rhetoric is an art, then it is
only through it, via the teacher or school of rhetoric, that one can arrive at the end
of the art, which is the orator and/or the speech.1 One counterexample will suffice
to show that rhetoric is not an art.
It was observed at the end of the last chapter that exclusivity runs through all the
Hellenistic arguments raised against rhetoric,2 but the exclusivity referred to in the
title of this argument is not of the same type. The uniqueness of the exclusivity in
the education argument lies in the nature of the art as an array of knowledge pos-
sessed by an expert in a master-pupil relationship. That is to say, in this argument,
education is the exclusive factor by which art is expressed.
The exclusivity of art was a concept serving motives not entirely philosophical.
The philosophical schools were worried about the loss of their livelihood as students
were attracted away to the schools of rhetoric. In the ancient period it was accepted
that an artist was entitled to teach and even to demand a tuiton fee; his entitlement
to teach could at least be questioned by proving him to be a charlatan. With this in
mind, the opponents of rhetoric set out to prove that rhetoric was not an art. Many
arguments were employed, but practical success (dissuading students to study with
rhetors) was most likely to come from undermining the teacher-pupil relationship,
using the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument.
3.2. The Sources
All four main sources provide testimony for this argument: Cicero, De Oratore I.
83–93;3 Quintilian, II. 17. 5–13; Sextus Empiricus, Math. II. 13–19;4 and various
fragments from Philodemus.5
1 The orator and the speech are both products of the art of rhetoric, as shown by the two formu-
lations of this argument in Quintilian, II. 17. 7 (oratio) and II. 17. 11 (orator). These products need
to be distinguished from ends of rhetoric, such as persuasion (tò peı́Xein, persuadere) and speaking
well (tò eu légein, bene dicere), although of course there is a connection between them.
2 See pp.56–57 above.
3 This includes the whole of Antonius’ long speech, in order to provide the context for the speci-
fic arguments at I. 89–90.
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None of these sources provides a complete and clear picture of the Exclusivity of
Teaching Argument, but much may be gained by comparing each with the others.
Several possible interpretations present themselves, but it seems that one may final-
ly be established as being more plausible than the others. Our method will begin by
examining the most complete text and its origins without implying that this is the
preferred version of the argument from the point of view of its correctness or fide-
lity towards its sources.6 The other sources may then be compared with it. This
method may seem to be arbitrary, and indeed it is, but it is dictated by the poor state
of our sources.7
Of the four sources in this instance, we choose to begin with Cicero, for three rea-
sons: firstly, the theoretical basis for the argument is to be found there; secondly,
the argument is consciously presented as self-standing; thirdly, the argument is ex-
plicitly attributed to Charmadas.8
3.3. The Testimony of Cicero
3.3.1. The Arguments
The speech of Antonius in De Oratore I. 80–95 contains a description of a debate in
Athens between Charmadas the philosopher and Menedemus the rhetor (I. 83–93),
which may be divided into two parts (83–89; 90–93) for the simple reason that at I.
90 Charmadas turns to a discussion of the “art” of rhetoric, and denies its existence
completely. The discussion is supposed to be de officio et ratione oratoris disputatio
(82), and this is a clear departure from that subject. We are told at I. 90 that Charma-
das was often carried away in this direction. The digression is not restricted to this
4 The Exclusivity of Teaching Argument appears at II. 16–18, in the context of a discussion on
the téloß during criticism of the definition of art which appears at II. 10.
5 The state of the text of Philodemus prevents precise location of the argument and its context.
The relevant fragments are discussed in §3.6 below.
6 Barnes and RW used Sextus Empiricus as their main text for all the arguments (the Appendix
of RW presents the arguments in the order of their appearance in Sextus, together with their paral-
lels in the other sources). It must be clearly stated that the order of appearance of arguments in Sex-
tus Empiricus reflects no more than the choices made by Sextus himself in the arrangement of his
material. Our own method is to choose the most complete version of each argument as our starting
point, with no preference for a particular author.
7 The same method is used in the collation of manuscripts, whereby one manuscript is chosen
primarily for its relative completeness against which variant readings in other manuscripts are noted.
After the collation, this base manuscript may be found to be marginal to the textual tradition as a
whole.
8 The argument is attributed to Critolaus in Philodemus where, however, we lack a context ap-
proaching anywhere near the completeness of Cicero. Whatever the case may be concerning the ori-
gin of the argument, there can at least be no doubt that Charmadas used the argument.
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passage, but is expressed in outbursts by Charmadas9 throughout the whole conver-
sation, and we do not know for certain when or where these took place.10
The second part is of most interest to us and will occupy most of our attention;
yet the whole discussion is of great significance, and we shall return to the earlier
parts of it in due course. One point needs to be made at this stage. It is Mnesarchus
who begins the argument, the Stoic who is the first representative of the philoso-
phers against the rhetors. It is only his dry and unacceptable speech which causes
Charmadas the Academic to enter the conversation and take charge (I. 84). Charma-
das is thus seen to improve upon the argument of Mnesarchus. At I. 90, however,
the frequent interruptions by Charmadas and his denial of rhetoric as an art harm
the alliance with the Stoics;11 it needs to be clearly stated that the description of the
debate in these paragraphs presents the complex controversy of the philosophers
against the rhetors and against rhetoric (the double debate). While Charmadas does
not regard rhetoric as an art, he cannot use this argument against rhetoric so long as
he and Mnesarchus are presenting a united front against Menedemus and the rhet-
ors. For the time being he must keep to arguments concerning mainly the sphere of
activity proper to rhetoric; the philosophers will attempt to restrict it as much as
possible, while the rhetors strive to expand it. Yet Charmadas and Mnesarchus still
have their internal debate regarding the Stoic support, no matter how idiosyncratic
it might be, for rhetoric as an art.12 In other words, Charmadas should avoid argu-
ments against rhetoric as an art so long as Mnesarchus is present, and deviates if he
employs them despite Mnesarchus.
The question immediately arises whether the arguments against rhetoric as an art
reflect the internal debate of the philosophers or constitute part of the external de-
bate against the rhetors, since the subject matter could indeed be used in both con-
texts. A decisive conclusion can be reached only through an analysis of the argu-
9 Charmadas’ tendency to interrupt is emphasized; cf. excitabatur homo promptus (ibid., 85).
10 We should not automatically dismiss the possibility that this conversation with Menedemus
is not the only conversation Charmadas had, so that the digression on the art of rhetoric in I. 90
might represent a conversation Charmadas had with someone else which Antonius witnessed. We
do read about diserti homines at I. 85, with Menedemus among them. Furthermore, the use of verbs
in the imperfect throughout I. 84–85 might support this claim. Yet Antonius’ report of the discus-
sions Charmadas had with other rhetors should be distinguished from the content of the conversa-
tions. When Antonius refers to the content of the conversations, he restricts himself to the conversa-
tion with Menedemus, giving the impression that Menedemus represents the diserti homines. Were
this not the case, Antonius would not have had to mention him specifically in connection with the
argument at I. 85 (qui cum diceret). He could have reported a general debate between philosophers
and rhetors, naming all those involved, as Crassus does in I. 45ff.
11 Leeman-Pinkster (1981) 182–183 see Charmadas as contradicting, or at least denying, his
own rhetorical position as it appears in I. 87.
12 The reference to the dry speech of Mnesarchus at I. 83 may be alluding to this. On the use of
the word spinosa in connection with the Stoics, cf. also Cic. Fin. IV. 79.
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ments themselves in relation to the various groups and their attitude towards rheto-
ric. The answer to this question must therefore be postponed to the end of the dis-
cussion.13 It is now time to turn to our first source, De Oratore I. 90–91, in the
speech of Charmadas.14
Charmadas completely rejects the possibility that rhetoric is an art. He backs up
his position with two argumenta (I. 90).15 The first is that all humans are born with
the natural ability “to speak for themselves”. All humans apply rhetoric naturally in
their daily lives: they can persuade others to accept their opinion and support it
when it is to their advantage; they can frighten their opponents with threats; they
can present their version of events and support it with arguments; they can refute
their opponents’ version together with its supporting arguments; and they can even
conclude their accounts in the right way. In short, man is a natural orator. The sec-
ond argument (et quod) is that experience and exercise (consuetudo exercitatioque)
are sufficient to sharpen the understanding and improve one’s ability to speak.16 We
shall call the first the Natural Orator Argument, the second, the Experienced Orator
Argument. Common to both is the conclusion that rhetoric is not an art.17
It is only now that Charmadas passes to exempla, but here too we find in effect
two arguments. Firstly, no author of handbooks on rhetoric was himself an orator;
here, Charmadas reviews all such authors beginning with Corax and Tisias. Sec-
ondly, many people were very eloquent (eloquentissimi homines) without having
learned rhetoric or even seeing the need to learn it. Charmadas brings as his exam-
ple here none other than Antonius himself. The first “example” we shall call the
13 See nn.64–65; 78–79 below.
14 Charmadas continues his attack in I. 92, but the argument there is clearly different, and is
about knowledge. The presentation of the argument (artem vero negabat. . .) also shows that this is a
new argument, sharing with the previous argument only the conclusion that rhetoric is not an art.
Other arguments not belonging to the exclusivity of teaching, at least in its original form, are also to
be found in I. 90–91, and will be treated later in the discussion. They must also be treated as evi-
dence for the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument, since Cicero or his source regard them as such.
15 Charmadas’ use of argumenta may be contrasted with Menedemus’ use of exempla, e. g., ea
Menedemus exemplis magis quam argumentis conabatur refellere (I. 88).
16 Leeman-Pinkster (ibid.) refer to I. 5, where Cicero mentions a difference with his brother
Quintus. A quick comparison suffices to show that the additional argument reflects the opinion of
Quintus, in other words, that rhetoric is a function of natural talent and exercise. I shall be arguing
later that Cicero at I. 90 may well be combining two similar arguments, one an improvement on the
other.
17 The opening sentence of Aristotle’s Rhetorica also expresses the opinion that humans are
orators “in some way” (trópon tiná). This, however, actually helps Aristotle to categorize rhetoric
as an art, in the same group as dialectic. Aristotle may be regarded in this context as belonging to
the first period, with Charmadas, of course, belonging to the second. This example demonstrates
very well how a simple fact may be used to support different, even conflicting, conclusions, depend-
ing upon the motivation of the author of the argument. On the Charmadas’ argument itself, see Brit-
tain (2001) 319–328.
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“Dumb Rhetor Argument”,18 and the second we shall call the “Famous Orator Ar-
gument”.
Charmadas’ position against the exclusivity of teaching is, then, supported by
four arguments: Natural Orator; Experienced Orator; Dumb Rhetor; Famous Orator.
It is time now to turn to an analysis of these arguments.
The first problem is the unclear distinction between argumenta and exempla.
Parts of the exempla could easily have appeared as argumenta in their own right:
the actual examples (rhetors such as Corax and Tisias; orators such as Antonius) ex-
emplify definite claims made within the exempla (that authors of handbooks did not
practise rhetoric themselves; that one can be a famous orator without learning rheto-
ric).19 Since the Ciceronian text, however, distinguishes between the argumenta and
the exempla, an attempt must be made to ascertain the motives for this distinction.
On the face of it, we have four separate arguments, two of which contain examples,
for which reason these two are referred to in their entirety as exempla, while the
other two are claims containing no examples, for which reason they are argumenta.
There is another possibility, the one adopted here, that the exempla arguments sup-
port the argumenta.20 The two argumenta appear to be making one basic claim, that
rhetoric is nothing but a natural ability given to every human, amenable to improve-
ment by exercise and experience. Corroboration is provided by the exempla argu-
ments, that rhetors where never orators, and that famous orators never learned rheto-
ric. Even if the two argumenta do make one basic claim, however, Cicero treats
them as separate arguments, and the two elements should be considered separately.
An examination of Cicero’s text and the parallels in Sextus Empiricus and Philo-
demus leads me to a tentative proposal, that of the two argumenta, the second, the
Experienced Orator argument is actually an improved and extended version of the
first, the Natural Orator argument. A reason for the improvement may be found in
the second argument of the exempla, the Famous Orator, which had originally been
devised to support rhetoric. My reconstruction is as follows: the opponents of rheto-
ric claimed that rhetoric was not an art but a natural ability (Natural Orator argu-
ment). The supporters of rhetoric replied that natural rhetorical ability could allow a
person to perform moderately well in lawcourts and public assemblies, but did not
suffice to turn the speaker into a professional orator, for which there was a need for
the art of rhetoric and the rhetors (proto-Famous Orator argument). It was in answer
to this that the opponents emphasized experience and exercise (Experienced Orator
argument). They would have argued that those who were more than moderately suc-
cessful in public speaking were so not because of any training in an art, but simply
18 This name is inspired by one of the parallels to this argument which appears in Sextus Em-
piricus II. 18, on which more later.
19 The parallels in other texts will show that these are indeed arguments.
20 The exempla are exempla here because they contain examples with specific names, but the
arguments themselves are what support the argumenta.
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because they had more experience and exercise in public speaking. These three ar-
guments could have coagulated into one cohesive argument against rhetoric as an
art, that a person has a natural rhetorical ability which may be improved by experi-
ence and exercise. We shall call this the Extended Natural Orator Argument,21 in
which the Famous Orator argument was turned on its makers. It would have been at
this later stage when the opponents of rhetoric added the names of famous orators
who never learned rhetoric.22
The only example which could corroborate the Extended Natural Orator argu-
ment should logically be a person or persons who had never learned rhetoric and yet
had become famous at oratory, the persuasiveness of the example increasing with
the number of orators mentioned.23 Although the Famous Orator argument with its
examples is essential to the extended argument, Charmadas first produces an exem-
plum dealing with those who did not become orators, intending, of course, the tea-
chers of rhetoric. In what way does the Dumb Rhetor argument inherent in this first
exemplum support the extended argument that rhetoric is natural and not an art?
Clearly, if it is shown that no24 rhetor was an orator, it would need to be concluded
– according to the opponents of rhetoric as an art – that they lacked the natural abil-
ity, experience and exercise so essential to the successful orator, and that no art of
rhetoric was in their possession to help them be successful orators.
The phrase quasi dedita opera in the Dumb Rhetor argument is ambiguous. On
the one hand, it might mean that the rhetors were aware of their shortcomings as
orators despite their expertise and intentionally refrained from entering that field.
This interpretation, however, would grant the rhetors an art of rhetoric, and this does
not fit the context. The alternative interpretation is quite the opposite: the rhetors
could have served as orators had they wished (just as anyone could, naturally), but
21 The Extended Natural Orator argument is therefore presented by Cicero, who, however, ap-
pears also to preserve the stages in its development. The parallel texts also present this version.
Quintilian II. 17. 5, following Cicero, takes the two argumenta as one argument: Quidam naturalem
esse rhetoricen volunt. et tamen adiuvari exercitatione non diffitentur. See the more detailed discus-
sion below.
22 It may be the case, although this is entirely speculative, that the supporters of rhetoric failed
to provide specific examples of famous orators who had learned rhetoric. Their argument was gener-
al, and stated impersonally that natural ability was insufficient at the level of a famous, professional,
orator. Their claim would seemed to have required no examples, while the argument to the contrary
would certainly have required examples.
23 Charmadas in our passage adduces only one example, but the Greek source would have sup-
plied a number of examples, as may be seen from the parallels in Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian
(see immediately below); cf. the remarks of Hubbell (1920) 372–373.
24 Charmadas goes out of his way to survey all the main teachers of rhetoric from the very first
up to his time; this heads off a potential counter-argument which might have explained the per-
ceived failings of this or that rhetor in the practise of oratory as due to physical disabilities (stutter-
ing, shortness, etc.). It would be implausible to suggest that all the main rhetors were not orators be-
cause they all suffered from physical disabilities.
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they had reasons for not doing so. Whatever the case may, it would seem that the
Dumb Rhetor argument was not an original element of the Extended Natural Orator
argument, and the reason for its addition will need to be considered later in the dis-
cussion.
The development of the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument as it appears in Ci-
cero’s testimony may be summarized as follows:
a) The Natural Orator argument: all have rhetorical ability without the
need for teachers of rhetoric.
b) The proto-Famous Orator counter-argument suggests that one cannot
become a successful orator without an education in rhetoric which de-
velops this natural ability. It may not have been felt necessary to add
the names of famous orators.
c) In reaction to the proto-Famous Orator argument, the opponents of
rhetoric as an art devised the Experienced Orator argument: these fa-
mous orators do not prove the existence of an art of rhetoric, since their
success is grounded in their experience and exercise of oratory.
d) The proto-Famous Orator argument is adopted by the opponents of
rhetoric as an art, and the Famous Orator argument is used – with ex-
amples – to support the Extended Natural Orator argument.
e) A second exemplum – the Dumb Rhetor – is added to complement the
Famous Orator exemplum in the Extended Natural Orator argument.
Although it is less pertinent, it precedes the Famous Orator exemplum.
3.3.2. The Target of the Arguments
It must now be asked whether the argument reflects the internal or the external de-
bate, or, given that the testimony presents a late stage in the evolution of the argu-
ment, a mixture of both. A full answer to this question must be postponed to the end
of this chapter, but some progress may already be made.
The two exempla arguments cannot belong to the internal debate. The Famous
Orator argument would have been to no avail against the Stoics. The examples of
famous orators who had not studied rhetoric25 would not have been considered by
the Stoics to be orators at all, since for them only the Stoic sage could be an orator.
The Dumb Orator argument would also have been irrelevant against the Stoics. To
grasp this point, we shall need to make a distinction which will actually be of use to
us throughout the rest of the discussion: this is the distinction between teachers of
25 Cicero’s testimony gives only Antonius as an example, but the Greek source would have in-
cluded famous Greek orators such as Aeschines, Demades and even Demosthenes. See further in the
discussion on the parallels in Sextus Empiricus, Quintilian and Philodemus.
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rhetoric and the study of rhetoric. The Stoics regarded rhetoric as an art and as
something to be studied. At the same time, they did not posit the existence of tea-
chers of rhetoric. One of their innovations in the field of rhetoric is the very idea
that rhetoric is an art which does not have specialized teachers.26 The Stoic sage
will be the true orator. Any true orator would need to be a Stoic sage. The Stoic
sage, wise in all aspects of behaviour, would necessarily be the expert in the field of
rhetoric too. The fact that Charmadas bothered to list all the famous rhetors from
Corax and Tisias onwards clearly indicates that this argument was directed against
the schools of rhetoric rather than the Stoics, who would certainly not have regarded
Corax, Tisias and the other rhetors as Stoic sages.
Although the exempla arguments clearly belong to the external debate, the argu-
menta are not so easily categorized. The Natural Orator argument, especially in its
extended form, could serve both debates. Even if a Stoic were not a specialized tea-
cher of rhetoric, he would still have taught rhetoric as a part of Stoic philosophy,
against which practice the Natural Orator argument would have been pertinent. The
opponents of rhetoric in the internal debate, the Peripatetics and Academics, could
have argued against the Stoics that there was no need at all to waste time on the
teaching of rhetoric, since rhetoric was a natural ability, not an art, which could im-
prove with experience and practice.
The Natural Orator argument in the external debate was given, as we have seen,
some supporting exempla. If the argument was also used in the internal debate, we
might expect it to have had some exempla there too. What these exempla might have
been will be revealed in our discussion of the parallel from Quintilian, but Cicero
does not supply any such exemplum against the Stoics. We may conclude, therefore,
that Cicero’s testimony relates to the exclusivity of teaching insofar as it pertains to
the external debate, and to the second stage of the debate, the period in which the
Academic Charmadas attacked the teachers of rhetoric. The possibility that the ar-
gument was also used in the internal debate has not been ruled out, but there is no
evidence in Cicero.
So far, the argument has been speculative and based on probabilities. The paral-
lels to the Ciceronian testimony will provide a clearer picture of the original argu-
ment, its claims, its targets, and its author.
26 This is a claim made explicitly at the beginning of the speech of Mnesarchus: . . . atque ipsam
eloquentiam, quod ex bene dicendi scientia constaret, unam quandam esse virtutem et, qui unam
virtutem haberet, omnis habere. . . I. 83. Furthermore, according to Stoic doctrine, rhetoric not only
has no need for teachers of rhetoric, but is not even an independent field of study. Virtue is the art
of living well; every art consists of two aspects, namely knowledge and its practice; virtue was di-
vided into the knowledge called wisdom, and its practice, called philosophy. All fields of knowledge
of the Stoic sage were actually aspects of this wisdom in relation to the various topoi – discrete parts
– of behaviour: rhetoric was always subsumed in one way or another to the logical topos of philoso-
phy. See Ludlam (1997) 205–211; 223–225.
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3.4. The Testimony of Sextus Empiricus
3.4.1. The Arguments
We are concerned here with Sextus Empiricus II. 16–18. It is particularly important
with Sextus not to ignore the context, since he puts much thought into the arrange-
ment of his material.27 This passage constitutes part of a longer argument (13–19),
itself part of an even longer argument (10–19) with which we shall begin.
At II. 10, Sextus adduces the Stoic definition of art and commences his criticism
of this definition. The Stoic definition may be divided in two parts. The first part
states that art is a system of exercised cognitions;28 and the second part states that
this is to the beneficial end of [cognitions] relevant to life.29 This is how Sextus or
his source found the Stoic definition of art which served as ammunition in his criti-
cism of rhetoric. The passage at II. 11–12 is devoted to a critique of the first part of
the definition. The argument then turns at II. 13–19 to the second part of the defini-
tion on the goal of art.30 At II. 16, however, there begins what appears to me to be
an addition to the original argument, added either by Sextus or his source, as we
shall now see.
II. 13 begins with the claim that rhetoric not only fails to achieve its goal consis-
tently but fails even in the majority of cases. The argument at II. 14–15 proves this
claim, and this is followed by II. 16:
eiper te e ndécetai genésXai r v́tora mv̀ metascónta tṽß r vtorikṽß
técnvß, ou k a n eiv tiß técnv r vtorikv́. e ndécetai dé ge ıkanw̃ß kaì
katà trópon r vtoreúein mv̀ metascónta r vtorikṽß. . .
This is none other than the Famous Orator argument which we identified in Cicero’s
second exemplum.31 One might discern a rational connection between this argument
and the preceding context (§§13–15) as follows: on the one hand, rhetoric does not
achieve its objective, while on the other hand, there are those who never learned
27 As will be seen from our analysis of the text; cf. RW (2006) 397 on their appraisal of Sextus
as a source.
28 sústvmá estin e k katalv́yewn suggegumnasménwn.
29 kaì epì téloß eu crvston tw̃n e n tw̃ bı́w lambanousw̃n tv̀n a naforán. The various parallels
to the Stoic definition appear in SVF I. fr. 73; for additional sources see Barnes (1986) 18 n.29.
30 Although this part of the Stoic definition of art refers to the beneficial end rather than to the
end per se, Sextus in his criticism discusses the end per se, raising the question whether the expert
always, or at least in most cases, succeeds in the realization of his art. On this problem, see §5.4.1
below. Here we are concerned only with the way Sextus or his source thinks, and his arrangement
of the discussion.
31 The argument of Cicero’s first exemplum appears in Sextus II. 18, and is dealt with immedi-
ately below.
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rhetoric yet do achieve its objective. It is, however, not difficult to see the patch-
work here. Firstly, there is the formal-textual proof. §15 concludes with a statement
that rhetoric is not an art. Were §16 part of the argument beginning at §13, such a
conclusion would have been premature. Secondly, if §16 is assumed to supplement
§§13–15, there would then be a problem with the expression “and conversely”
opening §18. In such a case the argument falls into three parts, the first and third of
which are of a piece (§§13–15, 18), giving us the pattern A (13–15) B (16–17) A
(18).32 Beyond all this, §§13–15 deal not with the possibility of an orator existing
without having learned rhetoric but with the aim of rhetoric and the orator, namely
persuasion and victory. §16 does not deal with these. We would have expected of a
second side of the equation some argument establishing that there are those who are
not orators but still manage to beat their opponents through persuasion. While
§§16–19 deal with the exclusivity of teaching, §§13–15 deal with the exclusivity of
Attaining the End Argument.33 We must, therefore, regard §§16–19 as a self-stand-
ing passage, and it is this to which we shall now turn.34
§16 of course begins a new problem, with §§16–17 representing one side, and
§§18–19 (“conversely”) representing the other; this two-sided argument parallels
the two arguments in Cicero’s exempla. The first to appear is the Famous Orator ar-
gument (§16),35 followed by the Dumb Rhetor (§18). Unlike Cicero, Sextus allows
32 Barnes (ibid.) 9 refers to this argument: “If it is possible to become an orator without partak-
ing in rhetoric, then rhetoric will not be an art (II 16); and secondly, he urges ‘conversely’ (a nti-
strófwß) that if the close students of rhetoric are impotent in practice, then rhetoric is not an art (II
18).” Barnes has overlooked the fact that Sextus takes 16 to be a second side of 13–15, with all the
problems that that entails. Barnes’ statement that 18 deals with students is incorrect. The paragraph
actually deals with teachers, as is corroborated by the epithet sofisteúonteß in the following sen-
tence. Furthermore, Barnes even refers the reader in n.41 to the parallel in Cic. De Oratore I. 20. 91,
with which we have dealt above; but he failed to note the two sides of the equation and the different
order in which they appear in the two sources.
33 The exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument is analysed in detail on §6.3 below.
34 Radermacher compares Sextus with Quintilian. Sextus II. 13–15, and Quintilian II. 17. 22 he
calls b1, while Sextus II. 16 and Quintilian II. 17. 11 he calls b2. On the connection between them,
he writes (1895) xv: Offenbar nämlich gehören b1 und b2 enger zusammen, insofern als unter 1
nachgewiesen wird, daß der technisch gebildete Redner nicht immer sein Ziel erreicht, unter 2, daß
auch Ungebildete dies Ziel (tò peı́Xein) erreicht haben. It is easy to see Radermacher’s mistake.
While b1 is immediately followed by b2 in Sextus, the two passages are quite a way apart in Quinti-
lian. Radermacher found some logic to the sequence in Sextus, and imposed that on the passages in
Quintilian. It did not occur to him that the passages might concern different subjects entirely (as
should be clearly seen from the different contexts in which the passages appear in Quintilian), and
that Sextus (or his source) was guilty of stitching the two together; cf. RW (1964) 399 (Appendix);
Brittain (2001) 299. The parallels in Quintilian will be discussed in detail later in this chapter,
pp.71–76.
35 Sextus provides an example from Demades “and many others with him”. His source may
well have contained additional names, but for reasons to be considered later, Sextus prefers to men-
tion only Demades. Cicero also provides only one example, in his case Antonius, where he is clearly
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the defenders of rhetoric to produce a refutation after each argument (§§17 and 19
respectively), and Sextus also reverses the order of the two arguments, for reasons
to be discussed below.
So far we have identified only the two exempla arguments appearing in Cicero.
What of the argumenta, the Natural Orator and the Experienced Orator arguments?
Sextus has his supporters of rhetoric begin their defence against the Famous Orator
argument (§16) with the following (§17):
a llwß te kaì [epeì]36 toútoiß a pistoũmen w ß toioútoiß gegonósi kaì
e n eÇ xei ka k toiaútvß tinòß tribṽß37 epì tò r vtoreúein parelvluXósin,
a ll’ ou n ge e n tw̃ kaX’ v mãß bı́w polloùß párestin o rãn légontaß
mèn eu fuw̃ß epì dikastvrı́wn kaì e n e kklvsı́aiß, tà dè tecnikà tṽß
r vtorikṽß paraggélmata mv̀ ginẃskontoß.
The first of Cicero’s argumenta, the Natural Orator argument, has in Sextus re-
placed the Famous Orator argument in the following way: “If we doubt the veracity
of the fact that Demades did not learn rhetoric, we still have another objection to
rhetoric, the Natural Orator argument.”
As for the Experienced Orator argument, traces of it are to be found in the pas-
sage just quoted, where the reason why we might doubt the Famous Orator argu-
ment is that we do not believe that it is possible through tribv́ alone to attain such a
level of rhetoric. There is no hint in §16 that tribv́ caused Demades, the example gi-
ven there, to attain his level of rhetoric. Sextus (or his source) seems to have abbre-
viated an argument, or pasted together from different sources. The objection in §17
clearly responds to some argument claiming that Demades or one of the other fa-
mous orators attained his level of rhetoric through tribv́. This argument would have
been raised by the opponents of rhetoric, and it is none other than the Experienced
Orator argument.
Cicero and Sextus have organized the material differently. Which version is more
reliable? Cicero retains the claim establishing an alternative to the art of rhetoric
(the Natural Orator argument) and provides exempla while Sextus (or his source)
does not have this claim at all. We have also just seen the lax editing of the Famous
Orator argument in Sextus. Moreover, the Natural Orator argument should not be
used as an alternative to the Famous Orator argument, since it is weaker. Our analy-
reworking his material for a Roman audience. Hubbell (1920) 372–373 argues that the examples
were originally Greek (we may surmise that they included Demades). This is supported by the fact
that Cicero’s Charmadas originally had a list of Greek orators who had not learned rhetoric: innu-
merabilis quosdam nominabat (De Oratore I. 91).
36 G reads epeı́. Harder emended to ei. Mutschman-Mau omit epeı́.
37 I regard the conjunction of eÇ xiß and tribv́ as a hendiadys: Demades’ eÇ xiß was acquired by
tribv́, the latter consequently being the element responsible for his becoming an orator. The order
of the two words is otherwise inexplicable, since it is the tribv́ which is materially prior to the eÇ xiß.
With regard to this argument I shall henceforth refer only to the tribv́.
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sis of Cicero revealed that it was actually the Famous Orator argument which could
undermine the Natural Orator argument. All these considerations lead to the conclu-
sion that the version in Sextus is later than the one in Cicero. If Sextus himself is re-
sponsible for the editing, then this is certainly the case; and probable even if Sextus
is merely copying his source.38 His refutation of the counter-argument against the
Dumb Rhetor argument increases the probability that Sextus’ version is later than
Cicero’s, since Cicero would surely have used this material in Charmadas’ speech
against rhetoric had he known about it.39
3.4.2. The Target of the Arguments
Our analysis of Cicero had shown with high probability that the schools of rhetoric
were the target of the general argument (the external debate). Since all the argu-
ments used in it are to be found in Sextus, it would appear logical to regard them in
Sextus as also testifying to the external debate. While this may indeed be the case, it
should be recalled that the external debate had two stages. The differences between
the two versions suggest that each testifies to a different stage; since Cicero’s ver-
sion is attributed to Charmadas, Sextus’ version might logically testify to the earlier
stage of the debate and the main protagonist, Critolaus.
The apportionment of the two versions, however, cannot be made so absolutely.
Each reflects a number of transformations during the transmission, with influences
from other versions. It would be more correct to extricate whatever version is possi-
ble of the argument.40 Thus the argument as a whole in Sextus is later than the argu-
ment as a whole in Cicero, but we can extricate from it a version of the external de-
bate as it was in the first stage. This may be proved by observing the differences
between Cicero and Sextus, especially in the order of the Famous Orator argument
and the Dumb Rhetor argument. I claimed during the analysis of Cicero’s passage
that the Famous Orator argument was the best proof for the claim of the Natural
Orator and should have appeared at the beginning of the exempla; indeed this is
where we find it in Sextus. It will be necessary later on to consider why the Dumb
38 Probability is the best that can be aimed at when speculating about the chronological order of
two versions. It might, for example, be argued that Cicero’s version is a condensed form of Sextus
§§ 16–17. Our assessment is more probable for the reasons already cited, and in light of the compar-
ison with Quintilian II. 17. 5–13 (immediately below).
39 The counter-argument in Sextus II. 17 is not of the same order, since it is none other than the
Natural Orator argument which appears in a different context in Cicero. The counter-argument in II.
19 against the Dumb Rhetor argument, on the other hand, has no parallel in Cicero, although we
learn from previous paragraphs in Cicero of attempted responses by Menedemus and their refuta-
tions by Charmadas (e.g. I. 88–89).
40 Thus Sextus II. 10–15 certainly reflects an argument against the Stoa (the internal debate),
since all the claims are based on the Stoic definition of art. We have already demonstrated that §16
is an addition by Sextus or his source; see pp.66–67 above.
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Rhetor took pride of place in Cicero’s exempla, but for now all that concerns us is
that Sextus reflects Critolaus and the first stage of the debate.
A further proof might be added, although it would not stand independently. Cri-
tolaus appears explicitly in §12. This occurs during another argument, but during
the wider circle of argument in §§10–19, which may have been taken in its entirety
from a source deriving from Critolaus.
To summarize our findings from Sextus: this version of the Exclusivity of Teach-
ing Argument reflects the first stage of the external debate in the middle of the sec-
ond century B.C.E. when Critolaus led the philosophical attack on the schools of
rhetoric.
Two main claims in our discussion so far still require substantiating: firstly, that
the Dumb Rhetor argument was a late addition to the Exclusivity of Teaching Argu-
ment; secondly, that there was an internal debate in which the Stoic position came
under attack from rival philosophical schools; nothing has yet been found which
might have reinforced the Natural Orator argument which we have suggested may
have been used against the Stoic position.
Both points are addressed in our analysis of the next source. Quintilian provides
the only testimony in which there is no trace of the Dumb Rhetor argument; the Nat-
ural Orator argument on the other hand is accompanied by what we shall call the
Homeric Orators argument, which appears neither in Cicero nor in Sextus.
3.5. The Testimony of Quintilian
A couple of points need to be stressed before we begin the analysis proper of the ar-
guments. Firstly, while the testimonies of Cicero and Sextus reflect the attack on
rhetoric, Quintilian clearly reflects the Stoic position in support of rhetoric.41 That
his testimony reflects the first stage of the internal debate (Critolaus against Dio-
genes of Babylon) may be inferred from the total absence of Charmadas from me-
tarhetorical passages.42
41 There is much evidence to support this. The definition of rhetoric adopted by Quintilian at II.
15. 38 is Stoic: scientia bene dicendi. Chrysippus and Cleanthes are mentioned in §34 (=SVF II. fr.
292). II. ch. 20 is wholly devoted to the question whether rhetoric is virtus (cf. SVF II. fr. 291), and
Quintilian answers this in the affirmative. Book XII, esp. its prologue, which may be taken together
with the introduction to the whole composition (Praef. 9), presents the perfect orator as the Stoic
sage.
42 Charmadas does appear in Quintilian, XI. 2. 26, but only as an example of someone with a
good memory, although a variant reading would have him replaced by Carneades (see the apparatus
in Radermacher’s Teubner edition). In Cicero, Charmadas is explicitly the source for the arguments;
in Sextus he appears along with a list of others at II. 20.
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3.5.1. The Arguments
II. ch.17 deals with the question whether rhetoric is an art.43 We are concerned with
II. 17. 5–13; the first four sections constitute an introduction to the various argu-
ments. They justify engaging in a question which appears to be redundant; for who
would dare to say that rhetoric is not an art? Much could be said about these sec-
tions, but we are obliged by the strictures of our subject to pass over them and con-
centrate on the subsequent arguments.
§5 begins with the word quidam (“some people”). Leaving for a moment the
identity of these people, let us jump ahead to §14 where the main argument of the
chapter begins. For the next 30 sections until the end of the chapter, various argu-
ments are adduced against rhetoric and are examined by Quintilian. These argu-
ments include such subjects as the goal of rhetoric, its materia, its tendency to harm,
advocate lies, and contradict itself; in short, all the main arguments except for edu-
cation and the institution of the teacher and his pupils: this discussion is reserved
for §§5–13. The fact that this discussion precedes the arguments proper suggests
that it derives from a source other than the one reflected in §§14ff.
§§5–13 may be divided into three main parts. The first part (§§5–6) is the open-
ing objection of “some people” that rhetoric is natural, but may be assisted by train-
ing. This is none other than the Extended Natural Orator argument, that is, the Nat-
ural Orator and the Experienced Orator argument combined, which we have
identified in Cicero,44 and uncovered in Sextus. The defensio for this argument is
that even simple people, slaves and barbarians, can orate similarly to professional
orators.45 The second part (§§7–11) comprises both the Homeric Orators argument
– if rhetoric is an art which begin with Corax and Tisias, how is it that there are al-
ready orators in Homer? – and Quintilian’s relatively lengthy response. The third
part (§§11–13) contains the Famous Orator argument which we have already identi-
fied in Cicero and Sextus.
43 The question appears explicitly in 17. 1.
44 Quintilian regards Cicero’s Antonius in De Oratore as expressing a similar opinion. Rader-
macher’s apparatus fontium sends the reader to II. 232, where there do indeed appear the words ob-
servatio and exercitatio. Yet the reader could have been directed to I. 90 which better reflects the
general theory expressed in Quintilian, although the word observatio is missing. §5 expresses the
same theory as the one In I. 90, that rhetoric is natural and can be assisted by training and experi-
ence; and Quintilian’s words in the same section dicit Antonius certainly suit what is going on in I.
90 rather than II. 232. Quintilian, relying on his memory, may well have conflated the two passages
from Cicero.
45 This is no more than a detailing of the Natural Orator argument at the beginning of §5. While
it is the Natural Orator argument itself in Cicero which establishes that rhetoric is something natural,
in Quintilian this claim opens the section, standing apart from the argument.
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The three parts form one organic whole covering the Exclusivity of Teaching Ar-
gument, so far as Quintilian is concerned. A closer examination reveals that the ar-
guments may have been taken from different contexts with different targets. The
parts have been stitched together, as may be easily demonstrated. The second part is
introduced as follows (§7):
deinde adiciunt illas verborum cavillationes, nihil, quod ex arte fiat,
ante artem fuisse. . .
The third part begins as follows (§11):
quo illud quoque excluditur, quod dicunt, non esse artis id, quod faciat,
qui non didicerit. . .
The difference between the two bridging statements is clear. The first statement in-
troduces the Homeric Orators argument (§§7–11), attributing it to those who re-
garded rhetoric as natural and used this to strengthen their case. Quintilian saw this
introduction in his source. The Famous Orator argument (§11–13) is added as an ap-
pendix. It was not found with the rest of the argument, as will be clear from the
Homeric Orators argument. After concluding his response to the opponents of rheto-
ric as an art, Quintilian recalls the Famous Orator argument and adds it as an after-
thought to his reply, joining it on in his own words.
Thus one source, from which §§5–11 derive, claims that rhetoric is natural and
establishes this with the Homeric Orators argument. Another source, from which
§§11–13 derive, does the same with the Famous Orator argument. We see here two
strategies for proving that rhetoric is natural: first, by noting that there were orators
before the invention of the art of rhetoric; second, by observing the existence today
of famous orators who have never studied the art of rhetoric.
Both arguments provide the same alternative to rhetoric as an art; namely, that
rhetoric is natural. I propose, however, that the two arguments originally had differ-
ent targets. Against the teachers of rhetoric, the most appropriate argument would
have been the one showing that even after the invention of the art of rhetoric, one
could become a famous professional orator without studying rhetoric. The Homeric
orators would not have been so problematic for the teachers of rhetoric, since
Homeric speakers were clearly not professional orators, by definition, not having
studied the as yet undiscovered art of rhetoric.
The use of the Homeric Orators argument would have been most effective
against those who could not deprive the Homeric speakers of the art of rhetoric, and
these, of course, would be the Stoics.
In 1957, Kennedy published an article tracing the source for what we are calling
the Homeric Orators argument. He argued that the Stoics were the first to identify
the Homeric heroes as orators, in the context of their concerted effort to find in them
all the virtues. This identification led to the Homeric Orators argument being used
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by the opponents of rhetoric. “Since the Stoics’ grammatical interests and their alle-
gorizing mythological views fostererd the study of Homer, it may well have been
they who first claimed, probably in the third century B.C., that rhetoric existed in
Homer and who thus created an opportunity for an attack on logical consistency.”46
Kennedy convincingly demonstrates how the attribution of the epithet “orator” to
the Homeric heroes depends upon the development of the theory of tria genera di-
cendi, which first clearly appeared in the Perì léxewß of Theophrastus. It would
only have been after the development of this theory that the three types of speaking
could be identified with the trio Odysseus, Nestor, and Menelaus.47 Such a develop-
ment could have taken place only during the Hellenistic period, and the Stoics are
known to have used allegory to present the Homeric heroes as Stoic sages, finding
in them all the virtues, one of which happened to be rhetoric. It is now time to move
on to an examination of the Homeric Orators argument. §7 begins as follows:
deinde adiciunt illas verborum cavillationes, nihil, quod ex arte fiat,
ante artem fuisse: atqui dixisse homines pro se et in alios semper: doc-
tores artis sero et circa Tisian et Coraca primum repertos: orationem
igitur ante artem fuisse eoque artem non esse.
Reading the words orationem igitur ante artem fuisse, one might wonder who had
this rhetoric, and when; but Quintilian soon provides the answer – the Homeric her-
oes (§§8–9):
nos porro, quando coeperit huius rei doctrina, non laboramus, quam-
quam apud Homerum et praeceptorem Phoenicem cum agendi tum
etiam loquendi et oratores plures et omne in tribus ducibus orationis
genus . . . illud enim admonere satis est, omnia quae ars consummaverit
a natura initia duxisse.
We may have identified the Homeric Orators argument here,48 but the mention of
Tisias and Corax shows that the context is the external debate. The Stoics would ne-
cessarily deny that these two non-Stoics were really teachers of rhetoric. The use of
this argument against the schools of rhetoric is problematic. Would a rhetor regard
the Homeric heroes as orators? Would he not be shooting himself in the foot?
The questions only multiply when we examine Quintilian’s response. He appears
to be aiming at a middle ground whereby the Homeric heroes are to be seen as re-
presenting the natural ability which could be improved by the art of rhetoric. Thus,
for Quintilian, rhetoric is indeed natural, as is seen in Homer, but it can be improved
by the art of rhetoric. If, however, the orginal targets of this argument were rhetors,
46 Kennedy (1957) 30.
47 There are other candidates for this trio, but that is not at issue here.
48 We shall see that Philodemus has a version of this argument being used against the schools
of rhetoric, p.81 below.
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why would they make life difficult for themselves by taking this unsatisfactory posi-
tion? Their position would be so much stronger were they to deny any rhetorical
ability to the Homeric heroes. Such a position has already been identified by Kenne-
dy in prolegomena 17 in Rabe’s collection. The author explicitly denies that Home-
ric speakers have rhetoric.49 What, then, is Quintilian’s source? It is obviously a
Stoic source. Quintilian’s answer could have been given independently of the argu-
ment he is defending against, as it is nothing other than the Stoic position that every
art is a product comprising the three elements of nature, exercise and art. Kennedy
has already shown this from the introduction in De Inventione I. 5, which clearly re-
flects the Stoic view, especially of Posidonius, in the context of a discussion of hu-
man development in general.50
The Homeric Orators argument in Quintilian’s version is thus a compound of an
objection directed against teachers of rhetoric (the external debate) and a response
which reflects an answer to an attack directed against the Stoics (the internal de-
bate). Either Quintilian himself or his source has combined arguments from differ-
ent contexts. It is actually the confused use of the two arguments which has allowed
us to uncover the Homeric Orators argument and determine its original context.
We turn now to the Famous Orator argument in §§11–13. We have already seen
in the earlier analyses that its context is restricted to the external debate. In the phi-
losophers’ attack on the rhetors, the Natural Orator argument is intended to present
an alternative to rhetoric as an art, and this argument we have found supported in
Cicero and Sextus by two other arguments, the Dumb Rhetor and the Famous Ora-
tor. There is no trace of the Dumb Rhetor argument in Quintilian. The Famous Ora-
tor argument is appended as an afterthought to the general Exclusivity of Teaching
Argument, on Quintilian’s own initiative. This argument, peculiar to the external
debate, was not found by Quintilian in the Stoic influenced source he was using for
his response in §§7–11. Yet it is Quintilian of all our sources who can cast much
light on the Famous Orator argument.
After presenting the argument itself in §11, Quintilian moves on to examples in
§§12–13. In contrast to Cicero and Sextus who present only the name of one famous
orator who did not learn rhetoric (Antonius and Demades respectively), Quintilian
provides a collection of possible responses with regard mainly to two orators, De-
mades and Aeschines. It would seem, therefore, that rhetors argued against the ex-
amples thrown at them by the opponents of rhetoric. The discussion in §§12–13 ap-
pears to be a summary of various sources which referred to this argument, with each
source having a different response. Common to all is the explicit declaration by
Quintilian, neque orator esse qui non didicit potest. One’s interpretation of the verb
49 See also the comment made by Kennedy (ibid.) 24–25: “When a late Greek rhetorician says
something unique, one immediately assumes, not that he is being original, which is unthinkable, but
that he is following an independent source.”
50 Kennedy (ibid.) 31 n.22.
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disco has great bearing on each answer. The responses themselves are four in num-
ber:
a) Both the examples learned late in life. This answer takes education to
be connected with studies at the proper school age. It may be because
this answer is unsatisfactory that there are others.
b) Aeschines “learned” from his father who was a teacher of literature.
The concept of learning has here been broadened, although it should be
borne in mind that there was quite an overlap between the various
fields of study and Aeschines may well have come into contact with
certain rules of speaking while studying literature, while maintaining a
distance from rhetors and schools of rhetoric.
c) The testimony regarding the learning of Demades is doubtful.
d) Demades “learned” from vast experience, which itself is the essence of
learning. This answer would have encouraged students of rhetoric to
dispense with rhetors, and Quintilian felt obliged to justify visiting rhet-
ors (and paying them): exercise may make one an orator, but not to the
extent that he could write his speeches down.
These answers, together with the testimonies of Cicero and Sextus, will enable us to
reconstruct satisfactorily the development of the Famous Orator argument, and
hence the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument as well, at least in the context of the
external debate.
We had already speculated during the analysis of the testimonium of Cicero that
the examples in his source had been Greek; we also know from explicit statements
in Cicero and Sextus that the opponents of rhetoric as an art used many examples.
Quintilian, however, is so far the only one to provide more than one actual example,
Demades and Aeschines. Cicero provided one of his speakers, Antionius himself, as
an example, and Cicero is clearly the author of this example, preferring a Roman
example over the Greek examples in his source. Sextus, however, also provides only
one example, Demades. It may be that Aeschines was dropped by him in response
to the objection we have seen in Quintilian, that Aeschines did study the principles
of speech during the course of his literature lessons with his father.51 As for De-
mades, it is worth comparing Sextus with Quintilian:
a llwß te kaì [epeì] toútoiß a pistoũmen w ß toioútoiß gegonósi kaì e n
eÇ xei ka k toiaútvß tinòß tribṽß epì tò r vtoreúein parelvluXósin –
Sextus, II. 17.
51 The very many (pamplvXeı̃ß in Sextus II. 16, innumerabiles in Cicero, De Oratore I. 91) ex-
amples may have been dropped for similar reasons. Demades is very difficult to explain away.
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Demaden neque non didicisse certum sit et continua dicendi exercitatio
potuerit tantum, quantuscumque postea fuit, fecisse; nam id potentissi-
mum discendi genus est – Quintilian, II. 17. 12.
The two passages complement each other. They reflect the reaction of the suppor-
ters of rhetoric to the extended Natural Orator argument which included both the
Experienced Orator and the Famous Orator arguments. While the opponents
claimed that rhetoric was not an art but something natural which could be helped by
practice, as exemplified by Demades who became a professional orator by means
only of exercise and experience, the supporters of rhetoric at first simply denied
this.52 Since they could not find for Demades any teacher or rhetorical studies, they
developed a different answer, and this is preserved in Quintilian: formal rhetorical
training cannot be dispensed with; on the other hand, Demades, who did not have a
formal rhetorical training cannot simply be disregarded, nor his lack of studies
merely doubted (lacking the proof positive that he did study, as in the case of
Aeschines); the answer, therefore, is simply to expand the concept of learning to
embrace exercise as well, especially if this learning is over the long term (continua
exercitatio),53 and declare that exercise itself is a form of learning, although formal
education yields better results. Quintilian even has an example – Demades himself,
who did not dare to write his speeches down, since such an enterprise would have
required a formal education.
3.5.2. The Target of the Arguments
As already mentioned, Quintilian’s testimony differs from those of Cicero and Sex-
tus in that it reflects both the external and the internal debates. Although §§5–11,
which clearly belong to the internal debate, also include elements of the external de-
bate, Quintilian is so far the only witness to the internal debate.
With the help of Quintilian’s testomonium we may now return to the problem of
the ordering of the Famous Orator and the Dumb Rhetor arguments in Cicero and
Sextus in the context of the external debate. Since the Famous Orator argument is
the stronger and the most pertinent for demonstrating that rhetoric is natural, its po-
sition in second place in Cicero needs to be explained. In order to do so, it would be
best to summarize the development of the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument in the
context of the external debate according to our findings so far.
a) The opponents of rhetoric as an art posit the Natural Orator argument
as an alternative to the claim that rhetoric is an art.
52 Reflected in the testimony of Sextus, and in the first part of Quintilian’s (Demaden neque
non didicisse certum sit. . .).
53 See also Isoc. Antid. 296.
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b) The supporters of rhetoric as an art distinguish between the natural ora-
tor and the real orator.54
c) The opponents of rhetoric as an art react to this move with a double ar-
gument. On the one hand they adduce the Famous Orator argument, in
which they mention examples of famous orators who clearly had not
studied rhetoric. On the other hand, they need to explain how these peo-
ple became famous orators without formal rhetoric, and this they do
with the Experienced Orator argument whereby the orator acquires his
skill through experience and practice. Aeschines and Demades are the
only two named examples so far.
d) The supporters of rhetoric as an art refute each example individually.
The conclusion follows that there is no famous orator who has not stu-
died rhetoric; exercise and practice are insufficient. It is enough for the
supporters to find for each example a teacher of rhetoric, but failing
this, they can point to evidence of formal study. Aeschines is easily
dealt with. The two excuses appearing in Quintilian, II. 17. 12 would
have sufficed to turn him into an orator who had studied formal rheto-
ric. Demades was more problematic, and the supporters were obliged
to extend the concept of study to include practice.
If the father of Aeschines could be turned into a teacher of rhetoric, and if practice
itself could be portrayed as the very essence of study, it would seem that no orator
could have been deemed by the supporters of rhetoric to have lacked formal training
in the subject. This type of argument would have encouraged the discovery of du-
bious biographical details and the distortion of terms such as “study”, leading, I sug-
gest, to the opponents of rhetoric as an art introducing into the Exclusivity of Teach-
ing Argument the Dumb Rhetor argument, an attack pointing to the fact that no
teacher of rhetoric or author of works on rhetoric practised as an orator. There may
well be a practical or logical reason why rhetors were not also orators, but the fact
that since Corax and Tisias no one had served in both capacities must surely have
given many pause for thought.55 This may explain why the Dumb Rhetor argument
appears first in Cicero. His testimony reflects the later stage of the debate, when
54 This argument does not seem to have required historical examples. It is the opponents of
rhetoric who needed to provide examples of famous orators who had not studied rhetoric.
55 Supporters of rhetoric as an art reacted to this argument as well, as we have already seen from
Sextus, II. 19, but this section also shows how the reaction was countered. Another attempt to criti-
cize the Dumb Rhetor argument may be found in Philodemus, II. 87. fr. XIV; this testimony shows
that the supporters claimed that the art of rhetoric was self-sufficient (au totelv́ß) but needed for its
application many natural aids and much exercise and experience. Thus although the rhetor lacked
the exercise, experience and natural aids obligatory for actual oratory, his knowledge proved that
rhetoric was still an art, although he did not practice it. For a discussion of this reply, see Barnes
(1986) 10.
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Charmadas and Menedemus were involved. The testimony of Sextus, we have de-
termined, reflects the first stage of the debate – the attack launched by Critolaus –
and the primacy of the Famous Orator argument reflects a time when it alone would
have sufficed to prove that rhetoric was natural, to which the Dumb Rhetor argu-
ment would have been attached later during the transmission.
3.6. The Testimony of Philodemus
Unlike the previous authors, Philodemus does not present us with a continuous testi-
mony. The numerous difficulties in the reconstruction of his text necessarily reduce
his contribution to supplementing details missing from our other sources. There are
five main passages in which reference is made to the Exclusivity of Teaching Argu-
ment:
a) II. p.71–72, fr. VIII.
b) II. p.76–77, fr. III–IV
c) II. p.97–98, fr. VIII
d) II. p.110–111, fr. XX
e) II. p.111–112, fr. XXI.56
3.6.1. The Arguments
The fragments provide us with additional information about the sources of the Ex-
clusivity of Teaching Argument, its targets, and names which we have not so far en-
countered. Furthermore, they also show the way Philodemus understands the con-
nection between the various claims which make up the Exclusivity of Teaching
Argument on the one hand, and the way this whole argument is connected with the
other general arguments yet to be examined by us.
This second point should be addressed first, since it directly affects our under-
standing of the nature of the testimony. While it is true that Philodemus lived just a
few years after the second stage of the debate and would no doubt have had access
to at least some of the writings of those involved, the subject of his work – certainly
in the second book, has nothing to do with the debate itself. As an Epicurean, he is
only concerned with justifying regarding as an art only one type of rhetoric, namely
56 There are a few other fragments which mention names such as Aeschines and must surely
have dealt with aspects of the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument, but their condition is so proble-
matic that it is better not to rely on them at all. See, e.g., II. p.69, fr. V. Without doubt it mentions
Aeschines, but nothing clear can be gleaned from the fragment. The reconstruction by Sudhaus is
far from satisfactory.
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sophistic rhetoric.57 The second book is devoted to a survey of opinions against
rhetoric. We may suppose that even were he to have used works connected with the
debate over rhetoric as a whole, his own limited interests would have led him to ab-
breviate and excerpt from his sources. This is indeed what we find him doing. Al-
ready at II. 102, fr. VII, Philodemus, referring to Critolaus, writes: ou creı́a me perì
tw̃n a llwn pántwn légein, ouÅ ß kaì au tòß Kritólaoß e kférei dià tv̀n pròß toùß
r v́toraß filotimı́an. Philodemus may well be correct in saying that Critolaus pro-
duced many arguments which were no more than different versions of the same ba-
sic arguments,58 but this does not mean that we should accept that the various argu-
ments Philodemus assumes to be the same argument necessarily are. Philodemus
could have encountered numerous arguments in many sources with countless exam-
ples arranged in different ways, and he may well have made hasty connections in
his desire to summarize. He may well have conflated arguments originally aimed at
different targets. All this requires the modern scholar to use extreme caution in ex-
amining the testimony provided by Philodemus. Each fragment needs to be analysed
in its own right.
Regarding the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument, Philodemus sees a clear con-
nection between the Homeric Orators argument and the Famous Orator argument
(II. 71–72, fr. VIII):59 ou krı́nw dè palillogeı̃n a nagkaı̃on einai tṽß a podeı́xewß
katá ge tv̀n dúnamin ou Xèn diaferoúsvß toũ didáskontoß lógou “NVrwaß v toi
idiẃtaß mv̀ maXóntaß tv̀n r vtorikv̀n dunatoùß kaì e pisv́mouß gegonénai.” The
quotation ending this fragment would have been found by Philodemus in his source,
indicating that the connection between the two arguments would also have been
made there already.60
Another connection is made at the beginning of the fragment, between the Exclu-
sivity of Teaching Argument as a whole, and another argument entirely: [parakei-
ménv dé tiß v n taútU a pódeixiß, kaX’ vÅ n dià pantòß mèn telesiourgeı̃n e légeto]61
57 Hubbell (1920) describes the internal Epicurean debate between those who denied rhetoric as
an art and those, including Philodemus, who regarded what they called sofistikv́ as an art and a
type of rhetoric. Hubbell adds (251): “The rhetorical works of Philodemus are an exposition of this
doctrine. Thus the fragments which we have are the remains of a distinct literary movement in the
Epicurean sect, and should be regarded as a literary pronunciamento.”
58 Cf. Sudhaus (1892) III. xxx: Auf ihn vor allen geht daher der Tadel Philodems, daß sich viele
Beweise nur in verschiedene Formen kleiden, in Wirklichkeit aber, dunámei, dieselben sind. Oder
aber es werden nur andere Beispiele vorgeführt, und wieder ist ein neuer Beweis gegen die Rhetorik
fertig.
59 The version followed here is that of the Supplementum p. xxxi, which differs in two places
from II. 71–72: krı́nw instead of kreı́nw, and the indication of a quotation (NVrwaß. . . gegonénai),
on which see n.63 below.
60 As Barnes (1986) 19 n.42 seems to indicate, although idiẃtaß is usually translated “ordinary
people”, the word in this context clearly refers to the Famous Orator argument, opposed as it is to
the vÇ rwaß.
61 Supplied by Sudhaus in the Supplementum p. xxxi.
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pãsa técnvk tò d’ eikoboleı̃n ou k o rXoboleı̃ plv̀n ei pou spanı́wßk r v́toraß dè
deinoùß gegonótaß a neu maXv́sewß pareilv́famen. The Exclusivity of Attaining the
End Argument may easily be discerned, followed by the Exclusivity of Teaching
Argument here represented by the Famous Orator argument.62
Taking the fragment as a whole, we may see that Philodemus has used here two
different sources which each made a connection to do with the Exclusivity of
Teaching Argument. One connected the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument with the
Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument, and the other made a connection be-
tween the Homeric Orators and Famous Orator arguments within the Exclusivity of
Teaching Argument. It is Philodemus who connects all of this together into one ap-
parently seamless unit.63
3.6.2. The Target of the Arguments
Let us turn now to the second point, that Philodemus may be providing us with the
source for the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument, and even for some of its compo-
nent arguments. Our analysis of Cicero, Sextus and Quintilian had led us to suggest
that the Homeric Orators argument originated in the internal debate, and was direc-
ted against the Stoics. This conclusion rested on two facts: firstly, that the Stoics
were alone, or at least the first, in regarding the Homeric heroes as orators; sec-
ondly, that the argument appears only in Quintilian who was greatly influenced by
the Stoics. These facts are not decisive, but Philodemus provides the following testi-
mony (II. 77, fr. IV):
a llà par’ au toı̃ß toı̃ß vÇ rwsin, eiper isvn gnẃmvn e ceiß, paraplv́sion
eu rv́seiß tòn HAdraston kaì tòn LOdusséak tòn polumv́canon d’
NOmvroß e xetragẃ dvsen, a gaXòß w n, w Stwiké, toùß stı́couß, kaì
toùß tṽß Kı́rkvß desmoúß.
62 Sextus, II. 13–16 makes the same connection, suggesting that both Sextus and Philodemus
are relying here on a common intermediate source which had already made the connection.
63 Sudhaus, Hubbell and Barnes all fall down on this point. Sudhaus, discussing the fragment in
the Supplementum, p. xxxi, draws two conclusions: that the logos belongs to Critolaus; and “Daß zu-
nächst beide Beweise inhaltlich auf dasselbe hinauskommen, ist klar. Der eine sagt: vor der Eröff-
nung der zunftmäßigen Schulen gab es Redner, der andere: neben der Rhetorenschule gab es Red-
ner, beide sagen also aus: unabhängig von den Schulen gab es Redner.” Hubbell (1920) 287–288
n.27 writes, “This argument is like that which proves that there is no art of rhetoric because the her-
oes were rhetors before any treatises on rhetoric were written.” Barnes (1986) 19, n.42, during his
discussion of the Famous Orator argument in Sextus, II. 16, comments, “In a variant of the same ar-
gument the premise is established by appeal to the Homeric heroes, who spoke skilfully long before
the inventions of the rhetoricians.” Barnes then refers to our fragment from Philodemus (II. 71) and
adds, “As Philodemus remarks, =II 71. 7?, the variant is not substantially different from the version
which appeals to Demades and his similars.”
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The address to a Stoic (w Stwiké) unambiguously demonstrates that this passage is
an attack against the Stoics, in which use is made of the Homeric Orators argu-
ment.64 Another testimony should suffice to make the case (II. 110, fr. XX):
márturaß dè paréxei, dióti v san a gaXoì politikoì kaì prò toũ
Plátwna kaì LAristotélvn suntáxasXai politikáß, ei mvXén’ eÇ teron,
ouÅ ß NOmvroß eisv́gagen, kaì tv̀n filosofı́an dé tiß pròß toútouß
légwn ou k ou san epistv́mvn parastv́seik kaì gàr prò toũ Zv́nwna
kaì KleánXvn kaì Swkrátvn kaì LAristotélvn. . .
This is clearly an attack against the Stoics since Zeno and Cleanthes are mentioned
along with earlier philosophers. The argument is that if the Stoics teach rhetoric
while regarding the Homeric heroes as orators, their philosophy is not a knowl-
edge.65
The only critic of the Stoics so far identified (in Cicero) has been Charmadas, but
we had already speculated that he was not the source of the argument because Ci-
cero’s testimony indicates that there were arguments surrounding rhetoric already
towards the middle of the second century B.C.E. Furthermore, our analysis showed
that the version attributed to Charmadas was later than the original. Neither Sextus
nor Quintilian mentions any name in this context. Philodemus, however, does pro-
vide a name for a proponent of the Famous Orator argument, in the context of the
external debate, Critolaus (II. 97–98, fr. VIII):
w ß plousiomacoũnt’ Aiscı́nvn mv̀ dedidácXaik safw̃ß gàr légei, oÇ ti
Dvmádvß ou k e maXen, wÅ ß d’ au tw̃ß Aiscı́nvß v toi kaì par’ a llwn v di’
au tw̃n tà meXodikà tṽß r vtorikṽß ou t’ a plata tò plṽXoß o nta
proskarterv́seẃß te pollṽß ou deómenak tòn mèn gàr DvmosXénvn
pánteß kekrágasin oı kat’ au tòn tecnı́tvn einai, kaì Kritólaoß ou k
a parneı̃tai.
Critolaus is here mentioned by Philodemus as using (apparently for the first time)
the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument at least in the context of the external de-
bate.66 Furthermore, he is also presented here as negotiating with regard to various
orators. Armed with these details we may now attempt to reconstruct the original ar-
gument as Critolaus would have used it in the external debate.
64 Furthermore, later in the fragment the attacker raises a possible Stoic response to his attack.
65 II. 111, fr. XXI reflects a similar context, with the Stoics replying that Homer was no less
wise than Corax and Antiphon, and “we would be foolish to consider Homer to be the discoverer
not only of philosophy but also every other art except for rhetoric.” The reference to Corax is rare
evidence for Stoic reaction to the rhetors in the context of this argument.
66 This does not automatically eliminate Critolaus as the originator of this argument’s use
against the Stoics (the internal debate). Indeed, it is quite probable that the attacks launched against
the Stoics in the previous two fragments discussed was none other than Critolaus, but his name does
not appear in the fragments.
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The original Exclusivity of Teaching Argument included the Natural Orator argu-
ment, in the version which also included the Experienced Orator argument, and
proved its point with the aid of famous orators who had not studied rhetoric.67 The
examples included Demades and Aeschines. Hubbell has argued that there may
have been arguments about Demosthenes as well. Critolaus agreed that De-
mosthenes was a tecnı́tvß. That is to say, he attributed his achievements to his
rhetorical studies. This may suggest that in other cases Critolaus did not attribute
such achievements to rhetorical studies. He would have argued, for example, that
Aeschines and Demades succeeded because of their natural talent and their practice
and experience in speaking.
Critolaus used to subvert rhetoric with negative terms, most famously kakotec-
nı́a.68 Another term he would use corroborates our proposed attribution of the Ex-
clusivity of Teaching Argument to Critolaus (Quintilian, II. 15. 23):
quidam eam neque vim neque scientiam neque artem putaverunt, sed
Critolaus “usum dicendi” (nam hoc tribv́ significat).69
The various terms used by Critolaus are specific to various attacks on rhetoric. We
shall be arguing later that the term kakotecnı́a reflects his criticism of the harm
done by rhetoric.70 The term tribv́ (usus) of couse reflects the Exclusivity of Teach-
ing Argument,71 the best demonstration that rhetoric is not an art but no more than a
knack.
3.7. Conclusion
The Exclusivity of Teaching Argument rests on the claim that rhetoric is natural and
may be aided by practice and experience (the Extended Natural Orator argument).
This claim may be strengthened in several ways, and for two different targets, the
rhetors (external debate) and the Stoics (internal debate). In the external debate, the
philosophers used the Famous Orator argument, while in the internal debate, the
Peripatetics and Academics used against the Stoics the Homeric Orators argument.
The Stoics had their reasons for regarding the Homeric heroes as orators, and the
rhetors would claim that without formal study one could not be a professional ora-
tor. Thus the Famous Orator argument could not serve against the Stoics: they did
67 This is the first attributable version, but it already shows signs of development from some-
thing more elementary; see pp.61–64 above.
68 Sextus, II. 12.
69 Cf. also II. 15. 2.
70 See §5.4.2 below.
71 This and similar terms appear in the sources we have examined in this chapter: tribv́ (Sextus,
II. 17); consuetudo exercitatioque (Cicero, De Oratore I. 90).
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not regard famous orators such as Demades, Aeschines or even Demosthenes as ora-
tors since only the (Stoic) wise man could be a true orator. Conversely, the Homeric
Orators argument could not be used against the rhetors since the rhetors did not re-
gard the Homeric heroes as orators, preceding as they did the inventors of rhetoric.
The Exclusivity of Teaching Argument was used not only in both arenas of the
double debate, but also in both stages.72 Critolaus (first stage) appears in the testi-
mony of Philodemus, and Charmadas (second stage) in that of Cicero.73 In the ex-
ternal debate, Critolaus used only the Famous Orator argument. This was weakened
over time by the refutations of each and every example, so that by the second stage,
Charmadas found it necessary to add the Dumb Rhetor argument.74
Cicero and Sextus reflect the external debate,75 while Quintilian reflects the in-
ternal debate.76 The Homeric Orators argument, belonging only to the internal de-
bate, appears in Quintilian but is missing in Cicero and Sextus, while conversely the
Dumb Rhetor argument, belonging only to the external debate, appears in Cicero
and Sextus, but is missing in Quintilian.
72 See pp.45, 54 above.
73 In both cases the context is the external debate, but they were both in a position to be the pro-
ponents of the arguments in the internal debate too. In other arguments to be analysed below these
two are expressly portrayed attacking the Stoics.
74 Barnes (ibid.) 10 has already shown that the argument most probably originated with the Epi-
cureans, and even Epicurus himself. The Dumb Rhetor is a variant of the general argument against
any teacher who does not practise what he teaches. E.g., Plutarch at the beginning of SR attacks the
Stoics for teaching about politics while not actually participating in politics. Epicurus infamously
scorned any linguistic studies, and may well have attacked the rhetors with this argument. Even so,
it was Charmadas who added the Dumb Rhetor to the general Exclusivity of Teaching Argument.
He it was who surveyed every teacher of rhetoric, beginning with Corax, and showed that not one
ever practised as an orator. It is this inclusiveness which transforms an ad hominem argument to one
against the art of rhetoric itself.
75 This answers a question raised in our analysis of Cicero (p.60 above), why Charmadas at-
tacks only the rhetors while Mnesarchus is present with arguments against rhetoric being an art.
76 Philodemus does not present any version of the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument although
its various elements are scattered throughout the fragments.
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4. The Falsa Argument
4.1. General Points
Falsa may be understood in the singular as agreeing with any feminine noun such
as perceptio and opinio; and may be understood substantivally in the neuter plural
as “false things”. This comment anticipates some of the problems associated with
this argument as it is now to be found in our sources.
It is almost a foregone conclusion that an orator does or could lie in pursuit of his
goal. The word “orator” is practically synonymous with “liar”. More than this, how-
ever, is the notion that rhetoric itself as an art is something of lie or deception. The
art of persuasion places great value on the most immediately impressive activities
available to the orator, such as emoting, vocalizing, and arguing populistically,
avoiding the less successful strategies of telling the truth which is often difficult to
grasp, or less appealing. The criticisms both of the orator and of rhetoric itself are
included in what I shall call the Falsa Argument.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the Falsa Argument, we should distinguish it
from two other phenomena which might be expected to belong to it. The first is the
practice in utramque partem dicere,1 where the speaker argues both for and against
a position. It follows that at least one position must be false. However, it is not part
of the Falsa Argument, both because the sources treat it as something separate, and
because it was a mainstay of dialectic, and not intrinsic to rhetoric. The second phe-
nomenon was an argument which concentrated on the harm resulting from the lies
told by an orator.2 The Falsa Argument itself was not concerned with the results of
the practice of rhetoric, and the Benefit Argument will be dealt with in the next
chapter.3 Thus the Falsa Argument is restricted to the very issue of falsity itself. It
claims that rhetoric is false and deceitful. The very rules of rhetoric express an at-
tempt to deceive the audience, while the orator does not present what he himself
thinks to be the case and lies deliberately.
1 Also known as contraria dicere, or disserere or disputare, and all this without going into the
Greek parallels. Some of the variations may well have had something to do with the distinctions be-
tween rhetorical and dialectical practice. The phenomenon was widespread in almost all the Helle-
nistic schools, and may have originated with the early sophists. It is beyond the scope of the present
work, but it might be worth mentioning that it is dealt with in its rhetorical context mainly in Quinti-
lian, II. 17. 30–36.
2 See, e.g., Quintilian, II. 16. 2: . . .cum pro falsis contra veritatem valet.
3 See pp.97–128 below.
ISBN Print: 9783525252949 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647252940
© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen
4.2. The Sources
The three sources to be considered here are Quintilian, II. 17. 18–21, 26–29; Sextus
Empiricus, II. 10–12; Philodemus, I. 22, col. III; II. 90, fr. XVIII.4 There are great
similarities between the sources, but just as many problems. Our first task will be to
compare the sources. We shall follow this with a consideration of the secondary lit-
erature (Hubbell, Barnes and RW), and finally offer an alternative.
4.2.1. The Testimony of Quintilian
Starting at II. 17. 14, Quintilian appears to quote from a source summarizing the ar-
guments of the main philosophical schools against rhetoric.5 The first argument
mentioned, the Materia Argument, is postponed until ch. 21, and the second argu-
ment is addressed first. This is the Falsa Argument (§18):
altera est calumnia nullam artem falsis adsentiri opinionibus, quia con-
stitui sine perceptione non possit, quae semper vera sit: rhetoricen ad-
sentiri falsis, non esse igitur artem.
This argument is full of Stoic terminology, and it hints at one of the main Stoic dog-
mas, that the knowledge of the sage is dependent on his consent (sugkatáXesiß) to
what appears to him. When the sage assents correctly to a sense impression,6 he has
a “grasp” (katálvyiß) of a state of affairs in the real world. The Latin terms used
by Quintilian in §18 and possibly his source are translations of the Greek Stoic con-
cepts:
adsentiri: adsentior and its cognates, assensus, assensio parallel the
Stoic term sugkatáXesiß and cognates.7
4 There are also some other parallels in Philodemus which will be addressed during the course
of the discussion.
5 Quintilian’s attribution of the arguments to all the main philosophical schools does not guaran-
tee that the context is the external debate alone. Each argument needs to be examined in its own
right. As I hope to demonstrate, the Falsa Argument appearing in §§18–21 is actually aimed at the
Stoics (the internal debate). The appearance of the Stoic Athenodorus among the philosophers
named in §15 need prove no more than that at least one of the other arguments in §17ff. is to do
with the external debate.
6 As is always the case. The Stoic sage assents only to those sense impressions (fantası́ai) ac-
tually reflecting real things and coming from those real things. Ordinary people make the mistake of
assuming that all their sense impressions are of this type.
7 Cic. Lucullus 37: nunc de adsensione atque adprobatione, quam Graeci sugkatáXesin vocant,
pauca dicemus.
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perceptione: cognitio, perceptio, conprehensio are all used by Cicero
to translate katálvyiß.8
constitui: this would appear to be translating a form of the Greek verb
sunı́stvmi, cognate with the noun sústvma,9 a word we shall find in
the Stoic definition of técnv in our next parallel, Sextus, II. 10.10
In a word, the argument is clearly based on the Stoic definition of art.11
There seem to be two possible options. Firstly, that the argument reflects a Peri-
patetic/Academic attack on the Stoics, in which Stoic concepts, especially those ta-
ken from the Stoic definition of art, are turned against them. The second option is
that it reflects a general philosophical attack on the rhetors, being based on what
had become the commonly accepted definition of art.12 I shall be arguing in support
of the first option.
There are three points in Quintilian’s text which deserve our attention.
1. After the attack has reached its conclusion – rhetoricen adsentiri falsis, non
esse igitur artem – Quintilian provides the obvious response (II. 17. 18):
ego rhetoricen nonnumquam dicere falsa pro veris confitebor, sed non
ideo in falsa quoque esse opinione concedam, quia longe diversum est,
ipsi quid videri et ut alii videatur efficere.
This argument against rhetoric as an art is thus refuted by emphasizing the fact that
the orator is aware of his own lies and does not assent to false opinion. This solution
is so simple that it makes the attack appear illogical. It seems strange that anyone
would even raise such an easily refutable argument. Who could confuse a liar who
knows the truth with someone who believes his own falsehoods? One might point to
Quintilian’s description of the argument as a mere calumnia, and claim that despite
it’s being a weak argument, the philosophers were willing to use anything they
8 Cic. Lucullus 17: nec definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si ver-
bum e verbo volumus, conprehensio, quam illi katálvyin vocant; cf. Cic. Fin. III. 18; see also p.46
n.102 below. On the Stoic senses of perceptio and constitui see RW (2006) 328, nn. 69–70.
9 It is interesting that none of our Latin parallels for the Stoic definition of art (see next section)
translates the word sústvma with a noun. Verbs are preferred to express the notion, especially con-
stare (Quint., II. 17. 41; Cic. Acad. II. 22; id. Fin. III. 18). The only appearance of a noun to trans-
late the term is constructio in Cicero ap. Diomed. II. p.421 K.
10 For the Stoic definition cf. also SVF I. fr. 73; II. fr. 94.
11 It should be emphasized that the argument does not adduce the actual definition, at least not
in its entirety. See also RW (ibid.) 328.
12 This is the opinion of RW (ibid.) 328: “. . . the argument is clearly meant as a general attack
on rhetoric as opposed to one on a specifically Stoic position.”
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could find. I shall argue that philosophers would not use a weak argument. The
superficial reading of the argument must be abandoned.
2. Quintilian in §§19–21 provides three historical examples (Hannibal, Theopom-
pus, Cicero) and as a fourth example, the painter. These examples are not all of a
piece. After the first two examples, the argument ends, to all intents and purposes,
with a comparison with rhetoric: item orator, cum falso utitur pro vero, scit esse fal-
sum eoque se pro vero uti: non ergo falsam habet ipse opinionem, sed fallit alium
(§20). Yet Quintilian continues with a further two examples. Furthermore, the two
additional examples are essentially different from the first two. Cicero is unlike
Hannibal and Theopompus in his being an orator while they were military generals.
The fourth example, the painter, is even more out of place.
I shall argue here, based on the parallels to be examined later, that the original
example provided with the response was the painter alone. Before copying down
this example, Quintilian himself added the examples of Hannibal and Theopompus,
found nowhere else as examples, certainly not in parallels to the Falsa Argument,
and summed up the argument. He may have used Cicero as a bridge to the painter
example;13 he was an obvious choice, being an orator, and the idol of Quintilian.
3. perceptione seems to substitute for opinionibus. Is Quintilian confused, or is
he aware of what he is doing?
4.2.2. The Testimony of Sextus Empiricus
It is the final question of the last section which leads us to Sextus, II. 10–12. In this
parallel we find the Stoic definition of art, plainly hinted at in Quintilian,14 and an
argument concerning yeudṽ, translated by Quintilian as falsa. This said, the argu-
ments are far from identical.
Sextus begins his discussion with the Stoic definition of art (§10): pãsa toı́nun
técnv sústvmá e stin e k katalv́yewn suggegumnaménwn, and concentrates at first
on sústvma e k katalv́yewn in order to show that rhetoric does not meet this criter-
ion and is therefore not an art. §11 opens with the statement: tw̃n gàr yeudw̃n ou k
eisi katalv́yeiß, yeudṽ dé e sti tà legómena tṽß r vtorikṽß einai Xewrv́mata, fol-
lowed by various examples such as ouÇ tw parapeistéon toùß dikastáß and moicw̃
sunvgorvtéon kaì ıerosúlw which are not a lvXṽ and hence are a katálvpta. The
conclusion necessarily follows that rhetoric, not being a sústvma e k katalv́yewn,
is not an art.
13 Pace RW (ibid.) 332: “We do not expect a further illustration from outside the realm of ora-
tory. . . it may be that the mention of tenebrae in the Cicero example caused Q. to think of pictorial
illusion.”
14 See nn.10–11 above.
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Radermacher had already noted the passages in Quintilian and Sextus as paral-
lels15 without much comment.16 The first to attempt an analysis of the parallel was
Hubbell, using two separate arguments in Philodemus. The first argument we shall
call the Rhetoric as Fraud argument. It refers to the rules of rhetoric and establishes
that they are false: tà pleı̃sta Xewrv́matá e stin a lvXṽ, yeudṽ dè tà katà tv̀n
r vtorikv́n (I. 22, col. III, lines 11–13). The second argument we shall call the
(Self)Deceiving Orator argument, according to which the orator deceives himself
when deceiving others: eiper a patw̃sin oı r v́toreß, kaì au toı́, w tini a patw̃sin,
a patw̃ntai (II. 90 fr. XVIII, lines 4–6).
Hubbell rightly identifies the Rhetoric as Fraud argument with Sextus II. 10–
12,17 and identifies the (Self)Deceiving Orator argument with a question not found
in Quintilian, but answered by Quintilian at II. 17. 19–21. According to Hubbell,
Quintilian presents the Rhetoric as Fraud argument in the form of a question at §18,
but his reply has more to do with the (Self)Deceiving Orator argument. If the calum-
nia in §18 is to be identified with the one in Sextus, II. 10–12 and Philodemus, I.
22, col. III, then after Quintilian’s statement, rhetoricen adsentiri falsis, non esse
igitur artem, there should have come a response referring to the theorems of the art,
as we find in Philodemus.18 Instead we find the reply pertaining to the (Self)Deceiv-
ing Orator argument. Hubbell writes (376):
The proper sequence to this argument in Quintilian is a discussion of
the Xewrv́mata or opiniones of rhetoric to prove that they are true. This
would be parallel to the claims of Sextus that such principles as ouÇ twß
o rgv̀n kinvtéon (11) are false. But Quintilian replaces this by the re-
ply. . .
While Hubbell is correct in identifying Quintilian’s reply with the Rhetoric as Fraud
argument, there are some difficulties with his interpretation. Firstly, how can Quin-
tilian reply to an objection he does not posit? It is more likely that Quintilian be-
lieves that he is answering an objection he has actually posited. Secondly, with re-
15 Radermacher (1895) p.x parallels Sextus, II. 10–12 with two combined passages from Quin-
tilian – II. 17. 27 and then 18. On the place of the former passage, see pp.95–96 below.
16 Radermacher (ibid.) p.xv on his combined passage from Quintilian says only: “Sie ist kein
sústvma ek katalv́yewn”.
17 The identification between Philodemus I. 22, col. III and Sextus II. 10–12 by Hubbell (1920)
375 is criticized by Barnes (1986) 12: “For Sextus is not objecting that rhetoricians in fact produce
a lot of false precepts: he is objecting that the theorems of rhetoric, by their very nature, are bound
to be false.” Barnes points to the answer provided by Philodemus that if one’s having false theorems
negates one’s claim to art, then philosophy should not be said to be an art, nor should medicine or
music. . . (Philodemus, ibid.). However, the response of Philodemus reflects only his own under-
standing of the attack rather than the way that the objecters themselves understood it.
18 For the response of Philodemus, see the previous note. The absence of a response in Sextus is
natural and obvious: he was one of the opponents of rhetoric.
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gard to the calumnia itself, Hubbell sees it as a parallel to the whole of Sextus, II.
10–12; the differences between the two passages cannot support this. Hubbell’s own
equivocation in the above quotation – Xewrv́mata or opiniones – well demonstrates
his haste in establishing a common ground.19 The Greek for opinio is dóxa, and the
Latin for Xeẃrvma is spectaculum, theorema, or Cicero’s perceptum.20 Both sources
have false things in common (falsa, yeudṽ), but those false things – theorems and
opinions – are quite different.21 Thirdly, the (Self)Deceiving Orator argument was
answered so easily that either Quintilian must be regarded as inept, or the argument
itself still needs to be properly understood by us.
To address these problems, we need to return to Quintilian’s formulation of the
calumnia. While it was Hubbell’s opinion that Quintilian raised one objection but
answers another, it seems to me that Quintilian raises one objection which is actu-
ally a conglomeration of two objections. Sextus dealt only with yeudṽ Xewrv́mata,
but Quintilian deals both with opinio and with perceptio. It is the objection regard-
ing opinio which he answers.
Thus the Falsa Argument at II. 17. 18 (the calumnia), comprises the following
elements:
a) the first objection: altera est calumnia nullam artem falsis adsentiri
opinionibus,
b) the second objection: quia constitui sine perceptione non possit, quae
semper vera sit:
c) reply to the first objection: rhetoricen adsentiri falsis, non esse igitur
artem.
The original attack might appear to have comprised (a) and (c) alone. Note that the
plural falsis in the response refers to the opinions in (a) and cannot refer to the per-
ceptio in (b). Leaving the second objection to be examined later,22 we shall now
deal with the first objection.
19 The same may be said for Hubbell’s second identification, between Quintilian, II. 17. 18 and
Philodemus I. 22, col. III. While the subject matter might be identical, the terminological parallel is
lacking. We might have expected in Philodemus the verb sugkatatı́Xvmi or the noun sugkatáXesiß,
or at the very least yeudeı̃ß dóxai, or even just yeudṽ.
20 Cic., De Fato V. 11 = SVF II. fr. 954, lines 5–6: percepta appello, quae dicuntur Graece
Xewrv́mata.
21 This may be the best place to note how RW interpret Quintilian’s question. They essentially
agree with Hubbell that the calumnia as a whole deals with the rules of rhetoric, which they refer to
as “items of knowledge”. However, while Hubbell ignored the first part of the sentence, RW attempt
to explain the connection between the two parts in a way which would make the calumnia whole
and coherent. Say RW (2006) 328: “The reason why Q. uses the noun opinio in this phrase is that he
needs a term for ‘item of knowledge’ which (unlike perceptio) does not have built into it the notion
of truth”. For a detailed discussion of the position of RW, see p.92 below. For my own explanation
for the two parts of the sentence, see the text immediately following this note.
22 See §4.3.2 below.
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4.3. The Falsa Argument
4.3.1. The (Self)Deceiving Orator Argument
In order to understand what exactly lies behind the formulation nullam artem falsis
adsentiri opinionibus, we must turn to the parallel in Philodemus, II. 90 fr. XVIII,
lines 4–11:23
eiper a patw̃sin oı r v́toreß, kaì au toı́, w tini a patw̃sin, a patw̃ntai,
wÇ sper ou d’ a llwß gı́netai e n o rásei ou d’ a koúseik ei gàr a llw sum-
bébvken v a pátv, kaì au tòß a patãtaik ou mãllon toı́nun a patw̃sin v
a patw̃ntai.
As we have already seen, Hubbell was the first to note this parallel to Quintilian, II.
17. 19–21, but for the calumnia itself found parallels in Sextus, II. 10–12 and in an-
other Philodemus, I. 22, col. III which actually refer to the Rhetoric as Fraud argu-
ment. It is my contention that the lines we have just quoted are a parallel to the first
objection of the calumnia. The key to understanding the argument in Philodemus is
the word a patw̃sin, and the paraphrase in which it appears. Hubbell translates
(289):
If the rhetors deceive, they are themselves deceived by their own in-
struments, just as in the case of sight and hearing.
This translation has taken the dative of w tini as instrumental (and has forced the sin-
gular into a plural in English). The main drawback with this interpretation is that
the argument is rendered unintelligible. Here is my alternative interpretation:
If the orators deceive, they too, in whatever they deceive, [in this] are
deceived, just as it is not otherwise in sight and hearing.
The objection is now intelligible, and becomes more so if the reference to sight is
connected with Quintilian’s example of the painter (§21), given as part of his re-
sponse to this objection. The painter knows that his picture is actually on a flat sur-
face and does not believe that the picture is three-dimensional although it looks as
though it is. He does not assent to the appearance. In the same way, the orator is
aware of the nature of his lies and does not assent to them. So much for the re-
sponse, but the objection is quite sophisticated. The painter is as deceived as anyone
else in seeing the picture as three-dimensional, even if he is aware of its two-dimen-
sional nature. Were he not to do so, he would be unable to create the illusion which
is the power of his art. Thus the painter is deceived in that in which he deceives
23 Lines 4–6 had already been quoted above, p.88.
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others.24 This is the signficance of the words “in seeing” (e n o rásei)25 and espe-
cially of the word w tini.
Now comes the comparison with the orator, but the argument in Philodemus does
not go into any detail.26 It is left to us to attempt a reconstruction of the logic behind
the comparison between the painter and the orator. In what way could an orator be
deceived in that in which he himself deceives? Two lines of attack are possible, and
it is difficult to decide between them. Firstly, when the orator uses lies, the fact that
the lies serve a function in his arguments means that they are assented to, regardless
of whether the arguments themselves are valid or not. The orator’s assent to his lies
consists in the very action of drawing conclusions based on these lies. The answer
appearing in Quintilian, II. 17. 19–21 attempts to distinguish between the functional
aspect of the orator in his presentation of arguments and conclusions, and the episte-
mological aspect of the orator in his ability to judge what is real. There are actually
two sorts of assent: the functional assent to be found in action; and the assent inher-
ent in man qua rational animal.
The second possible line of attack exploits a basic assumption of rhetoric, that
every argument has its counterargument. The orator’s lies are not contradictions of
manifest facts, such as its being night when it is day (although such extreme cases
could be countenanced), but rather work in the realm of possibilities, plausibilities,
claims and interpretations where counterarguments are most effective. In his efforts
to make the worse case appear the better one,27 the orator will attempt to strengthen
the persuasiveness of an argument using deceit (a pátv) and is likely to persuade
himself, just as a painter cannot help but see a three-dimensional picture even if he
knows that the picture is two-dimensional. A defender might object that the orator
would not fall for his own lies just as a painter would not believe his picture to be
three-dimensional, even if there is some semblance of reality.
Both lines of attack are supported by the painter parallel. The expression e n o r-
ásei in Philodemus would then parallel either the operation of concluding an argu-
ment, or the state of the orator in making that conclusion.
Philodemus provides the missing link in Quintilian’s argument, the claim that the
moment the orator uses lies he assents to them (in either of the ways mentioned in
the last paragraph), and according to the Stoic definition of art, rhetoric cannot then
24 Or as Philodemus puts it, he no more deceives than is deceived.
25 The other example alluded to by Philodemus, “[in] hearing” ([e n] a koúsei) would be applic-
able to the mimic or any other artist who deceives through sound. Quintilian chose to bring only the
example from the visual arts.
26 Nor can we expect any help from the defender since the fragment provides us with only part
of the first response (the word prw̃ton appears in line 11); the defender does not understand how
the conclusion is arrived at that rhetoric is not an art; or why the attacker claims that the orators de-
ceive and are deceived, and do not just deceive.
27 Cf. peiorem causam meliorem facere; tòn vÇ ttw lógon kreı́ttw poieı̃n (Quint. II. 16. 3; Plat.
Apol. 23d6).
The Falsa Argument 91
ISBN Print: 9783525252949 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647252940
© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen
be an art.28 It appears that the (Self)Deceiving Orator argument is to be found
mostly in Philodemus, with its conclusion in Quintilian. A reconstruction of the
whole argument runs as follows. When the orator lies, he is deceived by his lies; but
art cannot assent to lies. . . Rhetoric assents to lies (since the orator is deceived by
his own lies). Therefore rhetoric is not an art.29
4.3.2. The Rhetoric as Fraud Argument
Quintilian may be confused, but he is no fool. We have found the calumnia to con-
tain traces of two arguments, but for Quintilian they are one complete argument.
We must understand Quintilian’s view of the argument before continuing.
RW in their comments on §18 provide a plausible reconstruction of the process
(327–328): “The calumnia is, as it were, a backward reasoning from the observation
that orators do in fact say things which are false: for someone to act in accordance
with the art of rhetoric and lie, the items of knowledge which make up the técnv of
rhetoric must themselves be false.” Thus RW connect the two parts of the argument
in Quintilian. Just like Hubbell before them, RW regard the whole calumnia as deal-
ing with the rules of rhetoric, and these rules are for them “items of knowledge” to
which refer both opinio and perceptio which appear in Quintilian’s question. Unlike
Hubbell, however, RW consider the items of knowledge to be false because of the
lies of the orator rather than of morally tainted rules such as appear in Sextus.30
While RW do manage to connect Quintilian’s response with his question, the
weak point in their argument is obvious: the lies of the orator do not appear in the
question, and they have to be deduced.31 Furthermore, the term opinio appearing in
his question is said to refer to the rules of rhetoric, or the items of knowledge,32
while the same term in his answer refers to the lies of the orator.33
28 RW (ibid.) 327–330 discuss the matter at length, but the Philodeman parallel is dismissed in
a short paragraph (330): “Parallels in Philodemus do not require detailed discussion. . . The details
of the argument are ludicrous, and bear no relation to Q. except for the general contrast of deceiving
and deception.”
29 The words quia constitui sine perceptione non possit have been omitted from the reconstruc-
tion because they belong to the Rhetoric as Fraud argument, to be dealt with immediately below. It
is the addition of the latter argument which causes the conclusion of the (Self)Deceiving Orator ar-
gument to refer to rhetoric rather than the orator.
30 Thus RW (ibid.) 330 do not find a whole parallel between Sextus, II. 10–12 and Quintilian,
II. 17. 18–21. Both sources “share the assumption that the items of knowledge which make up rheto-
ric include false ones: on Q.’s argument they seem to be false for a different reason.” According to
RW (338, n.75), the passage in Sextus has a parallel in Quintilian II. 17. 26.
31 RW (ibid.) 327: “The calumnia is, as it were, a backward reasoning. . .”
32 RW (ibid.) 328; see also n.21 above.
33 RW (ibid.) 329: “factual untruths as opposed to. . . morally reprehensible untruths.”
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It seems to me that Quintilian conflates two distinct parts of one argument. The
calumnia comprises parts of two arguments patched together, but they share a com-
mon origin. This is none other than the Stoic definition of art.34 Furthermore, both
arguments are based on falsa. It is my contention that Quintilian found both parts in
one argument and in his attempt to summarize the argument, perhaps with undue
haste, omitted what would have made the argument much clearer.35 Whatever the
case may be, the original argument attacks the nature of rhetoric through the use of
the Stoic definition of art.36 The aim of this argument is to show that rhetoric is built
on yeudṽ / falsa, demonstrable on two levels, education and application. The first
attack hinged on the notion of yeudṽ Xewrv́mata / falsa percepta, and this is pre-
served in Sextus, II. 10–12.37 The second attack, reconstructed from Quintilian and
Philodemus together, exploits the notion of yeudeı̃ß dóxai / falsae opiniones. Thus,
neither the rhetor nor the orator can claim to have katalv́yiß / perceptio, and with-
out this, rhetoric cannot be considered an art.
4.4. The Target of the Arguments
We have just seen that the Falsa Argument attacks rhetoric as art on two fronts, the
theoretical side (Rhetoric as Fraud argument) pertaining to the rhetor and the theo-
rems he teaches, and the practical side ([Self]Deceiving Orator argument) pertaining
to the practice and opinions of the orator. The Rhetoric as Fraud argument is linked
34 The definition is clearly seen in Sextus, but is only hinted at in Quintilian in the phrase quia
constitui sine perceptione non possit, quae semper vera sit, a point noted by many. My claim is that
the first part of Quintilian’s argument also derives albeit indirectly from the Stoic definition of art,
as may be seen by the verb adsentior. The fact that the orator lies could lead him to assent to the
very false opinions he is using to deceive others.
35 Barnes (1986) 12–13 is well aware of the difference between the two arguments. After his
discussion of the argument against the Xewrv́mata of rhetoric in Sextus, II. 10–12, he adds in n.59:
“It is clear from Philodemus that there was another argument against rhetoric which invoked falsity,
but which depended on the claim that in seeking to deceive others orators deceive themselves too.”
While identifying what we call the (Self)Deceiving Orator argument in Philodemus II. 90, he does
not analyse §§18–21 in Quintilian, but merely mentions the parallel: “The same argument and the
same reply are found in Quintilian, II xvii 18–19.” Thus Barnes, for whom this particular argument
is beyond the scope of his enquiry, does note the connection between the two arguments, apparently
because of the expressions yeudṽ and falsa, as there seems to be no other reason to note an argu-
ment on opiniones in a discussion dealing with Xewrv́mata.
36 RW (2006) 330 argue that the difference between the versions of Sextus and Quintilian is
due to the authors themselves rather than their sources: “they have fitted out the same skeleton of an
argument with different examples, suitable to their respective argumentative needs (rhetoric as
wielded by a good man is a worse target from Sextus’ point of view than the rhetoric of scoun-
drels).”
37 And of course in the Philodeman parallel, I. 22, col. III.
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with the name of Critolaus in Sextus, II. 12.38 If both arguments are both compo-
nents of the Falsa Argument, it would be natural to assume that the (Self)Deceiving
Orator argument and the Falsa Argument as a whole should also be attributed to
Critolaus. As it happens, Critolaus is mentioned by Quintilian just two sections be-
fore the argument on opiniones. This occurs in §15 which begins the list of argu-
ments against rhetoric with a list of philosophers who appear to have been responsi-
ble for the arguments. The list is headed by Critolaus.39
All who have addressed the Falsa Argument in one way or another have noted
the presence of many technical Stoic terms. RW argue that the presence of the Stoic
definition of art merely shows that it was widely accepted and could be used in an
attack on the schools of rhetoric. This may be so, but the argument manifests many
Stoic technical terms which were not widely accepted or understood: terms such as
kaXv́konta in Sextus, II. 12,40 and adsentior in Quintilian. This fact, combined with
the attribution of the argument to Critolaus, suggests very strongly that the argument
was in fact aimed against the Stoics themselves. One might add that the rhetors
would hardly be moved by a technical, almost abstruse, philosophical argument
dealing with epistemology.
If the argument is, as I claim, originally one used by Critolaus against the Stoics,
it might be asked why he would attack them when he himself presents rhetoric
which they regard as unworthy of the name.41 Critolaus would not have accepted
the Stoic attempt to distinguish their rhetoric from that of the schools of rhetoric,
and regards them as responsible for giving rhetoric in general a good name by as-
serting that rhetoric is a virtue. His attacks on the Stoics, however, would need to be
framed in Stoic terms in order to have any chance of being effective.42
4.5. Conclusion
We may complete the picture by examining two more sources dealing with falsa
from different perspectives. Quintilian tries as far as he can to arrange the metarhe-
torical issues. Thus we have seen him in §17 postponing a discussion of the materia
which he apparently saw in his source till later (chapter 21). In the chapter prior to
the one we have been dealing with (chapter 16), the subject is the benefit of rhetoric.
In §2 Quintilian raises a possible objection: cuius (sc. eloquentiae) denique tum
38 See also Barnes (1986) 21 n.58. The exact way in which Critolaus is to be linked with this ar-
gument will be considered in the chapter on the Benefit Argument, pp.123–124 below.
39 On Aristotle’s appearance in §14 see p.183 n.37 below. He does not seem to have been an in-
tegral part of the original sources for the arguments.
40 Barnes (ibid.) 21 n.6 writes: “The occurrence of the term kaXṽkon suggests – but does not
demonstrate – a Stoic origin for the argument.” He is rightly cautious in his formulation.
41 See p.42 above.
42 A similar strategy is adopted by Critolaus in the End Argument; see pp.158–159 below.
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maximus sit usus, cum pro falsis contra veritatem valet. This might seem at first
sight out of place, but not if the falsa are understood in context: the lies of the orator
cause injuries to society, injuries which are listed at the beginning of the section:
eloquentiam esse, quae poenis eripiat scelestos, cuius fraude damnentur interim
boni, consilia ducantur in peius. . . This falsa Argument is clearly directed against
the schools of rhetoric, but the originator of the argument could well be the same
Critolaus who used a more technical and epistemological falsa Argument against
the Stoics.
These two fronts do not exhaust the matter. In II. 17. 26–29 we find another front.
The chapter, as we have already noted, appears to bring together arguments from a
number of sources originating from a number of philosophers listed in §14. The
transition from one argument to another is not always as clear as we would wish,
and sometimes it just appears as though Quintilian moves from one argument to an-
other by association. At any rate, in §26 we come across an argument against the
orator who deceives by arousing the emotions. This seems at first glance to be a po-
pulist argument against the orators. Not only their verbal lies are perceived to be
bad, but also their emotive power is somehow perceived to be fraudulent. The truth
is hidden on both counts. The actual formulation of the argument, however, reveals
it to be Stoic: uti etiam vitiis rhetoricen, quod ars nulla faciat, criminantur, quia et
falsum dicat et adfectus moveat.43 The identification of the emotions (adfectus) with
“vices” leaves no room for doubt.44 The next question is whether the Stoics are the
object of the attack, or are themselves attacking the orators using Stoic philosophy.
The answer is fairly straightforward if we look at the context. The response to this
attack is given by the rhetorical schools, using the defence that rhetoric needs to
arouse the emotions to get a point across in what is after all an imperfect world.45
That the rhetorical schools are responding to a Stoic attack becomes even clearer
from the continuation of their reply:
quorum neutrum est turpe, cum ex bona ratione proficiscitur, ideoque
nec vitium. nam et mendacium dicere etiam sapienti aliquando conces-
sum est, et adfectus, si aliter ad aequitatem perduci iudex non poterit,
necessario movebit orator: imperiti enim iudicant et qui frequenter in
hoc ipsum fallendi sint, ne errent.
43 RW (2006) 338 find a parallel for this in Sextus, II. 11, but the similarities are not all that
striking.
44 Cf. Quintilian, V. 1. 1; Cicero, Tusc. IV. 29 = SVF III. p.104 fr. 425, lines 14–16.
45 This reply is very similar in sentiment to Aristotle, Rhet. 1355a24–29, where arousing the
emotions is a counterweight to the parlous state of the jurors and participants in the assemblies. In
other words, falsa and the adfectus they arouse are means which justify a good end.
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There is a clear hint in this passage to the city of sages to which the Stoics aspired.46
It is as if the rhetors argued that the Stoics may well have no need of rhetoric in their
ideal city, but in this imperfect world even the wise man would have to agree that
good sense requires the occasional arousal of emotions and the odd lie in order to
achieve beneficial effects.47 This then is rare evidence for a purely Stoic attack on
the rhetorical schools, a limited instance of the external debate.48
To sum up the entire argument. Critolaus attacks the Stoa by means of the notion
of falsa. On the one hand, the rules of rhetoric (perceptiones) manifest the fraudu-
lent nature of the occupation. On the other hand, whenever the orator himself lies,
he is likely to assent to the fraudulent opinions he is using to persuade his target
audience. In either case, Stoa principles must deny rhetoric the status of an art, since
no art can have anything to do with false perceptions or opinions. Critolaus does not
accept the Stoic distinction between its own rhetoric and that of the rhetors, and he
appears to blame them, at least in part, for the success of the rhetorical schools by
their portrayal of rhetoric as a virtue.
46 For an attempted reconstruction of Zeno of Citium’s book Politeia which, while apparently
referring to its Platonic namesake, also outlined a Stoic ideal city of sages, see Schofield (1991); cf.
SVF I. fr. 41.
47 While RW identify the Stoic traces in Quintilian’s argument, they do not regard the argument
as peculiar to the Stoics.
48 The beginning of §26 may also be part of the Stoic attack on the rhetors, since the syntax cre-
ates the impression of one source for an argument against one target. Indeed, the argument that
rhetoric does not know when it achieves its objective (artes scire, quando sint finem consecutae,
rhetoricen nescire) could well be a Stoic attack against the rhetors since in their system the orator
knows that his goal has been achieved simply by speaking well. Quintilian, who has already adopted
the Stoic position, thus present the background for the attack as a response to it (nam se quisque
bene dicere intelleget).
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5. The Benefit Argument
5.1. General Points
The Benefit Argument appears in both our main sources – Sextus and Quintilian –
clearly and explicitly. The passages in question are Sextus, II. 20–42;1 10–12,2 and
Quintilian, II. ch. 16.3 There are of course additional passages which deal with bene-
fit; e.g., Quintilian, II. ch. 17 collects various criticisms against rhetoric as art, and
cannot help but touch on benefit, among many other topics. Cicero and Philodemus
add nothing new to the arguments comprising the Benefit Argument, but should not
be overlooked as they may be able to solve problems which crop up during the com-
parison of the two main sources. We shall begin with Quintilian’s discussion of the
problem of benefit, in II. ch.16.
5.2. Quintilian and the Benefit Argument
Quintilian, II. ch. 16 breaks into two halves, §§1–10 and 11–19. The first half begins
with a presentation of a criticism of the harm caused by rhetoric (1–4), continues
with a rebuttal using the objectors’ own assumptions (5–6), and ends with examples
1 Cf. §43 init. Furthermore, §§43–47 are an integral part of the discussion on Benefit; they in-
clude the responses of the supporters of rhetoric and the attackers’ reply to the responses. The ex-
change of blows presented there exposes various layers of the argument to analysis, as will be seen
during the course of the discussion.
2 These sections do not actually deal explicitly with the Benefit Argument, but with the Falsa Ar-
gument (on which see the previous chapter). A philological and philosophical analysis of the sections,
however, reveals the Benefit Argument at the heart of the argument there; see pp.118–127 below.
3 We should also mention chapter 20, entitled an virtus, whose aim is to present rhetoric as a
virtue; this is of course also connected to the question of benefit. Virtue is always good and benefi-
cial; if a certain art is considered a virtue, it must be considered beneficial and incapable of causing
harm. This chapter, however, sheds no further light on the Benefit Argument or its sources, but em-
phasizes only the removal of the vir malus from rhetoric, a point which Quintilian is at pains to
make. He adopts the Stoic position that the orator is necessarily a vir bonus, and he dedicates a
whole chapter to proving it. The chapter recycles material already used earlier, such as 20. 8–9
which repeat 16. 11ff., and as Quintilian himself points out at the end of the chapter: sufficiant igi-
tur haec, quia de utilitate supra tractavimus – i. e., in chapter 16. At the same time, there are some
important issues in this chapter, such as the Stoic theory concerning the development of art (§6), but
nothing new directly concerning benefit in the context of an argument.
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showing the benefit of rhetoric (7–10). The second half presents a Stoic version of
rhetoric.
5.2.1. Quintilian, II. ch.16 (Description)
Following the criticism of the harm caused by rhetoric (1–4), Quintilian adopts two
complementary strategies. The first (5–6) is to rebut the criticism by means of a
counterattack: if rhetoric is to be abolished for the bad use to which it may be put,
then many essential things would need to be abolished for the same reason. Quinti-
lian includes in this list: strategy, medicine, philosophy, food, shelter and even the
heavenly bodies. The second strategy (7–10) is to emphasize the advantages of the
art of speaking. Quintilian gives an encomium which attributes nearly all the
achievements of human society to rhetoric. The two strategies elicit the conclusion
that even if rhetoric can be used in utramque partem, it is not intrinsically bad. It is
not fair to consider bad what can be used for good, or, in the words of Quintilian:
non est tamen aecum id haberi malum,4 quo bene uti licet (10).
Although the objections against rhetoric can simply be refuted, there is an easier
way, which is to eliminate the objection itself. Quintilian claims that all the criti-
cism is based on the perception that rhetoric is harmful, when rhetoric is viewed as
the art of persuasion (11). If, however, rhetoric is understood as the knowledge of
speaking well, it is clearly impossible for the orator to cause harm.5 According to
this (Stoic) definition of rhetoric,6 the orator and the vir bonus are one and the
same.7
4 On the importance of the word malum for identifying the source of this argument, cf. p.105
below.
5 Strictly speaking, the Stoicizing response is adopted and completed in §11. The subsequent en-
comium to rhetoric derives from Stoic sources and uses Stoic themes, as well demonstrated by RW
(2006) 279–230 (in their introduction to chapter 16) and 292–300 (in their notes to the various sec-
tions). I do not agree with RW, however, that the source itself was an encomium to rhetoric, but
rather to speech, which was then reworked specifically for rhetoric, perhaps by Quintilian himself.
No word denoting rhetoric (such as eloquentia) appears in the speech. The terms which do appear –
facultas dicendi, loquendum, sermo, vox – all concern speech as opposed to ratio (14–15). It is only
at 17 (Quare si nihil a dis. . .), when Quintilian ends this speech and begins to summarize his conclu-
sions, that he uses oratio and facultas orandi.
6 On the Stoic definition of rhetoric, scientia bene dicendi or e pistv́mv toũ eu légein, see SVF
II. fr. 291–292 and RW (ibid.) 271–274, notes on 15. 34–35.
7 The adverb “well” in the Stoic definition of rhetoric (see last note) need not be understood in a
moral sense, but it is obvious to Quintilian that it should be so understood, as is best seen from 16.
11; on this subject, see further Sohlberg (1972) 263–272. See also n.9 on p.26 above.
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5.2.2. Quintilian, II. ch.16 (Analysis)
So far we have considered the internal logic of the chapter, but it should be borne in
mind that Quintilian’s internal and coherent logic need not reflect the state of his
sources. He or an intermediate source may have reworked earlier sources. I shall be
arguing that our text is the product of two different criticisms launched against two
different targets. Hiding behind the Benefit Argument as it is presented here is the
two-staged double debate.8 This interpretation rests to a large extent on the parallels
in Sextus, but we may already note some of the resultant discrepancies in Quinti-
lian.
Quintilian begins by referring to the very unworthy way in which those who at-
tack rhetoric use rhetoric in their attack (§1): nam quidam vehementer in eam invehi
solent et quod sit indignissimum, in accuastionem orationis utuntur orandi viribus.
At this early stage of the analysis I shall make just two points here. Firstly, the com-
ment could have been made about any of the attacks on rhetoric throughout the book
and is not peculiar to the Benefit Argument; it concerns more the general strategy of
the critic of rhetoric rather than the content of any particular criticism. Secondly,
Quintilian did connect this comment with the Benefit Argument, and it is up to us to
discover the reason. We may already suspect that behind this comment lies a claim
which is directly connected with the Benefit Argument. A detailed analysis of this
comment, however, must be postponed until the end of our discussion.9
In the meantime, we may wonder who is being referred to in this comment. It
must be someone who not only enjoys rhetorical ability without having learned
rhetoric, but also uses his rhetorical talent to attack rhetoric. In Cicero’s De Oratore
I. 47, Crassus in his reply to Scaevola refers to studying Plato’s Gorgias together
with Charmadas, and that in this dialogue maxime admirabar Platonem, quod mihi
oratoribus inridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur.10 The critic referred to in
our passage is very probably none other than Plato.11
The text in De Oratore does not address the subject matter of the criticism. It is
enough for Crassus to hint at its character. According to him it is to do with contro-
versia verbi or contentio (ibid.). Since we are not Romans we may be able to view
the Greek debates more positively. To discover the subject matter of the criticism,
let us return to Quintilian and the criticism adjacent to his remark hinting at Plato. I
8 See p.45 above.
9 See p.102 below.
10 Cf. the beginning of I. 47: . . . in dicendo gravissimo et eloquentissimo, Platoni. . .
11 The comment of RW (2006) 282 is a little confusing, but tends finally towards identifying
Plato as the critic: “Q. has declaimers in particular in mind” but then, “. . .though Q. may not have
philosophers particularly in mind (see above on quidam) this epigram recalls a stock criticism of
Plato, voiced e.g. by Crassus in Cic.”
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shall be arguing that the criticism in §2, at least in part,12 reflects an attack on rheto-
ric by Charmadas, based on Plato’s Gorgias.13
The question immediately arises, how an Academic like Charmadas could be re-
sponsible for the personal attack on Plato. The answer to this is to be found in De
Oratore I. 84, where Antonius is reporting on a conversation between rhetors and
philosophers, among them Charmadas. When he refers to Charmadas and his criti-
cism, he says: sed cum maxime tamen hoc significabat, eos, qui rhetores nominaren-
tur. . . neque posse quemquam facultatem assequi dicendi, nisi qui philosophorum
inventa didicisset. This is a clear testimony attributing to Charmadas the priority of
philosophy to rhetoric. Comparing this with the other testimony on Charmadas in
§47, we may conclude that Charmadas proves his claim by appeal to Plato. The phi-
losopher who never studied rhetoric can not only beat rhetoric, but also beat it at its
own game. If the philosopher who never studied rhetoric (Plato, or stricitly speak-
ing, Plato’s Socrates) is able to defeat the professional orator (Gorgias and his pu-
pils), then rhetoric is surely not an art. Charmadas is actually presenting a double ar-
gument here. Rhetoric is harmful; but even if there are some good points to it, they
are taken from philosophy. Criticism of Plato only enters the argument in a later
version such as that in Quintilian.14
Thus we may conclude that Charmadas drew from Plato’s Gorgias arguments
against rhetoric. The most important argument in that dialogue concerns the harm
caused by rhetoric. The conversations with Polus and Callicles deal explicitly with
bad use to which rhetoric is put by pupils, and Socrates even leads Gorgias himself
to the question of the bad pupil. Charmadas, therefore, would have taken from Gor-
gias arguments which touch on what we call the Benefit Argument. He also
exploited the very fact that Plato, a philosopher, defeated professional rhetors using
their own tools.15 Anyone learning philosophy learns rhetoric as well.16 The oppo-
site is not the case.17
12 §2, the essence of the objection, appears to concentrate a number of claims which were ori-
ginally made separately. These will be analysed in due course.
13 We shall see that Charmadas indeed attacked rhetoric for the harm it caused. This of course
is insufficient to attribute to Charmadas verbatim the claims of §§2–3, but he is a prima facie candi-
date for at least some of the subject matter.
14 The supporters of rhetoric could either criticize Plato, or actually use his rhetorical ability to
their own advantage. If he defeats rhetoric using rhetoric, he is demonstrating, according to the posi-
tion of the opponents themselves, that rhetoric is beneficial; his use of rhetorical rules proves that
rhetoric exists. There is no explicit trace of these claims in our sources, although they may lie be-
hind the beginning of Quintilian, II. ch. 16.
15 Charmadas himself, as an Academic Sceptic, was trained to defeat his rivals using their own
techniques.
16 One of the most prominent debates between the philosophers and the rhetors is who stole
from whom, and how much, clearly reflected in Cicero, De Oratore I., and the Praefatio of Quinti-
lian.
17 Alcidamas attacking Isocrates in On the Sophists uses a similar argument: the method of Al-
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The connection between the rhetorical abilities of those who attack rhetoric and
the Benefit Argument is also made by Quintilian, so it would only appear natural to
attribute the subject matter of the criticism in §§2–4 to Charmadas. Any attempt,
however, to connect between §1 which hints at Charmadas as the source and §2
which reveals the contents of the criticism is fraught with difficulties. Charmadas
was not the first to use Plato in an attack on rhetoric. He was anticipated by at least
one additional philosopher, none other than Critolaus.18 Furthermore, Critolaus used
Plato for what we have called the Benefit Argument, as we shall see in our analysis
of the parallel in Sextus. Should the criticism in §§2–4 be attributed to Critolaus or
Charmadas or to both? If to both, then how?
Despite the great temptation to regard these sections as revealing the content of
the criticism of Charmadas hinted at by Crassus in De Oratore, there are good rea-
sons for not doing so, mainly to do with the parallels to this issue to be discussed in
due course, but also because at this early stage it would be premature to jump to
conclusions based on sections which reflect summaries of summaries of arguments.
What does seem probable is that Charmadas is responsible for the comment on Plato
(§1) and that it is somehow connected with the Benefit Argument. Quintilian may
have added the arguments in §§2–3 from another source, in which case there would
be no necessary connection between them and the comment on Plato. The argu-
ments run as follows (II. 16. 2–4):
(2) eloquentiam esse, quae poenis eripiat scelestos, cuius fraude dam-
nentur interim boni, consilia ducantur in peius, nec seditiones modo
turbaeque populares, sed bella etiam inexpiabilia excitentur, cuius deni-
que tum maximus sit usus, cum pro falsis contra veritatem valet. (3)
nam et Socrati obiciunt comici docere eum, quo modo peiorem causam
meliorem faciat, et contra Tisian et Gorgian similia dicit polliceri Plato.
(4) et his adiciunt exempla Graecorum Romanorumque et enumerant,
qui perniciosa non singulis tantum, sed rebus etiam publicis usi elo-
quentia turbaverint civitatium status vel everterint, eoque et Lacedae-
moniorum civitate expulsam, et Athenis quoque, ubi actor movere ad-
fectus vetabatur, velut recisam orandi potestatem.
The structure of the argument is worth noting. The reported speech in §2 might ap-
pear to be quotation, but this is not necessarily the case. §3 appears to be no more
than an example for the last argument in §2 (pro falsis contra veritatem valere),19
but it could be a continuation of the quotation, or an addition to the quotation from
cidamas, tò légein, is preferable to that of Isocrates, tò gráfein, because anyone learning the for-
mer method will in any case learn the latter, but the opposite is not true. For a discussion, see Lie-
bersohn (1999) 115.
18 Sextus II. 12; 20; cf. also pp.119–120 below.
19 I agree with the explanation given by RW (2006) 282 on II. 16. 1.
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another source. If it is indeed an addition, then the last argument in §2 could also be
an addition, added together with the continuation at some later stage.
§4 does not follow on from §3. “And they (sc. the opponents of rhetoric) add to
these [arguments] examples. . .” Quintilian himself may be summarizing his
sources.20 Towards the end of §4 we find that rhetoric was expelled from Sparta and
Athens, demonstrating (eoque) that rhetoric is indeed harmful. This argument is pre-
sented, however, in such a way as to suggest that it was once independent and has
been added on here. We shall return to these problems of structure in due course,
but it is now time to turn to examine the problems connected with the content of the
criticism.
There are three issues which catch the eye in §§2–3. Firstly, the formulation of
the argument is rhetorical: rhetoric snatches the wicked away from punishment
while the good are condemned. The formulation and the internal logic of §2 suggest
that this is a quotation joined to §1 by Quintilian,21 since §2 is no more than a de-
monstration of the claim made in §1. That is to say, Quintilian regards the criticism
in §2 as an example of the rhetoric used by opponents of rhetoric in their criticism
of rhetoric.
The second issue is the clearly social context. In an argument about the harm that
rhetoric causes, the fact that the wicked are snatched away from punishment by
rhetoric is hardly harmful to them personally, but it does harm society. The same ap-
plies to the fact that the good are condemned by rhetoric. It is society which is
harmed as much as the individuals concerned. The harm to society is also the sub-
ject of the following items, including revolt and war. Thus we shall call the argu-
ment in §2 the Social Harm argument, as opposed to a potential Individual Harm ar-
gument which would show how rhetoric harms the individual.
The third issue concerns the last claim made in §2, pro falsis contra veritatem va-
let. Unlike the other arguments which are to do with the harm caused by rhetoric,
this claim touches on the method by which rhetoric achieves its harmful results. It is
this claim only which is exemplified in §3. Furthermore, §4 also exemplifies this
claim only. Why, then, does the last claim in §2 enjoy two sections of examples
while the examples of the previous sources are indicated but not detailed (et his ex-
empla, §4)? This is assuming that Quintilian is following a source in which the con-
20 While this is possible, Quintilian hardly ever misses an opportunity to provide his reader with
Roman examples, even replacing the Greek examples of his sources with Roman examples of his
own. The phrase exempla Graecorum Romanorumque might suggest that Quintilian is summarizing
a Roman source which had added Roman examples to the Greek examples of its own Greek source,
or more probably that he is copying what he found in a summary of that Roman source. This will be
of importance in sorting out the various arguments appearing here and in the parallels in Sextus and
Philodemus.
21 Quintilian is the only source connecting the comment about the opponents of rhetoric using
rhetoric in their criticism with this argument.
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tents of §4 followed on §2, with §3 being interpolated.22 It would seem that Quinti-
lian in §2 was following a source which had collected all the arguments, stripped
them of their examples, and turned them into one Social Harm argument. Quintilian
regarded the final claim of §2 and the examples of §3 as an extension of this argu-
ment. Leaving these aside for now, let us turn to §4.
Quintilian seems to have supposed, and may have seen in his source, that those
who adiciunt exempla in §4 are the same quidam mentioned in §1. A careful analy-
sis of the connection between §§2–3 and §4 will show that they actually contain dif-
ferent stages of the same argument, if not different arguments.
§4 presents us with two new elements. The first is of course the mention of the
Romans. §§1–3 were entirely Greek both in character and in their examples.23 The
fact that Quintilian mentions Romans indicates that the argument is originally Greek
but has undergone Romanization, and Quintilian does not reflect the original source.
Did the Romanization involve merely the adding of examples or also a reworking of
the argument? The latter seems to be the case, as may be demonstrated by means of
the second element in the argument, which is the distinction between social and in-
dividual harm (perniciosa non singulis tantum, sed rebus etiam publicis). §2 con-
centrated on rhetoric’s social harm.24 We shall consider in due course who the indi-
viduals harmed by rhetoric might be – victims of the orator, or the orator himself.
Our analysis of §§2–4 has raised more questions than it has answered. Many of
the serious problems will be solved only after an analysis of the parallels in Sextus,
Cicero and Philodemus. Before turning to them, however, it is worth perusing the
answers Quintilian himself gives to this criticism.
§§5–6 do not address the content of the criticism, and in fact seem to agree that
rhetoric causes harm. Quintilian at this stage does not even attempt to emphasize
the benefits accruing from rhetoric, which he postpones until §§7–10. Here his strat-
egy is to make the criticism look absurd. This is a well-known rhetorical technique.
He suggests that by the same argument used against rhetoric, so too should politics,
medicine and wisdom itself be censured, since they too can cause harm.25 The final
22 I shall be arguing that the final claim of §2 was itself an addition to the Social Harm argu-
ment, only after which the examples of §3 were added. See pp.125–126 below.
23 The examples in §3 for the last claim in §2 are all Greek: Socrates, and then Tisias and Gor-
gias. §4 ends with the examples of Athens and Sparta, but begins with the assertion that examples of
Greeks and Romans were added to the arguments of §2.
24 Quintilian formulates the distinction in §4 as if social harm is the novelty, but §2 has already
dealt with this. The inclination of an author faced with isolated information in a source summarizing
previous summaries would be to regard social harm as greater than individual harm and formulate
accordingly.
25 Quintilian strengthens the argument with examples unconnected with the arts: among them,
food, shelter and even the heavenly bodies themselves. These examples are a later addition, perhaps
by Quintilian himself. They have no parallel, and they stray from the subject of the argument, the
debate between rival arts. More will be said on this in due course.
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example, wisdom itself, suggests that this defence is against a philosophical at-
tack,26 and this, together with the rhetorical tone of the response, suggests that the
context is the external debate, between the philosophical and the rhetorical
schools.27
That the response in §§5–6 is part of the external debate is corroborated by con-
sidering its target. A first reading might establish that these sections respond to a
general claim that rhetoric harms (this would be the General Harm argument, which
includes the Social Harm and Individual Harm arguments). Such a reading would
regard the immediately preceding mention of the eviction of rhetoric from Sparta
and Athens (§4) as incidental to the main argument. Another reading, however, is
possible. §§5–6 might refer only to the expulsion of rhetoric from Sparta and
Athens, and not to a General Harm argument. It must be borne in mind that Quinti-
lian, if not his source, is reworking his material. It would seem that §§2–4 have been
taken from one source, in which the expulsion of rhetoric was not an independent
argument, while §§5–6 have been taken from another source, in which they were a
response to the expulsion of rhetoric as an independent argument.28 The response,
together with the expulsion of rhetoric argument, is in the context of the external de-
bate. The philosophers attacked rhetoric by pointing to its expulsion (the expulsion
of rhetors) from Sparta and Athens, and in response, the rhetors produced arts and
additional items, such as philosophy itself, which would have had to be expelled for
the same reason given by the philosophers for the expulsion of rhetoric.29
The external debate continues up to the end of §10 where the argument is
summed up, while §11 changes the target of the attack. §§7–10 are actually a re-
sponse to §§2–3 (the General Harm argument). We have argued that §§4–6 are in
the context of the external debate. In fact, the whole of the response in §§5–10 is
rhetorical, and part of the external debate. The Stoics had no need of the arguments
used in this response, and §11 is where Quintilian begins to address the Stoic theory
which undermines all the criticism based on the Benefit Argument.
Before continuing, it might be worth summarizing the three main criticisms:
a) The first basic criticism of rhetoric rests on the Social Harm argument
(§§1–3), to which there are two responses. The first response is the pre-
sentation of examples showing that rhetoric is actually beneficial (7–
26 The word sapientia in the list of things to be censured is parallelled in the following sentence
by the philosophers in the list of people who use these things badly.
27 The criticism in §§2–3 was launched against the Stoics as well, in the context of the internal
debate, but the Stoics had a much better response, which appears in §11; see pp.109–112 below.
28 This proposal will be borne out by the parallel in Sextus, p.110 below.
29 The response only points to the fact that some of the philosophers have caused harm through
maltreatment of wisdom, and no examples are provided of philosophers being expelled. This will be
an important point in reconstructing the various layers of the argument during our analysis of the
parallel in Sextus.
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10). The second response is to change the definition and basis of rheto-
ric such that it is logically impossible for it to do harm (11ff.).
b) The second criticism pertains to the General Harm argument which dis-
tinguishes between the social and individual aspects (4 init.). Quintilian
regards it as a development of the first argument, with it adding Greek
and Roman examples.
c) The third criticism may be called the Expulsion argument. This is what
appears in Quintilian as an intrusive remark about the fact that rhetoric
was expelled from Sparta and Athens (4 fin.). The response is to show
that other arts, above all philosophy,30 could also do harm, and that
they should by the same argument also be expelled from cities. This re-
sponse is intended to make the attack appear absurd (5–6).
Considering the number of arguments we have uncovered, it would be worth asking
whether any of them can be attributed to one philosopher or another. It would seem
that at least in one case we can identify the originator. Quintilian sums up his re-
sponse emphasizing the benefit in rhetoric (7–10), with the words (10): quare, etiam
si in utramque partem valent arma facundiae, non est tamen aecum id haberi mal-
um, quo bene uti licet. This is in response to someone who argued that rhetoric was
bad. We know that one of the disparaging terms for rhetoric used by its opponents
was the word kakotecnı́a, translated by Quintilian as mala quasi ars (II. 20. 2). This
term is clearly identified with Critolaus.31 The inclination to attribute the argument
to Critolaus is strengthened by §11 which begins: Verum haec apud eos forsitan
quaerantur, qui summam rhetorices ad persuadendi vim rettulerunt. I shall be ar-
guing in the chapter on the End Argument that Critolaus was the one who insisted
on defining rhetoric as dúnamiß toũ peı́Xein.32
Critolaus may be the target for the rhetorical response in §10,33 but as we have
already noted, there is a second response to §§2–3, and this begins in §11 and con-
tinues until the end of the chapter. This is a Stoic response, rebutting the criticism
by defining rhetoric as scientia bene dicendi, and it reflects the internal debate be-
tween the Peripatetics (Critolaus) against the Stoa (Diogenes of Babylon).
30 Wisdom closes the list in Quintilian, but the parallels, esp. in Sextus, II. 25, indicate that phi-
losophy was the main target of the counterattack.
31 Critolaus may not so much have argued that rhetoric is a bad art, as that the harm it causes
outweighs its benefit. While we have no explicit evidence for such a position, a similar line of
thought may be seen in the words of Scaevola in Cic. De Oratore. I. 38: ego vero si velim et nostrae
civitatis exemplis uti, et aliarum, plura proferre possim detrimenta publicis rebus, quam adiumenta
per homines eloquentissimos importata.
32 See pp.158–160 below.
33 It is rhetorical in its use of examples and its avoidance of technical complexity; cf. the testi-
mony of Cicero referring to the debate between Charmadas and Menedemus in De Oratore I. 88.
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The Social Harm argument, then, may be attributed to Critolaus, but the remain-
ing two arguments – General Harm and Expulsion – are still unaccounted for. The
General Harm argument is clearly a later addition to the first argument, with its
Greek and Roman examples. The Expulsion argument is also an incidental addition
intended by Quintilian to show the fact that rhetoric is harmful, but §§5–6 which re-
spond to it indicate that this argument was at some point independent.
Critolaus cannot automatically be made the advocate of all three arguments since
they have been shown to derive from different backgrounds. The temptation is great
to attribute the Expulsion argument to Charmadas, whose tracks are certainly to be
found in this chapter. It would be very neat to divide the arguments up between Cri-
tolaus of the first stage and Charmadas of the second stage of the debate, with Social
Harm attributed to the former, and Expulsion to the latter. Unfortunately, Quinti-
lian’s account reflects a summary combining the various layers, and such a division
would be misleading and arbitrary. The state of affairs is more complex than that.
For further help, we need to turn to the parallels, and above all, Sextus Empiricus.
5.3. Sextus Empiricus and the Benefit Argument
Is is immediately clear that Sextus works with more than one source. It is not always
clear how many sources he works with, or where he turns from one to another. II.
20 is one such case. The first 19 sections of this book concern the Stoic definition of
art and the various parts of this definition.34 The two main components of the defini-
tion are the sústvma and the téloß. The discussion about benefit starts in §20 and
Sextus begins to follow a new source, as the opening makes clear. Benefit is indeed
part of the Stoic definition, but is not an independent point at issue there; it appears
there in the description of the téloß (téloß eu crvston). The first source Sextus used
for the criticism based on the Stoic definition may have continued with a discussion
of the end. Sextus fixes his attention on the word eu crvston in the definition, and
for this reason changes to a source dealing with benefit.35 The passage relevant to
our discussion continues down to II. 47. The following section, 48, explicitly begins
a new discussion on the Materia Argument (uÇ lv).36
34 Cf. §3. 4 above.
35 I shall be arguing that the original source for the Stoic definition of art may well have contin-
ued with a discussion of benefit, but that it was replaced by a discussion of the end before it reached
Sextus; see §5.4, esp. p.124 below.
36 See chapter 7 below.
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5.3.1. Sextus Empiricus, II. 20–47
A preliminary division of the passage would be as follows:
a) 20–25: The expulsion of rhetoric from cities indicates its lack of benefit
(= harm), and hence it is not an art. §25 includes a refutation of the ar-
gument by the supporters of rhetoric, and two objections to the refuta-
tion by the opposition.
b) 26–47: The harm caused by rhetoric is described at length: to indivi-
duals (27–30); to society (31–42). There follow two refutations of the
argument by the supporters of rhetoric, and two objections to each refu-
tation, with an additional objection (43–47).
The two elements which appeared incidentally in Quintilian II. 16. 4 are clearly set
out here:
a) the expulsion of rhetoric from the cities
b) the distinction between social and individual harm
Since these are clearly parallels, either Sextus and Quintilian share a common
source which Sextus expanded upon and Quintilian abbreviated, or Quintilian’s
source reflects an earlier stage and Sextus drew on a source reflecting a later, more
developed, stage. In fact, there is a third alternative which I shall be arguing for
here: that there are indeed two stages, but that each text reflects both, with Quinti-
lian abbreviating his mixed stages, and Sextus developing his. By comparing these
and other parallel texts, we shall be able to arrive at a fair picture of both stages.
The Benefit Argument in Sextus is one of the few places where a source provides
explicit attribution, albeit not without problems (II. 20):
oı dè perì tòn Kritólaon kaì oı a pò tṽß LAkadvmı́aß, e n oıß e sti
Kleitómacoß kaì Carmı́daß, eiẃXasi kaì ou toi toiaũtá tina légein,
oÇ ti. . .
The formulation appears to portray all these philosophers sharing the one argument,
although it may mean, as I shall be arguing, that the same argument was advanced
first by Critolaus, and that it was developed by the Academics. Furthermore, our no-
tion of a two-stage double debate37 requires us to consider the targets of each of
these attacks – the rhetors or the Stoics. It is also interesting to note that while Crito-
laus and two Academics are mentioned at the beginning of the discussion on benefit,
only the Academics are mentioned at the end. The text itself provides the reason for
this (43):
37 See p.45 above.
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tosaũta mèn ou n kaì toı̃ß LAkadvmaïkoı̃ß e n katadromṽß mérei
légetai perì r vtorikṽß, wÇ ste ei mv́te tw̃ e conti mv́te toı̃ß pélaß e stìn
w félimoß, ou k a n eiv técnv.
The criticism e n katadromṽß mérei begins only in §26, regarding the harm caused
to the individual and to the many. The final sentence at §43, therefore, refers only to
§§26–42.38 The mention of the two Academics along with Critolaus in §20 requires
another explanation. One possibility might be that Critolaus is accredited with the
Expulsion argument (20–25) and Sextus mentions the two Academics in anticipa-
tion of §§26ff. In other words, §20 serves as a general programme for the whole dis-
cussion to come. Another possibility is that the Expulsion argument is also Aca-
demic, but is a development of an argument advocated by Critolaus. The difficulty
in deciding between these possibilities is the result of the nature of the texts of Sex-
tus and Quintilian where both stages are reworked and confused. Nevertheless, it
seems to me that the second possibility is to be preferred, for reasons to be provided
immediately below.39
The content of the passage will now analysed according to the two arguments
identified in it: the Expulsion argument and the General Harm argument.
5.3.2. The Expulsion Argument
The argument is presented clearly and simply in §20: if all cities everywhere perse-
cute rhetoric, there is no benefit in it. The argument rests on the notion that arts are
beneficial to life (biwfeleı̃ß) and that cities understand (epistámenai) what is good
for them. Cities do not expel arts which are good for them.40 If all the cities every-
where expel rhetoric, this would indicate that rhetoric is not beneficial, and hence is
not an art. The following sections prove this claim by means of examples of the
most important cities: Crete, Athens and Sparta. The parallel in Quintilian will help
us to understand the character of the argument (16. 4):
et his adiciunt exempla Graecorum Romanorumque et enumerant, qui
perniciosa non singulis tantum, sed rebus etiam publicis usi eloquentia
turbaverint civitatium status vel everterint, eoque et Lacedaemoniorum
38 This part continues until §47, with the addition of refutations and objections to the refuta-
tions.
39 To anticipate the end of the discussion, I shall present a third alternative, that the Expulsion
argument appeared independently only in the second stage with Charmadas; see §5.5.2 below.
40 Sextus provides some interesting examples – housekeepers and shepherds. A house cannot
survive without a manager, and a herd cannot survive without someone to look after it. A city, how-
ever, can survive without rhetoric. Furthermore, the city can survive when it expels its rhetors.
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civitate expulsam, et Athenis quoque, ubi actor movere adfectus veta-
batur, velut recisam orandi potestatem.
The key word here is eoque. It makes all the difference between the two parallels.
In Quintilian the expulsion of rhetoric from the Greek cities does not appear as an
independent argument but as an incidental remark indicating that rhetoric is a bad
art, or no art at all. This reflects its status in the Benefit Argument of Critolaus. In
Sextus, II. 20–24, the version is an independent and fully developed argument, re-
flecting the second stage of the debate. This is why Critolaus and the two Aca-
demics are mentioned in §20. At the same time, it must be recalled that Quintilian
and his source abbreviate, allowing for the possibility that Critolaus already used
the fully developed and independent Expulsion argument. This interpretation would
require Quintilian to be somewhat confused in his reducing the argument to a mere
aside on the previous argument (eoque). It is actually this possibility which the par-
allel in Sextus seems to suggest.
I shall argue that the parallel to Quintilian’s argument is Sextus, II. 20–25. Then I
hope to demonstrate that the text of Sextus reflects two stages in this argument, one
to be attributed to Critolaus and the other to Charmadas, since they are mentioned
explicitly in connection with this argument.
Sextus is attacking rhetoric, and for this reason he produces the supporters’ refu-
tation of the criticism knowing that he will then add the objections by the opponents
of rhetoric to this refutation. The refutations and objections appear in §25. Here it
seems that the supporters of rhetoric claimed simply that there were some cities
which also expelled philosophy. Here we are on firm ground. A similar claim is
made in Quintilian, §§5–6, where wisdom itself is also mentioned, although Quinti-
lian adds a few other arts and other items which are not expelled despite their poten-
tial to do harm.
The appearance of ipsa sapientia at the end of the list of arts in Quintilian hints
at a solution. I argue that the rhetors’ refutation concentrated on philosophy because
they were being attacked by philosophers. The other examples of Quintilian, of
duces and magistratus, are Roman. In other words, all but ipsa sapientia originates
in a Roman addition. The Greek original had but wisdom itself. There is no conclu-
sive proof here, since it could also be speculated that the Roman examples replaced
Greek ones, but Quintilian does not behave like Cicero.41 Quintilian does not bother
to replace Greek examples he finds in his source. If the arts added to wisdom did
not appear in the Greek source,42 there is even less reason to suppose that the other
items, such as heavenly bodies, appeared there. These additions actually detract
from the force of the argument, and must have been added by someone who did not
41 Cf. Hubbel (1920) 372–373.
42 One of the arts is medicine, which might be considered more Greek than Roman, but it is a
commonly mentioned art in the debate over rhetoric and could easily have been added by a Roman.
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sufficiently understand the sting in the argument, being unaware of the original con-
text.
With the aid of the parallel in Sextus, it is now possible to confirm our suspicion
that §§5–6 in Quintilian are a response only to the comment on the expulsion of
rhetoric from the cities, and that consequently the expulsion was not originally an
incidental remark but an independent argument launched by the philosophers
against the rhetors.43 Sextus concentrates exclusively on the philosophers in §25,44
and we have already concluded that the argument originates with Critolaus, men-
tioned explicitly in §20 and hinted at in Quintilian, II. 16. 10. Others adopted the ar-
gument, but before identifying them we must distinguish between two versions of
the argument as formulated by Sextus. In one version, everyone everywhere
(pánteß pantacóXen) persecuted rhetoric (§20). In what is meant to be the response,
we find a reference to “certain (tineß) of the Greek cities”, rather than all of them
(§25). Sextus has conflated two arguments. Clearly, the current refutation would
have responded to an argument mentioning only some cities. The current argument
is sweeping and much stronger, requiring a stronger refutation which is absent here.
The weaker argument and refutation would seem to be the earlier stage, followed by
the stronger argument and refutation at a later stage. The examples given in the ear-
lier argument of certain Greek cities would no doubt have been Sparta and Athens,
mentioned in the parallel in Quintilian (§4). The original argument may indeed have
claimed that the greatest cities of the time, Sparta and Athens, had expelled rhetoric.
The rhetors would have justly noted that Sparta and Athens are only “certain” of the
Greek cities, there being many more, and they could have brought counterexamples
of certain Greek cities expelling philosophy (Epicurean and Socratic). The philoso-
phers would have had to counter this by claiming that all cities everywhere expelled
rhetoric. To this the rhetors could not give the desired counterexample of philoso-
phy being expelled from all cities everywhere.
It seems that immediately after the claim that all cities everywhere expelled
rhetoric (the later version of the argument), Sextus or his source moved to the earlier
version, where there were examples of various cities. The provision of particular ex-
amples after the universal claim would hardly have helped the later argument, and
they clearly belong to the earlier version, regarding certain cities. Nor does the con-
clusion in §24 refer to all cities everywhere, but is of a piece with the examples ta-
ken from the earlier version. Thus the later version’s sweeping claim which opens
the presentation of the Expulsion argument in Sextus is the only element he uses of
that later version. Sextus may have drawn this claim from memory to introduce the
examples he saw in his source.
43 See the discussion above, pp.103–104 above.
44 Sextus refers to the Epicurean and Socratic schools. It may be these whom Quintilian hints at
in II. 16. 5. They would have been ideal for the rhetorical counterattack, serving as examples of phi-
losophers who were expelled from cities, or, indeed, killed.
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Not only are there two versions reflecting two stages in the development of the
argument, but there are also two replies to the refutation (§25):
prw̃ton mèn gàr ou k a n e coien toútw parasceı̃n marturı́an wÇ sper epì
r vtorikṽß oı tou nantı́on sunagagónteßk epeita ei kaì e xébalón tineß
tw̃n pólewn filosofı́an, ou katà génoß pãsan e xébalon a llà tinàß
aıréseiß, oıon tv̀n LEpikoúreion w ß v donṽß didáskalon, tv̀n Swkra-
tikv̀n dè w ß e kfaulı́zousan tò Xeı̃on. aı méntoi ge proeirvménai
póleiß ou tinà mèn parUtv́santo r vtorikv̀n tinà dè prosv́kanto,
a llà koinw̃ß pãsan periéstvsan.
Sextus typically uses a number of sources at the same time. It may be said with
some caution that when he assembles a number of similar arguments, they have
been taken (by him or his source) from sources reflecting different stages of the
same argument. In this case, the connection between the two arguments appears to
be quite simple: First of all (prw̃ton mén), the supporters of rhetoric are unable to
prove the expulsion of philosophers from the cities; secondly (epeita) even if there
were philosophers who had been expelled, they were not expelled as a group (katà
génoß). This reply has gone through several stages and is not so simple as it looks.
To begin with, either the rhetors had examples of philosophers who had been ex-
pelled or they did not. If they did, their opponents should have replied immediately
with the katà génoß argument; if the rhetors did not have any examples, their oppo-
nents should have been content with pointing this fact out. Furthermore, the second
reply does provide examples, apparently used by the rhetors being countered; but
then, how could their opponents begin with the claim that the rhetors had no exam-
ples? The decisive proof is actually to be found in Quintilian, II. 16. 5–6, which we
have already established is the reply of the rhetors to the Expulsion argument, and
have identified as a parallel to Sextus, II. 25. The identification was correct, but not
entirely accurate. The objection to the refutation in Quintilian is not identical to the
one in Sextus. Quintilian makes no mention of the philosophers expelled from cities,
referred to in Sextus, but does have the argument that other arts – including wisdom
itself – perform criminal acts, with the conclusion that according to the argument of
the opponents of rhetoric, these arts, including philosophy, should be expelled. It is
this which provides us with the solution to the two-fold objection to the refutation
in Sextus. The first of the objections to the refutation in Sextus actually replies to
the argument we find in Quintilian, while the second is a response to the claim of
the rhetors that the Epicurean and Socratic sects were expelled. The development of
the argument is as follows:
a) The philosophers prove that rhetoric is not an art by noting that it was
expelled from the cities (Sextus, II. 20).
b) First stage: The rhetors rebutted this with the counter-argument that ad-
ditional arts, including philosophy, could also do harm (Quintilian, II.
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16. 5–6). The philosophers retorted that the rhetors could not provide
an example of such an expulsion (Sextus, II. 25).
c) Second stage: The rhetors provided examples, such as the Epicurean
and Socratic sects being expelled (Sextus, II. 25). In response the philo-
sophers made their claim universal, that all cities everywhere expelled
rhetoric.
We are left with the second part of the objection to the refutation where the expul-
sion of rhetors and philosophers is distinguished: the philosophers are expelled indi-
vidually, but the rhetors are always expelled katà génoß. This comes instead of the
claim that rhetoric was expelled by all cities everywhere. One possible explanation
for this would be that the universal claim was too sweeping to be credible, while the
claim that rhetors were expelled as a group would be more plausible. Another possi-
ble explanation is that Sextus has once again conflated replies originally intended
for different contexts. Sextus has his own reasons for grouping all the arguments to-
gether, all the refutations together, and all the objections to the refutations together,
but it makes our search for his sources somewhat more difficult than it might have
been. I propose the following: the Expulsion argument was used in both the internal
and the external debates. Both the rhetors and the Stoics found examples of philoso-
phers being expelled from cities, and the opponents of rhetoric were obliged to find
responses suitable for each target. The universal argument (“all cities everywhere”)
was directed at the rhetors, while the katà génoß argument was directed at the
Stoics. The plausibility of this solution is increased by the fact that the two replies
appear in different contexts. The universal argument appears as an integral part of
the attack, while the katà génoß reply appears clearly as a reply. They could thus
derive from different sources.
The reply is very suitable against the Stoics who claimed that there were two
kinds of rhetoric, with Stoic rhetoric being the true kind. The reply would have been
in response to a Stoic claim that the rhetoric expelled from the cities was only of the
non-Stoic kind, and its import would have been that there are indeed divisions be-
tween artists within an art, and individual philosophical sects might have been ex-
pelled from certain cities, but rhetoric was expelled katà génoß (and not kat’ eidoß)
– according to its genus, not one of its species.
So far we have uncovered at least two stages and even two targets. It is now time
to consider the identity of the proponents of each stage of the argument. It might be
thought at this stage45 that Critolaus is obviously the advocate of the argument at
the first stage, and Charmadas at the second. Charmadas is not mentioned explicitly
by Quintilian, but is in Sextus, together with the universal argument (“all cities
everywhere”), although this is not conclusive evidence since Sextus conflates the
various stages.
45 But see pp.125–127 below.
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To conclude our analysis of the Expulsion argument, we may summarize our
findings as follows. Critolaus advocated the argument in the first stage. It may have
been part of a general argument dealing with the harm caused by rhetoric, but the
Expulsion argument could have stood independently. The argument was directed
against the rhetors, and it used a number of examples of Greek cities which had ex-
pelled rhetoric, or at least had greatly restricted it.46 The rhetors replied with coun-
ter-examples emphasizing the expulsion of philosophers from the cities.
Charmadas advocated the argument in the second stage,47 where the attack rested
on the universal claim that all cities everywhere expelled rhetoric. If the Stoics were
also attacked with this argument, they would have responded by distinguishing their
rhetoric from that of the schools of rhetoric. The opponents of rhetoric would then
have responded with the katà génoß argument.
5.3.3. The General Harm Argument
The General Harm argument (including the Social and Individual Harm arguments)
is clearly Academic, and therefore does not originate with Critolaus the Peripatetic.
Sextus in his summation (§43) refers only to Academics in connection with this ar-
gument and even adds a typical Academic feature – e n katadromṽß mérei. This
Academic origin is not affected by the fact that the division also appears in Quinti-
lian. The passage there derives from a source, as we have already noted, which re-
works all the attacks against rhetoric, and the distinction made there between indivi-
dual and social harm is clearly at a join patching together two sources.
The Benefit Argument, apparently initiated by Critolaus, is improved by the ad-
dition of the General Harm argument which we are attributing to Charmadas (Sex-
tus, II. 26–48). It is clearly divided as follows:
46 It should be borne in mind that in the external debate, the philosophers attacked the rhetors,
but the real targets were the potential students. This argument would have served to worry the stu-
dents that after their studies they would not find employment in rhetoric. The discussion of the Spar-
tans at §§21–24 does not deal directly with rhetoric (at least in §22) but rather with the “laconic”
style of native speech (Sextus makes the connection between this style and rhetoric with the word
oÇ Xen at the beginning of §22). The Spartans are “laconic” (brief and to the point) while rhetoric is
famously regarded as makrologı́a (probably on the strength of Plato’s Gorgias 449c5). “Hence” the
Spartans hate rhetoric. The problem with this argument is that rhetoric can also handle minimalism
in speech, using short sentences which nevertheless confuse and confound. This is not to say that
the Spartans did admire rhetoric.
47 But see pp.126–128 below where I shall claim that the Expulsion argument became indepen-
dent only with Charmadas, requiring both the versions we have identified here to be attributed to
the second stage of the debate.
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a) 26–30: Individual harm
b) 31–42: Social harm
c) 43–47: Refutations and objections to the refutations
Our analysis of the passage in Quintilian revealed that the Benefit Argument of Cri-
tolaus dealt solely with benefit to society.48 The later distinction between individual
and social harm requires us to pay some attention to the new element, individual
harm.49
There would seem to be some Platonic influence here. Charmadas utilized Gor-
gias50 where there is a similar division,51 yet the difference is very great. Socrates
fought against the rhetoric of Gorgias. A dramatic analysis of the dialogue reveals
that the moral doctrine of the sophist is self-destructive (cf. individual harm); rheto-
ric, which is supposed to lead him to power and government (money and pleasures),
will turn him into a wretched leader fearing his fate morning and evening.52 He
would also harm the polis as well as himself by educating everyone to behave hedo-
nistically and by enslaving everyone to his own pleasures. Thus the dialogue Gor-
gias portrays the intrinsic connection between individual and social harm and re-
veals that they are mutually dependent.
Charmadas preserves the two types of harm, but removes the intrinsic connection
between them. The rhetor suffers from rhetoric because it is thankless. Sextus
(§§27–30) describes what might be considered a lawyer’s nightmare.53 Rhetoric
also harms the public since it undermines the laws which are seen as good for the
state (§§31–42).
A counter-criterion for art, however, was becoming increasingly important, the
criterion of benefit, which takes the focus away from social benefit towards private
benefit. When benefit to the individual was used as the criterion for judging a field
of activity as an art, even at the expense of social benefit, the appeal to social harm
to discredit rhetoric lost its effectiveness. It became necessary for opponents of
rhetoric to prove that rhetoric harmed the individual.54
48 See p.102 above.
49 Cf. p.103 above.
50 Cicero, De Oratore I. 47.
51 See also Barnes (1986) 19 n.39.
52 Furthermore, his success is not assured. He might fail and find himself governed by a leader
who used means similar to his own to gain power, and with similar intentions.
53 Barnes (ibid.) 9 criticizes this claim as being one-sided. Indeed, one can imagine instances in
which rhetoric, e.g., benefits the bank account or even adds to the happiness of its agent. Not all the
rhetors lose their cases, and most would win at least one or two. However, a debate is conducted in
such a way that each side goes to extremes to present the client’s case in the best light. Barnes (ibid.)
16–17 n.20 considers this to be an argument of Sextus himself. His criticism is correct, but the con-
text is important here.
54 The scope of the present study does not allow for an examination of the transition from social
to individual benefit as a criterion of art in the ancient world. The issue is complex and would repay
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The whole passage (§§26–42) is full of examples, with rhetoric appearing promi-
nently. This reflects how Cicero’s testimonium (De Oratore I. 88) described the
character of Charmadas’ argument. Charmadas is also mentioned in §20 and the
Academy in §43 (where Critolaus is not mentioned). In addition, the distinction be-
tween individual and social harm appears in Quintilian at the beginning of the argu-
ment (§4). We may therefore state with a great degree of certainty that Charmadas
was the instigator of this new stage in the argument. Who, however, were his tar-
gets; the rhetors or the Stoics?
An analysis of the content does not allow a conclusive answer. The rhetors are
clearly indicated in the words kaì taı̃ß pròß toùß goneı̃ß a caristı́aiß (§28). If what
is taught in the schools of rhetoric displeases the parents, who would send their son
to such places? Yet the internal debate has also left its mark. The orator is corrupted
by engaging in rhetoric; he is required to be and to act other than he might wish.
Such claims oppose the Stoic notion that the orator is a good man. Rhetoric, it is
claimed, makes a man bad. His occupation is a kakotecnı́a and he will become
kakóß.55 Another possibility to be considered is that the criticism combines both tar-
gets. We have already seen Charmadas doing precisely this in De Oratore. The refu-
tation of the criticism and the subsequent objection to the refutation (§§43–47) sup-
port this possibility.
Sextus adduces two responses to the criticism, and this already inclines us to sus-
pect two targets of the Benefit Argument. The first refutation distinguishes two
types of rhetoric: the first is the higher rhetoric belonging only to the wise man; the
second belongs to mediocre or bad men. The criticism of rhetoric in §§26–42 is di-
rected only at the second type of rhetoric. The Stoic56 position is that the sage is a
good orator not because wisdom and rhetoric are combined in him, but that speaking
well is one of the aspects of the good man, just as a bad orator is a bad orator be-
cause he is a bad man (a fool). A Stoic orator can never be a bad man, and the Bene-
fit Argument does not affect him.
The parallel to this response is of course Quintilian’s reply at II. 16. 11, which
supplements what is missing in Sextus. The Benefit Argument is directed against
the rhetoric of the mediocre and wicked. The aim of this sort of rhetoric is to per-
suade, and this allows the possibility of a bad man being an orator. The other sort of
study. The ancient sources reflect a tension between the two spheres of benefit, and there is no doubt
that the rise of rhetoric was a catalyst for the transition.
55 Another trace of the internal debate may be found in an image at the beginning of the discus-
sion on social harm (§31): oı gàr nómoi póleẃn eisi súndesmoi, kaì w ß [yucv̀] sw̃m=a pneúm?atoß
e kfXaréntoß fXeı́retai, ouÇ tw nómwn a naireXéntwn kaì aı póleiß diólluntai. This analogy is
somewhat Stoic in character if Theiler’s emendations are accepted.
56 Barnes (ibid.) 15–16 n.11 refers to the opinion of Gigante (1981) who sees in tineß the Epi-
curean group which regarded sophistic rhetoric as an art. The emphasis on sofóß, however, estab-
lishes that the context is Stoic, and this also seems to be the opinion of Barnes.
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rhetoric is that of the sage, and its aim is to speak well, which does not allow the
possibility of a bad man being an orator.
An identical division of rhetoric is to be found in Cicero, De Oratore I. 83, where
it is attributed to the Stoic Mnesarchus.57 This theory of Mnesarchus forms part of
his argument with the philosopher named there explicitly: Charmadas vero multo
uberius eisdem de rebus loquebatur (§84). What Charmadas said would seem to be
the reply presented in Sextus, II. 43 and Quintilian, II. 16. 11. If this is the case, we
may at least trace one leg of the Benefit Argument, the General Harm argument, to
the internal debate between Charmadas and Mnesarchus.
The second reply in Sextus produces the classic argument appearing already in
Plato’s Gorgias which removes responsibility from the rhetor for the deeds of a cor-
rupt pupil and blames rhetoric’s bad deeds on the corrupt character of those using it;
the art itself is innocent. The use of an identical argument here strongly suggests
Platonic influence.
While the first reply in Sextus derives from the Stoics, the second derives from
the rhetors who were also attacked by the Benefit Argument. The rhetors cannot use
the Stoic division of rhetoric as a means of defence since they only recognize one
type, and even with Stoic division they would have been identified with the worse
form of rhetoric, precisely the type of rhetoric being attacked. The rhetors found in
Plato’s Gorgias a ready-made argument given by Gorgias which could be used by
them without modification. It is also worth noting the comment Sextus makes re-
garding the use of examples. A similar comment is made in Cicero, De Oratore I.
88 in the context of the external debate between the philosophers (Charmadas) and
the rhetors (Menedemus). Thus far the refutation of the criticism by the supporters
of rhetoric, clearly showing the second stage of the two-fold debate with Charmadas
attacking both the rhetors and the Stoics and being replied to.
After presenting the refutation of the criticism (II. 44), Sextus turns to the objec-
tions agains the refutation (II. 45–47). Here we find something strange yet typical of
Sextus. There are three replies, two responding to the Stoic refutation, and one to
that of the rhetors, and yet the replies are out of order: against the Stoics (45), rhet-
ors (46), then Stoics again (47). The reason for this arrangement is that the first two
replies are from one source (lélvXe dè toùß mèn prẃtouß oÇ ti. . .[45]; pròß dè toùß
deutérouß r vtéon oÇ ti. . . [46]), while the third is from another source, introduced in
a general way (kaXólou dè tṽß r vtorikṽß [47]), and is used by Sextus as a conclu-
sion.
Sextus applies against the first Stoic refutation (43) an argument exploiting Stoic
ideas. The Stoic sage is unlikely to exist, or at least is very rare. Stoic rhetoric, de-
pendent on the existence of the wise man, is therefore as good as non-existent. This
formulation of the argument grants rhetoric a nuparxı́a.58
57 Cf. Cic. Luc. 69; see also pp.42–43 above.
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The next reply is against the refutation of the rhetors (44). Here Sextus distin-
guishes between the example of the wrestler and rhetoric. In his opinion, rhetoric,
unlike wrestling, directly teaches how to lie and deceive, show us, for example, pw̃ß
a n tà mikrà megála poiv́saimen tà dè megála mikrá (46).59
Sextus’ second objection to the Stoic refutation (47) denies the distinction be-
tween two types of rhetor – the a steı̃oß r v́twr and o mv̀ toioũtoß. The very fact that
rhetoric deals with e nantı́a means that it deals necessarily with tò a dikon.
As is always the case when Sextus provides two arguments against one target,60
we must ask ourselves why he does so. As in the case of the Expulsion argument,
the two objections are from two different sources. The second objection (§47) is bet-
ter than the first (§45), since the first actually allows the existence of the Stoic rheto-
ric by admitting that the Stoic sage might exist at all, no matter how rare this might
be; the second uses the very power of rhetoric against itself. It might seem that the
two arguments reflect the two stages of the debate, rather than two aspects of the
second stage. The text in Sextus, however, does not provide us with any guidance.
The refutation of the Benefit Argument in Quintilian (§7)61 provides only partial
parallels to Sextus. In Quintilian, §§11–19 certainly parallel Sextus, §43, with both
resulting from the Stoic division of rhetoric. In the case of the refutation by the rhet-
ors, Quintilian and Sextus reflect different stages of the debate, Quintilian the first
and Sextus the second. The use of examples emphasizing the benefit of rhetoric
characterized the rhetors arguing against Critolaus in a general social context (§§7–
10). There is no hint there of individual harm. When Charmadas in the second stage
talks about social and individual harm, the rhetors are obliged to defend themselves
from the charge of harming their pupils, and do not content themselves with empha-
sizing the benefit of rhetoric (Sextus, §44).
We may sum up the General Harm argument as follows: Critolaus attacked rheto-
ric on the grounds that it harmed society, and launched his attacks against the rhet-
ors and the Stoics alike. The rhetors responded with examples of the benefit of
rhetoric to society. The Stoics avoided the criticism altogether by distinguishing
their rhetoric from the inferior sort being attacked by Critolaus. Charmadas devel-
oped Critolaus’ argument and turned it into a double argument – Social Harm and
Individual Harm (= the General harm argument), he too attacking both rhetors and
Stoics. The rhetors responded by attempting to escape the responsibility for any
harm caused by the orators, and the Stoics, as usual, distinguished their rhetoric
from the inferior sort.
58 The argument emphasizes that it is not the intention of the Stoics to create a form of rhetoric
which actually does not exist, but they do so quite unintentionally (a konteß).
59 On the location of this argument, see pp.125–126 below, esp. n.81.
60 Cf. the two objections to the refutation of the Expulsion argument in §25, pp.111–112 above.
61 The refutation of the Expulsion argument appears in Quintilian, II. 16. 5–6, parallelling Sex-
tus, II. 25; see pp.109–110 above.
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5.4. Kakotechnia
We have so far attempted to reconstruct the various arguments raised in the Benefit
Argument in their various forms according to stage and target. The Benefit Argu-
ment, however, is more than the sum of these arguments. There is an overarching
context in which all these arguments find their full significance.
5.4.1. Sextus Empiricus, II. 12
We established that Sextus began his discussion at §20 with a new source. Although
benefit had already been implied in the second part of the Stoic definition of art in
§10 (téloß eu crvston), Sextus begins to deal with benefit in its own right only in
§20.62 Our analysis was correct but not accurate enough. Sextus introduces the argu-
ment as that of Critolaus and the Academicians Clitomachus and Charmadas, but
while for him he is using a new source, I wish to claim that the source itself is using
a complex version of the argument. To understand what is going on, we should first
return to the Stoic definition of art in §10.
The definition comprises two parts. The first states that art is a sústvma. . . e k ka-
talv́yewn suggegumnasménwn, and the second part explains that it has a beneficial
aim in life: kaì epì téloß eu crvston tw̃n e n tw̃ bı́w lambanousw̃n tv̀n a naforán.
An opponent would need to refute only one part of the definition in order to invali-
date the whole. Of the two parts, the second would have been much easier to refute
since it is not entirely in Stoic technical jargon, and because attacks on rhetoric be-
cause of the harm it causes had been common ever since Plato’s time, if not before.
This does not mean that the first part would not have had its critics. Indeed, Sextus
begins his criticism of this definition with the following declaration: v dè r vtorikv̀
ou k e sti sústvma e k katalv́yewn, w ß parastv́somenk ou k a ra =técnv? e stin v
r vtorikv́. From here until the middle of §12, the object of the attack is the first part
of the definition. The declaration and the refutation refer only to the first part of the
definition. An opponent determined to attack both parts of the definition would have
declared his intention to do so,63 or not made any declaration at all, but attack the
first part and then the second part. Neither of these alternatives appears in our text.
The critic declares that he will refute the first part, and proceeds to do so. There is
no discussion of the beneficial end.
62 See p.106 above.
63 Cf. e.g., the statement in §26, where the critic declares that rhetoric is beneficial neither to
society nor to the orator himself; the declaration is followed by two arguments reflecting the de-
clared intent.
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In Chapter 3, on the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument, we analysed Sextus, II.
16–19, but mentioned that they were part of a wider argument including §§13–19,
themselves part of an even wider argument including §§10–19.64 From the point of
view of Sextus or his source, the argument in §§13–19 is the criticism of the second
part of the Stoic definition of art. The argument, however, is not quite what it
seems.
First of all, §§13–19 deal with téloß and not with téloß eu crvston. In the con-
text of the Benefit Argument, however, it is the adjective which is the weak link in-
viting attack. The argument was clearly added to the present context from another
source because it was at least dealing with the second part of the Stoic definition.
That it is an addition may also be proved from another angle. The discussion on the
first part of the Stoic definition ends in the middle of §12 with the words:
a mélei gé toi kaì oı perì Kritólaon tòn Peripatvtikón, kaì polù
próteron oı perì Plátwna, eiß toũto a pidónteß e kákisan au tv̀n w ß
kakotecnı́an mãllon v técnvn kaXestvkuı̃an.
If §§13–19 are a continuation of the refutation of rhetoric using the Stoic definition
of art, why does this continuation begin with an attribution? This passage clearly
does not originally belong with the previous argument. In the source used up to §12,
therefore, rhetoric is refuted by an attack on the first part only of the Stoic definition
of art. Could that critic find no means to refute rhetoric using the second part of the
definition? Did it not occur to him to refute the notion that rhetoric benefits? This
would be unlikely.
The answer seems to me to lie in a careful reading of the attribution to Critolaus
(§12). The words eiß toũto a pidónteß appear to signify that it is the first argument
which is to be attributed to Critolaus.65 Without denying the possibility that the first
argument should indeed be attributed to Critolaus, it is my contention that the attri-
bution actually refers to what is said in §12 itself. The discussion before the attribu-
tion has ended, as may be seen from its concluding summary: ouÇ twß ou dè tv̀n
r vtorikv̀n u polvptéon e cein tecnikv̀n u póstasin, epì toioútoiß paraggélmasi
saleúousan. It may also be observed that the content of the first criticism differs
from what is attributed to Critolaus in §12. The various rules of rhetoric appearing
as examples for the earlier criticism all deal with the harm caused by rhetoric, e. g.:
ouÇ tw parapeistéon toùß dikastàß, o rgv̀n kinvtéon v e leon, moicw̃ sunvgorvtéon
kaì ıerosúlw (§11). These rules could have been used by anyone wishing to attack
rhetoric using the criterion of benefit. Critolaus in the attribution, however, is por-
trayed as having examined these rules and observed the working methods of the ora-
tors, and come to the conclusion that rhetoric is a kakotecnı́a (§12).
64 See p.66 above.
65 So far as I can see, all the secondary literature touching on this point agree that it is the first
argument which is to be attributed to Critolaus.
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This term together with its cognates and Latin equivalents was developed in the
context of the Benefit Argument. In the present context, none of these terms appears
in the argument preceding the attribution to Critolaus, where we find instead episte-
mological terms such as u póstasiß, but do appear after the attribution, which sug-
gests again that the attribution is not to do with the previous argument but has been
joined on. It also seems absurd to claim that rhetoric has no tecnikv̀ u póstasiß and
immediately go on to claim that in fact it is a kakotecnı́a.
Finally, it may be observed that in the attribution, Critolaus appears together with
Plato, and, as Radermacher has already suggested (xvi), Critolaus appears to have
drawn his argument from Plato. While we may not be able to examine the writings
of Critolaus, we are able to examine the writings of Plato. Once again we turn to
Gorgias, the most obvious dialogue for Critolaus to have used for arguments attack-
ing rhetoric, and we find that this dialogue has no epistemological argument like
that preceding the attribution, yet another proof that the attribution does not belong
originally to the previous criticism. Both Critolaus and the dialogue Gorgias do,
however, deal with the harm caused by rhetoric.66 If we can prove that the term ka-
kotecnı́a is connected exclusively with the question of benefit in rhetoric, we shall
be able to speculate that it was this idea (but not the term itself) which Critolaus
drew from Plato’s Gorgias, together with the Benefit Argument in one form or an-
other, and that it was Critolaus himself who coined the term kakotecnı́a. The attri-
bution in §12 suggests that Plato coined the term, but he was if anything only the in-
spiration for it.
5.4.2. Kakotechnia – sources
The term appears, as we have seen, in Sextus, II. 12. It appears three more times in
Sextus, and twice in Quintilian:
1. Quintilian, II. 20. 2–3
equidem illud, quod in studiis dicendi plerique exercuerunt et exercent,
aut nullam artem, quae a tecnı́a nominatur, puto (multos enim video
sine ratione, sine litteris, qua vel impudentia vel fames duxit, ruentes),
aut malam quasi artem, quam kakotecnı́an dicimus. nam et fuisse mul-
66 Socrates in the Gorgias also criticizes the lack of truth in rhetoric and especially the lack of
knowledge in it. The main context, however, is its social harm. Already in his conversation with
Gorgias, Socrates bases his refutation on the bad student. In his conversations with Polus and Calli-
cles the subject is made even more explicit. At a deeper level, the dialogue needs to be seen as a cri-
ticism of the harm caused by the hedonistic doctrine underlying the need for rhetoric; but not every
reader in the Classical period, just as now, would have seen this. What would have been clear to all
would have been the moral criticism emphasizing the social harm in rhetoric.
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tos et esse nonnullos existimo, qui facultatem dicendi ad hominum per-
niciem converterint. mataiotecnı́a quoque est quaedam, id est superva-
cua artis imitatio, quae nihil sane neque boni neque mali habeat, sed va-
num laborem. . .
The context is Quintilian’s attempt to characterize rhetoric as a virtue (the Stoic po-
sition). For this purpose he criticizes the other occupations in contemporary and ear-
lier rhetoric. The words we have emphasized in the passage demonstrate that kako-
tecnı́a here pertains to the maltreatment of people.67
2. Quintilian, II. 15. 2
eorum autem, qui dicendi facultatem a maiore ac magis expetenda vitae
laude secernunt. . . quidam etiam pravitatem quandam artis id est kako-
tecnı́an nominaverunt.
This is a particularly interesting passage. Quintilian claims that there are those who
separate the art of speaking from the more sought after greater glory in life, after
which there follows a long list of terms and definitions of rhetoric, including kako-
tecnı́a, although we learn there nothing new about the term. It is only later in the
discussion that Quintilian goes into detail with all these terms and definitions, even
attributing them to people by name. He identifies kakotecnı́a with a certain Athe-
naeus and translates the term as ars fallendi (II. 15. 23). This translation emphasizes
the harm inherent in rhetoric, and is quite appropriate, but there is a problem with
the attribution. It is manifest from his list that Quintilian assumes that each term has
no more than one source. The term appearing before kakotecnı́a in his list is usus,
and this term, a translation of tribv́ as Quintilian points out, is attributed to Crito-
laus (§23).68 One might suspect that Quintilian or his source found both usus and
the definition of kakotecnı́a in a source deriving from Athenaeus (or Athenaeus
himself) where both terms were in fact attributed to Critolaus; it may have been
Quintilian’s desire to attribute only one item to each person that caused him to attri-
bute one to Critolaus, mentioned in Athenaeus, and one to Athenaeus himself.
Athenaeus also appears in Sextus, and is attributed with a definition (II. 62):
LAXv́naioß dè lógwn dúnamin prosagoreúei tv̀n r vtorikv̀n stocazoménvn tṽß tw̃n
a kouóntwn peiXoũß. This definition contains a term first applied by Critolaus to
rhetoric, who claimed that it was not a técnv but a dúnamiß.69 It would seem that yet
again Athenaeus is accredited with something which he in fact derived from Crito-
laus.
67 Cf. the noun pernicies here with the cognate adjective perniciosa in the General Harm argu-
ment in II. 16. 4.
68 We have already shown that this term was applied to rhetoric by Critolaus in the context of
the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument, p.82 above.
69 This will be proved in the chapter on the End Argument, pp.162–164; 173 below.
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Immediately after the definition of kakotecnı́a as ars fallendi, Quintilian pro-
vides a discussion, two pages long, on Plato, and his Gorgias in particular, in order
to prove that the philosopher does not oppose rhetoric. The reason for the location
of this discussion here is that it appeared in Quintilian’s source, following the defi-
nition there. It has more to do with Critolaus than with Athenaeus.
We may conclude that Critolaus attacked rhetoric from a number of different an-
gles, each proving that it was not a técnv but a dúnamiß. From one angle it was a
tribv́ and from another it was a kakotecnı́a. He drew the idea from Plato, and from
Gorgias in particular. This was summarized in a source, perhaps Athenaeus, to
which was appended a response, consisting of a discussion attempting to demon-
strate that Plato did not oppose rhetoric, and that hence Critolaus had misinterpreted
him.
We turn now to the testimonia in Sextus concerning the term kakotecnı́a. In ad-
dition to our passage (§12) there are three others:
3. Sextus, II. 36
pródvlon dé e sti tò katà tw̃n nómwn au tv̀n u párcein kaì e x w n e n
taı̃ß kakotécnoiß técnaiß u potı́Xentai.
The context for this sentence is Sextus’ attempt to prove that rhetoric harms society.
The arts in question are of the literary type.
4. Sextus, II. 49
ouÇ tw kaì lógwn tw̃n mèn sumferóntwn tw̃n dè blaptikw̃n o ntwn, ei
mv̀ perì toùß sumférontáß e stin v r vtorikv̀ a llà toùß blaberoúß,
pròß tw̃ mv̀ einai técnv e ti kaì kakotecnı́a genv́setai.
Sextus explicitly opposes kakotecnı́a to what is beneficial. He provides as an exam-
ple the pharmacist who harms by means of his art.
5. Sextus, II. 68
ou demı́a gàr perì yeũdoß ıÇstatai técnv, a ll’ a nagkaı̃ón e sti tv̀n
r vtorikv̀n toũto metadiẃkousan v mv̀ einai técnvn v kakotecnı́an
u párcein, metà toũ pálin tàß au tàß u pantiázein a porı́aß.
The context for this passage is very similar to that of §12. The background is episte-
mological: the fact that the orators use opposing arguments makes rhetoric some-
thing false. While it is true that there are no Stoic terms here such as katalv́yeiß
and that the argument is formulated for a wider audience, the principle is the same.
The two passages are identical in that rhetoric is called kakotecnı́a, and both, I shall
argue, originate in the Benefit Argument and acquire an epistemological colouring.
The similarity of Sextus, II. 68 to ibid., 10–12 can help identify the person who
gave the argument the epistemological Stoic colouring, since §68 does not stand
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alone. It is part of a whole string of arguments undermining the signficance of tò
e nargw̃ß a lvXéß. At §60 Sextus begins the formal discussion of téloß with a list of
philosophers emphasizing tò peı́Xein, and proceeds to refute tò piXanón in all three
of its meanings. §§68–70 are part of this refutation. The chapter on the End Argu-
ment will include a detailed analysis of this passage proving that the source of this
list is Charmadas, developing an argument by Critolaus.70 Furthermore, the discus-
sion in §§63–74 is typically Academic, with the presentation of two possibilities
and a third being a combination of these, all subsequently refuted. We may also note
here that Charmadas uses arguments pertaining, among other things, to epistemol-
ogy in Cicero’s De Oratore, where his opponent is the Stoic Mnesarchus.
Philodemus is able to corroborate our findings. Radermacher had already found a
parallel to Sextus, II. 10–12 in Philodemus, I. p. 22, col. III, for which he was criti-
cized by Hubbell. The debate between them has been discussed above in the chapter
on Falsa, and will not be repeated here.71 Neither, however, considered the possibi-
lity that §§10–12 derived from the Benefit Argument. Radermacher saw simply the
sústvma while Hubbell could only add a division between the arguments which he
claimed Quintilian had not noticed.72 Here, then, is Philodemus, I. p.22:
tà pleı̃sta Xewrv́matá e stin a lvXṽ, yeudṽ dè tà katà tv̀n r vtorikv́n,
dṽlon oÇ ti ou dè tv̀n filosofı́an técnvn r vtéon ou dè tv̀n iatrikv̀n
ou dè tv̀n mousikv́n. . .
Hubbell rightly notes that the reply is fragmentary (269), but it is not difficult to
identify the response to the Benefit Argument as it appears in Quintilian, II. 16. 5.
The examples are almost identical. In both passages we find philosophy and medi-
cine. The only differences are the appearance of music in Philodemus, absent in
Quintilian, and the appearance of duces and magistratus in Quintilian, absent in Phi-
lodemus. These differences, however, hold the key. We had noted earlier that the
words magistratus and duces had been added by a Roman author, perhaps Quintilian
himself, in the attempt to Romanize the Greek source.73 These examples may have
replaced mousikv́ in that source.
Whatever the case may be, the reply making use of philosophy and claiming that
it too could suffer the same criticism launched against rhetoric appears explicitly in
Sextus, II. 25, as a response by the supporters of rhetoric to the Benefit Argument.
There remains one open question, an explanation for the apparent confusion.
Why did an editor, be it Sextus or his source, attribute an argument based on yeudṽ
Xewrv́mata to Critolaus when he based his attack on the harm caused by rhetoric?
70 For the discussion of the issue, see pp.154–169 below, esp. pp.161–162 on the detailed argu-
ment concerning Charmadas.
71 See Radermacher (1895) xv; Hubbell (1920) 375–377; and §4.2.2 above.
72 See last note.
73 See p.109 above.
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The answer is, of course, that Critolaus attacked on both issues. The editor was not
confused in attributing to Critolaus the argument based on yeudṽ Xewrv́mata, but
was confused about its contents and location. While Critolaus did attack rhetoric on
the grounds of yeudṽ Xewrv́mata, the second half of §12 refers to another criticism
also by Critolaus, that of the harm caused by rhetoric. This criticism, however, is
also based on the yeudṽ Xewrv́mata. That is, both criticisms are based on the same
rules of rhetoric such as ouÇ tw parapeistéon toùß dikastáß – these are the false
principles of rhetoric, and because of them rhetoric does harm. The double argu-
ment is powerful: not only is rhetoric not a sústvma and therefore not beneficial to
society, but it is actually harmful. The first argument concentrates on the fact that
since the Xewrv́mata are a katálvpta, then rhetoric, having no sústvma, is not a
técnv, while the second argument shows that it is so far from being a técnv that it is
a kakotecnı́a.
This interpretation of Sextus, II. 10–12 as belonging to the Benefit Argument is
supported surprisingly by Philodemus. The examples Sextus adduces of activities
pertaining to yeudṽ Xewrv́mata are v kleptikv́ and v toicwrucikv́, exactly the same
two examples appearing in Philodemus, II. 143–144, fr. 1, where the context is
clearly the harm caused by rhetoric (a crvston), and this is the subject of his fifth
book on rhetoric.74 The fourth book ends with a description of the following sub-
ject: oÇ ti kaì bláptei prosteXeı̃sa a pátaiß (“that [rhetoric] also harms being con-
nected to deceptions”).75 This reveals the connection between harm and lies, a con-
nection which already existed in the text of Philodemus. Thus the connection Sextus
makes between harm and lies was already there in his source or sources.
The picture is now becoming clearer. Critolaus asserted that rhetoric comprised
yeudṽ Xewrv́mata which, he argued, offended against both halves of the Stoics’
own definition of art, specifically sústvma in the first half and téloß eu crvston in
the second. An intermediate source conflated the two arguments into one attack in
which the content of the first argument was retained along with the attribution to
Critolaus of the second argument which now lacked all content. The gap was filled
by the End Argument (§§13–19).76 Finally, a discussion concerning benefit was also
added, perhaps by Sextus himself, in another attempt to fill the same gap (§§20–
47).
Who is the source for the Benefit Argument in §§20–47, given that Critolaus’ ar-
gument is already presented in a highly compressed way in §§10–12? The question
is pertinent especially since Critolaus is mentioned among others in §20. Which cri-
ticism is to be attributed to Critolaus? It seems to me that the attribution in §20
should be understood as singling out Critolaus as the spiritual father of this argu-
ment, just as Plato was earlier seen to be singled out as the spiritual father of the
74 Cf. Hubbell (ibid.) 305–306.
75 Philodemus, I. 223. 20–21; cf. Hubbell (ibid.) 305.
76 On the source for §§13–19, see the chapter on the End Argument, p.160 below.
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Harm argument against rhetoric.77 The argument commencing in §20 is entirely to
do with the second stage of the debate. It is none other than the Expulsion argument,
which Charmadas developed from that of Critolaus.
5.5. Two Problems
We now arrive at that apparently unavoidable stage in source criticism based on the
summaries of summaries of early sources in which conflation and confusion abound
where some conclusions we had considered proven or at least highly plausible are
turned upside down.
I wish to return to two problems with which we began the Benefit Argument and
the discussion in Quintilian.
The first problem78 dealt with the last argument of §2 (pro falsis contra veritatem
valere), and the examples of Socrates, Gorgias and Tisias in §3. The argument
seemed at the time a little strange since it did not deal with the harm caused by
rhetoric to society but rather with the method because of which it did harm. Also,
the fact that there were examples for this particular argument when immediately
afterwards it was noted that there were examples for all the arguments, but these
were not actually given, indicated a problematic text.
The second problem79 was the appearance of the Expulsion argument in the sec-
ond half of §4 in Quintilian as an aside. We had concluded from an analysis of
Quintilian’s text together with the parallel in Sextus that it was originally used by
Critolaus as an independent argument and that Charmadas developed it to claim that
rhetoric was expelled from all cities everywhere (pánteß pantacóXen).
5.5.1. pro falsis contra veritatem valere
Now that the role of Critolaus in Sextus, II. 10–12 has been clarified, it appears that
the pro falsis contra veritatem valere argument in Quintilian is nothing but an inter-
polation into the Benefit Argument of one of the arguments forming the Falsa Ar-
gument (the Rhetoric as Fraud argument). Critolaus attacked rhetoric using both
halves of the Stoic definition of art, with both arguments depending on the notion of
yeudṽ Xewrv́mata comprising rhetoric. Already at an early stage of the transmission
of these arguments they became jumbled up so that both our sources present mixed
versions which actually allow us to recover the original. In Quintilian, II. 16. 2–3,
where the context is the Benefit Argument, the claim pro falsis contra veritatem va-
77 See p.120 above.
78 See pp.102–103 above.
79 See pp.104–113 above.
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lere is interpolated at the end of §2 by means of the clause cuius denique tum maxi-
mus sit usus, cum pro falsis contra veritatem valet to which is added the example in
§3.80 In Sextus, the context is the Falsa Argument, and the Benefit Argument is in-
terpolated by attributing to Critolaus the classification of rhetoric as a kakotecnı́a.
From all this we learn that the confusion between the two arguments, arising from
their exploitation of the “rules of rhetoric”, was made in a source common to Sextus
and to Quintilian.81
In sum, Critolaus shows that by neither half of the Stoic definition of art can
rhetoric be considered an art, since it is based on rules such as ouÇ tw parapeistéon
toùß dikastàß (Sextus) or quo modo peiorem causam meliorem faciat (Quintilian).
The first criticism is epistemological and uses the first half of the Stoic definition of
art: the rules of rhetoric are yeudṽ (falsa) and therefore a katálvpta and cannot
form a sústvma which means that, according to the Stoic definition of art, rhetoric
is not a técnv (Rhetoric as Fraud argument). The second criticism demonstrates that
these same rules of rhetoric are harmful to society. Thus Quintilian, II. 16. 1–3 and
Sextus, II. 10–12 are complementary parallels in their presentation of the Social
Harm argument. The whole argument has at its heart the claim pro falsis contra ver-
itatem valere.
5.5.2. The Expulsion Argument in Critolaus’ Version
We had speculated that Critolaus had used the Expulsion argument as a self-stand-
ing, independent argument in which rhetoric was observed to have been expelled
from some famous cities, and that Charmadas had developed it to include all cities
and everywhere. We are now in a position to suggest a different possibility.
There is no doubt that Critolaus employed a version of the Expulsion argument
since his name is mentioned in Sextus, II. 20 at the beginning of this argument.
Quintilian’s version, however, in which the Expulsion argument is closely con-
nected with the Social Harm argument, may reflect the original version. That is to
say, Critolaus would have used the fact that some cities had expelled rhetoric as in-
direct evidence for the harm rhetoric was perceived to cause. Critolaus is mentioned
in Sextus, II. 12 and 20, and the connection between the two places may now be
seen to be logical and natural. Our analysis of §12 had shown Critolaus to be the ori-
ginator of the Social Harm argument, while §20 shows him to have observed the
80 The example may itself have been added later to exemplify this interpolated claim.
81 The “rules of rhetoric” allow a certain confusion in Sextus, II. 46 as well, where they under-
pin the ethical argument that rhetoric causes harm, and the epistemological argument that rhetoric is
a fraud, a part of which is interpolated into the ethical argument: the words oıon pw̃ß a n tà mikrà
megála poiv́saimen tà dè megála mikrá, v pw̃ß a n tà mèn dı́kaia a dika faneı́v tà dè a dika dı́kaia
are reminiscent of Quintilian, II. 16. 3: quo modo peiorem causam meliorem faciat.
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fact that rhetoric had been expelled from cities. That is to say, the expulsion would
have been used by him not as an argument, but as evidence for the Social Harm ar-
gument.
The Social Harm argument would not have required an additional argument
based on the fact that rhetoric had been expelled from some cities. It was only when
the Benefit Argument centred on the Individual Harm argument82 that the fact that
rhetoric had been expelled could be turned into an independent argument, as indeed
happened in the hands of Charmadas. Thus Charmadas must be attributed with both
versions of the Expulsion argument, the more extreme version replacing the earlier
version because of counterexamples of some philosophers being expelled from ci-
ties (Sextus, II. 25).
5.6. Conclusion
Our two main sources for the Benefit Argument reflect sources which summarized
the debate without distinguishing between its two stages or the different targets for
criticism. Both sources are required to make any sense of the confusion, and much
can be discovered by comparing them.
Critolaus uses the “rules of rhetoric” which he claims to be false for two different
attacks on rhetoric using the Stoic definition of art as a criterion. Using the first half
of the definition, Critolaus shows that rhetoric is not a sústvma or art (the Rhetoric
as Fraud argument); according to the second half of the definition, rhetoric is actu-
ally a kakotecnı́a (the Benefit Argument, mainly the Social Harm argument). The
first attack is directed against the Stoics, the second against the Stoics and the rhet-
ors alike. The Rhetoric as Fraud argument was discussed at length in the previous
chapter. Here we shall concentrate on the Benefit Argument.
Critolaus emphasized in his version of the Benefit Argument the harm caused by
rhetoric to the polis (the Social Harm argument), and used the fact that rhetoric was
expelled from some cities as supporting evidence. Both targets reacted, but each in
their own way. The Stoics attempted to distinguish their own rhetoric from the more
popular sort, claiming that their own orator was necessarily a good man (being the
Stoic sage). The rhetors emphasized the positive aspects of their rhetoric and indi-
cated that an art should not be considered bad just because some proponents misuse
it, especially if the same art is also used for good things.
In the second stage, Charmadas introduces two interconnected changes. He first
distinguishes between Social and Individual Harm, with the latter argument concen-
trating on the orator himself. The second change is his conversion of the fact of the
expulsion of rhetoric from some cities into an independent argument. This is possi-
82 The Social Harm argument does not disappear in the second stage, but it is subordinated and
appears only after the Individual Harm argument (§§27–30).
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ble precisely because the social context is no longer the main thrust of the Benefit
Argument. He uses his version of the Benefit Argument and his Expulsion argument
against both the Stoics and the rhetors.
The Expulsion argument in its first version was refuted by the rhetors who
pointed to other arts, especially philosophy, which had occasionally been expelled
from cities. According to the present argument, these arts too would need to be con-
sidered invalid. The Stoics responded to the same attack by distinguishing between
their rhetoric and that of the ordinary rhetors, the latter alone being expelled. Char-
madas objected to the Stoics by pointing to the fact that unlike philosophy rhetoric
as a whole was expelled. To the rhetors, his first response was that philosophy had
never been expelled from any city. The rhetors seem to have managed to find a few
examples to back their claim, at which point Charmadas was obliged to change his
argument, now claiming that rhetoric was being expelled by all cities everywhere
(which was not the case with regard to philosophy).
Charmadas also directed his General Harm argument against both targets, both of
whom used one argument to counter both the charge of Individual and Social Harm.
The Stoics resorted once again to their distinction between Stoic and ordinary rheto-
ric. The rhetors passed the responsibility for harm caused by rhetoric to the person-
ality of individual orators. Charmadas replied to the Stoics by noting that the Stoic
sage by their own admission was a rarity or non-existent, concluding that their
rhetoric too, being the province of the Stoic sage alone, was just as non-existent.
His response to the rhetors was that the rules of rhetoric were quite unlike the rules
of other arts. Rhetoric was inherently harmful, while other arts could be harmful if
misused.83
83 In the interests of clarity, some alternatives have been passed over in silence, although they
are mentioned in the main discussion.
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6. The End Argument
The End Argument essentially includes two arguments concerning exclusivity.1 The
first is the Exclusivity of the End Argument; the second is the Exclusivity of Attain-
ing the End Argument. In the Exclusivity of the End Argument, it is claimed or as-
sumed that rhetoric should have an end not shared by any other art.2 The Exclusivity
of Attaining the End Argument demands that rhetoric should attain its end, whatever
it might happen to be.3 The two arguments are occasionally combined: on the one
hand, the orator does not always persuade (the Exlusivity of Attaining the End Ar-
gument), while on the other hand, many people who are not orators do persuade (the
Exclusivity of the End Argument).4 In other words, the orator, and only the orator,
must always achieve his end. These two arguments, in all their many and various
versions, appear from our sources to comprise the essence of the End Argument.5
6.1. The Sources
So far as the sources for the End Argument are concerned, a distinction must be
made between those presenting arguments dealing with the end explicitly and con-
sciously, and those sources in which the arguments on the end appear out of context
or in general discussions.
The main sources are once again Sextus and Quintilian, to whom we may occa-
1 On the widespread use of exclusivity in all the arguments against rhetoric in the second Period,
cf. pp.56–57 above.
2 In stricter versions of the argument there is a demand that the end of rhetoric should not even
be shared with any of its parts (Sextus, II. 85).
3 As we shall see below, there are two versions of this argument. The strict version requires per-
fect exclusivity; if even in one instance the art fails to attain its end then it is no art. The relaxed ver-
sion would deprive rhetoric of its claim to be an art only if it fails to attain its end in most instances.
4 Both arguments usually have additions touching on other arguments, and they will be dis-
cussed where appropriate. One example will suffice here: the end of rhetoric needs to be beneficial;
if it is not, then rhetoric is not an art. This argument should be classified under the Benefit Argu-
ment.
5 There are additional arguments which may be classified under the End Argument, such as the
clarification of the term “persuasion”, the benefit of the end, the relations between the end of rheto-
ric and the end of its parts, etc. On all these, see the discussion on the Exclusivity of the End,
pp.144ff. below.
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sionally add Philodemus, and, at least in one instance, Lucian.6 It is difficult to dis-
tinguish between them according to the types of arguments they present, although
this is sometimes possible on localized points. This survey of the sources on the
End Argument will, therefore, deal with all of them without entering into the com-
ponent arguments, which will be left for the discussion.
Sextus provides several arguments pertaining to the end. Of course, in rhetoric,
nearly everything is connected with everything else, and, as we shall see, the end
can appear in discussions which are not about it explicitly. This is particularly the
case in the definition of rhetoric (and of art in general) where the end is often one of
the elements of the definition. However, there are many instances where one issue
is transferred into another issue, and this is often the case with the end, and, as we
shall see later, the materia.7 Thus there is no need to make do only with the argu-
ments formally and explicitly dealing with the end.
Sextus deals formally with the end in II. 60–87. The passage opens with the de-
claration, tà nũn dè metelXónteß kaì a pò toũ télouß tṽß r vtorikṽß poiẃmeXa tàß
e nstáseiß. It concludes (§88) with the words, wÇ ste ei mv́te uÇ lvn e cei v r vtorikv̀
perì vÅ n tecniteúei, mv́te téloß ef’ oÅ a nágetai, ou k a n u párcoi v r vtorikv́. ou te dè
uÇ lvn e cei ou te téloß kaXẁß parestv́samenk ou k a ra u párcei v r vtorikv́.8 This
long passage on the end actually comprises many arguments dealing with the end
from many angles and using a variety of assumptions.9 It will naturally occupy not
a little of our attention as it clearly summarizes a collection of arguments from a
number of sources. These we shall attempt to uncover with the aid of parallels,
where they exist. Sextus also provides at two other places which allow us to learn
something about the End Argument. The first is §§13–15 where we find a clear ex-
pression of the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument.10 The second is §§2–5
6 Lucian helps to uncover the source of some of the arguments in the End Argument; see §6.5
below.
7 One prominent example is Sextus, II. 51: in a discussion of the materia (uÇ lv – 48ff.), §51
clearly deals with tò eu légein, which is the end of rhetoric according to the Stoics. This belongs to
the Exclusivity of the End Argument. On this section see pp.201–205 below, in the chapter on mate-
ria.
8 This statement refers both to the preceding discussion on the end, and to the earlier discussion
on materia in §§48–59.
9 In general, §§60–78 criticize the end of rhetoric on the assumption that this is persuasion;
§§79–87 refute rhetoric on the assumption that the end is anything but persuasion, such as benefit,
victory, etc.
10 Sextus or his source regards §§13–15 as the first leg of an argument, the second leg of which
is §§16–19. We have already demonstrated in the chapter on the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument
that these are actually two independent arguments (see pp.66–68 above, and the analysis of the sec-
ond leg in that chapter). The difference between the two arguments boils down to the simple point
that the Exclusivity of Teaching Argument looks for someone who is not an orator who still man-
ages to persuade, while the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument looks for the orator who is
unable to persuade.
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where rhetoric is being defined (with the definition being attributed to Plato). I shall
argue that there are traces here of a discussion of the end (the Exclusivity of the End
Argument).
Quintilian is our second source, and he too provides us with a number of passages
pertaining to the End Argument, some explicitly and some implicitly during metar-
hetorical discussions. Quintilian does not, however, provide a formal discussion of
the end, and this requires some explanation.
Quintilian took some pains to present an orderly metarhetorical discussion.11
Since no metarhetorical discussion would be complete without a discussion of the
end, we may be sure that Quintilian provides one, in one form or another. II. ch. 15
opens with the sentence, Ante omnia, quid sit rhetorice. quae finitur quidem varie. . .
and indicates that it will deal with the definition of rhetoric. The assumption under-
lying this declaration is that a definition of the field will clarify its essence. The pro-
blems begin once we enter the chapter, and there are many remarks which at first
sight seem to deal rather with the end. A partial explanation for this phenomenon
may be found in the fact that the Latin word finis is ambiguous, translating as it does
two different Greek words: oÇ roß (“term”, “definition”), and téloß (“end”, “goal”).12
Quintilian uses the word without making much distinction between the two mean-
ings. Cicero translates oÇ roß as definitio, finitio, definitiva, etc., but Quintilian does
not.13 Be this as it may, it is not surprising that the end should be discussed together
with the definition since it is difficult to separate the two. In many versions of the
definition of art, the end is one of the most important, or even the most important,
element. A careful reading of ch. 15 reveals that the first half of the discussion con-
siders the end as an element in the definition, while the second half (15. 15 onwards)
considers the materia as an element in the definition (in addition to the end). Thus
art may be described through its end14 and/or its definition.
We may conclude that the “formal” discussion of the end of rhetoric is to be
found in II. ch. 15. In addition to this, II. ch. 17 presents an argument connected
11 Cf. prooem. 21–23. In the sections themselves, when Quintilian mentions a particular argu-
ment which will be dealt with later in its proper place, he does not deal with it until that later discus-
sion (II. 17. 17). Conversely, when he touches on a subject already dealt with, he does not repeat the
discussion but refers the reader back to it (II. 20. 10).
12 For finis as téloß cf. II. 18. 1; 16. 11, and esp. 15. 38 which adduces the Greek term expli-
citly); for finis as oÇ roß cf. II. 15. 3, 13, 19, 34; for ambiguous usage, cf. 15. 9, 11, 35. For a more de-
tailed list, see RW (2006) 227 n.30.
13 There is only one place in the whole of the metarhetorical discussion in II. ch. 15–21 where
oÇ roß is translated as finitio (15. 34). RW (ibid.) 271–272 attempt to explain this problem.
14 Radermacher appears to have provided his own chapter headings without warning the reader
in his praefatio. II. ch. 15 receives the title, quid sit rhetorice et quis eius finis. He usually uses for
his titles the first words of the chapter, but in this case he adds the words et quis eius finis, suggest-
ing that he wrestled with the same problem confronting us, that the chapter appears to deal not only
with the essence of rhetoric but also with its end.
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with the end.15 Quintilian there surveys a long list of philosophers, beginning at
§14, and summarizes the main arguments against rhetoric. The third argument in
the list is what we have called the Exclusivity of Attainment of the End Argument,
and it appears in II. 17. 22–25. We shall deal with it in the first part of the discus-
sion.
The Exclusivity of the End Argument and the Exclusivity of Attaining the End
Argument both appear in Sextus and in Quintilian; the latter argument, however, is
formulated as an argument in Sextus, II. 13–15 and in Quintilian, II. 17. 22–25,
while the former is not so presented in either source, but appears as part of the dis-
cussion on the definition/end of rhetoric, or rather, on Plato’s opinion of the issue
(Sextus, II. 2–5;16 Quintilian, II. 15. 5–917). Before we attempt an analysis of the
sources for these arguments, it might be worth considering the End Argument as a
whole, since the end is not just one characteristic among many of rhetoric; the end
defines in large part the character of rhetoric, so that any change in the perception
of the end leads to a change in the perception of rhetoric altogether.
6.2. Introduction to the End Argument
The presence of an end is not a prerequisite of art in particular, but rather for any oc-
cupation in general.18 We do nothing unless it has some purpose, some end. This is
all the more true of art. One engages in art in order to achieve its end, but of course,
this end must be for some good. Every art, therefore, is assumed to have an end
which is beneficial to mankind in one way or another, with each art having an end
peculiar to itself.19 Many sources are aware that arts may be classified in genera
(génv) and species (eidv), although they may formulate this concept in different
ways. The ends of these arts would also change as appropriate to a genus or a spe-
cies. Distinguishing arts according to their ends was already known to Aristotle, but
did not originate with him.20 There are three main types of art according to their
ends – productive, practical and theoretical.21 The productive arts are the most ba-
15 Radermacher provides this chapter with the title an ars, taken from the words appearing in
the text at the end of §1.
16 We should also note Sextus, II. 72, but this is clearly dependent on II. 2–5. On this argument,
see pp.145–150 below.
17 To be demonstrated below, §6.4.2.
18 Aristotle, EN 1049a1–2: pãsa técnv kaì pãsa méXodoß, o moı́wß dè prãxı́ß te kaì
proaı́resiß, a gaXoũ tinòß efı́esXai dokeı̃.
19 Cf. Sextus, II. 85 fin., although there the convention is unfairly turned on its head by the op-
ponents of rhetoric.
20 Awareness of this may be seen in Plato’s Gorgias in the example Socrates gives to Chaere-
phon and the examples Chaerephon then gives to Polus (447d4–448c1).
21 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica 1025b25ff., whose discussion is intended to distinguish the theo-
retical from the productive and practical, and subsequently within the theoretical to distinguish the
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sic, and may also have been the first historically.22 These are the arts whose end is a
concrete object separate from the activity of the art. A piece of furniture may be
considered the end of carpentry, and it exists after the carpenter has completed his
work. The practical arts have one identical end achieved in the very activity of the
art. One example of this is dancing. The theoretical arts share an end which has
nothing to do with bodily activity.23 The end is achieved in knowledge.
The development of the three main types of art may reflect the development in
the perception of benefit, as this is one of the axes of art qua art. At first the produc-
tive arts alone were considered beneficial. The demand for some benefit beyond the
concrete caused the development of the practical arts, and later, the theoretical
arts.24 The direction of the development of benefit and end, therefore, is from the
external concrete opus or e rgon to the internal sphere of thought.
We may now ask ourselves to which group rhetoric belongs. It is a difficult ques-
tion to answer. Quintilian devotes to this question a whole chapter (II. 18), and it is
quite tortuous. His conclusion does not concern us at the moment, but his discussion
serves to demonstrate how problematic the question was, a question dependent upon
one’s view of the end of rhetoric.
The end of rhetoric is not expressed in a concrete product, or, as Quintilian puts
it, quae operis, quod oculis subicitur, consummatione finem accipiunt (18. 2). Even
a written speech cannot qualify since the writing materials are irrelevant to the end.
The orator, however, has an end in mind; but whatever it is, it is not cognitio et aes-
timatio rerum (18. 1). Thus rhetoric does not belong to the productive or the theore-
tical groups. By a simple process of elimination, one might arrive at the conclusion
that rhetoric must therefore belong to the practical group. Even if this conclusion is
logically necessary, however, the matter is far more complex. The orator does not
consider the end of his activity to be the act of speaking itself, yet it would seem that
during the period with which we are dealing there was a large group of philosophers
metaphysical (first philosophy) from the rest. He makes the distinctions between Xewrvtikv́, prak-
tikv́, poivtikv́, but the division is of pãsa epistv́mv rather than técnv, while the criterion is not the
téloß but v a rcv̀ tṽß kinv́sewß kaì stásewß. Even so, the division is similar.
22 It has been claimed that the word técnv derives from the Indo-European root tek which is to
do with fastening together pieces of wood to build a house, a task originally shared by the entire
household or tribe. Hence the word téktwn, a carpenter; cf. Roochnik (1996) 19, and n.6 on the verb
tı́ktw.
23 Thinking is considered not to be a bodily activity.
24 So far as rhetoric is concerned, Isocrates may be regarded as the point at which this art’s ben-
efit was conceived no longer as direct but as indirect. In his war with Alcidamas, Isocrates devel-
oped the claim that benefit need not be immediate and direct. While Alcidamas trained his pupils
for an occupation whose benefit was obvious and immediate (Alcidamas, 34: tŨ creı́a toũ bı́ou),
Isocrates concerned himself with improving the citizens. The benefit of his profession was not ob-
vious or immediate, but it was a greater benefit in the long term. Alcidamas dealt with tà idia, sum-
bólaia, whereas Isocrates was concerned perì koinw̃n. Furthermore, Isocrates called his teaching
“philosophy” in the wider sense of a general education.
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who regarded rhetoric as a practical art, if art it was. Quintilian again (18. 2): fere
iudicandum est rhetoricen in actu consistere, hoc enim, quod est officii sui, perficit:
atque ita ab omnibus dictum est. . . Quintilian is in fact thinking of the Stoics who re-
gard the end of rhetoric to be tò eu légein / bene dicere.25 This perception of the
end of rhetoric is clearly internal, and has influenced the Stoic perception of rhetoric
as an art.
Art began in experience. Thus states Aristotle at the beginning of the Metaphy-
sica, but the idea was already hardly new. It already appears in the first chapters of
the Hippocratic work perì a rcaı́vß ivtrikṽß, and in the famous speech of Polus in
Plato’s Gorgias (448c4–10). In the first stages of the development of the arts, the ar-
tist (or future artist) moves between experience and art. By degrees, through experi-
ence and observation,26 he developed a body of rules which, even if they did origi-
nate in experience, once formulated were no longer dependent on experience.27 In
these early stages in the development of the art, the artist and his end are almost in-
dependent of the art. He knows what his aim or end is, and uses his art in order to at-
tain it. He is not interested in art per se or even in artistic activity. He can distin-
guish quite well between the necessary and the inessential. His art is only a means
to attain his end, and as such is external to the artistic activity.
At some stage, the art acquires an extensive and stable set of rules and the bud-
ding artist no longer relies on experience and simple praecepta but goes instead to a
teacher and uses technical handbooks. His original aim, to persuade, becomes mar-
ginal to his new aim, which is to master the art he has received from his teacher.
Furthermore, once it was assumed that learning the art would suffice for achieving
the end of the art, the mastery of the art came to be identified with the end of the art
and the fulfilment of the expectations of the artist. It would not be correct to say that
the artist changed his aim and the end of the art from persuasion to merely following
the instructions of the art, since the change was not so conscious. The end became
internal as the orator became less concerned about successfully persuading his audi-
ence while paying more attention to following the rules of rhetoric. The tail was
now wagging the dog. The orator no longer used rhetoric in order to persuade, but
rather rhetoric found expression through the orator, and the end moved from the ar-
tist to the art itself.28
25 This end is presented by Quintilian at the end of chapter 15 as a consequence of the definition
of rhetoric as epistv́mv toũ eu légein / scientia bene dicendi. The opposite, however, is the case: the
definition is dependent upon the end. On the relationship between the definition and its elements,
see p.131 above; see also RW (2006) 226–227.
26 The Latin observatio translates paratv́rvsiß. There was actually an argument to the effect
that rhetoric was no more than observatio, a sort of experience based on a long observation of audi-
ence reactions. Medicine early on was also considered by some to be merely observatio (Quintilian,
II. 17. 9).
27 The rules could still change in small details due to the experiences of other artists.
28 To this description of the transition from external to internal end should be added the histori-
cal circumstances. So long as rhetoric has a significant political function, the student learns the rules
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Hermagoras (mid.-second century B.C.E.) exemplifies the stage at which the
end of the artist was replaced by the end of the art.29 His composition is an outstand-
ing expression of rhetoric as an art. It is a vast collection of a complex but coherent
and well ordered set of rules. It is an independent system which purportedly pro-
vides the desired outcome, a successful speech and, in any case, victory. This may
be seen in his definition of rhetoric (Sextus, II. 62): kaì KErmagóraß teleı́ou
r v́toroß e rgon einai e lege tò teXèn politikòn zv́tvma diatı́XesXai katà tò e nde-
cómenon peistikw̃ß. This work clearly exhibits Stoic influence,30 and it is a short
step from here to regarding the end of rhetoric as speaking well.
In the early stages of the development of rhetoric, the end was quite simply per-
suasion, and we find Plato’s Socrates suggesting to Gorgias peiXoũß dvmiourgóß as
a definition of rhetoric. Gorgias accepts this proposal. There is no reason to suspect
the reliability of this testimonium, and it may be assumed that tò peı́Xein was re-
garded as the end of rhetoric by its early proponents, Corax and Tisias.31 This, how-
ever, was in the period during which rhetoric was still being formed. All people oc-
casionally find themselves trying to persuade in a variety of contexts. Their
experiences tended to add to the body of rules comprising rhetoric, as Aristotle
notes at the beginning of his Rhetorica. In the Hellenistic period, however, for rea-
sons already mentioned32 and other causes,33 the art came to fruition, and was its
own reward for the artist indulging in it.
This survey is far from exhaustive, but it is intended only to alert the reader to
the transition from external to internal end. This said, the rhetors formally regard
persuasion (and victory) as the end of rhetoric. Even the Stoics, who claim a differ-
ent end for rhetoric, do not entirely overlook persuasion, although it is pushed to the
for the sake of an ulterior end; he needs to ensure that the rules will aid him in the assemblies and
other institutions (hence the debate between Isocrates and Alcidamas is about the relative success of
their systems; see n.24 above). By the time of Hermagoras (see immediately below), rhetoric had
already completely lost its political function except for providing encomia to the leaders, and the
like.
29 Like most historical landmarks, Hermagoras must be understood to be a somewhat arbitrary
choice, but exemplary nevertheless.
30 The work has not survived, but it may be reconstructed through later texts and in particular
Cicero’s De Inventione, whose introduction, at least, shows Stoic influence, most probably Posido-
nian. Furthermore, the division between theses and hypotheses, an invention of Hermagoras in his
composition, was attacked by Posidonius (Plutarch, Pompeius 42. 5); cf. Kennedy (1994) 97–101;
id. (1957) 31 n.22.
31 This is the common opinion in all the prolegomena in the collection edited by Rabe (1931),
appearing in the description entitled pw̃ß e n a nXrẃpoiß v lXen v r vtorikv́ – cf. proleg. 4, p. 18, 24–
27.
32 The transition from external to internal end was a function of the formation of rhetoric and
its rules, added to which there were historical circumstances mentioned above, n.28.
33 In particular, the Stoic perception of rhetoric as a virtue, on which immediately below.
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margins. In the words of Quintilian, II. 17. 23, tendit quidem ad victoriam qui dicit,
sed cum bene dixit, etiam si non vincat, id, quod arte continetur, effecit.34
The Stoics had their own reasons for advocating an internal end for rhetoric.
They regarded rhetoric as a virtue, and as such, it could be had only by the wise
man. The Stoic sage is independent of everything external for his happiness. Thus
his good use of rhetoric is also independent of external factors such as persuasion.
Furthermore, anyone who is not a Stoic sage is necessarily an utter fool;35 no Stoic
sage should be dependent upon the opinion of fools.36 Quintilian (II. 5.1) reminds
his readers that it is very difficult to persuade without using various strategems
aimed at the emotions of one’s audience. He hints there that this may have been an
additional reason for the Stoics to turn away from the external end to the internal.
He calls the Stoics there clari, but it is clear that he is referring to the Stoics.37 They
regard the attempt by the orator to turn the opinion of the judges by appealing to
their emotions as the result of the orator regarding the end as merely vincendi gra-
tia. This desire to win is not worthy of a self-respecting man.38
In sum, there were in the Hellenistic period two parallel ends of rhetoric: persua-
sion; and speaking finely or well. Both were associated with the practical end (as
opposed to the productive and the theoretical ends). Rhetorical studies in this period
were artificial in that they consisted of detailed and complete systems of rules. The
student was expected to do no more than execute these rules as prescribed.39 The
opponents of rhetoric in this period could not attack the end without addressing the
double nature of rhetoric.
6.3. The Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument
The main sources for this argument are: Quintilian, II. 17. 22–25; Sextus, II. 13–15,
86–87; Philodemus, I. 25.32–26.12; I. 26. 13–19; II. 105 fr. XI. These fragments
have been used in whole or in part by Radermacher, Hubbell and Barnes. To these
34 On the Stoic method hinted at here, see pp.137–140 below.
35 At least according to early Stoic theory. Later Stoics could envisage various stages on the
way to wisdom.
36 This was a point used in one of the attacks on the Stoics; cf. Quintilian, II. 17. 36ff.; Cicero,
De Oratore I. 92.
37 E.g., the adfectus there is regarded as a vitium; cf. Quintilian, II. 17. 26.
38 This is particularly relevant to our discussion of Quintilian, II. ch. 15, pp.146–147 below.
Quintilian regards the Stoic position as the way to prevent the bad man from entering rhetoric, and
that it was this fear which motivated them to regard the end as tò eu légein. It seems to me, how-
ever, that the Stoics were motivated less by such a fear than by elements of their Stoic theory, as I
have outlined here in the discussion.
39 Cf. Quintilian, II. 17. 25: et medicus sanitatem aegri petit: si tamen aut valetudinis vi aut in-
temperantia aegri aliove quo casu summa non contingit, dum ipse omnia secundum rationem fecerit,
medicinae fine non excidet.
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may be added some hints in Lucian which can help to complete the picture, espe-
cially with regard to the origin and the structure of the argument.
Quintilian, II. 17. 22 cites the following criticism:
aiunt etiam omnes artes habere finem aliquem propositum, ad quem
tendant: hunc modo nullum esse in rhetorice, modo non praestari eum,
qui promittatur.40
Two problems immediately arise with this citation. Firstly, the two sides of the dis-
junction cannot refer to the same end. It is illogical to claim that rhetoric has an end
which occasionally is not presented, while on other occasions it is presented but not
achieved. Secondly, it is not clear whether the arts are said to have an end, or rather
an end towards which they strive. The word hunc could refer to either possibility,
with different consequences.
The first problem seems to have arisen because of the conflation of two separate
attacks, perhaps against two different targets. This possibility appears more likely
after an examination of the first part of the disjunctive sentence. This criticism
claims that there are cases in which rhetoric does not present an end at all. It is diffi-
cult to imagine someone engaging in a field of activity which has no end, and all
the more so if he considers that activity to be an art. It would seem that the criticism
rejected the claim that rhetoric had an end because arts should have an end ad quem
tendant. The target for such a criticism would need to be the Stoics, who regarded
the end of rhetoric to be tò eu légein or bene dicere. This was already part of the ac-
tivity of the art, and not, strictly speaking, something beyond the art to be aimed at,
as implied by the verb tendo. Quintilian in his response to this criticism argues that
speaking well can be coupled together with striving towards an end.41 Having iden-
tified the end of rhetoric as speaking well, he emphasizes (II. 17. 23), tendit quidem
ad victoriam qui dicit, sed cum bene dixit, etiam si non vincat, id, quod arte contine-
tur, effecit. The orator strives towards victory, the end which is outside the actual
activity of the art. Quintilian’s rebuttal will be considered later, but for now it will
suffice to understand what the criticism was. The first part of the conflated criticism,
therefore, is against the Stoics, in the context of the internal debate.42
40 Spalding (1798) considered the second line (hunc . . .) to be part of Quintilian’s own discus-
sion. Comparison with parallels (below) reveals both sentences to have been cited from Quintilian’s
source.
41 Quintilian is not aware that the criticism was originally directed against the Stoics, and mis-
construes the criticism as directed against persuasion as the end of rhetoric. He does, however, ap-
pear to have made use here of sources which had understood the context, on which immediately be-
low.
42 The Stoic context is clear from other Stoic elements which creep into Quintilian’s text, such
as the distinction between téloß and skopóß in §23. The usage is extremely confused, as we shall
see, and cf. Barnes (1986) 11, esp. nn. 52–53 who, however, concludes n.53, “we need not suppose
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The second part of the conflated criticism is on an end which is presented but not
always achieved, and it is clearly referring to persuasion. This was the end of rheto-
ric according to the rhetors.
The disjunctive criticism, therefore, conflates two criticisms, one directed against
the Stoics and the second against the rhetors. The Exclusivity of Attaining the End
Argument pertains only to the second.43 Quintilian himself, however, does not see
things in this way. He does realize that there are two attacks, but he assumes that
they are against the same target. He does not see that the first criticism is against the
Stoics, and actually uses a Stoic argument in order to respond to it.44 He states this
explicitly in §23: firmum autem hoc, quod opponitur, adversus eos fortasse sit, qui
persuadere finem putaverunt. For Quintilian, both parts of the disjunctive criticism
treat persuasion as the end of rhetoric.45 In order to understand his text, we must fol-
low his reasoning, and accept temporarily the notion that persuasion is the end of
rhetoric in both parts.
Quintilian’s response may be examined in two ways. Textually, the words nos
enim esse finem iam ostendimus et quis esset diximus respond to the first part, refer-
ring the reader to the end of ch. 15; the words et praestabit hunc semper orator:
semper enim bene dicet respond to the second part. In principle, however, Quintilian
responds to both parts together: rhetoric presents an end – bene dicere – and the ora-
tor will always exhibit it. The artist, perfectly applying the rules of his art, is freed
from the dependency upon persuasion, and will always attain his end.
We shall now focus on the second part of the argument. We shall see later, espe-
cially from Sextus, II. 13–15,46 that the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument
appeared on two levels. The first and stricter version demanded the attainment of
the end in every instance: one failure would suffice to deny the title of art. The sec-
ond, more relaxed version demanded only that the end be attained in the majority of
cases: a number of failures would be acceptable before the title of art would need to
that Quintilian used a Stoic source”, seeing the argument as “common intellectual property”; it
seems to me that while the immediate source need not have been Stoic, the ultimate source was cer-
tainly Stoic.
43 The second attack might also be directed against the Stoics on the assumption that they were
seen to be justifying the existence of the rhetorical schools by their support of rhetoric. That both
criticisms were launched against the Stoics will receive some support from sources later in the dis-
cussion.
44 In general, Quintilian adopts the Stoic position on rhetoric: see prooem. 9; 15. 38 passim. He
uses the Stoic end, bene dicere, as a means to answer the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argu-
ment, but that is not to say that the Stoics adopted this end simply in order to rebut the argument.
They had good philosophical reasons for making speaking well the end of rhetoric (see p.136 and
n.38 above). Quintilian, with his art under attack, found many advantages in Stoic rhetoric, includ-
ing this one, which he regarded as solving the present criticism.
45 It remains to be understood how Quintilian could understand the criticism that rhetoric has
no end as assuming that the end of rhetoric is persuasion; on this point, see pp.158–159 below.
46 See p.140 below.
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be denied. It is difficult to decide which version is being applied in the present criti-
cism, but from Quintilian’s response, the emphasis is on the fact that the orator will
always (semper) attain his end, implying that the original criticism was of the strict
version. Furthermore, Quintilian adds examples from medicine and navigation
where such a strict criticism is not applied, and he does so in order to argue that the
occasional failure to attain an end is no reason to deny the title of art. Thus, Quinti-
lian gives a double reply to the second criticism: firstly, rhetoric does actually fulfil
the strict requirement, since the orator always attains his end, which is that of speak-
ing well; secondly, by their own criterion, the opponents of rhetoric would also need
to deny the title of art to medicine and navigation.47
Let us now recapitulate Quintilian’s rebuttal of the criticism (II. 17. 23–25).
Quintilian suggests that the critic might be (fortasse) one who regards the end of
rhetoric as persuasion. He himself regards the end of rhetoric as speaking well, so
that the orator always attains his end. Quintilian does not deny that the orator strives
for victory, but it is irrelevant for attaining the end, which is speaking well. There
follows the second reply comprising the examples of medicine and navigation.
As we have already observed, Quintilian appears to regard both parts of the dis-
junctive criticism as treating the end of rhetoric as persuasion. It is difficult to un-
derstand the first part of the criticism, that rhetoric has no end, if the opponents raise
this claim knowing that the end is persuasion. Furthermore, the passage in Sextus,
II. 13–15 also provides the two examples of navigation and medicine, but there they
exemplify arts which attain their end in the majority of cases. That is to say, in Sex-
tus, these examples are an integral part of the argument.
It is our contention that Quintilian (or his source) is somewhat confused. He
seems to have recalled something about navigation and medicine, but uses these arts
for a purpose other than the one designed for them in the original argument. Let us,
therefore, attempt to reconstruct the original Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argu-
ment.
There were originally two arguments. The first was directed against the Stoics
and their end of speaking well. The critics claimed that this was not an end, even if
it were presented as such. A true art requires an end beyond its own activity towards
which it strives (tendit), which is not the case with speaking well. It is against this
claim that the Stoics respond in §§23–25. A careful examination of the passage re-
veals traces of the Stoic distinction between téloß and skopóß, although the re-
sponse is now so confused that it almost says the opposite. The Stoic reply would
have been that the téloß is to persuade, but that the immediate goal, the skopóß, is
to speak well. Quintilian argues that the téloß of speaking well is always achieved,
even if the audience remains unpersuaded. There is a further confusion in §25 be-
tween summa and finis. Also, it is noticeable that Stoic technical terminology is not
47 See the discussion of Barnes, referred to in n.42 above.
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to be found in this passage, but it is clear that the Stoics insisted on the fact that their
rhetoric had an end, and that that end was to speak well.
The second argument was directed against the rhetors. Rhetoric does not always
attain its end. The rhetors responded with the examples of navigation and medicine.
This style of response, the use of counter-examples, suited the rhetors who were not
philosophers (cf. Menedemus in Cicero, De Oratore I. 88).
Quintilian, then, fails to notice that the two criticisms are directed against differ-
ent targets. He presents the opinion of the Stoics, and believes that his Stoic re-
sponse answers both criticisms. He adds the examples of navigation and medicine
as support for the main response and his general view that the activity of the art is
the end, although these examples were originally the response of the rhetors who
alone had to deal with the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument.
The criticism in Sextus, II. 13–15 is also double. Rhetoric does not always attain
its end, and does not attain it in the majority of cases.48 There is no art whose end
does not either always attain its end, or at least attains it in the majority of cases.
Therefore, rhetoric is not an art.
This is a development on the second part of the criticism in Quintilian, where the
requirement was that the end should always be attained in every case. In Sextus, the
requirement has been relaxed. The same examples as in Quintilian appear in Sextus
as well, namely navigation and medicine, as examples of arts which do not always
attain their ends, but do so in the majority of cases. A further development in the ar-
gument appearing in Sextus is that this double argument is directed at the rhetors
alone, and at what they regard as the end of rhetoric, persuasion.49
The examples as they appear in Sextus clearly reflect a second stage in the Exclu-
sivity of Attaining the End Argument. The first stage was characterized by the strict
version of the argument, that the end should always be attained in every case. This
drew the rhetors’ response that the same demand would deny the title of art from
such arts as navigation and medicine. The opponents toned down their criticism and
demanded only that an art should attain its end in the majority of cases, as in naviga-
tion and medicine; in their view, rhetoric failed even this criterion.
Yet another passage in Sextus, this time in §§86–87, is the last source to present
a version of the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument. This occurs in a discus-
sion of the end (§§60–88). The first part of the discussion (§§60–78) deals with cri-
ticisms of rhetoric based on its end being persuasion. From §79 onwards the discus-
48 Hubbell (1920) 377 attributes this double criticism to Quintilian, but we have seen that Quin-
tilian presents only the strict version while Sextus presents both the strict and the relaxed versions.
49 The Quintilian formulation may be due to the habit of presenting double criticisms. If so, the
criticsm in Quintilian is late than the original arguments used in it. For a similar application of dou-
ble arguments see Sextus, II. 26–43 and our discussion in chapter 5 on the Benefit Argument, §5.3.3
above.
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sion concerns four ends of rhetoric other than persuasion. The fourth end is tò ni-
kãn, on which we find (86–87):
leı́petai ou n tò nikãn au tṽß einai téloß. oÅ pálin a dúnatón estin. o
gàr popllákiß mv̀ tugcánwn toũ katà grammatikv̀n télouß ou k a n
eiv grammatikóß, kaì o pollákiß mv̀ tugcánwn toũ katà mousikv̀n
télouß ou k a n eiv mousikóß. toı́nun kaì o mv̀ tugcánwn pollákiß toũ
katà r vtorikv̀n télouß ou k a n eiv r v́twr. o dé ge r v́twr pleionákiß v
nikã nikãtai, kaì tosoútw pleı̃on oÇ sw dunamikẃteróß esti, tw̃n tà
a dika e cóntwn prágmata ep’ au tòn suntrecóntwn. ou k a ra r v́twr
estìn o r v́twr. oÇ te mv̀ tucẁn toũ katà r vtorikv̀n télouß ou k a n
epainoı̃to, r v́tora dè e nı́ote nikvXénta epainoũmenk ou k a ra
r vtorikṽß téloß e stì tò nikãn.
This criticism gives the impression of being populist and occasionally sarcastic
(ou k a ra r v́twr estìn o r v́twr) about a well-known argument, at least in its general
outline. §§79–88 appear to be an addition to the main argument, and seem to be a
collection of arguments and versions of arguments. The criticism here has some
connection with the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument, but there is nothing
new in this version.50 The examples used of the musician and the grammarian are
quite common in our sources (albeit not usually together). The very presentation of
victory as an end differing from persuasion is known from a few parallels which
will be dealt with in the discussion on the Exclusivity of the End Argument.
Philodemus confirms and supplements our findings so far. We read in I. 25. 32–
26. 12:51
Pãß tecnı́tvß epaggélletai tò téloß poiv́sein, o dè r v́twr ou k52 epag-
gélletai peı́sein. Ou pãß tecnı́tvß, e àn e cU frénaß, epangélletai tò
téloß dià pantòß poiv́sein. Ou te gàr iatròß ou te kubernv́tvß ou te
toxótvß ou te a plw̃ß oÇ soi tàß epistv́maß ou pagı́ouß e cousin a llà
stocastikáß. NWst’ v kaì taútaß ou r vtéon einai técnaß v kaì tv̀n
r vtorikv́n. LEpaggéletaı́ te kaì o r v́twr tò téloß poiv́sein.53
50 This is also the opinion of Barnes (1986) 20 n.50.
51 This testimonium is also used by Barnes, who regards the various sources as conducting a
conversation between themselves (“Philodemus also rejects Sextus’ argument. . .”). Philodemus is
important for the sources he used.
52 ou k] suppl. 14. 17; eu Sudhaus, vol. I of the previous version.
53 Here I divide the fragment into two. The second half (lines 13–19 will appear below). Barnes
adduces the fragment in its entirety and does not indicate two arguments, although the last part of
the cited first half demonstrates that this is the case: wÇ stL v kaì taútaß ou r vtéon einai técnaß v
kaì tv̀n r vtorikv́n. e paggéletaı́ te kaì o r v́twr tò téloß poiv́sein. Barnes (ibid.) 11 translates
these sentences “Hence you must say either that these too are not arts or else that rhetoric is in fact
an art. And the orator too undertakes to achieve his end”. This is clearly a conclusion, while the fol-
lowing second half of the fragment presents an additional stage in the argument, even if Philodemus
The Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument 141
ISBN Print: 9783525252949 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647252940
© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen
Firstly, Philodemus corroborates our earlier conclusion that there were two stages to
the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument against the rhetors. In Sextus, II. 13–
15, the argument of the opponents of rhetoric was that rhetoric fails to attain its end
in all instances, and even in a majority of instances; in Philodemus, the argument of
the rhetors, using the examples of medicine, navigation and archery, is that rhetoric
is a conjectural art, in which the artist does not always declare the attainment of his
end. Were rhetoric to be denied the title of art on this criterion, then many similar
arts would also need to be denied their title.
The second part of the fragment is more important since here Philodemus pro-
vides unique information. Sextus at II. 15 provides a refutation of the second argu-
ment of the rhetors as well, that they attain their end in the majority of cases. The
opponents of rhetoric claim that the orator loses more often than he wins. Neither
Sextus nor Quintilian provides a response by the rhetors to this claim. Philodemus
does provide an answer (I. 26. 13–19):
LEstì d’ au toũ tò téloß, oÅ férei tw̃n pragmátwn v fúsiß, ou te dià
pantòß keı́menon ou dè mà Dı́a katà tò pleı̃ston. LAllà polù mãllon
tw̃n mv̀ r vtórwn tò e rgon54 poieı̃.
The rhetors can accept, with their opponents, the possibility that they lose more of-
ten than they win, but that, they argue, this does not make rhetoric any less an art,
since the ratio of their successes is still greater than that of a non-orator.55
Let us now consider the origins for the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argu-
ment. Since there are two stages in the attack against the rhetors, one earlier and
himself might consider the whole passage to be one continuous argument. Cf. Sudhaus (1892) suppl.
15 who regards the following as an addition by Philodemus himself, in support of rhetoric.
54 Until now Philodemus has used the word téloß but now adopts the term e rgon. Barnes
(1986) 11 correctly translates this as “function” (rather than “end”, his translation for téloß). Hub-
bell (1920) 270 uses the three terms “result”, “end”, and “purpose” indiscriminately. It is difficult to
decide whether Philodemus intends a strict distinction between terms, or is simply being lax. I have
assumed the latter.
55 Barnes (1986) 11 also identifies an additional response of the rhetors in Philodemus, I. 71–
72. He argues that the first response which claims that even if the orator loses more often than he
wins, he still wins more often than one who is not an orator, is only empirical so that in theory there
could be a situation in which one who is not a rhetor might win more than he loses simply by
chance. For this reason, according to Barnes, “Philodemus has a better suggestion to make” in which
the orator is better than the non-orator in the way that he attains his few victories, a pò tṽß dia-
Xésewß. It seems to me, however, that Barnes is making a connection between two fragments which
are from different contexts. The argument in I. 71–72 does not deal with the Exclusivity of Attaining
the End Argument but rather The Exclusivity of Teaching Argument. Furthermore, the argument
ends with the words ka n epì tinwn a potugcánU tw̃n katà méroß which Barnes (ibid.) 12 translates,
“even if in some cases he fails in the particular results”, demonstrating, surely, that this is not a con-
tinuation of the argument against the rhetors. It should have said, to conform to Barnes’ argument,
“even if in the case where the orator loses in the majority of instances and even more than the non-
orator, the fact that he works a pò tṽß diaXésewß is what defines him as an orator.”
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one later, it would be natural to attribute the earlier to Critolaus. Not only is this lo-
gical, but there is textual support for it.
The passage in Quintilian, II. 17. 22–25 is part of a summary of arguments begin-
ning at §14 deriving from various philosophers, but above all Critolaus. The second
stage of the argument in Sextus, II. 13–15 is less easily identifiable. At least it may
be determined with some degree of confidence that the first stage of the argument
was a double attack by Critolaus against the Stoic end of rhetoric, which he refused
to recognize as an end, and the end of rhetoric as seen by the rhetors, which Crito-
laus may have launched against either the rhetors themselves and/or the Stoics who
he regarded as providing a figleaf to the rhetors.56 The second stage of the criticism
we might guess is Academic, and attribute it to Charmadas, although this is much
less certain from the evidence.57 At any rate, this later version uses the relaxed cri-
terion and shows that even by that standard rhetoric is not an art, since it fails to at-
tain its end in the majority of cases. The two examples of medicine and navigation
which appeared in the first stage as a response to the attackers have been incorpo-
rated into the new attack.
The Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument is one leg of the End Argument.
We turn now to the other leg, The Exclusivity of the End Argument. An analysis of
this argument will no doubt supplement our picture of the End Argument, but it
may also change the picture we have reached so far, since the two legs are mutually
dependent and at each stage may be assumed to have derived from the same
source.58
56 The only testimonium for an actual debate between a philosopher and a rhetor is of course
the conversation between Charmadas and Menedemus in Cicero, De Oratore I. 85–93, where the
discussion is restricted to which is the better school and what the field of studies might be in each
one.
57 The name of Charmadas does not appear in this context either in Sextus or in Philodemus.
Furthermore, the name of Critolaus does appear in Sextus, II. 12, one section before the Exclusivity
of Attaining the End Argument, and the whole passage §§ 10–19 seems to be one attack against the
Stoic definition of art. We have, however, already proved in the chapters on the Exclusivity of
Teaching Argument and the Benefit Argument that §§13–15 are out of context, since they deal with
téloß per se when the context actually requires a discussion of that part of the Stoic definition of art
which is téloß eu crvston (§10); see pp.66–67; 118–119; 124 above. Thus the position of the argu-
ment does not imply anything about its origin, while the Academic character of the argument and
the improvements in the argument over the original version indicate that Charmadas may well be its
originator.
58 In particular, we shall find after an analysis of the Exclusivity of the End Argument that the
arguments in Quintilian, II. 17. 22–25 which we have determined were launched at two different tar-
gets – the Stoics and the rhetors – need to be understood slightly differently. The argument against
the rhetors also served against the Stoics in the internal debate.
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6.4. The Exclusivity of the End Argument
Most arguments against rhetoric overlap to some degree with each other, and the
Exclusivity of the End Argument is no exception. In its simplest and most basic
form it presents an exclusive requirement, that the end of rhetoric must be peculiar
to rhetoric.59 The more complex the definition of the end of rhetoric, the more likely
that its elements will overlap with other arguments. One example will serve here:
when the téloß of rhetoric is not merely persuasion but tò teXèn politikòn zv́tvma
diatı́XesXai katà tò e ndecómenon peistikw̃ß, the End Argument is found to overlap
to some extent with the Materia Argument.60 The process is almost inevitable, since
the search for an end peculiar to rhetoric (idion, Sextus, II. 5) requires it to be so
complex that some of its elements are bound to common to other arguments. Our
sources clearly reflect the development of the complexity of the end.61 From the
simplest and most basic end, tò peı́Xein, the complexity increases until the descrip-
tion of the end takes up several lines.
This development of the endless end is clearly artificial and is a prominent indi-
cator of the Hellenistic period. There is an outstanding example of this in the ninth
prolegomenon;62 sometimes there is no problem if the end and the materia are com-
mon to several arts (lines 8–13):
deı̃ dè ginẃskein, oÇ ti tw̃n u pokeiménwn tà mèn miã mónU técnU u p-
ókeitai. . . tà dè pleı́osin. . . kaì tw̃n telw̃n pálin tà mèn miãß mónvß
eisì técnvß. . . tà dè kaì e térwn. . .
This is of course a late text.63 Rhetoric no longer threatens the livelihood of anyone.
It was only the people threatened by it in the Hellenistic period who turned what
was perfectly natural into problems and attacked rhetoric with them. It was natural,
for example, for the arts to be interconnected. Many of them grew out of earlier arts
and simply peeled off from them, leaving each with a common materia. It was also
the case that humans could find various ways (or arts) to attain a certain end.64
59 The more complex version contains a double requirement, that the téloß be peculiar to rheto-
ric and that neither rhetoric nor any of its parts has any other téloß: cf. Sextus, II. 73; 89–92.
60 On the close relations between téloß and uÇ lv, see the following chapter on the Materia Ar-
gument; esp. the discussion on Sextus, II. 51, pp.201–205 below.
61 On the addition of the materia to the end in order to make it more focussed, cf. Quintilian, II.
15. 15.
62 Rabe (1931) 100, lines 8–24.
63 The author of this text was a teacher of rhetoric and philology in early 11th. century Constan-
tinople. His name was LIwánnvß Sikelóß (or Sikeliẃtvß), nicknamed Docapatrv́ß. His sources
were certainly much older, reaching back to at least the late Roman period (e.g., the second century
Hermogenes of Tarsus).
64 In Lucian, De Parasito 9, Simon defines parasiticism and identifies its end as pleasure. He is
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There are two sources which certainly deal with the Exclusivity of the End Argu-
ment. These are Sextus, II. 72–73, and Quintilian, II. 15. 10–11. The argument com-
prises two parts, and it may be summarized as follows: on the one hand, there are
additional things which persuade apart from rhetoric; on the other hand, rhetoric has
more ends than only persuasion.
In addition to these two sources which deal with the argument, there are two
other sources dealing with criticism of the Exclusivity of the End, without actually
appearing as an argument. These are Sextus, II. 2–5 and Quintilian, II. 15. 6–9.
The final source deals neither with the argument nor with the criticism of the Ex-
clusivity of the End. This is Sextus, II. 60–62, where he begins the formal discus-
sion of the end. This passage is closely connected with the context in which the last
two passages appear: both Sextus, II. 2–5 and Quintilian, II. 15. 6–9 appear as part
of a survey of philosophers who all regarded persuasion as an essential element65 in
rhetoric. Sextus, II. 60–62 presents a parallel survey, for which reason it is worth
considering it in this section.
I should also mention the Whole/Part argument which may be summarized as fol-
lows: it cannot be the case that art and its parts have different ends. This may be
seen as a type of Exclusivity of the End Argument. It appears to have been an inde-
pendent argument with its own title, a pò tw̃n merw̃n, found in the only source to
present the argument, Sextus, II. 89–92.66 We shall not be dealing with this argu-
ment in the present study.
6.4.1. Analysis of the Exclusivity of the End Argument
Sextus, II. 72–73:
fası́ gár, v toi técnv estìn v r vtorikv̀ v ou k estin. kaì ei mèn mv́ e st-
ti, mvdè téloß au tṽß zvtw̃menk ei dé e sti, pw̃ß koinòn e cei téloß kaì
toũ mv̀ r v́toroß; tò gàr peı́Xein polloı̃ß páresti dià ploũton v
kálloß v dóxan, w ß próteron u pedeı́knumen. r vXéntwn dè pollákiß
tw̃n lógwn kaì ep’ au toı̃ß pepeisménwn tw̃n dikastw̃n ou dèn v tton
prosménousin oı r v́toreß, eÇ terón ti a pekdecómenoi téloß, kaì
prosménonteß déontai. ou k a ra tò peı́Xein r vtorikṽß e sti téloß, a ll’
ei a ra, =tò? metà toũto epakolouXoũn.
not bothered by the fact that this end might be common to various other arts. Nor does his opponent
attack him on this point.
65 The sources reflect some vagueness between téloß and oÇ roß (=finis).
66 It seems to be hinted at in Philodemus, II. 105, fr. XI 4–10.
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This is at first sight an unassailable argument. On the one hand, the end of rhetoric
cannot be persuasion since others who are not orators are also able to persuade; on
the other hand, even the orators require more than mere persuasion.
A second glance begins to raise problems. This passage reports what some people
say (fası́), but it is not clear where what they say ends. Sextus clearly inserts his
own remark sending the reader to §4, but it is not certain whether the remark is sim-
ply the reference, w ß próteron u pedeı́knumen or the whole sentence, tò gàr peı́Xein
polloı̃ß páresti dià ploũton v kálloß v dóxan, w ß próteron u pedeı́knumen. Is
the second part of the equation integral to the original argument, or is this also an
addition by Sextus from some other source?
It seems to me that we are dealing with a collage. Firstly, the words pw̃ß koinòn
e cei téloß kaì toũ mv̀ r v́toroß; would lead one to expect to find tecnı̃tai who are
not orators and yet persuade. One could indeed make do with simply other people
who persuade by means of wealth, and so on, but as the argument stands, wealth
and beauty stand on their own without the aid of the many. We have a Philodeman
parallel which presents the tecnı̃tai (I. 19. 12–18):
Aı diáforoi técnai tw̃n a llv́lwn telw̃n ou tugcánousin, toũ dè tṽß
r vtorikṽß télouß kaì filósofoß kaì grammatikòß kaì dialektikòß
paráxei. . .
The final problem is that the end of the argument refers only to the second part of
the equation, whereas one would have expected an argument with two integral parts
to conclude with a reference to both.
For solutions to any of these problems, it will be necessary to turn to the parallel
in Quintilian, II. ch. 15. So far as metarhetoric is concerned, this is one of the most
important chapters in the whole of Quintilian, with parallels to many arguments and
many versions of one argument, although they are scattered throughout the chapter
and stamped with Quintilian’s mark, much more so than in other chapters. This fact
makes it very difficult to expose his sources, and it will be necessary to digress a
moment to discuss the aims of Quintilian in this chapter, and his mode of presenta-
tion.
Quintilian’s aim in the whole of his work is to present the perfect orator, none
other than the good man, as he writes in his prooemium 9:
Oratorem autem instituimus illum perfectum, qui esse nisi vir bonus
non potest, ideoque non dicendi modo eximiam in eo facultatem, sed
omnis animi virtutes exigimus.
This theme pervades the whole work, and it is particularly emphasized in the last
book dedicated almost entirely to this subject. Quintilian seems to have been extre-
mely concerned about the entry of bad men into the profession. The source of his
anxiety might be practical, but Quintilian finds relief in the Stoic position which he
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adopts with enthusiasm, to the extent that he identifies all that is not Stoic as at-
tempting to introduce, or overlooking the introduction of, the bad man into rhetoric.
It does not occur to Quintilian that the Stoic system is not necessarily motivated by
the fear of the bad man entering rhetoric,67 just as those whose views differ from
that of the Stoics are not all attempting to bring the bad man into rhetoric.
In II. ch. 15, Quintilian can, and indeed must, produce his credo with regard to
rhetoric. He understands that the discussion of the definition has not exhausted the
subject. He must state unambiguously that there is no place for the bad man in
rhetoric. His discussion, however, is far from orderly, and does not flow intelli-
gently from his sources.68 Quintilian was a rhetor of more than twenty years’ stand-
ing. He was no philosopher, and from this point of view, II. ch. 15–21 cannot be
considered his home territory. He was certainly an expert on rhetoric per se, but me-
tarhetoric is something else altogether. Every rhetor would refer at least at the be-
ginning of a course to certain metarhetorical elements, but would not have gone too
deeply into them. It was not for this that students came to him. Quintilian is no dif-
ferent from other rhetors. When he discusses metarhetoric he is dependent on his
sources. He had, however, already read a great deal of material before writing his
work, as he states in his prooemium (3–4), and there is no reason to disbelieve him.
This would have been a double-edged sword for one who was not blessed with a
philosophical mind, had no real understanding of the various philosophical schools
of thought, no awareness of their internal controversies, let alone the motivations
for such controversies or the background to them. He remembered a vast amount, as
befits one trained in rhetoric, and served him well in rhetoric per se, but it was a dis-
advantage in metarhetoric. Chapter 15 is written associatively so that while it ap-
pears to be orderly, it confuses a great many details. It may be assumed that after
writing a passage Quintilian would not return to it and check it against the sources if
he had not been copying from them. At least, this does not seem to have been his
normal work practice.
Three elements conspire to make the analysis of chapter 15 philologically chal-
lenging: 1) the pathological motivation of the author to treat metarhetoric almost ex-
clusively with regard to the problem of the bad man in rhetoric; 2) his faulty grasp
of Hellenistic philosophy; 3) the misapplication of his vast reading and extensive
memory.
Chapter 15 is so structured that it falls into two main parts. In §§1–32, Quintilian
surveys various opinions regarding the definition of rhetoric which he believes al-
low the bad man to be considered an orator. From §33 onwards, he gives his own
opinion, which is that of the Stoics.
67 See pp.32–35; 136 above.
68 RW (2006) 225–229 introduce this chapter as if it is orderly. A distinction must be made,
however, between Quintilian who imposes order according to the criterion he has determined as pri-
mary, and the order of his sources which would have required some understanding of them.
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§§1–32 may be divided as follows. In §2, Quintilian lists five opinions which do
not regard rhetoric as a virtue in the Stoic sense of the word. He discusses these until
§23. He then turns to a discussion of Plato in §§24–32 with a view to refuting those
who see the philosopher as an opponent of rhetoric.
The five opinions appearing in §§2–23 will occupy us later in the discussion. We
are concerned here with the Exclusivity of the End Argument which has a parallel
in §§10–11. Up until §10, Quintilian has surveyed various definitions of rhetoric
which regard persuasion as the main factor69 in rhetoric. Because of the criticism
adducing various means of persuasion other than rhetoric (= Exclusivity of the End
Criticism), Quintilian turns in §10 to examples attempting to make the end of rheto-
ric peculiar to rhetoric by formulating it as vis dicendo persuadendi. The examples
are from Plato’s Gorgias and from Theodectes/Aristotle. The definition of the latter
is ducere homines dicendo in id quod auctor velit. There follows the double criti-
cism in §11:
sed ne hoc quidem satis est comprehensum: persuadent enim dicendo
vel ducunt in id quod volunt alii quoque, ut meretrices, adulatores, cor-
ruptores. at contra non persuadet semper orator, ut interim non sit pro-
prius hic finis eius, interim sit communis cum iis, qui ab oratore procul
absunt.
Persuasion is not peculiar to the orator, and on the other hand, the orator does not al-
ways persuade. This criticism, however, is not all that clear. While the final part
makes sense (the second interim – there are other people apart from the orator who
persuade in speech or manage affairs according to their wishes),70 it is not at all
clear what the first part intends (the first interim). Where have we seen an example
that persuasion is not the exclusive end of the orator? What about the previous ob-
servation which is immediately dropped, at contra non persuadet semper orator?71
The parallel in Sextus, II. 72–73 helps to answer these questions. This passage is
formally a complete parallel to the equation appearing at the end of Quintilian, II.
69 I use ‘factor’ because we cannot determine at the moment whether persuasion here is re-
garded as a téloß or a oÇ roß precisely because Quintilian seems not have been fully aware of the dis-
tinction throughout the entire chapter and the metarhetorical discussion altogether; cf. p.131 nn.12–
13 above, where we demonstrated that Quintilian was aware that finis translates both terms,
although his usage indicated that he was not entirely aware of the distinction; cf. also RW (ibid.) in
their introduction and notes to chapter 15.
70 On the difference between people who persuade and arts which persuade (Sextus, II. 5), see
p.153 below.
71 This is not to be understood as a version of the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument,
as if the orator does not always attain the peculiar end of rhetoric; cf. RW (ibid.) 245: “understand-
ing persuadet as ‘succeeding in persuading’.” The intent is that the orator has an end other than per-
suasion, as is clear from the words non est proprius hic finis eius, and from a comparison with the
formulation of the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument in 17. 22: aiunt etiam omnes artes ha-
bere finem aliquem propositum, ad quem tendant. . . modo non praestari eum, qui promittatur.
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15. 11. §72 parallels the second leg, except that the examples are different. In Sextus
the orator is accompanied by those who persuade by means of money, wealth, etc.,
while in Quintilian they are various kinds of lowlife.72 §73 parallels the first leg of
the equation, including its content. It now becomes clear what lies behind the vague
words at contra non persuadet semper orator. After the orator persuades, he is still
waiting for something else, and this is the end; thus persuasion is not the end. To
discover what he is waiting for, all that we need to do is to return to Quintilian and
the definition of Theodectes/Aristotle: ducere homines dicendo in id quod auctor
velit. That is to say, the persuasion is for some purpose desired by the orator, and it
is this which is the end of rhetoric.
We may now see that Quintilian has a basic structure to chapter 15, but during
the course of writing occasionally recalls other items and inserts them, not always
in their proper place. Sometimes he combines things which were originally separate,
and thereby creates unintelligible sentences, which seems to be what happened here.
Quintilian combined the definition of Gorgias and Theodectes/Aristotle since for
his purpose the fact that they both joined speaking onto the end of rhetoric was what
he found important. Quintilian sees no great difference between them, and here he
is quite right.73 What we mean by persuasion as the goal is of course that our goal
following the persuasion will be achieved; the target audience will accept our opi-
nion and act upon our wishes. However, what appears logical is not always correct,
especially when it is to do with the controversies surrounding rhetoric. There were
those who saw (or wanted to see) in the definition of Theodectes/Aristotle and in si-
milar definitions a type of end quite different and separate from persuasion, which
leads to the first leg of the equation: interim non sit proprius hic finis eius (=at con-
tra non persuadet semper orator).74 Quintilian (or his source) failed to understand
72 The criticism in Sextus is before the addition of speaking (dicendo) to the end of rhetoric,
while in Quintilian the criticism comes afterwards. Even after the addition of speaking, however, ex-
amples of other arts which use speech could have been used. Such a criticism appears in Plato’s
Gorgias and is reflected in Sextus, II. 5; cf. Philodemus I. 19, col. 1. 12ff. where the orator is ac-
companied by the philosopher, the grammarian and the dialectician. Quintilian is of course using
second or third hand material, or rather his memory of it, which might explain his unorthodox exam-
ples.
73 Cf. the definition of Apollodorus in §12. The identity between persuadere and sententiam
eius (sc. oratoris) ducere in id quod velit is a little suspicious. A comparison with the final part of
the definition by Theodectes/Aristotle in §10 makes it look like an artificial definition combining
various things. Furthermore, the parallel to this argument of Apollodorus appears in Sextus, II. 79.
Indeed, the main thrust of Sextus’ opposition to this end (§84) makes no distinction between the two
ends. Finding favour with the judges is as good as persuading them; victory is as good as persuasion
(although Sextus does criticize tò nikãn in other ways; cf. §§86–87).
74 Sextus, II. 86–88 may now be seen to contain something interesting. Victory, which is an ele-
ment in the Exclusivity of the End Argument (apparently a later version; see next note), now takes
on an extra role in the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument. Such transitions are typical of
the End Argument.
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or properly recall the argument in the Greek original which Sextus did understood
correctly.
To conclude this analysis of the Exclusivity of the End Argument, there is no
doubt that Quintilian and Sextus had a common source which claimed that persua-
sion is not exclusive to rhetoric. This becomes the first leg in Sextus, II. 72, whose
second leg is no more than a piece of ad hoc sophistry.75 Apart from the two sources
mentioned here, the second leg makes no other appearance, while the first leg does
have other parallels.
This first leg, as it appears in Sextus, II. 72 and in Quintilian, II. 15. 11, appears
completely out of context. Quintilian is completely confused, while Sextus adds it
as an appendix to the main argument76 dealing with the end (§§60–71), arguing e x-
éstai tw̃ bouloménw crṽsXai (72).
In order to discover the source of the argument, the motivation behind it, the con-
text in which it was created, and its aims, and especially its position in the general
controversy over rhetoric, it will be necessary to turn to those parallels which are
not formulated as arguments. They fall under what I call the Exclusivity of the End
Criticism.
6.4.2. Analysis of the Exclusivity of the End Criticism
Immediately after the first leg in Sextus, II. 72, we are referred back to §4. It is not
clear which words may be attributed to Sextus himself, but even in the most extreme
case (where the comment begins with tò gàr peı́Xein), it is this that the argument in-
tended. At any rate, there is no doubt that Sextus, II. 2–9 constitutes a parallel to the
Exclusivity of the End Argument. To this parallel must be added in the first stage
Quintilian, II. 15. 6–9. In these two places, the Exclusivity of the End appears as
part of the discussion concerning Plato’s opinion of rhetoric. This is explicit in Sex-
tus, but needs to be proved in Quintilian. An analysis of the sources shows that they
have a common intermediate source.
The beginning of the metarhetorical discussion in Quintilian, II. ch. 15 is very re-
miniscent of the beginning of the discussion in Sextus, although their objectives are
exactly opposite. Sextus is attacking, and Quintilian is defending, rhetoric. Both be-
75 It has no connection with the context of the discussion. The fact that persuasion is not always
the end of the orator exceeds the bounds of the present argument, which continues in §12 where it is
observed that there are others who are not orators who even so manage to persuade, thereby proving
that persuasion through speech is not exclusive to rhetoric. Indeed, this addition does not appear in
Sextus, II. 2–5, which seems to be a parallel to the first leg.
76 The addition may have already been in his sources, who regarded the criticism stemming
from the significance of the term tò piXanón as the main criticism concerning the end (§§60–71).
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gin by surveying the most outstanding definitions77 of rhetoric supplied by previous
generations. Quintilian does not make do with a comprensio verborum but seeks the
qualitas ipsius rei (II. 15. 1).78 Similarly, Sextus seeks not only the e nnoia but also
oÇ e sti tò zvtoúmenon (§1).
Sextus adduces the opinions of Plato, Xenocrates and the Stoics, and Aristotle
(§§2–9). In the context of Plato (§§2–5), Sextus provides a definition e x
episunXésewß, a definition based on Plato’s Gorgias, which essentially assembles
all the reservations Socrates had raised against rhetoric in his discussion with the
sophist.79 The definition begins, of course, with Socrates’ proposal that rhetoric is
peiXoũß dvmiourgóß, from which it progressively reduces in scope.80 The first step
is the addition of dià lógwn, since there are also other means of persuasion which
fall outside the scope of rhetoric. The next stage concerns those things essentially to
do with speech, and so on. We are actually most interested, however, in the first
step, the addition of dià lógwn to peiXoũß dvmiourgóß.
Although Quintilian, II. 15 is more complex, the general context is similar and
testifies to a common source.81 Plato appears twice in Quintilian in the part dealing
with the téloß element in the definition of rhetoric (§§4–14).82 That he does appear
twice indicates a certain confusion in Quintilian’s text. It is partly explained by the
position of Isocrates who opens the survey in Quintilian. The definition peiXoũß
dvmiourgóß is not that of Isocrates. It is attributed to Gorgias in Plato’s Gorgias,
and appears as such in Sextus, II. 2. Even Quintilian himself doubts the attribution
to Isocrates. At any rate, after attributing the definition to Isocrates, and discussing
how best to translate the Greek term, Quintilian adds apud Platonem quoque Gor-
gias. . . fere dicit (§5). There is no doubt that Quintilian or his source mistakenly at-
tributed to Isocrates Plato’s definition.83
77 Cf. Sextus II, 1: fére prw̃ton skeyẃmeXa tı́ a n eiv r vtorikv́, tàß e pifanestátaß eiß toũto
tw̃n filosófwn a podóseiß paratiXémenoi.
78 II. 15. 1 seems to have been the beginning of the second half of the second book, which Quin-
tilian in his preface says comprises quae de ipsa rhetorices substantia quaeruntur (I. prooemium
21). At the same time, II. ch. 13–14 act as a kind of introduction to it.
79 On the history of this method, see RW (ibid.) 236 on the words apud Platonem.
80 The order of the elements in the definition do not correspond with the order of their appear-
ance in the dialogue; see n.97 on pp.157–158 below.
81 RW (ibid.) 236–238 devote an extended discussion to the problem of the common source, at
least so far as it pertains to the definition attributed to Plato. After rejecting the opinion of Raderma-
cher who identified the source with a Stoic work, they state that it was “a doxographical source on
definitions of rhetoric, compiled by a rhetorician rather than a philosopher” (237). I shall consider
this conclusion in due course, but it should already be noted that they do not analyse the two sources
together, or note the differences in detail and their exact location. They also fail to take into consid-
eration an additional parallel in Sextus, II. 60–62.
82 In §14 Quintilian begins his discussion of the uÇ lv element in the definition of rhetoric.
83 See also the comments of RW (ibid.) 234–235 on the words re vera and peiXoũß dvmiourgóß.
They support the view that Isocrates never wrote a technical handbook (técnv), although he may
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The Exclusivity of the End Criticism appears in Sextus very close to Plato’s defi-
nition, and is close to the comment about Plato in Quintilian, except that Cicero in-
tervenes. It is typical of Quintilian to add Roman examples and sources wherever he
can, occasionally even replacing the original Greek examples. We may be sure that
the Exclusivity of the End Criticism beginning in the middle of §6 was originally
next to Plato’s definition, and the appearance of Cicero is the work of Quintilian.
It is now time to examine the criticism itself: the definition of the end of rhetoric
as peiXoũß dvmiourgóß is unsatisfactory since there are additional things which per-
suade apart from rhetoric. These are, according to Sextus, II. 2:
tò mèn ‘dià lógwn’ prostiXeìß táca paróson pollá e sti tà peiXẁ
toı̃ß a nXrẃpoiß e nergazómena cwrìß lógou, kaXáper ploũtoß kaì
dóxa kaì v donv̀ kaì kálloß.
and Quintilian, II. 15. 6:
verum et pecunia persuadet et gratia et auctoritas dicentis et dignitas.
postremo aspectus etiam ipse sine voce, quo vel recordatio meritorum
cuiusque vel facies aliqua miserabilis vel formae pulchritudo senten-
tiam dictat.
Quintilian’s testimonium divides into two parts either side of the word postremo,
and the reason is obvious. Quintilian adds Roman examples. The first three exam-
ples are intended to match three Greek examples, which also appear in Sextus: pecu-
nia-ploũtoß; gratia-v donv́; auctoritas dicentis et dignitas-dóxa.84 Beauty moves to
the second part of the passage because Quintilian wishes to organize a new group of
means of persuasion having in common aspectus ipse sine voce. In this group Quin-
tilian can place his Roman examples: recordatio meritorum cuiusque, with Manius
Aquilius in mind (§7), and facies aliqua miserabilis, intended for Servius Galba
(§8), while formae pulchritudo he reserves for Phryne (§9).
Quintilian, therefore, used the same source as Sextus, but added between v donv́
and kálloß his own list of means of persuasion accompanied by Roman examples.
Interestingly, Quintilian does not add Roman examples where there were no Greek
examples in his source. Sextus had examples only for kálloß, and Quintilian retains
have composed a collection of speeches (técnai) with which his pupils could learn to deliver
speeches, while they also accept the view of Dodds that the term peiXoũß dvmiourgóß originated in
Plato.
84 For the identification of gratia with v donv́, cf. LSJ, s.v. B. The identification of dóxa with
two Roman concepts reflects a common phenomenon in translations. It is especially understandable
with dóxa since reputation does arouse both authority and worthiness. Contrast RW (ibid.) 240 who
state, “Q. covers three of Sextus’ headings in the same order: money, gratia et auctoritas et digni-
tas=dóxa, beauty.” According to this scheme of things, Quintilian would have skipped the third ex-
ample, pleasure, which does not seem very plausible.
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there the Greek example of Phryne. His new Roman examples he adds to his own
new items.
Quintilian then summarizes the criticism as follows (II. 15. 9–10):
quae si omnia persuadent, non est hic, de quo locuti sumus, idoneus fi-
nis. ideoque diligentiores sunt visi sibi, qui, cum de rhetorice idem sen-
tirent, existimarunt eam ‘vim dicendo persuadendi’. quem finem Gor-
gias in eodem, de quo supra diximus, libro velut coactus a Socrate
facit . . .
It is worth comparing this with the parallel in Sextus, II. 4:
ou toı́nun a skópwß o Plátwn a poblépwn eiß tv̀n di’ au tw̃n gino-
ménvn peiXẁ e lexen oÇ ti r vtorikv́ e sti peiXoũß dvmiourgòß ou c o pw-
soũn a llà dià lógwn.
In both sources, the comment about the addition dià lógwn or dicendo, although
this is by no means the final addition to the definition, is followed by a conclusion.
In Sextus this is the mentioning of the name of Plato who would be better placed at
the end of §5. In Quintilian we find the declaration non est hic, de quo locuti sumus,
idoneus finis where the word idoneus is a Latin translation of the Greek term idion
which appears at the end of §5 in Sextus.
Thus, the Exclusivity of the End discussion appears in both sources at the transi-
tion from the Platonic end – vis persuadendi / peiXoũß dvmiourgóß and its improve-
ment to vis dicendo persuadendi / peiXoũß dvmiourgòß dià lógwn. The Exclusivity
of the End discussion continues, but there are significant differences between the
two sources. In both sources it is agreed that persuasion through speech does not ap-
ply exclusively to rhetoric. According to Sextus, there are other arts which persuade
through speech, such as medicine. According to Quintilian, there are other types of
cajolers – alii quoque, ut meretrices, adulatores, corruptores. These examples are
notable for not representing artists.
It may be concluded that the original discussion on Plato’s definition of rhetoric
included only peiXoũß dvmiourgóß with the addition of dià lógwn to exclude from
the definition all non-verbal means of persuasion. The common source would seem
to have claimed that Plato defined rhetoric as the creator of persuasion, but that he
argued that rhetoric also required to be linked with speech. The remaining qualifiers
are later additions which is why the versions in Sextus and Quintilian differ from
each other. What is common, however, is that both sources set the Plato discussion
within a survey of various philosophers who referred to rhetoric. This is clearly seen
in Sextus, II. 1–9, and from the assembly of theories and opinions adduced in Quin-
tilian, II. ch. 15. We would like to know who is the source for the survey, if indeed
there is one common survey, and what the purpose and target of the survey might
have been. In order to gain a clearer picture of the survey, it will be necessary to ex-
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amine an additional survey which has something in common with the other two,
although there are also differences. This is Sextus, II. 61–62.
This passage appears during what we have called the formal discussion of the
end. While the two earlier sources contain the Exclusivity of the End Criticism, this
third passage is explicitly declared to be dealing with the end. This already allows
us to consider the possibility that this passage, too, has something to do with the Ex-
clusivity of the End. In fact, this passage, in addition to the others, will enable us to
reconstruct the correct structure of the Exclusivity of the End Argument, and finally
the End Argument as a whole.
We shall begin with what is common to all three surveys:
1. Stoic Background and Influence
I wish to show that the background to the surveys is the internal debate against
the Stoa. Traces of it are discernible in all three surveys.
Immediately after the opening line, we find in Sextus, II. 1:
a ll’ epeì koinòn u párxeẃß te kaì a nuparxı́aß e stìn v e nnoia, kaì
ou dèn toútwn eÇ teron oıón té e sti zvteı̃n mv̀ prolabóntaß oÇ e sti tò
zvtoúmenon, fére prw̃ton skeyẃmeXa tı́ a n eiv r vtorikv́. . .
The terms uÇ parxiß and a nuparxı́a originate in Stoic philosophy.85 The former term
denotes the reality, the latter the unreality of a prãgma (a state of affairs) indepen-
dent of us. We grasp the reality of the state of affairs by giving our assent
(sugkatáXesiß) to a true verbalization of the state of affairs, such as v méra estı́n.
The impression (fantası́a) presented to us was credible or persuasive (piXanv́),
and if it actually reflected accurately the state of affairs from which it came, it
would be a katalvptikv̀ fantası́a. The term e nnoia is also a Stoic term, and it de-
notes a general concept or notion, such as a horse or a unicorn, whether actual cases
are present or absent; the concept per se is, therefore, as Sextus observes, common
to reality and unreality.86 For Sextus to prove that rhetoric is not an art, he must re-
fute each and every concept of the philosophers who hold that it is an art.87 Sextus
obtains the concept he wishes to refute by surveying the opinions of Plato, Xeno-
crates and the Stoics and Aristotle (§§2–9). This is a completely logical and coher-
ent strategy. As we have seen, what we have called the Exclusivity of the End Criti-
cism appears during his survey of the opinion of Plato (§§2–5).
85 It is true that these concepts later entered general philosophical parlance, but in the present
context they are clearly Stoic. On the origin of these terms, see Glucker (1994).
86 Cf. the use of e nnoiai in the epistemology of the Stoic Antipater of Tarsus in Ludlam (1997)
366–368.
87 A Pyrrhonian sceptic has no other choice but to refute every positive dogma in order to prove
his point, but in fact he will address only the most prominent (tàß epifanestátaß eiß toũto tw̃n fi-
losófwn a podóseiß).
154 The End Argument
ISBN Print: 9783525252949 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647252940
© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen
The Stoic background is proven not only from the terminology used but also
from the context of the discussion. All nine of the first sections merely prepare the
way for the discussion based on the Stoic definition of art (§§10–42).88 Seen as
such, §§2–9 are part of the criticism agains the Stoa.
The survey in §§60–61 is also connected with the Stoa, and indeed is connected
with the same Stoic definition of art. While earlier the definition appears after the
survey in §§2–9, here it appears at the beginning of the survey.89 The appearance of
the Stoic definition is enough to corroborate our finding regarding the Stoic back-
ground and the internal debate. The criticism itself beginning in §63 is full of Stoic
terms, such as fantası́a and sugkatáXesiß.90
The Stoic background also appears in Quintilian, II. ch. 15 which is entirely
structured around differentiating those who separate rhetoric from the good man
from those who do not (the Stoics); in other words, those who define the end of
rhetoric as speaking well from those who define it as persuasion. The conclusion to
the chapter, beginning at §33 is an encomium to the Stoic theory.
2. The List of Names
The common source for all three surveys must have presented all the names of
philosophers which all three surveys share, and perhaps where only two agree. The
shortest list is the one in Sextus, II. 2–9, where we find Plato, Xenocrates and the
Stoics, and Aristotle. In Sextus, II. 60–61 the list is a little longer: Plato, Xenocrates,
Aristotle, Ariston the Peripatetic, Hermagoras, Athenaeus and Isocrates. Quintilian
provides Isocrates, Plato, Cicero, Plato again, Theodectes/Aristotle, Apollodorus,
Aristotle again, Hermagoras. The lists are certainly not identical, not only in the list
of names, but also in the definitions attributed to them. We shall deal with all these
problems later.
Now let us consider some of the differences between the three surveys:
1. Context of the Discussion
In Sextus, II. 2–9, the context is the oÇ roß. This word, together with the phrase
katà dioristikv̀n efodon, appears in §2 with regard to Plato, but the syntactical
structures appearing among the rest of the philosophers also show that the passage
is dealing with oÇ roß. Thus, in connection with Xenocrates and the Stoics, we find
the structure e legon r vtorikv̀n u párcein + accusative; with Aristotle, paradı́dwsi
tv̀n r vtorikv̀n (sc. einai) + accusative. In Sextus, II. 60–61, the context is clearly
the téloß, although the structures are not unambiguous. With some of the philoso-
phers, such as Plato and Aristotle, the formulation conforms more to the oÇ roß, but
with others, such as Ariston and Hermagoras, the formulation is more suited to the
88 This claim will be proved in p.160 and §6.4.3 below.
89 The definitions are not identical, on which see p.158 below.
90 The source for this criticism will be discussed below, pp.158–160.
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téloß.91 Quintilian begins with oÇ roß as the context, but already in §3 we meet with
munus orandi, a term more suited to the téloß.92 Even the definitions themselves
often pertain to the téloß, such as Cicero’s definition using the infinitives dicere,
persuadere,93 or those of Theodectes/Aristotle, Apollodorus and Hermagoras.
We have already noted the ambiguity in Quintilian’s use of finis which may
translate either oÇ roß or téloß.94 The confusion is compounded by the similarity in
content of the two topics. Since each of the two passages in Sextus has a clear pre-
ference, one for the end, and the other for the definition, it is impossible to establish
by simple comparison what the common source needed with a list of philosophers,
and in what context. A more complex comparison is required.
There are a number of problems in Sextus, II. 2–9. These sections are intended to
introduce §10 which quotes the Stoic definition of art, using which, Sextus will
deny that rhetoric is an art. This being so, §§2–9 should demonstrate that the usual
view is that rhetoric is an art. The attempt to use the list of philosophers in this way
is not entirely successful, especially since the actual refutation based on the Stoic
definition of art can manage very well without the list at all. The connection be-
tween the two parts is of course the word técnv. It suffices to assume that rhetoric is
an art for the refutation to have a point, and for this, the survey is unnecessary, and
is indeed dropped, with the argument concentrating on the elements of the Stoic de-
finition alone. Furthermore, not all the philosophers in the list use the word técnv. It
is used by Aristotle (the third, and the last, in the list), and perhaps we could allow
epistv́mv in the formulation of Xenocrates (§6). Plato’s definition makes no refer-
ence at all to the word técnv or anything similar to it, but actually emphasizes per-
suasion. Yet Sextus concludes this survey by connecting all of these definitions with
all their differences to the beginning of the Stoic definition which starts with the
word técnv. He appears to succeed by glossing the various terms used in the differ-
ent definitions, and connecting them all with técnv:
técnv v e pistv́mv lógwn v toũ légein kaì peiXoũß peripoivtikv́
a) Aristotle – técnv lógwn
b) Xenocrates and the Stoics – epistv́mv toũ eu légein
c) Plato – peiXoũß dvmiourgóß
91 The characteristic syntactical structure in a téloß sentence is an infinitive, especially with a
definite article; this point has been well made by RW (2006) 227.
92 RW (ibid.) 234 comment on this term: “It cannot stand in for e rgon here. . . which is trans-
lated as officium although it must mean much the same. . .” See on the parallel between munus and
e rgon escaton p.160 and n.102 below.
93 The word officium also points towards the end.
94 See p.131 and nn.12–13 above.
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Despite his best efforts, Sextus is unable to synthesize all the definitions. Plato’s de-
finition is tacked on to the other two with kaı́, although Sextus has made it look as
though it is the técnv which creates the persuasion, which was not the Platonic So-
crates’ intention. As for the other two definitions, Sextus has identified técnv with
epistv́mv, which might suit Xenocrates, but certainly not the Stoics, while his iden-
tification of lógwn with toũ légein succeeds only because he has omitted the all im-
portant eu .95
Given this clumsy concluding sentence, we have no choice but to turn to the par-
allel in Sextus, II. 60–61. Here it is rather the opening sentence which attempts to
state what is common to all the participants in the survey:
oı mèn ou n pleı̃stoi kaì carı́enteß e scaton oiontai tṽß r vtorikṽß e r-
gon einai tò peı́Xein.
Indeed, the survey of the philosophers this time shows without any exceptions that
persuasion is the end of rhetoric.
Returning to Sextus, II. 2–9, another problem is the mention of the Stoics to-
gether with Xenocrates. In fact, mentioning the Stoics at all before the Stoic defini-
tion of art in §10 is problematic, and their mention is obviously an addition to the
original survey. The three named philosophers appearing in this survey also appear
in the other survey in §§61–62, where Xenocrates is on his own. The Stoics are
chronologically out of place in a list of otherwise fourth century B.C.E. philoso-
phers. According to the survey, the Stoics, along with Xenocrates, do not even call
rhetoric a técnv but an epistv́mv,96 somewhat ruining the point of the survey as
being somehow connected with the Stoic definition of art in §10. There are other in-
dicators that the Stoics have been added together with some Stoic material. The de-
finition as it stands, and the term bebaı́a katálvyiß, are quintessentially Stoic and
have little to do with Xenocrates, and the latter should surely not be blamed for the
accompanying long discussion on the distinction between rhetoric and dialectic.
The survey at Sextus, II. 2–9, therefore, suffers from two major deficiencies.
Firstly, it is not in its proper place and should not be serving as an introduction to
the Stoic definition of art. Secondly, the survey itself is confused; although the con-
text for the discussion is the oÇ roß, the original discussion actually dealt with the
téloß,97 and Xenocrates has suffered from serious Stoic contamination. We must re-
turn once again to Sextus, II. 60–61 for help.
95 Radermacher (1895) xx n.1 presents this text with the addition of eu , which may well have
been his own emendation, based on the fact that eu is part of the Stoic definition appearing in §6; cf.
Barnes (1986) 5; 17 n.21. Sextus, however, is aiming not at accuracy but at finding the lowest com-
mon denominator. There is no need to emend the text. Mau in his 1961 Teubner edition of the text
does not emend and does not even mention Radermacher’s emendation.
96 Xenocrates gives a completely different definition in the survey at §§61–62, which will be
considered in due course, pp.166–168 below.
97 This claim is corroborated by comparing the definition attributed to Plato in §2 with Plato’s
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§60 begins a formal discussion of the téloß, and divides into three parts. First is
the Stoic definition of art which requires the existence of téloß ti. This is followed
by the survey of a long list of philosophers who all regarded the end of rhetoric to
be persuasion. The third stage in the discussion is of course the refutation of rheto-
ric: if persuasion is not the end, then rhetoric has no end, and consequently is not an
art. This argument is entirely consistent and logical. This passage shares with the
earlier passage the Stoic definition of art, and the first three philosophers in the pre-
sent long list are the three named in the earlier one.98 The Stoic definition in the ear-
lier passage, however, comes after the survey, while in the later one it comes first.
This change is significant.
It should be clear by now that the original list was composed by someone intent
on presenting famous philosophers who considered the end of rhetoric to be persua-
sion. Who would do such a thing, and why? It is my contention that the person re-
sponsible is Critolaus, and that his aim was to use it against the Stoics.
We have already considered Quintilian, II. 17. 22–25 in the section on the Exclu-
sivity of Attaining the End Argument, where we established that the argument, pre-
senting two sides, reflects two different debates; the internal debate against the
Stoics who do not present an external end towards which one might strive (tendo),
and the external debate against the rhetors who present persuasion as the end, but
cannot guarantee its attainment in every case. We mentioned at the end of the dis-
cussion that both arguments could be used against the Stoics.99 We are now in a po-
sition to say with some certainty that both End Arguments were used against the
Stoics. The first leg of the argument attacked the Stoic end of rhetoric as speaking
well since this activity was intrinsic to the activity and not an end to strive for, while
the second leg attacked them for the conventional end of rhetoric as persuasion,
since this end could not always be attained by the orator. How could the conven-
tional end of rhetoric be imposed on the Stoics? By presenting them with a list of
philosophers too famous to ignore, all of whom held this view.
The attack on rhetoric using the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument had
to regard persuasion as the end of rhetoric. The Stoics could attempt to avoid the cri-
ticism by pointing to their Stoic end of rhetoric, speaking well. Critolaus was not
prepared to accept this, and in any case refuted this possibility in the first leg of his
argument. He claimed (now in Quintilian’s Latin, II. 17. 22) that omnes artes habere
finem aliquem propositum, ad quem tendant: hunc modo nullum esse in rhetorice.
Why this end, the end to be striven towards, is not in rhetoric at all is because Crito-
Gorgias 450b9–453a2 which contains the elements mentioned in the definition: dià lógwn, peiXoũß
dvmiourgóß. Were this definition to have derived from an original oÇ roß of rhetoric, we might have
expected some reference in it to the materia of the art, as they appear in Gorgias, such as e n di-
kastvrı́w (452e2), and dı́kaiá te kaì a dika (454b7).
98 Further evidence that the Stoics placed with Xenocrates in the earlier list are an addition.
99 See p.138 and n.43 above.
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laus is currently arguing against the Stoic end of rhetoric, speaking well. Having
disproved the Stoic end of rhetoric he would have produced his survey of famous
philosophers to complete the attack; here is the end that the Stoics should be advo-
cating,100 and here comes Critolaus’ refutation of that end too, the second leg of his
argument.
As we have already seen, Quintilian, II. 15 is an associative collection of sources
which have been smoothed out to suit the needs of the author. We may now see that
the survey appearing there was originally to do with the end, although the chapter as
a whole deals formally with definition. Its declared intention is to be found at the
beginning of the chapter (II. 15. 1):
alii malos quoque viros posse oratores dici putant, alii, quorum nos sen-
tentiae accedimus, nomen hoc artemque, de qua loquimur, bonis de-
mum tribui volunt.
“Our opinion” is of course that of the Stoics, appearing explicitly at the end of the
chapter, §§33ff. The non-Stoic group all regard persuasion as the end of rhetoric,
which Quintilian fears would allow the bad man into the profession. His solution is
to regard rhetoric as the knowledge of speaking well, since only the good man can
speak well (§34).101 The list at §2 contains five non-Stoic opinions, followed by
Quintilian’s fear (§3):
hi fere aut in persuadendo aut in dicendo apte ad persuadendum posi-
tum orandi munus sunt arbitrari: id enim fieri potest ab eo quoque, qui
vir bonus non sit.
There follows his survey which parallels those in Sextus, II. 2–9 and 60–61. It con-
tains many names and arguments, only some of which appear in the parallels in Sex-
tus, and the sources are far from uniform. One thing, however, is clear: Quintilian
discusses the end as an element of the definition up to §14, followed by a discussion
of the materia as an additional element of the definition up to the beginning of the
conclusion to the chapter in §33. This is not surprising, since the definition can con-
tain either the end or the materia or both of them together. We are interested here in
the first part, concerning the end. It seems to me that this part derives from a discus-
sion of the end and adapted by Quintilian or his source to be part of the discussion
on the definition. This may be proved with the aid of the parallel in Sextus, II. 60–
61. First, here is part of Quintilian, II. 15. 3:
100 Producing a collection of cases, names and examples might seem strange to us today, but it
was an effective tactic in argument in the ancient world. Thus Chrysippus collects numerous in-
stances from history to support his position on divination (Cicero, De Natura Deorum II. 10–12).
101 As already mentioned earlier, this does not reflect Stoic thought on the subject, but Quinti-
lian’s obsession with keeping the bad man away from rhetoric; see pp.136 and n.38; 147 above.
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hi fere aut in persuadendo aut in dicendo apte ad persuadendum posi-
tum orandi munus sunt arbitrari. . . est igitur frequentissimus finis ‘rhet-
oricen esse vim persuadendi’.
and Sextus, II. 61:
oı mèn ou n pleı̃stoi kaì carı́enteß e scaton oiontai tṽß r vtorikṽß e r-
gon einai tò peı́Xein. . . dúnamin eirv́kasin au tv̀n toũ dià lógwn
peı́Xein.
The passages share a common source. I have underlined only two of the more nota-
ble matches: tṽß r vtorikṽß e rgon = orandi munus;102 dúnamin toũ peı́Xein = vim
persuadendi.103
To summarize our findings so far: the list of names was produced by Critolaus to
demonstrate to the Stoics that noteworthy philosophers have always regarded the
end of rhetoric to be persuasion, and he used it in his Exclusivity of Attaining the
End Argument. Both Sextus, II. 2–9 and Quintilian, II. ch. 15 make use of the list,
but with regard to the definition of rhetoric. The attempt in Sextus is unsuccessful,
while Quintilian manages to work it into his chapter in a confused manner, relying
on the fact that the end filled an important function in the definition. The definition
appearing in Sextus, II. 10, immediately after the survey, seems to have been origin-
ally before the survey, as it is in §60, which is the only way that the survey makes
any sense.
Following the definition in §10, Sextus goes through several arguments: one
based on the sústvma in §§10–12; then the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argu-
ment in §§13–19. We see from this that Critolaus began his attack from the Stoic
definition of art. He had no need to confirm that rhetoric was an art according to the
earlier famous philosophers. The Stoics themselves probably declared this expli-
citly. He did need the survey once he began to attack their téloß. Thus, after attack-
ing their sústvma and before the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument, he
had to introduce the survey to prevent the Stoics hiding behind their Stoic end of
rhetoric, speaking well.
102 One might have expected munus to translate the Stoic kaXṽkon, but that term is commonly
translated by officium. Cicero uses munus as the equivalent of opus = e rgon in Tusc. I. 70.
103 The short list in §2 ends with kakotecnı́a, which is attributed to no one in particular. Crito-
laus is later accredited with usus (§23), and it is Athenaeus who immediately afterwards is said to
have called rhetoric the art of deceiving (= kakotecnı́a). As for the vis, it has already appeared in
the short list in §2 without any qualification, but there is no parallel in the detailed list, and Quinti-
lian may have been thinking of the vis persuadendi at the time. Critolaus would have derived the vis
persuadendi from Plato.
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6.4.3. The Surveys and their Sources
In our discussion of the Exclusivity of the End Criticism so far we have considered
two main problems: its location and its source. Its location is in the discussion of
Plato’s opinion on the end of rhetoric being persuasion. The source is Critolaus who
uses the criticism as part of a general survey of philosophers with a view to coercing
the Stoics to accept that the real end of rhetoric (if at all) is persuasion, and not
speaking well, which is the declared Stoic end of rhetoric. Critolaus does this at the
stage where he attacks the Stoics according to the second part of the Stoic definition
of art, in which the téloß is the weak link.
In our comparison of the two parallels in Sextus (§§2–9, 60–61), we found differ-
ent lists of philosophers. They shared Plato, Xenocrates and Aristotle, although the
earlier list added the Stoics to Xenocrates; the later list added Ariston, Herma-
goras and Athenaeus; and Isocrates, who also appears in Quintilian. Clearly, we
have here different versions of the same survey, which means that more than one
author made use of it and adapted it to his purposes. Who were these authors? Did
they all have the same motives? Why did they make the changes that they made?
Above all, is it possible to reconstruct the various surveys and attribute them to par-
ticular people?
The answer to all these questions is positive, with some reservations. With the
aid of the context of the discussion, terminological matches and the identification of
lines of thought, it is possible to speculate on the sources. The results may be specu-
lative, but they are quite plausible, and conform with other findings in this study.
The state of the sources does not allow anything more positive than this.
We shall begin with a number of clues. The survey appearing in Sextus, II. 60–
61 can certainly not be attributed to Critolaus since it includes philosophers who
lived after him. The context will help to narrow the field down somewhat. The sur-
vey concludes with tò piXanón, and the subsequent discussion is typically Aca-
demic, clearly reflecting the Academic-Stoic internal debate pertaining to episte-
mology. The opening declaration of §61, however, pertained to tò peı́Xein. What
might be the significance of the transition from tò peı́Xein to tò piXanón?
Here is a tentative suggestion. In the first stage of the internal debate, Critolaus
attacked the Stoics with the aid of their own definition of art. When attacking the
second part through the weak link, the end, he prefaced the attack with a list of phi-
losophers designed to make the Stoic accept that the end of rhetoric was persuasion.
The survey included at least Plato and Aristotle.104 Following the survey came the
Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument, in which it was claimed that the orator
104 I shall be arguing that not only were the Stoics a later addition, but that Xenocrates was in
all likelihood a modification of the original Isocrates; cf. pp.165–167 below.
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does not always attain his end, persuasion (Sextus, II. 13–15).105 In the second stage
of the debate, Charmadas uses this survey, but adds to it other philosophers and con-
verts it to a consideration of the Academic concept tò piXanón,106 applying a liberal
helping of Stoic terminology (Sextus, II. 60–71). Some support for this hypothesis
is to be found in the surveys themselves.
The surveys’ introductions and contexts suffice to show that the ultimate source
is Critolaus. His name appears explicitly in Sextus, II. 12, next to the opinion of Pla-
to. The context is the criticism of rhetoric in §§10–19, following the survey in §§2–
9. Yet, more precisely, §§10–12 deal with the first part of the Stoic definition, the
sústvma. This is no problem since Critolaus attacked both parts of the definition,
the sústvma and the téloß.107 Both attacks are based on Plato, but the connection
between Plato and Critolaus appears only in the context of the first half of the defi-
nition.108 The supplementary téloß argument at §§13–19 does not mention Plato or
Critolaus, even though it is influenced by at least the latter, since this is what we
have already claimed to be the later, relaxed version, used by Charmadas.109
A comparison of Sextus, II. 61–62 with Quintilian, II. ch. 15 also ties Critolaus
to this list. Both passages use the term dúnamiß / vis, and we shall see that this is the
essence of the argument, even if Quintilian confuses the issue. We have already
considered the general structure of chapter 15,110 but we must now go into parts of
it in some detail.
As already remarked in our earlier outline, Quintilian lists five opinions in §2
which he believes allow the entry of the bad man into rhetoric. So far as we are con-
cerned, these are five non-Stoic opinions, and they are as follows:
a) vis (dúnamiß)111
b) scientia, sed non virtus
c) usus (tribv́)112
105 Cf. §6.3 above.
106 See Brittain (2001) 324 n.53.
107 In the chapter on the Benefit Argument, §§5.4.1–5.4.2 above, we attributed to Critolaus the
Rhetoric as Fraud Argument (part of the Falsa Argument) and the Harm argument (part of the Bene-
fit Argument). These two arguments also attack the same elements of the definition, the sústvma
and the téloß, or rather the téloß eu crvston. Both arguments were grounded on the charge of
yeudṽ Xewrv́mata, which led to the later conflation of the two arguments (Sextus, II. 10–12). The
téloß element was thereby robbed of its argument, and was provided with a new one in §§13–19.
Comparing that argument with the present one, it now appears that Critolaus treated the two parts of
téloß eu crvston separately, in the End Argument and the Benefit Argument respectively.
108 Or more accurately, in the context of the harm caused by rhetoric. See last note.
109 See the discussion on the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument, p.143 and n.57
above.
110 See pp.146–150 above.
111 Quintilian himself provides the Greek original term; cf. §3.
112 Cf. §23.
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d) ars, sed a scientia et virtute diiuncta
e) pravitas artis, id est kakotecnı́a
In the discussion up to §32, Quintilian attempts to discuss all five of these opinions,
attributing them, so far as possible, to various philosophers. He typically pays some
opinions more attention than he does others, but in general his discussion may be di-
vided according to these five opinions. The second opinion, scientia, sed non virtus,
appears in §19, and is attributed to the Peripatetic, Ariston. The fourth opinion, ars,
sed a scientia et virtute diiuncta, appears in §21,113 and is attributed to Theodorus
of Gadara. The third opinion, usus, appears out of order at §23 and is attributed to
Critolaus. The fifth opinion, ars pravitas, id est kakotecnı́a, also appears in §23
(ars fallendi) where it is attributed to Athenaeus.
The attributions of Quintilian are unreliable, to say the least, and his presentation of
the opinions themselves should also be treated with caution.114 Quintilian, however,
must be understood if we wish to make progress. Of all the opinions, it is the first,
vis, which receives no personal attribution. This is somewhat strange since it takes
up a good proportion of the discussion, with the discussion of the second opinion
beginning only in §19. Even stranger is Quintilian’s view of the five opinions (II.
15. 3):
hi fere aut in persuadendo aut in dicendo apte ad persuadendum posi-
tum orandi munus sunt arbitrati: id enim fieri potest ab eo quoque, qui
vir bonus non sit.
The common denominator to the five opinions is in his view persuasion. Why per-
suasion is regarded as the element which would allow the bad man into rhetoric
does not concern us here. We are interested in something else entirely. Following
this common denominator, Quintilian continues, est igitur frequentissimus finis
‘rhetoricen esse vim persuadendi.’ The Greek behind the vis is dúnamiß, as we know
from Quintilian himself later in the paragraph. We may understand, therefore, that
the most frequent definition is dúnamiß toũ peı́Xein, and from here until §19, Quinti-
lian discusses persuasion, instead of discussing the first opinion, the vis. The solu-
113 Quintilian even gives this opinion an introductory sentence: ut iam ad eos veniamus, qui ar-
tem quidem esse eam, sed non virtutem putaverunt.
114 To take but one example, kakotecnı́a is how Critolaus calls rhetoric, but Quintilian attri-
butes it to Athenaeus, particularly astonishing since Athenaeus is an orator; it should also be noted
that ars fallendi is not necesssarily pravitas artis. We have testimonia showing that rhetors were
proud of their ability to deceive by means of their art (Sextus, II. 38), but would not have called their
art kakotecnı́a. Furthermore, the position of the name Critolaus just before this opinion allows the
suspicion that he was linked with this term in the original source, where he may well have been ac-
credited with a number of epithets for rhetoric, including usus which is what is attributed to him
here (see p.82 above). On the problem of the attribution of the definition to Athenaeus and for a
number of possible solutions see RW (2006) 258–259.
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tion is obvious. Quintilian is emphasizing one aspect of dúnamiß toũ peı́Xein / vis
persuadendi, that rhetoric is claimed to be vis tantum (§2), and not a técnv or
epistv́mv.
What we have, therefore, is a discussion concerning the end, apparently begin-
ning with the most frequent definition of rhetoric as a power of persuasion, but actu-
ally with the most frequently given end of rhetoric, tò peı́Xein. Quintilian may have
been a little confused by the Latin term finis which, as we have already seen, means
both “end” and “definition”.115 Here again are two passages we have already com-
pared:
Quintilian, II. 15. 2
hi fere aut in persuadendo aut in dicendo apte ad persuadendum posi-
tum orandi munus sunt arbitrati. . . est igitur frequentissimus finis ‘rhet-
oricen esse vim persuadendi’.
Sextus, II. 61
oı mèn ou n pleı̃stoi kaì carı́enteß e scaton oiontai tṽß r vtorikṽß e r-
gon einai tò peı́Xein.
It seems that Quintilian himself created the confusion by referring to the orandi mu-
nus (the end of speaking) as the most frequent finis and continuing as if finis were a
definition, albeit a definition of the end, in that the task of rhetoric is to persuade. In
fact, this definition, with qualification, is given in another part of Sextus, II. 61:
kaì gàr oı perì tòn Plátwna eiß toũto a pidónteß dúnamin eirv́kasin
au tv̀n toũ dià lógwn peı́Xein.
It is now possible for us to determine Quintilian’s sources. True to his concerns, he
has divided the philosophers according to the criterion of allowing the bad man ac-
cess to rhetoric. His source, however, was the same as the one used by Sextus, II.
61–62, a source which was based on that list by Critolaus which assembled the opi-
nions of philosophers who regarded persuasion as the end of rhetoric. Quintilian
turns this general claim that rhetoric is the vis persuadendi into the first view in his
list of five non-Stoic views. Having listed them, he returns to discuss the first view
but regards it as a discussion of what is common to all five views, persuadere.
Critolaus is not the only one to use a survey of the views of previous philoso-
phers. We have already noted in our examination of Sextus, II. 61–62 that there are
hints in the text to a later Academic adaptation of the list. A comparison of all three
passages will reveal that the survey was indeed made use of on more than one occa-
sion.
The survey in Sextus, II. 61–62 presents the latest version of the three, since it
mentions Ariston the Peripatetic and other orators later than Critolaus, but it has a
115 See p.131 and nn.12–13 above.
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logical structure which makes it the preferred choice for beginning the comparison.
The three philosophers beginning the list parallel the three named philosophers be-
ginning the list in Sextus, II. 2–9 (where the Stoics have been added to Xenocrates
in §6).116 These three are none other than Plato, Xenocrates and Aristotle. The defi-
nition attributed to Plato is that rhetoric is dúnamiß toũ dià lógwn peı́Xein. This is a
strange definition for two reasons. Firstly, Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias does not call
rhetoric a dúnamiß.117 Secondly, the definition attributed to Xenocrates, peiXoũß
dvmiourgóß, would suit Plato better, and it is indeed attributed to Plato in Sextus, II.
2. The use of dúnamiß in the first definition might well be to do with the point Crito-
laus wanted to make in his argument, that oı perì Plátwna (the followers of Plato,
such as Xenocrates and Aristotle)118 treated rhetoric as a means of persuasion,
backed up by specific examples from these philosophers (Xenocrates, Aristotle, to
whom are added Ariston, Hermagoras, Athenaeus and Isocrates).
Staying with our first three philosophers in §§61–62, there remain two problems.
What would have been the definition of Xenocrates, and how to explain the position
of Isocrates? The first question is difficult to answer. Xenocrates’ defnition should
not be the one in §60, since this is Plato’s, nor should it be the one in the parallel
passage, §6, attributed to him and to the Stoics, since the definition there –
epistv́mv toũ eu légein – is clearly Stoic only, and was imported together with the
reference to the Stoics. The second question is even more difficult to answer. Iso-
crates does not appear at all in §§2–9; in Quintilian he actually heads the list; here,
in Sextus, II. 62, he appears out of chronological order at the end of the list. What
could explain this puzzle?
Isocrates seems in Sextus, II. 62 to have been left without a place and conse-
quently tacked on to the end. Sextus or his source would have realized by the end of
the list that Isocrates should have appeared, but because his natural position has
been taken, he is added to the end. That he is added at all suggests that Sextus or his
source is aware that Isocrates is an important element in the list, as indeed his ap-
pearance at the beginning of the list in Quintilian confirms. Thus it would seem that
the rightful place of Isocrates in the list has been taken by someone else. By a pro-
cess of elimination, this person is Xenocrates. As it happens, Xenocrates does not
appear in Quintilian’s list, while his place in Sextus, II. 2–9 is very strange, as we
have already seen.119 Thus in Quintilian Xenocrates does not appear while Isocrates
does, at the head of the list, and in Sextus, II. 2–9, Isocrates does not appear. In Sex-
116 See p.157 above.
117 Socrates does ask what the dúnamiß of rhetoric might be (456a5ff.), which is not the same
thing.
118 The formula “oı perì X” in doxographies often means no more than “X” himself, but in the
present instance, where Sextus, II. 2 attributes one definition to Plato himself, the difference in for-
mulation here seems to be significant, pointing literally at “those around Plato”; cf. the same formu-
lation in II. 12. Moreover, the similarity between the formulas may point to Critolaos.
119 See pp.156–157 above.
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tus, II. 61–62, both appear, but Xenocrates is extremely problematic and Isocrates
has been tacked on to the end of the list.
The definitions attributed to Xenocrates in the two passages where he appears re-
veal an interesting detail. In Quintilian, the definition of rhetoric attributed to Xeno-
crates is peiXoũß dvmiourgóß. This certainly is not the definition of Xenocrates, and
even Quintilian casts doubt upon the attribution, albeit not for our reasons. As we
have seen, the definition is to be attributed to Plato, and Plato is indeed to be found
in close proximity.120 What happened here is simple and in one way parallels what
happened in Sextus, II. 61–62. The source refers to dúnamiß toũ peı́Xein / vis persua-
dendi, which is actually the conclusion Critolaus arrives at from his survey, but
which he attributes to the followers of Plato,121 so that the definition of Plato,
peiXoũß dvmiourgóß is attributed to the next in the list – in Quintilian, to Isocrates,
and in Sextus, II. 61–62, to Xenocrates.
The definition attributed to Isocrates in Sextus, II. 62 is epistv́mv peiXoũß. The
word epistv́mv is common to Isocrates here, and to Xenocrates in the earlier list
(Sextus, II. 6). In order to understand the reason for the switch, and in order to reject
what might have seemed to be a more plausible explanation, let us take a look at
Quintilian, II. 15. 19, where we meet the definition of Ariston the Peripatetic, the
second of the five opinions Quintilian had listed in II. 15. 2 – quidam scientia, sed
non virtus. The distinction between scientia and virtus is developed in §19:
. . . quorum fuit Ariston, Critolai Peripatetici discipulus, cuius hic finis
est: ‘scientia videndi et agendi in quaestionibus civilibus per orationem
popularis persuasionis’. hic scientiam, quia Peripateticus est, non ut
Stoici virtutis loco ponit . . .
§19 marks the transition from Plato to the next opinion to be dealt with, and in this
it parallels Sextus, II. 6, where after Plato we find Xenocrates.122 One might have
concluded from this that Ariston was replaced by Xenocrates. After all, the addition
of the Stoics is connected to these two philosophers because of the term epistv́mv /
scientia. However, this speculation is to be rejected, for a number of reasons. The
first is the observation that Ariston does not sit well chronologically between Plato
120 See also RW (ibid.) 235 s.v.
121 So Sextus, II. 61–62, oı perì Plátwna, while in Quintilian it is presented as a finis frequen-
tissimus.
122 The two places can be proved to be parallels as follows. We have mentioned that only in
§19 does Quintilian turn from Plato and the vis to discuss the second of the five opinions listed in
§2. Quintilian typically weaves into the discussion other philosophers, thereby requiring the name
of Plato to be mentioned three times, whenever he returns to the main discussion. At the end of the
discussion concerning Plato (according to our analysis), we read: cui Socrates persuadendi, non
docendi concedit facultatem, clearly echoing Sextus, II. 5: a ll’ oÇ tan sùn toútoiß mv̀ didaskalikv́n,
wÇ sper gewmetrı́a, a llà peistikv̀n poiṽtai tv̀n peiXẃ. The distinction between persuasion and
teaching is made in Plato’s Gorgias 454c7ff.
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and Aristotle (as in Sextus, II. 2–9). Secondly, Ariston and Xenocrates are not easily
confused phonetically. Thirdly, this solution would not explain the addition of the
Stoics to Xenocrates in Sextus, II. 2–9, especially since their definition has nothing
to do with persuasion, yet we had established that the source of the survey was in-
tended to provide the base for the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument.
Now let us examine the advantages of the other alternative, that the person re-
placed by Xenocrates was Isocrates. Firstly, the names sound very similar. Sec-
ondly, Isocrates does actually appear immediately after Plato in Quintilian’s list.123
Thirdly, the fact that Isocrates appears at the end of the list in Sextus, II. 61–62 indi-
cates that his original position was immediately after Plato (instead of Xenocrates,
of course). Were we to reinstate Xenocrates in Sextus, II. 2–9 as well, the three pas-
sages would be very similar. Isocrates’ definition of rhetoric as epistv́mv peiXoũß
would fit very well in the general context of the survey dealing with tò peı́Xein.124
Isocrates would fit the declaration in §1, tàß epifanestátaß eiß toũto tw̃n filo-
sófwn a podóseiß. He might well be considered a philosopher; in his speeches he
insists on having his educational system recognized as philosophy.
While it now seems clear that Isocrates was replaced by Xenocrates, we cannot
be certain why it happened. It could be as simple as an error based on the similarity
of the sound of these names, but this seems too simple, although it might have been
one element. A comparison between the two Sextus parallels suggests an alternative
or additional explanation. Their structures differ on a very interesting point. In §1,
Sextus promises to deal with the definitions of the philosophers, while the formula-
tion in §61–62 is less specific: oı mèn ou n pleı̃stoi kaì carı́enteß. This is justified,
since the list includes rhetors such as Hermagoras and Athenaeus. It seems to me
that Isocrates was replaced in the earlier list by someone who took the opening de-
claration seriously, did not take Isocrates seriously as a philosopher, and possibly
assumed that Isocrates was a mistake for the well-known philosopher, Xenocrates,
who would follow Plato naturally, having been one of his pupils, as was the third
name in the list, Aristotle. Isocrates found his way back into the second list, being
added at the end of it.
It remains to understand the position of Ariston, his appearance in Quintilian, II.
15. 19, and Sextus, II. 6. It must of course be recalled that Ariston was a pupil of
Critolaus. If Critolaus is the instigator of the survey, the mention of Ariston would
indicate a later adaptation of that survey. We have already speculated that the ver-
sion in Sextus, II. 61–62 originated with Charmadas, both because of the Academic
tone of the argument beginning in §63, and because of the addition of three names
123 This of course is based on our earlier analysis of the first part of chapter 15; see pp.165–166
above.
124 His use of epistv́mv is not surprising since the term can have many meanings; cf. Cope
(1867) 22–23.
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dating to the end of the second century B.C.E. These names, added by Charmadas,
began with Ariston.
Ariston was a Peripatetic about whom we know only a little. In Wehrli’s collec-
tion of fragments,125 only four fragments are attributed to him, of which the two
main ones are taken from our sources.126 What we do know about him is that he
was influenced by the Stoa and that he admired rhetoric despite the opposite inclina-
tions of his teacher. His definition of rhetoric in Quintilian, II. 15. 19 is positive,
treating rhetoric as a scientia,127 but of course Quintilian needs to point out that it is
not in the Stoic sense. Ariston may have been one of the reasons why the attack on
rhetoric shifted away from the Peripatetics and was later taken up by the Aca-
demics,128 with Charmadas at their head. Ariston may be seen as the link between
the first stage with Critolaus, and the second stage with Charmadas, all reference to
Ariston being in the second stage.
We are now in a position to reconstruct the development of the survey from one
stage to the other. We are aiming at consistency and plausibility so far as that is pos-
sible with the sources at our disposal. None of our sources reflects any one stage co-
herently.
In the first stage, Critolaus attacked the Stoics, using their own definition of art
against them. With his claim that rhetoric comprised yeudṽ Xewrv́mata, he could re-
fer them to both parts of the Stoic definition of art to prove that rhetoric was not an
art. Having dealt with the first half (rhetoric has no sústvma), he turned to the sec-
ond half (the téloß), where he first attacked the Stoic end, showing that speaking
well was not something beyond the activity of rhetoric itself. He then continued
with a survey of philosophers (he was attacking only the Stoics, not the rhetors)
who regarded the end of rhetoric to be persuasion, with a view to obliging the Stoics
to adopt what they should have considered as the true end of rhetoric, in order for
him to refute that as well. His list of philosophers included Plato, Isocrates, and
Aristotle. He demonstrated, using the Gorgias, that Plato regarded rhetoric to be
peiXoũß dvmiourgòß dià lógwn (the qualification “through logoi” being an attempt
to reach an exclusive end for rhetoric).
In the second stage of the debate, Charmadas added Ariston, Hermagoras and
Athenaeus to the list. His choice of orators suggests that he no longer restricted this
125 Wehrli, (1944) 53–54; see also RW (2006) 252 s.v.; Brittain (2001) 307–308 and n.21.
126 The other two fragments are taken from Philodemus, and their poor state does not allow us
to learn much about the philosopher. It is not surprising that most of Wehrli’s comments (ibid., see
last note) focus on distinguishing this Ariston from Ariston of Chios.
127 Quintilian’s argument that this is not in the Stoic sense because Ariston was a Peripatetic
does not hold water. It is necessary for Quintilian to distinguish Ariston from the Stoics, since it is
their definition which he will adopt later on.
128 Brittain (ibid.) 308 suggests only that Ariston is returning to an Aristotelian orthodoxy; see
also RW (2006) 252: “Ariston’s attitude to rhetoric was an ambiguous one.”
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attack to the Stoics, but aimed it at the rhetors as well. Against the Stoics, he used
this survey to set up tò piXanón, and exploited Stoic epistemology.129
6.5. Lucian
This reconstruction of the End Argument is based almost entirely on Sextus and
Quintilian, but some of it can be corroborated by Lucian. That his De Parasito
draws heavily from the debate between philosophy and rhetoric has been known for
over a century. Radermacher was the first to draw attention to this text in this con-
text, and Sudhaus elaborated a little. Yet Lucian has not be used as a source for re-
constructing the arguments of the debate. He has simply been noted as an author in-
fluenced by the debate.130 It is my contention that the text of Lucian may be used to
expose arguments and even their sources.
Our identification of Critolaus as the source for the Exclusivity of Attaining the
End Argument used the survey containing the Exclusivity of the End Argument, and
relied on a number of links which still require some confirmation in order to make
the thesis as a whole acceptable. The first and most important of these links is the
term dúnamiß which we have identified as the description used by Critolaus as the
author of the survey, rather than as an opinion of one of the philosophers appearing
in the survey. That is, we have speculated that Critolaus concluded that rhetoric is a
dúnamiß from all the opinions gathered in his survey regarding persuasion as the end
of rhetoric. The second link to consider is the connection between this survey and
the end. The third link is of course the identification of Critolaus with the argument.
We have so far based these links on linguistic connections, names appearing in
proximity to arguments, the development of arguments, and so. Lucian’s De Parasi-
to131 provides all three links neatly bound up together. The composition represents a
conversation between Simon and Tichiades, the former of whom is a parasite who
attempts to convince the latter that parasiticism is an art. Already near the beginning
of the conversation Simon adduces the definition of art (4. 146. 13–15):
129 The text reflecting Charmadas’ version is Sextus, II. 61–62, where the Exclusivity of the
End Argument does not appear at all. Critolaus had already completed this task, with Plato’s defini-
tion, dúnamiß toũ dià lógwn peı́Xein.
130 Sudhaus (Supplementum) xxviii: “Die ganze Polemik jener Tage mit ihrer marktschrieri-
schen Übertreibung und Lächerlichkeit spiegelt sich in dieser Schrift. . .”; Hubbell (1920) 368: “So
well known was the general form of argument employed that as Radermacher acutely observed, Lu-
cian could base one of his richest parodies – Perì parası́tou – on the old lines of the discussion
whether rhetoric was an art.”
131 I have used the Oxford edition edited by Macleod (1974). Radermacher and Sudhaus used a
text I have been unable to identify, but which may have been the one edited by Carl Jacobitz in the
middle of the 19th. century. I shall refer to Lucian by section number, page number, and number of
the line(s) on that page.
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técnv estı́n. . .132 sústvma e k katalv́yewn suggegumnasménwn próß
ti téloß eu crvston tw̃ bı́w .
This definition is almost identical to the one in Sextus, II. 10. Once again, the proof
or refutation that something is an art uses the Stoic definition of art as the criterion.
By 7. 148. 21–23, Simon will have proved that parasiticism is an art, using various
elements of the definition. Firstly, parasiticism is sústvma e k katalv́yewn (4. 147.
4 – 5. 148. 13). Secondly, there comes a proof that the katálvyiß of parasiticism is
suggegumnasménv (6. 148. 14–20). Finally comes a proof that parasiticism is bene-
ficial to life (7. 148. 21–23). The parallel with the argument in Sextus, II. 11 ff. is al-
most perfect.133
It is already very clear that Lucian is well versed in the debate between the philo-
sophers and the rhetors. Radermacher and Sudhaus present his familiarity with the
debate as of a general nature which any educated man such as Lucian would have;
the debate, after all, was at its height centuries earlier. It seems to me, however, that
Lucian composed his work with sources for the debate in front of him. A general
education, or the cultural atmosphere of the time, would not be able to explain the
detail in his work, and the accuracy in the order of presentation, maintained almost
until the end of the parody. Lucian, therefore, may be seen as an additional source
of information about the debate, to help us analyse, supplement, corroborate and
even discover sources. The detail Lucian provides, where it is clearly not parody,
such as the very notion of parasiticism, may be understood as taken from his sources
on the debate over rhetoric.
Following his proof of the art of parasiticism, Simon now turns to rejecting all
other descriptions of parasiticism (7. 148. 24 – 8. 150. 10). There are actually two
alternatives to the title of técnv, being dúnamiß and a tecnı́a. If these are rejected,
then we return to the formula of the Stoic definition of art, as indeed happens. Thus
parasiticism is proved both positively and negatively to be an art. The work goes on
to define parasiticism (9. 150. 11–15), but that is beyond the scope of our enquiry.
From that part that we have outlined so far it is possible to corroborate/prove that
Critolaus was the source for the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument, that he
was connected with the survey of philosophers, and with the End Argument as a
whole. Lucian also throws light on the thinking of Critolaus in the wider context of
the connection between téloß and dúnamiß.
The Exclusivity of the End is adduced in Sextus, II. 2–9 when the criticism is
raised that beauty can persuade even though it is not to do with rhetoric. Again, in
132 I have omitted the words not pertaining to the definition itself: w ß e gẁ diamnvmoneúw so-
foũ tinoß a koúsaß. The definition is Stoic, and the wise man must surely refer to the Stoic sage.
133 Apart from the suggegumnasménv as a separate part, and a discussion of it in the normal,
non-Stoic sense of mere exercise, clearly for the purposes of parody and entertainment.
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Quintilian, II. 15. 6–9, beauty appears in the list of things which persuade but do not
have anything to do with rhetoric. We speculated that these parallels were part of a
general survey aimed at demonstrating that the end of rhetoric is persuasion and that
this, therefore, was only a dúnamiß (Sextus, II. 61). Lucian has this stated explicitly.
In 8. 149. 1–3, Simon discusses what we have called the Exclusivity of the End.
According to his argument, parasiticism is not the same as beauty or strength. This
is similar to our parallels,134 but now he adds an important remark: wÇ ste técnvn
mèn mv̀ dokeı̃n au tv́n, dúnamin dé tina toiaútvn. That there were those who called
rhetoric an art, and others who called it a power, is of course nothing new, however,
but this sentence does allow us to tie the Exclusivity of the End Argument to
dúnamiß.135 One of the main reasons for calling rhetoric a dúnamiß is its problematic
end. Lucian’s example, beauty, reveals how dúnamiß is intended to be understood in
this context. The argument runs as follows. The fact that rhetoric has an end which
it shares with other things demonstrates that it is not an art, since an art has an end
which is exclusively its own and which it attains in every case or in most cases.
Beauty, strength, and indeed the ability to speak well (which rhetoric is claimed to
be) are no more than dunámeiß, and as such may or may not attain their ends.
It is now also possible to see in a wider context the connection between a com-
mon end and the fact that it does not always attain its end. Art is supposed to be a
system or method designed to attain a certain end, and as such should always or
nearly always attain that end. The best test of an art is whether that end can be ob-
tained only by that art and by nothing else. If rhetoric has an end in common with
other occupations, then it is not the only way to persuade, and it is therefore not an
art. It is merely a dúnamiß just like beauty or strength. None of these forms of per-
suasion can guarantee that the end will be attained, because they are not arts.
The other term Simon refutes as an epithet of rhetoric is a tecnı́a (8. 149. 5–8).
The use of this term to characterize rhetoric is typical of Critolaus, for which we
have sufficient evidence already.136 What is interesting is that the term appears here
in connection with the end: if parasiticism was an a tecnı́a, it would not be able to
attain its end. The term a tecnı́a means a lack of system.137 This is quite similar to
dúnamiß in the previous section, since this too has no system. Common to both is
the inability to guarantee attaining the end. Lucian seems here to be following Crito-
laus’ attack on the end of rhetoric. Critolaus achieved his objective by stating that
134 Strength does not appear as an example in our other sources, while pleasure and wealth do
not appear in Lucian. Beauty is the only characteristic in common, exemplified by Phryne. Each
author may use examples at his discretion. Quintilian, II. 15. 6–9 even adds Roman examples.
135 We have of course already seen vis / dúnamiß in Quintilian, II. 15. 2–4 and in Sextus, II. 61,
but the direct connection between the non-rhetorical persuasive elements such as beauty and the vis
is Lucian’s contribution.
136 See e.g., Philod. II. 102 fr. VII (= Wehrli, fr. 29).
137 Cf. e.g., Quintilian, II. 20. 2.
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persuasion was the end of rhetoric and then showing that rhetoric did not always at-
tain this end; thus rhetoric was merely a dúnamiß and so far from técnv that it was
actually a tecnı́a. Quintilian, II. 17. 22–25 and Sextus, II. 13–15 provide us with an
example of a counter example, namely, navigation, which becomes a part of the at-
tack in the relaxed version in the second stage of the debate (Sextus). Simon’s first
argument proving that parasiticism is not a tecnı́a is taken from navigation. I add
Quintilian for contrast and comparison:
Lucian, 8. 149. 6–8
fére gár, ei e pitréyeiaß sù seautw̃ naũn e n XaláttU kaì ceimw̃ni mv̀
epistámenoß kubernãn, swXeı́vß a n;
Quintilian, II. 17. 24
nam et gubernator vult salva nave in portum pervenire: si tamen tem-
pestate fuerit abreptus. . .
In conclusion, Lucian connects the terms a tecnı́a and dúnamiß with the téloß, and
thereby completes the picture. The term a tecnı́a reveals that Critolaus is the source
for the argument, and the significance of dúnamiß is fully revealed only here. The in-
ternal logic of the argument is thus made clear.138
6.6. Conclusion
The End Argument comprises two arguments, the Exclusivity of the End, and the
Exclusivity of Attaining the End.
The Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument was used both against the rhetors
and against the Stoics, and appears at both stages of the debate.
At the first stage of the external debate, Critolaus (so it seems) claimed that since
rhetoric does not always attain its end (to persuade), it is not an art. The rhetors re-
plied that many arts would need to lose the title of art according to this criterion,
such as navigation and medicine, since they too fail to attain their end in every case.
At the second stage, Charmadas (so it appears) relaxes the demand for an art to at-
138 An obvious question to ask is whether Lucian had access to a work of Critolaus, or of his
pupil Ariston, or of Charmadas. Unfortunately, there is no way of answering this question with any
degree of plausibility. In the words of Sudhaus (1892) xxvii-xxviii: “Naturgemäß veranlaßte der
Kampfruf ‘hie Rhetorik’ ‘hie Philosophie’ mit seinen vielfachen Nuancierungen, mit den Versuchen
beides zu verbinden oder daß eine unterzuordnen, eine Reihe von Programmschriften, direkt zum
Werben bestimmt. . . Alle diese Tageslitteratur hat nun, wie billig, die Zeit Verschlungen, und nur
der Schalk ist übrig geblieben, Lukianoũ Perì parası́tou, oÇ ti técnv v parasitikv́.” Did Lucian
himself make use of one of these ‘Programmschriften’?
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tain its end in every case, and is satisfied with it attaining its end in most cases. Yet
rhetoric cannot meet even this criterion. The rhetors reply that even when an orator
loses more than he wins, he still has a greater proportion of successes than a non-
orator.
At the first stage of the internal debate, Critolaus attacks the Stoics using the
Stoic definition of art which requires the presence of an end. Critolaus cannot, how-
ever, use the Exclusivity of Attaining the End Argument against the Stoic end of
rhetoric, since this is speaking well, and is always present in the activity of rhetoric.
He therefore attempts to prise the Stoics away from their end of rhetoric (which he
criticizes in any case as not an end, precisely because it is not outside the activity of
rhetoric), by presenting a survey of philosophers, Plato, Isocrates and Aristotle, who
regarded the end of rhetoric to be persuasion. The Stoics, who regarded themselves
as a link in the philosophical tradition, were thereby intended to feel obliged to re-
turn to the conventional end of rhetoric. Whether the Stoics chose to present the end
of rhetoric as speaking well or as persuasion, Critolaus could demonstrate that
rhetoric was not an art according to their own definition of art. At the second stage
of the internal debate, Charmadas added three more names to the list, Ariston the
Peripatetic, and the rhetors Hermagoras and Athenaeus, probably because he used
the argument in the external debate. In the internal debate, he based on this survey
an attack pertaining to tò piXanón and its ramifications.
The Exclusivity of the End Argument seems to have originated in the end of
rhetoric to be found in Plato’s Gorgias, at the transition between peiXoũß
dvmiourgóß and the addition dià lógwn. Critolaus used this definition in his survey
as part of his attempt to force the Stoics to accept persuasion as the end of rhetoric.
At the second stage of the debate, this definition took on a life of its own and be-
came an independent argument. In the final stage, a second leg was added to the ar-
gument: the orator, having attained persuasion, still expects more from his per-
suaded audience; thus, not only is persuasion not exclusive to rhetoric, but it is not
even the end of rhetoric but rather the means to an end.
The wider context for the criticism of Critolaus gives the End Argument its full
significance (the same may be said for the other arguments as well). Critolaus de-
nies rhetoric the title of técnv and claims instead that it is a dúnamiß. This term is
general, and Critolaus presents a long list of epithets for rhetoric, each denoting the
dúnamiß with regard to one or other of the weaknesses in rhetoric. For example, the
fact that rhetoric harms led Critolaus to conclude that the dúnamiß is so far from
being a técnv (conventionally always considered beneficial) that it should be
viewed as a kakotecnı́a.139 The dúnamiß is so far from being a técnv (lacking the
system required to guarantee attaining its end in every case) that it should be viewed
as an a tecnı́a. These two attacks – the End and Benefit Arguments – are closely
139 See chapter 5 above on the Benefit Argument.
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connected and based on the two components of the téloß eu crvston, appearing in
the second half of the Stoic definition of art. These are in addition to the Falsa Ar-
gument based on the sústvma appearing in the first half of the definition.
Despite the various reconstructions and detailed parallels, it is clear that great
chunks of the puzzle still remain in the dark; alternatives may be offered for each
part that we have explained. The advantage of the present reconstruction, however,
is that it has taken into account all of the available evidence and has attempted to
make one consistent hypothesis to explain all the phenomena in the various sources.
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7. The Materia Argument
One of the basic requirements of an art qua art is that it should have a materia
(uÇ lv). The artisan has a superior knowledge, or an understanding, of the materia of
his art, which is lacking to others dabbling in the same field.1 If someone has no ex-
clusive field, or at least a field which is more his than any other’s,2 he is no artisan.
It is his mastery of a definite field which allows the artisan to promise the attain-
ment of its end, at least with a higher degree of certainty than others, and to be bene-
ficial when attaining it. Thus we see that the end and benefit of an art are dependent
on the materia of the art; if the materia cannot be determined, or is not exclusive to
that art, then doubt must be cast on the art’s end and benefit, and indeed on it’s
being an art.
7.1. The Sources
The two main sourcs for the Materia Argument are once again Quintilian and Sex-
tus. In both sources, the Materia Argument is well defined and formally presented.
The passages are Sextus, II. 48–59, and Quintilian, II. ch. 21, the final chapter of the
book in which metarhetoric is dealt with. There are a few other passages in Quinti-
lian where the materia is touched upon, such as II. 17. 17, which refers to the main
discussion, and II. 15. 15–23. In addition to these two main sources, there are sev-
eral others we shall use during the course of the discussion, the most important of
these being Philodemus.
Before examining the sources themselves, we shall need to discuss a point of
methodology. The materia is more difficult to study than the other issues already
examined. The methodology used during the previous analyses was based almost
entirely on a comparison of Sextus with Quintilian, necessitated by the state of our
sources. It was impossible to ignore the fact that on every issue, Sextus and Quinti-
lian had drawn on common sources, or at least sources deriving from an ultimate
1 Roochnik (1996) 17–88 (the first part of his book) attempts to construct various criteria for art,
beginning from Homer and ending with Isocrates. It is no surprise that the first criterion he desig-
nates is the materia (20): “1. Techne is knowledge of a specific field: its subject matter is determi-
nate. The knowledge of the tekton, to cite the key example, is restricted to working in wood: the
tekton does not know how to forge metal.” The importance of this criterion had already been noted
by Heinimann (1961) 106.
2 Versions of the argument allow this option, as we shall see during the course of the discussion.
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common source. The differences as much as the similarities between the parallels
allowed us to reconstruct the original arguments so far as that was possible. There
were of course problems arising from the textual transmission, and from the inter-
pretation and use of the sources at the hands of Sextus and Quintilian, but these
could to some extent be accounted for in the analysis.
On the subject of materia, the state of affairs is completely different and obvious
even at first glance. The two main sources, Sextus and Quintilian, present passages
on the materia which diverge so much from each other that there is hardly anything
in common at all. This said, however, the difference beween this topic and the pre-
vious topics should not surprise us. It is actually more surprising that our sources for
a two-stage double debate3 have not been more diverse so far, and that the sources
drawn on from the innumerable works written both during the debate and after it on
the problem of rhetoric as an art should have been so similar, perhaps from one of
several traditions.
The topic of materia also differs from the other topics in that no philosophers are
attributed with the arguments. This adversely affects not only our ability to identity
the instigator of the argument, but also our ability to reconstruct it. In our earlier
analyses, the identification of one or two sources, by name of philosopher or at least
by school, allowed us to pin down the various stages of development of the argu-
ments. The presentation of the materia topic is formal and yet totally lacking in at-
tributions. This absence, together with the confusion in argument, suggests that the
sources are at several removes from the original.
For all these reasons, the methodology will be different for the topic of materia.
Each text will be analysed alone since there are no parallels with which to make in-
telligent comparisons. The result will be less satisfactory conclusions than in the
previous analyses, speculations, and occasionally a clarification of a corrupt or con-
fused text. This is not much, but it is all that can be expected in the present state of
the sources.
7.2. Quintilian, II. ch. 15–21
Of the two main sources on materia, we have chosen to begin with Quintilian. The
reason for this is simple. Quintilian presents an argument relatively uncontaminated
by other issues. Where there are problems, they are normally associated with the
way Quintilian himself works with his sources.
Chapter 21 is entitled quae materia eius.4 The entire chapter does indeed deal
with materia. As already mentioned above, there are hardly any divergences from
the discussion of the materia. The chapter is focussed and has an internal logic, even
3 See pp.45; 54 above.
4 On these titles, see p.131 n.14 above.
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if it is not perfect. At the same time, there are various types of arguments, various
targets, and various subjects, all of which we shall attempt to reveal. Before turning
to this task, however, we would do well to consider the location of the chapter in
Quintilian’s work.
Chapter 21 concludes the second book, the last part of which – chapters 15–215 –
constitutes Quintilian’s metarhetorical discussion. The chapters appear to present
the various metarhetorical topics from most to least important in the study of rheto-
ric. The most important topic is the definition6 of rhetoric (15), followed by benefit
(16), the question whether rhetoric deserves the title of art (17), and so on; but how
are we to explain the location of materia at the very end of the discussion? Is it less
important than the question natura an doctrina plus ei conferatur (19)? It is highly
implausible that Quintilian only thought of materia at the last minute. Quintilian
plans his work in advance, and sets out his programme for all to see (Prooem.
21ff.). Quintilian certainly did not think lightly of the materia, as his own remark in
II. 17. 17 shows: prima iis argumentatio ex materia est. omnes enim artes aiunt ha-
bere materiam, quod est verum: rhetorices nullam esse propriam, quod esse falsum
in sequentibus probabo.7 What are we to make of this? Was there a special reason
why Quintilian postponed the materia to the end of the metarhetorical discussion?
In order to answer this question, we need to distinguish between the order of ar-
gument and the order of instruction or education. Both orders are connected with
metarhetoric, but there is a great difference between them. The order of instruction
is designed for pupils beginning their studies in the schools of rhetoric, and it
touches on metarhetoric. The order of argument concerns the arrangement of the ar-
guments raised against rhetoric in the external debate. The order of argument may
have been included in the order of instruction, as indeed the work of Quintilian him-
self exemplifies, but would have been found in other contexts as well, such as books
dedicated to the subject.8
Arguments were to be found in both orders, and there would have been some
overlap. I shall argue here that the chapters of the second half of the second book of
Quintilian reflect the order of instruction, while the arguments appearing in chapter
17 reflect the order of argument.
Chapters 15–17 clearly reflect the order in which Quintilian found the subjects in
his sources. At the beginning of chapter 15 we find the words ante omnia, at the be-
ginning of chapter 16 we find sequitur quaestio, and at the beginning of chapter 17,
5 RW (2006) xxxiv see the metarhetorical discussion beginning in Chapter 14, where the trans-
lation of r vtorikv́ into Latin is considered.
6 On the ambiguity of the term finis and its ramifications, cf. p.131 and nn.12–13 above.
7 Cf. two similar comments, 15. 15, 23.
8 Cf. e.g., the testimony of Antonius in Cic. De Oratore I. 94, who collected material on Char-
madas’ criticism of rhetoric. The Grillus may be considered a book dedicated to this subject.
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transeamus igitur ad eam quaestionem, quae sequitur.9 The other chapters do not
furnish such clues, suggesting that Quintilian was not working with a source posses-
sing such indications. What is certainly clear is that the source for chapters 15–17
did not regard materia as worthy of a place in the first three topics.
Chapter 17 itself, beginning with §15, passes over to a new source which sum-
marizes the various arguments against rhetoric. The list of names adduced in §15 is
impressive. Nearly all the schools of philosophy of that time are represented there.
They all said a great deal (multa), but Quintilian or his source abbreviate (§16): hi
complura dicunt, sed ex paucis locis ducta: itaque potentissimis eorum breviter oc-
curam, ne in infinitum quaestio evadat. Immediately after this appears the comment
about materia.10 In this order of argument, the materia takes first place and is con-
sidered the main issue.
This theory has one problem which needs to be solved, and that is the position of
benefit. It is difficult to believe that benefit would take second place to materia or
any other issue. Yet benefit is absent from chapter 17. Was benefit absent from the
original order of argument? Did the opponents of rhetoric in 17. 15 not turn their at-
tention to benefit?11 One might suggest that the Benefit Argument has already been
dealt with before the Materia Argument in the order of instruction, appearing as it
does in chapter 16, allowing the order of argument in chapter 17 to begin immedi-
ately with materia. That is, Quintilian allows himself to overlook benefit in the or-
der of argument. This response, however, does not stand up to criticism. We would
have expected the comment in 17. 17 to point to benefit as the prima argumentatio,
with a reference to the previous chapter.12
The solution seems to be that the opponents of rhetoric themselves split benefit
off from the rest of their arguments, precisely because of its importance and its
length.13 Once they had finished the Benefit Argument they could turn to the rest of
the arguments. The various summaries behaved in a similar way, dealing first with
the Benefit Argument in one unit, then summarizing the remaining arguments in an-
other unit.14
This conclusion is corroborated by Sextus, but we must first understand a funda-
mental difference between Quintilian and Sextus regarding the aims of their works.
Quintilian is writing in order to facilitate the teaching of rhetoric. He is writing for
9 At the beginning of chapter 17 we gain the clear impression of Quintilian reading his source
which seems to have gone on at some length on the subject of benefit, probably because of the
wealth of examples provided, and stopping at some point (hence the remark at the beginning of the
chapter), rolling up the scroll, and moving on to this chapter, an ars.
10 II. 17. 17: prima iis argumentatio ex materia est. etc.; see p.177 above.
11 Cf. Sextus, II. 20.
12 For a sample backward reference, see II. 20. 10.
13 Cf. Quintilian, II. 17. 1.
14 On the position of chapter 16, see the remark of RW (ibid.) 277: “. . . It also provides some re-
lief between the rather dry chapters 15 and 17.”
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rhetors, but ultimately with the pupils in mind, the rhetors’ source of income. Sextus
is writing a philosophical work designed to attack rhetoric, and he does not have pu-
pils in mind. His work, therefore, draws from the order of argument. Quintilian is
obliged to work with both orders, the order of argument and the order of instruction.
The discussion of materia in Sextus, II. 48–59 precedes the End Argument (60–71),
and is actually the first subject after the Benefit Argument.15 Something similar
happens in Quintilian. Chapter 16 is dedicated to benefit, and the next subject is of
course materia; but after the comment on materia, the next subject to be dealt with
is the end (17. 22 ff.).
To conclude, Sextus and Quintilian draw from a common source dealing with the
order of argument. This source distinguishes between the Benefit Argument and the
other arguments. The Benefit Argument is dealt with first. Of the group of other ar-
guments, the Materia Argument comes first.16 As for the order of instruction, bene-
fit comes first (Quintilian, II. 16), but materia is pushed to last place.
7.3. Quintilian, II. ch. 21
The first task is to understand the internal logic of this chapter, be it of Quintilian or
of his source. It may be divided essentially into two main parts. The first, §§1–6, in-
cludes four opinions regarding the materia of rhetoric (1–3) which differ from that
of Quintilian, followed by Quintilian’s opinion (4–6). The second part, §§7–23, in-
cludes a number of criticisms against Quintilian’s materia with some responses.17
Both parts included subsections which we shall consider now.





d) tota vita / ethice18
15 This is if we begin the order of argument from Sextus, II. 20, where Sextus begins to use a
new source which may be a parallel to Quintilian, II. 17. 15ff. The twenty previous sections in Sex-
tus deal with the Stoic definition of art and are from a different source.
16 The prima iis argumentio comment at Quintilian, II. 17. 17 makes this abundantly clear, but
Sextus also reveals this to be so. A summary of the discussion on benefit is formulated as a conclu-
sion rather than as one of many arguments; it may be contrasted with the final part of the Materia
Argument in §60. The Materia Argument is placed explicitly after the Benefit Argument (metà
toũto).
17 §24 concludes the chapter. This section is an appendix distinguishing materia from the in-
strumentum. The discussion here does not deal directly with the debate over materia, and therefore
is not included in my division of the chapter.
18 The last two opinions are to be considered together since they appear to reflect an internal di-
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Quintilian notes that apud Platonem Gorgias is placed among those who support
the first view, but this the nearest we come to an attribution. All the opinions save
the last are refuted. Why the last is not refuted is strange, since Quintilian rejects
this opinion along with the rest. This puzzle is worth bearing in mind.
Quintilian’s own opinion quickly follows (II. 21. 4):
ego (neque id sine auctoribus) materiam esse rhetorices iudico omnes
res, quaecumque ei ad dicendum subiectae erunt.
This opinion is simply presented as Quintilian’s own opinion, but as he indicates, he
has some backing; no less than Plato19 (§4) and Cicero (§5). What does Quintilian
mean? There may be three possibilities. The first option is to suppose that the ele-
ments of this opinion are indeed to be found in Plato and Cicero, but it is Quintilian
who has pieced them all together. The second possibility is that Quintilian found the
opinion in his sources and then found authorities for it.20 The third possibility is that
Quintilian found the opinion with the authority of Plato in his source, and added to
it the authority of Cicero. It is this third option which seems to me most plausible.
Firstly, from §7 onwards, Quintilian deals with attacks on this opinion. It is hardly
likely that the highly philosophical, metarhetorical attacks were designed by him or
by anyone else against an opinion he had thought up for himself.21 The opinion, the
criticisms, and perhaps the responses too, all predate Quintilian. Yet Quintilian re-
gards this as his own opinion, albeit with authorities. He may have felt justified be-
cause he was the one to add the authority of Cicero. It is typical of Quintilian to add
Roman examples wherever he can, from Cicero if at all possible.22 He has even
more motivation in the present case since the Platonic authority is a construct out of
two places in Gorgias and Phaedrus,23 while the one sentence from Cicero contains
the two elements omnes and res.
We may assume for the present that the source contained an opinion which con-
sidered the materia of rhetoric to be omnes res, and relied upon the authority of Pla-
to.24 Who could be the source for this?
vision in Stoic philosophy (see immediately below). The subject matter of the two is the same,
namely virtus. Furthermore, the first four opinions are each held by quidam, while the fifth ex-
presses dissent from the fourth in being held by alii.
19 Cf. Gorgias 449d8–451d6; Phaedrus 261a8–9.
20 Quintilian may have found the authorities for it in another source referring to the same opi-
nion.
21 An analysis of these attacks will reveal to us that the source is Greek.
22 Quintilian, II. 15. 5, 9; 16. 8; cf. Hubbell (1920) 372–373.
23 From Gorgias 449d8–451d6 come the res, which, however, RW (2006) 383 regard as the
counterpart to tà o nta in 451d5–6; from Phaedrus 261a8–9 come omnes. Alternatively, Quintilian
would find support for both these elements in Cicero.
24 Quintilian reflects the source’s emphasis on the fact that this opinion is of Plato himself: quo
manifestum est hanc opinionem ipsius Platonis fuisse. This is significant, as we shall soon see.
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We may approach the correct answer by using common sense with a little help
from our sources. Who had the greatest interest in holding the materia of rhetoric to
be omnes res? On the other hand, who presented the four opinions Qunitilian re-
jects? They may be eliminated as proponents of the omnes res position.
The opinion that the materia of rhetoric is omnes res serves the interests of the
schools of rhetoric, where all they have is rhetoric. On the other hand, no philoso-
phical school could claim that rhetoric pertains to everything, since rhetoric in the
best case is only part of a philosophical system and would have a more defined ma-
teria. It is unlikely that the rhetors considered the materia of rhetoric on their own
initiative, but that in response to the pressure of the philosophers asking for their
materia they came up with omnes res ad dicendum ei subiectae.
Quintilian brings two supports for his opinion, the first from Socrates and the sec-
ond from Cicero. Socrates of course is the Platonic figure in the dialogue Gorgias.
The schools of rhetoric often turned to this dialogue for support. The most well-
known example is the one extending over several sections in Quintilian, II. 15. 24–
31, where he criticizes those who exploit the Gorgias in order to present Plato as op-
posed to rhetoric. Quintilian provides an interpretation of Plato which demonstrates
the opposite. It may be supposed that there were rhetors who exploited the Gorgias
to support their claim that the materia of rhetoric was omnes res.25 It was precisely
because the opponents of rhetoric based themselves mainly on Plato’s Gorgias that
the supporters of rhetoric also turned to it. If the great philosopher – Plato – sup-
ported the rhetors’ attitude, what could his descendants say?26
The authority of Cicero also indicates that omnes res is the materia of rhetoric.
Unlike the sentences formed from pieces of Platonic dialogues, the two sentences
from Cicero both refer to omnes res as the materia of rhetoric (De Inventione I. 5:
quod ad omnes res et privatas et publicas maxime pertineat; De Oratore I. 21). The
references are not in a polemical context but occur naturally and almost inciden-
tally.27 This does not mean that his source would be other than the rhetors with
whom he studied.28
Common sense, aided by the authorities adduced, has led us to the conclusion
that omnes res is the materia of rhetoric according to the rhetors. As for the attribu-
tion of the opinions appearing in §§1–3, a parallel in II. 15. 15–23 will provide some
answers. In fact, a comparison of chapter 21 with chapter 15 as a whole will confirm
omnes res as the materia of the rhetors, posit this materia in a wider context, and
will serve as the basis for the analysis of chapter 21 and the issue of the materia in
Quintilian altogether.
25 Cf. Quintilian, II. 21. 1, and our analysis, pp.183–184 below.
26 The comment quo manifestum est hanc opinionem ipsius Platonis fuisse (II. 21. 4) may have
been made in this context. See also n.24 above.
27 At least one of the expressions appears in the protasis of a concessive sentence.
28 De Inventione is certainly based on his rhetorical studies.
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Chapter 15 does not deal explicitly with the materia of rhetoric. Its declared sub-
ject is the finis, the definition of rhetoric.29 Quintilian is intent on keeping the bad
man away from rhetoric, and it is with this aim in mind that he rejects a number of
definitions.30 The exclusion of the bad man, however, is not the only criterion by
which Quintilian rejects definitions. There is a list in §9 of definitions all to do with
persuasion, definitions such as those of Gorgias, Isocrates and Cicero, which would
allow the bad man into rhetoric; but a closer examination reveals that they are re-
jected also because the definition is not peculiar to rhetoric: it is not idion / ido-
neum.31 Quintilian subsequently loses sight of his original aim and follows his
sources in a search for the perfect definition. Next (§10) comes a definition which
introduces the element of speech32 and again there arise problems which are not all
to do with the bad man. Many philosophers are mentioned for their opinions on
rhetoric, and it is not always clear whether they actually intended to define rhetoric
or only its end. Quintilian exploits whatever he chooses from these opinions for his
own purposes, and collects opinions from anywhere he can find them. Some philo-
sophers appear more than once and for opposing purposes.33 All this in Quintilian’s
search for the perfect definition, the one which is idoneus/proprius for rhetoric.
In §§15–23,34 there appears a new series of definitions adding something not pre-
viously found to the definition. The new element is the construct circa + acc.35
Quintilian is intent on narrowing down the definition to make it peculiar to rhetoric,
but for us the additions deal with materia.
The parallel between II. 15. 15–23 and II. 21. 1–3 is not perfect. Chapter 15 sup-
plies attribution to only a few of the opinions appearing in 21. 1–3; yet this part is
clear and well-defined. The incompleteness of the parallel is actually an advantage
as we shall now see.
29 On the ambiguity of the term finis and the resultant problems associated with chapter 15, see
p.131 nn.12–13 above.
30 He rejects every definition which is other than the Stoic definition which he adopts for the
whole of his composition, scientia bene dicendi. Only the morally good man can speak morally
well; see also p.26 n.9; p.70 n.41; p.146–147 above.
31 The term used in II. 15. 9 is idoneus finis. The word idoneus can translate idioß, although that
Greek term is usually translated by proprius, and idoneus usually translates ıkanóß, a rmódioß. Even
if the latter interpretation is preferred here, the idea is clear, that the declared end (or definition) is
insufficient, since it is not peculiar to rhetoric.
32 “The power of persuading by speaking” – vis dicendo persuadendi.
33 Aristotle appears three times in chapter 15, each time for a different reason; cf. §§10–11, 13,
16. Plato’s Gorgias is similarly used.
34 In §23 Quintilian promises to discuss all the definitions given in §§15–23 in the appropriate
place: cum de materia rhetorices dicendum erit. Not all the discussions in these sections, however,
pertain to materia, but this is typical of Quintilian.
35 This probaby reflects the Greek perì + acc. which frequently appears in the argument be-
tween Socrates and Gorgias in Plato’s Gorgias 449d1–450b5.
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At the very beginning of the passage there appears a remark on two opinions con-
cerning the materia of rhetoric, with a promise to determine which of them is cor-
rect in the appropriate place, i. e., chapter 21 (II. 15. 15):
quidam enim circa res omnes, quidam circa civiles modo versari rhetor-
icen putaverunt: quorum verius utrum sit, in eo loco, qui huius quaes-
tionis proprius est, dicam.
The two alternatives are omnes res and civiles (quaestiones).36 Both opinions are
exemplified: omnes res in §§16–18; civiles in §§19–23. The thinkers mentioned in
both lists of examples give a clear majority to rhetors (Iatrocles, Eudorus, Gorgias
apud Platonem, Theodorus of Gadara, Cornelius Celsus).37
The two lists, therefore, in §§15–23 reflect a debate among rhetors over the mate-
ria of rhetoric.38 The formulation of §1539 and the examples given up to §23, keep-
ing strictly to the two alternatives presented, show that Quintilian plans to deal in
chapter 21 with just these two alternatives regarding the materia of rhetoric. In fact,
chapter 21 does deal with these alternatives, but with more besides. It seems that by
chapter 21, Quintilian has forgotten his plan, or changed his mind, and it is up to us
to find out why.
Beginning with these two alternatives, as they appear in chapter 21, we see that
Quintilian adopts omnes res, the opinion appearing for the first time in §7. It would
naturally not appear in §§1–3 where Quintilian presents other views to be rejected.
The civiles (quaestiones) opinion is third in the list there. As we have seen, it was
supported by quite a few rhetors.40
36 The structure of the quotation would require us to understand civiles res, but we attribute to
Quintilian quaestiones for two reasons: the examples Quintilian adduces for this opinion mainly use
quaestiones; and the parallel in chapter 21 refers to quaestiones. Thus Quintilian would have been
thinking of quaestiones even if he omitted the word for one reason or another.
37 The two exceptions are Aristotle and Ariston, the second adduced for the opinion that rheto-
ric may be regarded as a scientia, sed non virtus, which reveals Quintilian’s confusion. Aristotle is
mentioned simply because rhetors are always happy to find an authority among the philosophers.
Quintilian does the same thing in II. 21. 4.
38 It is quite reasonable to suppose that schools of rhetoric would be divided among themselves
into different schools of thought. The potential student of rhetoric would be attracted to a rhetor
who could promise to teach him de omnibus rebus, but another potential student would be attracted
to the rhetor who could teach him not just anything and nothing, but the serious matters de civilibus
quaestionibus. Such considerations would have entered into the arguments of the rhetors themselves
in their internal debate, and in fact there is evidence for this in §§7–11; see pp.187ff below.
39 quorum verius utrum sit in eo loco. . . Only these two examples, omnes res and civiles quaes-
tiones, have the structure circa + acc. (perì + acc.), while the remaining examples are formulated
with in + abl.
40 We may add to the list Hermagoras, to whom Sextus II. 62 attributes a speech dealing with
zv́tvma politikón (=quaestio civilis).
Quintilian, II. 21 183
ISBN Print: 9783525252949 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647252940
© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen
To conclude and summarize our findings regarding the two main alternatives pre-
sented by Quintilian, he seems to have used the work of a rhetor presenting the two
alternatives regarding the materia of rhetoric. Of these he chooses omnes res and
presents his choice in II. ch. 21.
Surprising support for these findings comes from De Inventione which Cicero
wrote when he was still young. It reflects the teaching of the schools of rhetoric in
which he studied (De Oratore I. 5). He writes (De Inventione I. 7):
Materiam artis eam dicimus, in qua omnis ars et ea facultas, quae confi-
citur ex arte, versatur. . . quibus in rebus versatur ars et facultas oratoria,
eas res materiam artis rhetoricae nominamus. Has autem res alii plures,
alii pauciores existimarunt.
The terms res plures and res pauciores hint at omnes res and civiles quaestiones re-
spectively. Cicero then adduces an authority only for res plures, but it is the same as
the one Quintilian brings, and it explicitly connects res plures with omnes res (ibid.):
Nam Gorgias Leontinus, antiquissimus fere rhetor, omnibus de rebus
oratorem optime posse dicere existimavit.41
We now turn to the other alternatives to be rejected in II. 21. 1–3. We may already
realize that these alternatives are not part of the internal rhetorical debate, or we
would have seen them in chapter 15. These opinions, then, would seem to pertain to
the debates in which the philosophers are involved, be it the internal philosophical
debate, or the external debate between the philosophers and the rhetors. We shall
begin with the last opinion in the list, tota vita / ethice.
We hinted at the beginning of the discussion that there might be two versions of
the Stoic materia of rhetoric.42 Apart from the Stoics, no one was interested in the
materia of rhetoric for its own sake. The other philosophers were actually trying to
prove that there was no materia of rhetoric.43 The rhetors were looking for the mate-
ria of rhetoric under pressure both from philosophers and from their fellow rhetors.
Only the Stoics had a philosophical system in which rhetoric, like any other field of
behaviour of the Stoic sage, needed to be an art, and as such, they had a purely phi-
losophical interest in discovering what the materia of this art might be. Thus any
positive materia presented by a philosopher is likely to be a materia of rhetoric sug-
gested by a Stoic.44
41 We shall return to this quotation on p.193 below.
42 See pp.179–180 n.18 above.
43 The other philosophical schools might have dealt with rhetoric in their own systems, but only
the Stoic regarded rhetoric as an art. The other schools, attempting to deny rhetoric the title of art,
would have targeted materia as one of the means by which to achieve their aim. This would not
have affected their own occupation with rhetoric.
44 The other philosophical schools would of course then use the same materia in their attacks
upon it.
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Both the opinions advanced in §3 are Stoic, since they are grounded in regarding
rhetoric as a virtue, the quintessentially Stoic view of art. The difference between
the two opinions seems to be based on a difference between views of virtue. The
first regards virtue as being general, so that the materia of the general virtue, rheto-
ric, would need to be tota vita.45 The second sees the general virtue as comprising
many aspects, each of which is a particular virtue. By this view, the materia of the
particular virtue which is rhetoric cannot be tota vita, the latter being, if anything,
the materia of the general virtue. The peculiar materia of rhetoric is none other than
ethics. The reasoning, whether it is right or wrong, is typically Stoic.46 Its presence
in the list of opinions differing from Quintilian’s would indicate that it should be re-
futed, but it is not. This demands further investigation. Furthermore, now that we
have discovered it to be Stoic, the question is more urgent. Quintilian, after all,
adopts the Stoic position in all other respects. What did he find objectionable in
their materia of rhetoric? We shall return to this problem later.47
The list of opinions Quintilian does not accept regarding the materia of rhetoric
begins with oratio and argumenta persuabilia. We have already discovered opi-
nions connected with an internal rhetorical debate and the internal philosophical de-
bate. By a process of elimination we may suspect that the remaining opinions per-
tain to the external debate between the philosophers and the rhetors.
The first opinion, that the materia of rhetoric is oratio (=lógoß), does seem to
pertain to the external debate, but in a very special way. A cursory reading of II. 21.
1 might seem to be telling us that the rhetors claimed that oratio was the materia of
rhetoric, but that this was criticized by the philosophers. A different reading is
called for. This materia (to apply the term anachronistically here) is the most fa-
mous of all, as it is mentioned by Gorgias in Plato’s Gorgias 449e1. Just as famous
is the refutation of this materia by Socrates at 450b5–e1. It is implausible that the
45 Cf. SVF III. p.49 fr. 202: oÇ lou gàr toũ bı́ou e stì técnv v a retv́. RW (ibid.) 381 adduce this
source, but hesitate to state that it is Stoic. They prefer to attribute it to “Stoicizing rhetoricians”.
This tendency continues throughout their discussion of both views in §3. They identify again and
again Stoic elements but note linguistic difficulties and other problems which pull them back from
recognizing a Stoic philosophical source. The difficulties are certainly present, but it must be re-
called that Quintilian is using sources at second or third remove if not more. This point is alluded to
when in their discussion of one of the difficulties (identifying negotiale with pragmatikón) they
comment (382): “But perhaps the fact that the term is without parallel in this use is an accident of
transmission.”
46 The most suitable parallel to this passage is Quintilian, XII. 2. 15–20. The term negotialis in
§§1–3 appears there as moralis, but the parallel is clear, and the general character is Stoic. Quinti-
lian’s attempt to translate the term pragmatikón as locus negotialis in ethics (§3) is problematic,
since in many contexts it is either negotiale or morale. III. 6. 57 and III. 7.1 might appear to be par-
allels to our passage, in which case the opinion could have been attributed to Hermagoras, but the
context is quite different.
47 See pp.193–195 below.
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rhetors would adopt a materia which everyone knows how to refute.48 This is
clearly a materia foisted upon the rhetors by philosophers so that it can easily be re-
futed.49 The debate between the various parties was not usually conducted face to
face but through the agency of written works. An easy victory over the most famous
of the rhetors, Gorgias,50 would have been an ideal way to begin a polemical expo-
sition of the materia of rhetoric. The philosophers could claim that the founder, or
at least one of the most prominent founders, of rhetoric had already determined its
materia. Gorgias apud Platonem had identified it as perì lógouß, and no self-re-
specting rhetor could ignore the opinion of Gorgias; indeed, they were obliged to
adopt his opinion and face the consequences.
Sextus supports this reading of the text, in what seems to be the only parallel be-
tween Sextus and Quintilian on the whole issue of materia. Here is the criticism in
II. 48:
ei gàr perì lógon v grammatikv̀ poneı̃tai, ou te dè léxiß e stı́ ti ou te
lógoß e k léxewn sugkeı́menoß, w ß epedeı́xamen, dià tò ou tà mérv mv̀
e stin a núparkton einai, a kolouXv́sei kaì tò tv̀n r vtorikv̀n a nu-
póstaton u párcein.
The critic does not attempt to discover whether the rhetors actually claim lógoß to
be the materia of rhetoric. It is already clear to him. All that remains for him to do
is to criticize the claim itself. Quintilian provides one criticism, and Sextus another,
drawn from another of his works (against the grammarians). It seems that the philo-
sophers are not content to copy the Socratic refutation from Plato’s Gorgias.51 Each
philosopher can add whatever criticism he wishes; in Quintilian, II. 21. 1, the criti-
cism comprises two parts. We may conclude that the word quidam might well refer
to philosophers, in which case it is they who posit oratio as the materia of rhetoric
in order to refute it.
We are left with the second opinion, the materia of rhetoric is argumenta persua-
sibilia. This opinion is reminiscent of Aristotle,52 and it may have been held by a
48 This is not to mention the fact that we have already discovered two very different materiae
advocated by rhetors.
49 Critolaus employed the same method when he foisted persuasion as the end of rhetoric on the
rhetors to achieve an easy refutation; see pp.158ff above.
50 The words apud Platonem (21. 1) might emphasize two opposing sentiments. It might be in-
tended to prevent the reader from attributing the opinion to the historical Gorgias, since Gorgias
apud Platonem is only a dramatic figure; so RW (ibid.) 379. It might, however, be intended to pre-
vent the reader from attributing the opinion to Plato, since it is actually to be attributed to Gorgias
apud Platonem. This would seem to be the position a philosopher using this argument against the
rhetors would need to adopt. Contrast this with §4 where an opinion drawn from Plato’s Phaedrus is
emphatically attributed to Plato himself. There it is clearly the rhetors who wish Plato, the great phi-
losopher, to be seen to be supporting rhetoric.
51 The second half of Quintilian’s criticism is actually from Plato’s Gorgias.
52 RW (ibid.) 381 comment: “. . . the reference is presumably to the author of the definition gi-
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group of rhetors in the Peripatetic tradition.53 Quintilian himself in II. 15. 16 con-
nects omnes res with Aristotle and emphasizes there the persuasibile. Thus the ar-
gumenta persuasibilia may be seen to be a species of the general opinion of those
rhetors who consider res omnes to be the materia of rhetoric.
The list at II. 21. 1–3, therefore, reflects opinions on the materia of rhetoric from
three different debates: oratio / lógoß reflects the external debate between the philo-
sophers and the rhetors; civiles quaestiones and omnes res (including argumenta
persuasibilia) are the two main rival opinions in the internal rhetorical debate; tota
vita and ethice are two rival opinions within the Stoa. If this is the case, then Quinti-
lian seems to have relied in writing chapter 21 on a source summarizing all the var-
ious debates pertaining to the materia of rhetoric. In chapter 15, Quintilian touched
upon materia only as part of the definition of rhetoric, in various attempts to make
the definition peculiar to rhetoric after the addition of speech to persuasion.54 There,
having mentioned the two main alternatives (the ones in the internal rhetorical de-
bate), he promised to decide between them in the chapter dealing with the materia.
However, having arrived at the chapter on materia, he begins to deal with materia
per se and provides a relatively complete discussion, being dependent to a large ex-
tent on his source.
Quintilian provides six opinions on the materia of rhetoric, of which he claims to
support one, yet he does not refute the Stoic opinions. That is to say, he does not re-
fute the opinions where he should have done, at the beginning of the chapter, but he
does it later on, and not as a criticism of the Stoa. It may be suspected that the list of
opinions here is merely a sort of introduction in which all sorts of opinions are ad-
duced and some refuted, the refutations feeding off each other as the author sees the
various opinions and refutations that he has collected. They may well appear again
in the body of the chapter, together with responses, as we have seen was usual with
other topics for debate. If so, the chapter is quite complex. In fact, when we begin
the analysis of the various criticisms against omnes res as the materia of rhetoric,
we shall encounter problems, contradictions and inexactitudes. There is no doubt
that the source was a summary at some remove from the original arguments, confus-
ing terms and structures of arguments. Our analysis of the list in §§1–3, however,
will help us to some extent in exploring the chapter as a whole.
As already mentioned, §§4–6 presented Quintilian’s opinion regarding the mate-
ria of rhetoric, namely omnes res. This is the opinion which will occupy most of
Quintilian’s attention in the chapter, and we shall concentrate on it here. A number
of attempts to attack Quintilian’s opinion are presented from §7 onwards, but not all
ven at 2. 15. 13 and others of its kind”. At II. 15. 13 we find, quidam recesserunt ab eventu, sicut
Aristoteles dicit: ‘rhetorice est vis inveniendi omnia in oratione persuasibilia’.
53 The closest term to argumenta persuasibilia in Aristotle might be the e nXumv́mata which
Aristotle regards as akin to piXanaì a podeı́xeiß.
54 dicendo persuadere = peiXoũß dvmiourgòß dià lógwn, on which see pp.151–153 above.
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of the attacks are against omnes res. We might at first think that we are being told
of two attacks against omnes res in §7:
Hanc autem, quam nos materiam vocamus, id est res subiectas, quidam
modo infinitam, modo non propriam rhetorices esse dixerunt, eamque
artem circumcurrentem vocaverunt, quod in omni materia diceret.
The expression modo. . . modo. . . should refer to two separate attacks, and there is no
doubt that Quintilian and even his source thought that there were two.55 One might
suspect that these are two aspects of the same attack.56 The materia infinita might
be considered to be hinting at the demand of every materia to be limited.57 The ma-
teria non propria might be intended to hint at the demand that every materia be pe-
culiar to its art, and not shared with additional arts or things. In other words, the ma-
teria must be both finita and propria.
Both these demands, however, are problematic, each for different reasons. The
propria demand is logical and therefore intelligible. The search for the idion of a de-
finiendum has a long history. That rhetoric must have something peculiar to itself is
common sense.58 The second condition, that the materia be finita, is very strange.
So long as the materia is peculiar to its art, what does it matter whether it is infinita?
Indeed, if the materia is non propria, it is no more relevant that the materia might
be infinita. Finally, it should be observed that we know of no parallel to this de-
mand.59 Thus the infinita criticism seems not to be a philosophical argument per-
taining to one of the elements of the definition of art. As for the non propria criti-
cism, while it is intelligible per se, it might be asked what other art could also claim
to have as its materia nothing less than omnes res. If there is no other art claiming
this materia, then the non propria criticism is unjustified.60
The problems continue to increase. Quintilian notes that rhetoric was called ars
circumcurrens.61 This expression reflects the character of the art resulting from its
55 The non propria appear alone in 17. 17. The comment there is of significance to the issue of
the materia, as we shall see in due course, p.193 below.
56 RW (ibid.) 385 attribute both expressions to the same critics: “. . .who at different points in
their argument variously called a materia so defined limitless and not proper to rhetoric.” Such a
reading is plausible and would usually typify the thinking of Quintilian, but not necessarily of his
sources.
57 RW (ibid.) 384 refer the reader to the words of Crassus in Cicero, De Oratore I. 21, where
the expression is used in exactly this way. The orator restricts his occupation to forensic and delib-
erative speech.
58 We have called this the Exclusivity of Art; see pp.56–57 above.
59 Even possible terms such as uÇ lv a peiroß, uÇ lv a óristoß do not yield Greek parallels.
60 At the end of §13 we find dialectic presented as an art participating in the materia of rhetoric.
On the position of this section and of the criticism, see n.75 below.
61 A search of Greek literature using possible terms such as periforvtóß, perı́trecoß and
perı́dromoß has yielded no results. It is unclear on what grounds LSJ (s.v. peritrécw) identify ars
circumcurrens with técnv peritrécousa and refer to our passage in Quintilian. The term peri-
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special, problematic materia. It is not clear, however, whether this expression has in
mind the materia infinita or the non propria.62 The materia non propria is closer in
the text, but it could logically apply to either, since either faulty materia might be
construed as causing the art to run around in circles. The materia infinita should be
preferred if we accept Quintilian’s own explanation why the art runs around: quod
in omni materia diceret. Even if this is the case, why do we not find another epithet
for rhetoric when the other criticism of the materia is applied? Be this as it may,
Quintilian replies to both attacks (§8):
nam de omni materia dicere eam fatentur, propriam habere materiam,
quia multiplicem habeat, negant. sed neque infinita est, etiamsi est mul-
tiplex. . .
So far as Quintilian is concerned, both attacks agree that rhetoric speaks de omni
materia. The problem Quintilian feels the need to tackle is the fact that the oppo-
nents of rhetoric are unprepared to regard omnes res as the materia propria of rheto-
ric. Their reason is that it has a multiple materia. New problems suddenly arise, not
only adding to, but also intensifying, the old problems.
The most difficult of the problems is of course the fact that Quintilian begins
with a presentation of the non propria criticism but immediately leaves it to tackle
the infinita criticism. Furthermore, the opponents of rhetoric refuse to regard its ma-
teria as propria because it is multiplex, a new term which becomes in the very next
sentence the target of the infinita criticism. It would seem that some confusion has
crept in, if not textual corruption.
The Oxford text of Quintilian (edited by Winterbottom) presents with cautious
approval in the critical apparatus to II. 21. 8 an emendation by Kiderlin. The result-
ing text would appear as follows:
cum quibus mihi minima pugna est; nam de omni materia dicere eam
fatentur, propriam habere materiam =quia in eadem versetur et alius, in-
finitam,? quia multiplicem habeat, negant.
RW (ibid.) 385 comment on this emendation which actually appears in their text:
forvtóß appears in the thesaurus of Stephanus, on the strength of another place in Quintilian where
the word circumcurrens appears (I. 10. 41). However, the context there is geometry rather than lan-
guage. The TLL calls the word as it appears in our passage aÇ pax eirvména. At the same time, Quinti-
lian does not invent terms, and this must have derived from a Greek source; cf. II. 14, where Quinti-
lian is expansive when explaining his decision to transliterate the Greek rhetorice rather than adopt
a Latin equivalent. We would have expected some comment had he invented the term circumcur-
rens. See also the comment of RW (ibid.) 385.
62 RW (ibid.) 385 attribute it to both criticisms together, since they regard these criticisms as
one; see n.56 above.
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It is possible to construct tortuous explanations of the received text. . .
But all its problems were solved at a stroke by Kiderlin 1 130–2, who
added ‘quia in eadem versetur et alius, infinitam’ after materiam, words
very easily overlooked. Q. then first states the reasons for the claim that
materia so defined is (a) not ‘proper’ and (b) limitless. He then discre-
dits those reasons chiastically ‘sed neque infinita est. . . (10) neque pro-
tinus non est materia rhetorices [i. e. proper to it]. . .’.
It is fair to say that the text is corrupt, and Kiderlin’s emendation is brilliant. It is,
however, the sort of emendation which philologists propose exempli gratia, using a
sentence which appears elsewhere in the text and inserting it where the text is cor-
rupt. Now, according to the emendation, the multiplex clearly belongs to the infinita
criticism. Furthermore, both responses to the criticism now correspond each to one
of the criticisms. The answer in §§8–9 responds to the infinita criticism, while the
answer in §§9–10 responds to the non propria criticism.
Kiderlin’s emendation may be accepted with one reservation: it aims at under-
standing the thinking of Quintilian, but does not take his sources into consideration.
Neither Kinderlin nor RW attempt to understand the criticisms themselves, or the
original targets of those criticisms, but are content with trying to understand how
Quintilian presents them. The problem is that Quintilian is quite capable of making
a mistake. Confusion may already have been present in his sources, but Quintilian is
likely to have added to it by attempting to sort out the mess in as logical a way as
possible.63 Kiderlin also attempts to make the text logical. My contention is that the
text of Quintilian may be less than logical here as elsewhere. Quintilian’s presenta-
tion is problematic. Here are some of the problems.
The first problem is the asymmetry between the number of attacks and the num-
ber of responses: there are two attacks (infinita, non propria), but there are, so it
seems, three responses. Even if we accept the explanation of RW that §§8–9 re-
spond to the infinita criticism and §§9–10 respond to the non propria criticism,
§§12–13 also clearly respond to a non propria criticism, specifically a claim that
the discussion de bono, utili, iusto is shared with philosophy.64
Another problem is the place of the multiplex in the context of the infinita criti-
cism (according to Kiderlin’s emendation). There does not seem to be a connection
between the cause and the effect. Towards the end of §8, beginning with the words
et aliae quoque artes minores habent multiplicem materiam, Quintilian turns to a
long argument designed to show that there are many other arts with a materia multi-
plex. Yet this was not the thesis Quintilian had set out to prove. He is supposed to
63 When the sources are scrolls, it is impossible for an author such as Quintilian to keep them
all open while he works. He must rely on his memory for many details, and even the best memory
can make mistakes.
64 The word propria appears explicitly in §13.
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show that the materia of rhetoric is not infinita. An examination of §§8–9 reveals
the problematic connection between infinita and multiplex. Let us take sculpting as
an example. According to the argument presented, the materia of sculpting is indeed
multiplex since the sculptor may use silver, bronze, iron, and so on; yet it might be
asked whether the sculptor would use any materia whatsoever, even water, for ex-
ample. The attack by the opponents of rhetoric is not at all clear, since an art’s mate-
ria may well be multiplex but still not be infinita. The problem is exacerbated by the
supporters of rhetoric who in their answer basically provide examples of other arts
which have materia multiplex, but do not come to grips with the relationship be-
tween multiplex and infinita.
In order to return some semblance of order to these criticisms, we should indeed
begin by attempting to understand Quintilian’s line of thought. There are two criti-
cisms against the materia of rhetoric, infinita and non propria. Associated with
these are two epithets, multiplex and circumcurrens. Do these epithets describe the
materia or the art itself?65 It is difficult to decide from the text itself, since circum-
currens clearly describes art, while multiplex describes the materia. There are rea-
sons to believe, however, that they both originally described the art. The custom of
ending an attack by providing rhetoric with an unflattering term emphasizing its
failings as an art in the aspect under attack is well known and has already been
touched upon in this study. We have already referred to such terms as kakotecnı́a,
mataiotecnı́a, a tecnı́a. These terms pertain to the pursuit itself (criticizing its claim
to be an art), and it is logically easier to understand how a term for the pursuit came
to describe its materia, than that a term describing the materia came to describe the
pursuit itself. I suggest that multiplex originally described the art rather than the ma-
teria of the art. This being so, we have two terms, multiplex and circumcurrens, ori-
ginally describing the pursuit of rhetoric in light of two different attacks. Which cri-
ticism led to which epithet?
Let us return to the beginning of the analysis of §7, where we struggled to make
sense of the term circumcurrens. Quintilian uses it with regard to both criticisms,
but this is the result of confusion or conflation. It seems to me that the term circum-
currens was originally associated with the non propria criticism, and that conse-
quently multiplex accompanied the infinita criticism. The term circumcurrens is of
course metaphorical here. As RW (ibid.) 385 have already noted, “rhetoric is like an
itinerant trader. . . Alternatively, the force of circumcurrens might be that such an art
cannot choose its subjects, and so is vulgar and promiscuous.” Such a description is
applicable only to the materia non propria, since the propria condition guarantees
that the materia focus on a defined field which is firmly, peculiarly and unalterably
the province of that art.
65 Both materia/uÇ lv and ars/técnv are feminine, which may have helped cause or perpetuate
the confusion.
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Thus it would appear that the words eamque artem circumcurrentem vocaverunt
were possibly a marginal gloss by someone who had been reading the passage on
the non propria criticism, which had become interpolated into the text by the time
Quintilian or his source received it. This proposal would solve two problems one of
which we had earlier encountered. Firstly, we had tried earlier to associate circum-
currens with the infinita criticism because of the explanation provided, quod in
omni materia diceret.66 This produced a problem because circumcurrens was logi-
cally and syntactically closer to the non propria criticism. Removing the interpola-
tion allows us to see that the explanation provided refers not to the term circumcur-
rens but to the two criticisms together against res omnes as the materia of rhetoric,
which Quintilian and/or his source regard as identical. Secondly, §8 is asymmetri-
cal. Quintilian begins his refutation of both criticisms; the infinita criticism is asso-
ciated with the term multiplex67 while the non propria criticism has no associated
term.68 The presence of the interpolation in §7 now makes this explicable; The mo-
ment Quintilian considered circumcurrens to be associated with both criticisms
(§7), he could not use it later on to describe the non propria nor the infinita criticism
exclusively. Thus his explanation of the infinita criticism has the multiplex, and the
non propria criticism is reduced to the words, quia in eadem versetur et alius.
We have, therefore, discovered two criticisms against the materia of rhetoric, the
infinita and the non propria arguments. Yet already at the beginning of the discus-
sion we had already demonstrated that only the infinita criticism was applicable
against omnes res as the materia of rhetoric. We had also observed that when both
criticisms appear together, the non propria criticism is entirely redundant.69 We
need to discover the original contexts for each criticism, since they clearly do not
apply to the same argument.
We will recall that omnes res as the materia of rhetoric appeared in chapter 15 to-
gether with civiles quaestiones, each accompanied by a long list of rhetors. We had
concluded that all this reflected an internal rhetorical debate, or at least that part of
the debate where the subject was the materia of rhetoric. Some rhetors would argue
that the materia is omnes res, while others would argue for civiles quaestiones.
Neither the definition of rhetoric nor the end of rhetoric is at issue here; those are
subjects for the external debate with the philosophers and do not concern the pupil
who has already decided to study rhetoric. The rhetorical schools would not make
do with merely praising their wares. They would also apply negative advertising
against their rivals, and it is at this point that we enter the internal rhetorical debate.
The arguments of the opponents of civiles quaestiones are clear, and have been
hinted at already in Quintilian, II. 15. 15 in the word modo (“only”), but he is more
66 See pp.188–189 above.
67 As already remarked just above, this is a result of problems in the transmission; the term mul-
tiplex originally described rhetoric itself in light of the infinita criticism.
68 Reading, of course, Kiderlin’s emendation, which I follow throughout all of this analysis.
69 See p.188 above.
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explicit elsewhere. The civiles quaestiones are too narrow a materia since rhetoric
embraces much more (II. 15. 20). What would be more natural for the supporters of
civiles quaetiones than to claim the opposite for omnes res, that this materia is too
broad?
This plausible account receives support from Cicero’s De Inventione I. 7, quoted
more fully here:70
Materiam artis eam dicimus, in qua omnis ars et ea facultas, quae confi-
citur ex arte, versatur. . . item, quibus in rebus versatur ars et facultas or-
atoria, eas res materiam artis rhetoricae nominamus. Has autem res alii
plures, alii pauciores existimarunt. Nam Gorgias Leontinus, antiquissi-
mus fere rhetor, omnibus de rebus oratorem optime posse dicere existi-
mavit; hic infinitam et inmensam huic artificio materiam subicere vide-
tur.
We have already used this passage to prove the existence of the two alternatives for
the materia of rhetoric which we have identified with the rhetorical schools, omnes
res (=res plures) and civiles quaestiones (=res pauciores). Cicero, however, adduces
an argument only against the omnes res, and this is the infinita criticism. Returning
to Quintilian, II. 17. 17, to the remark referring the reader to the chapter on the ma-
teria (chapter 21), we find only the non propria criticism. There is no hint of the in-
finita argument there. We have already argued that chapter 17 as a whole reflects
the order of instruction, but that its content, from §15, reflects the order of argument
pertaining to the internal philosophical debate,71 then the non propria applies to the
attack against the Stoa, while the infinita criticism reflects the internal rhetorical de-
bate.
Thus the infinita argument originated with the rhetors who regarded the materia
of rhetoric as civiles quaestiones. They attacked their fellow rhetors who considered
the materia of rhetoric to be res omnes. They claimed that the materia as res omnes
was too wide, and their victims countered by claiming that the materia as civiles
quaestiones was too narrow.
As for the non propria argument, we need to return to II. 21. 1–3 and the Stoic
materia of rhetoric, tota vita or ethice. These were the two opinions which Quinti-
lian did not refute at the time. It would seem that they were to be refuted by the non
propria argument. The two Stoic opinions of the materia are not unique to rhetoric.
70 Already quoted in part, p.184 above.
71 See §7.2 above. II. 17. 15 identifies the source for this order of argument with the philoso-
phers. The list of philosophers per se does not guarantee that the arguments reflect the internal phi-
losophical debate against the Stoics, but an analysis of the arguments up to §29 clearly indicates the
internal nature of the debate; e.g., §18 deals with Stoic epistemology, as does §26 which mentions
in the response the Stoic end, bene dicere. Since this is the context, we may regard §17 as part of
the philosophical attack on the Stoa. Our position also rests on our analysis of chapter 21 and its
general context.
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As is pointed out in §§12–13, de bono, utili, iusto disserere philosophiae officium
est; these sections, then, which appear out of context (quod vero. . . non obstat) ex-
plain why the materia of rhetoric as tota vita or ethice is non propria. It remains to
prove our contention that the non propria argument is used by the philosophers
against the Stoics, and not by all the philosophers against the rhetors.
In his reply (§13), Quintilian refers the reader to the first book (prooemium 9ff.)
where we find the external debate between the philosophers and the rhetors. Our
claim, however, is that in chapter 21 it is the internal philosophical debate which is
reflected.72 Firstly, this is the only way in which to find a refutation for the Stoic
opinion otherwise unrefuted in §3. Secondly, the terms bonum, utile, iustum are the
three aspects of civil life covered by rhetoric.73 They are therefore a parallel to tota
vita/ethice in §3. Furthermore, Quintilian’s response to this criticism prevents us
from seeing this attack as part of the external debate. The response is full of Stoic
colouring, above all the identification of the orator with the bonus vir (= philoso-
phus), and the identification of rhetoric with dialectic. This identification reminds
us of the famous story attributed to Zeno in which an open hand is likened to rheto-
ric, and a fist to dialectic.74 The main proof is in this Stoic response. A general at-
tack by the philosophers against the rhetors would not have permitted the rhetors to
reply with terminology pertaining to only one school of philosophy, and that school
which was unusual in its attitude toward rhetoric.
The other philosophers accuse the Stoics of playing into the hands of the rhetors
by giving rhetoric philosophical approval. They attack the Stoic materia of rhetoric
by pointing out that it is coextensive with their philosophy and argue that the Stoics
should choose between philosophy and rhetoric. The Stoics provide a consistent and
simple answer: the philosophus or vir bonus is identical with the orator. In other
words, the Stoics reply to their critics by reference to their philosophical system.
The non propria criticism is appropriate against the Stoa because, while the rhetors
and the other philosophers can choose their own profession as having exclusive jur-
isdiction over ethics, the Stoics are supposed to find themselves in a quandary: they
cannot hold two different arts and claim that each of them has exclusive jurisdiction
over ethics. However, their response is simple and brilliant: the two arts are aspects
of the same thing. The expert in one is also expert in the other; not only is it possible
72 This is not to deny the fact that such arguments could also serve against the rhetors. In fact, it
is actually part of my contention that the non propria argument was used against both the Stoics and
the rhetors. We are currently concentrating on the first context; for the second context, see pp.195–
196 below.
73 This is a later version of the three pairs a gaXón-kakón, kalón-aiscrón, dı́kaion-a dikon
which effectively comprised ethics before the term v Xiká came into use with Aristotle. The later
version shows Stoic influence: a gaXón-utile, kalón-bonum, dı́kaion-iustum.
74 Sextus, II. 7; Quintilian, II. 20. 7; Cicero, De Finibus II. 6. Hints at this formal difference be-
tween the two arts may already be found in Plato’s Gorgias 449c4–6, from which Zeno may have
derived inspiration.
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for the materia to be common to both, but it is necessary for the materia to be com-
mon to both. Two materiae would make the Stoic system inconsistent.75
To summarize our findings so far, the non propria argument is used in the inter-
nal philosophical debate against the Stoics because of their support of rhetoric as an
art. The claim is that no two arts can share the same materia.76 The Stoic counter-
claim is that these may be two pursuits, but they are effectively one art of the one
sage.77 This analysis solve two of the main problems we had raised: the refutation
of the fourth and fifth opinions (the Stoic materia) in the list in II. 21. 1–3, and the
object of the non propria criticism which could not have been directed against the
materia of rhetoric as res omnes.
A reconstruction will now be attempted in order to understand why Quintilian
presents both criticisms, the infinita and the non propria, as pertaining to the attack
on the materia of rhetoric as res omnes. We have already demonstrated that the non
propria criticism does not belong to this attack, especially when accompanied by
the infinita criticism.78 We must attempt to understand what caused Quintilian to
add the non propria criticism. Why was he not satisfied with the infinita criticism?
It is my contention that both criticisms did at some point in the tradition appear
together, not, however, against omnes res, which could only be attacked by the infi-
nita criticism, but against another materia, and that Quintilian or his source transfers
them to the attack on omnes res. The materia of rhetoric which could be attacked by
both criticisms is none other than lógoß. The lógoß can be infinitus since there is
no limit to the things that can be talked about; it is also non proprius to rhetoric,
since there are other arts which share the same materia. A cursory glance at Plato’s
Gorgias will provide examples. Further confirmation comes from an examination of
the epithets accompanying the criticisms. The infinitus lógoß could well be called
multiplex, since it is as manifold as the subjects it can talk about. On the other hand,
75 Quintilian, II. 21. 13 continues with a remark apparently deriving from another source (deni-
que cum sit dialectices materia. . .). Instead of defending against the distinction between philosophy
and rhetoric, this argument now refers to the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric, claiming that
both of them can share the same materia; the difference between the two arts is only a matter of
length or style, dialectic being oratio concisa and rhetoric oratio perpetua (cf. Plato, Gorgias
449c1–8). This comment may have been added by someone aware that rhetoric was increasingly re-
garded as an aspect of dialectic in the field of Stoic logic. On the development of Stoic logic and its
parts, see Ludlam (1997) 229–249. See also n.60 above.
76 The non-Stoic philosophers regard ethics to be the province of philosophy alone, and on this
point they also attack the rhetors who regard ethics to be the province of rhetoric; see the discussion
in Cicero, De Oratore I. 45–57 and the argument between Crassus and Scaevola, pp.39–40 above.
77 Cf. the two aspects of the the Stoic sage as sofóß and spoudaı̃oß. The first refers to the theo-
retical aspect of the wise man, and the second to the practical aspect; but they are still two aspects
of one and the same man. Cicero seems to understand this since he translates both expressions as sa-
piens.
78 See p.192 above.
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the fact that other arts share this materia makes the lógoß a materia circumcurrens,
one that runs around from one art to another.
If this is the case, we must explain what caused Quintilian or his source to direct
both criticisms at the omnes res version of the materia of rhetoric. In light of our
findings, I would suggest that Quintilian’s source, summarizing the various argu-
ments against rhetoric, intended to present the infinita argument against omnes res,
but found in his source together with the infinita criticism the non propria criticism,
since both had been together against the lógoß version of the materia of rhetoric.
We may recall that in II. 21. 1–3, Quintilian surveyed a list of four materiae of
rhetoric. The first is oratio, which translates the Greek lógoß.79 Quintilian refutes
this materia with two parallel arguments for two ways in which oratio may be un-
derstood. Yet we are claiming that the lógoß as the materia of rhetoric was attacked
using the non propria and infinita criticisms. How does this all square up? Quite
simply, it may be supposed that there were a fair number of attacks against this ma-
teria, especially as it was so well known and identified with Gorgias.80 Alterna-
tively, the non propria and infinita criticisms may be regarded as a development of
the second argument appearing in §2:
sin hac appellatione verba ipsa significari putamus, nihil haec sine re-
rum substantia faciunt.
The non propria and infinita criticisms deal precisely with the res without which
the words do nothing. This is a continuation of the criticism of the second argument
against the oratio. The fact that the double criticism received a new target, omnes
res, caused it to appear later.
Let us now summarize all the discussion up to this point. The classic materia of
rhetoric was attacked using the non propria and infinita criticisms, but each was
used also in an additional context. The infinita criticism appeared in the internal
rhetorical debate, while the non propria criticism appeared in the internal philoso-
phical debate. Thus the analysis of Quintilian has led to the following results regard-
ing the two criticisms of the materia of rhetoric:
infinita
a) Originally part of the external debate. When the materia of rhetoric
was considered to be lógoß, it could be criticized for being infinita
since anything could be talked about.
79 The reference to Plato’s Gorgias leaves no doubt.
80 The discussion on Sextus immediately below will prove this. There were very many argu-
ments and claims, some of which were borrowed from attacks on other parts of the art of rhetoric,
aimed at the lógoß.
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b) Now part of the internal rhetorical debate. The rhetors advocating ci-
viles quaestiones as the materia of rhetoric attacked those advocating
omnes res.
non propria
a) Originally part of the external debate. When the materia of rhetoric
was considered to be lógoß, it could be criticized for being the materia
not only of rhetoric but of other arts as well.
b) Now part of the internal philosophical debate. The Academics/Peripate-
tics attacked the Stoics who regarded the materia of rhetoric to be tota
vita/ethice, on the grounds that such a materia was not only that of
rhetoric but also of philosophy (which the Stoics actually agreed was
the case).
The argument in II. 21. 14–19 does not deal with materia. It is based on materia,
or rather one of the materiae. The argument basically asks, if the materia of rhetoric
is omnes res, whether the orator is expected to know everything (omnia sciens). In
effect, it deals with the extent and the nature of the knowledge demanded of an ora-
tor. This argument, therefore, should not delay us. A few sentences should suffice.
Quintilian is using what may be called the Relaxed Criterion of Knowledge, origi-
nating in Aristotle’s Rhetorica, whence it reached Cicero. Quintilian found it in Ci-
cero’s De Oratore in the speech of Crassus. Cicero is cited as an advocate of the
Strict Criterion of Knowledge, but elsewhere Cicero can be more relaxed, as may be
learned from the speech of Antonius in the same dialogue.
This argument will not be analysed, but it is worth noting its location since it
helps to corroborate our findings concerning §§12–13 as reflecting the internal phi-
losophical debate on the Stoic materia of rhetoric. On first reading, this argument
appears, as already noted, to be directed against the omnes res of the rhetors (e.g., si
de omnibus ei dicendum est, at the end of the section). A more careful reading re-
veals an earlier substrate reflecting the internal philosophical debate. There are two
pieces of evidence. The rhetor is presented as omnium artium peritus. This recalls
Cato’s famous sentence adopted from the Stoics, vir bonus dicendi peritus. The con-
text, then, would be that of Stoic rhetoric. The second point is more important. The
rhetor is described as experienced in omnes artes, but had the criticism been against
the materia of the rhetors we would have expected omnes res. Being experienced in
all the arts is a characteristic of the Stoic sage. Thus Quintilian or his source receive
an argument against the rhetors which has been adapted from an argument origin-
ally against the Stoics and their strict criterion of knowledge. Furthermore, it may
be that the original argument against the Stoics had no particular connection with
the debate over rhetoric. We may therefore see three stages in the development of
this argument:
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a) The original argument was directed against the Stoic strict criterion of
knowledge by which the Stoic sage was considered to be wise.
b) The argument was then directed specifically against Stoic rhetoric by
the addition of the adjective peritus (e mpeiroß), perhaps replacing sa-
piens (sofóß) if that had appeared in the original version. In Stoic phi-
losophy, the sage and the orator are one and the same, since the sage is
competent in all arts, and rhetoric is one of them.
c) This revised argument was then adapted to be used against the materia
of the rhetors, omnes res.
If the criticism in §14 did indeed originate in a Stoic context, it becomes possible to
explain the proximity of this argument (the criterion of knowledge suitable for the
orator) to the argument appearing in §§12–13 (the demand for a materia suitable for
rhetoric). The target in both is the Stoa.
There is a deeper connection between the Materia Argument and the Knowledge
argument. The requirement for a materia is unintelligible if it is not tied to knowl-
edge of that materia. In other words, the true demand is not only for a materia, but
for one which should be known by the person engaging in it. Refuting the artisan’s
knowledge of his materia will now be as effective as refuting the materia itself. The
opponent can use both aspects in a double attack on rhetoric, criticizing both the
materia as non propria, and the one engaging in rhetoric as being unable to know
his materia. This is what we can learn from Quintilian, II. ch. 21.
7.4. Sextus Empiricus, II. 48–59
Following the same procedure applied to Quintilian on this subject, we shall attempt
to squeeze as much out of the text of Sextus as is possible. The formal discussion is
at Sextus, II. 48–59. This passage opens with the declaration, tò dè metà toũto kaì
e k tṽß uÇ lvß perì vÇ n e sti skopw̃men au tṽß tò a nupóstaton. A new subject begins
in §60: tà nũn dè metelXónteß kaì a pò toũ télouß. . . Unlike Quintilian, however,
Sextus does not seem to keep to the subject of the materia in all the arguments ap-
pearing in this passage. In fact the word uÇ lv does not appear at all in the entire pas-
sage, after the initial declaration we have cited. Clearly, the declaration is an addi-
tion by Sextus. The only term in the passage which could possibly hint at uÇ lv is
idion, which appears now and then during the discussion.81 There is no guarantee at
this stage that the term does hint at materia here.
81 In §§51, 55. There is an expression which might also hint at materia, and this is perì + acc.,
which appears once in §48 (ei gàr perì lógon); cf. the Latin equivalent used at Quintilian, II. 15.
15, circa + acc., on which see pp.182–183 and n.39 above.
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The discussion of materia in Sextus may be divided into two main parts. First
comes a formal discussion of the materia as lógoß (§§48–51), followed by a discus-
sion of kalv̀ léxiß and its parallel, eu légein (§§52–59) which originally may not
have had anything to do with the Materia Argument. It is also a question whether
all the sections in the first discussion pertain to the Materia Argument. There are
three main arguments there against the position that the materia of rhetoric is lógoß.
The first argument is at §48, the second §§49–50, the third §51. We may recall that
Quintilian provided only one criticism against this position.82 Sextus provides three
criticisms and they are all completely different from Quintilian’s. Their presentation
is such that we are less than impressed by the work methods of Sextus or his source
in the present case. Each criticism demonstrates the extremes to which the oppo-
nents of rhetoric were prepared to go in order to find a new refutation of the lógoß.
Some of these refutations have little to do with the lógoß itself. Sextus himself ap-
pears to have had some rather poor sources regarding the materia. His concentration
on only one example of materia, and in only one of its contexts (the external de-
bate), compares unfavourably with the rich variety we find in Quintilian.
Sextus prefaces the arguments with an important comment: kaı́toi proapo-
dédotai v mı̃n tò kefálaion e n tw̃ pròß toùß grammatikoúß. During the course of
the discussion, Sextus refers twice more to Adversus Grammaticos (§§52, 59). Sex-
tus himself in §59 refers to an a nalogı́a, but it is not clear what he means. Firstly,
the arguments appearing in §§48–51 have no presence whatsoever in Adversus
Grammaticos, while the first argument does appear there, but not in the same
form.83 Much the same may be said about the second half in §§52–59. There is
some resemblance between the arguments against the grammarians and those
against the rhetors since of course both fields deal with language; yet the differences
between the two sets of arguments are so great that they cannot be considered as in-
terdependent or as sharing a common source. It seems that Sextus began to deal
82 See Quintilian, II. 21. 1 and pp.185–186 above. To Quintilian’s explicit criticism we might
add our reconstructed arguments against it, the non propria and the infinita, on which see pp.195–
196 above.
83 It is therefore not surprising that two editors of our text send the reader to different places.
Mau in the 1961 Teubner edition refers to I. 99ff., in the chapter whose subject is oÇ ti a méXodón esti
kaì a sústaton tò tecnikòn tṽß grammatikṽß méroß. The subject may have something to do with
our subject, but the reader will search in vain for the léxiß argument against the lógoß (although his
remark may be referring to §120 concluding the chapter, where Sextus claims that there is no point
in continuing now that the a rcaı́ have been refuted). Bury in the 1949 Loeb edition sends the reader
to §139. This chapter is perì sullabṽß. At least in §§131ff. we find the whole-part argument, if not
the pair of terms lógoß and léxiß, or indeed léxiß and mérv lógou. It seems to me that Sextus is ac-
tually referring to §123, which effectively acts as an introduction to the discussion on the syllable.
In this section Sextus details the hierarchy leading to lógoß. Without the syllables, the word (léxiß)
would not exist, nor would the mérv lógou, nor, finally, lógoß itself. The reference is problematic,
and Bekker’s emendation (1842) of grammatikv́ to r vtorikv́ is understandable, since the argument
does not appear in Adversus Grammaticos.
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with the arguments against the lógoß, recalled dealing with the subject in Adversus
Grammaticos, and noted this fact in passing. This is far from declaring that the pre-
sent arguments derive from there, or from a common source. For this reason, it is
worth dealing with the Materia Argument without obligatory reference to Adversus
Grammaticos.
The first argument (§48) is based on the components of the lógoß, or more accu-
rately, on the relation between the whole and its parts, in this case, the relation be-
tween the lógoß and its léxeiß. The main thrust of the argument is simple. If the
léxeiß do not exist, the lógoß composed of them does not exist either. The conclu-
sion follows that rhetoric has no materia and that it consequently is not an art. The
sources for this argument are hard to find. The whole-part principle is often used in
refutations and typical of the Academy, but favoured also by other schools.84 Since
there are no attributions or parallels in other sources,85 this criticism will need to be
left as it is.
The second argument against the lógoß includes §§49–50 and clearly derives
from a different matter entirely, the question of benefit. Someone seems to have
turned this Benefit Argument to use against the materia of rhetoric.86 The argument
asserts that the only way in which the lógoß may be considered the materia of
rhetoric is if there is added to it the adjective sumférwn, but it is well known that
the lógoß of rhetoric is the opposite, blaberóß. The internal logic of this argument
is a little forced and the connection with the materia of rhetoric even more so. The
place of the argument is strange. It has already been proved one section previously
that the lógoß cannot be the materia. Three alternative explanations might be con-
sidered:
a) Sextus or his source may have understood that the léxiß argument was
insufficient.
b) The lógoß cannot be the materia of rhetoric, but even if it could, it
would have to be beneficial, but rhetoric is harmful.
c) Even if the lógoß were the materia of rhetoric, the materia needs to be
complete; but not every lógoß falls under art; therefore the lógoß can-
not be the materia of an art; therefore, rhetoric is not an art.
Despite these speculations, the argument remains problematic. Either the author of
this argument has looked for a new refutation, even if it has meant raiding the Bene-
fit Argument to attack materia; or we see that Sextus or his source works associa-
84 It already appears in Plato; cf. Theaetetus 201d ff.; Cratylus 385bff.
85 Quintilian, II. 21. 1 might be regarded as a parallel, with difficulty, since the words nihil haec
(sc. verba) sine rerum substantia faciunt deny the existence of the lógoß without res; but the two ar-
guments have very different motives.
86 This argument may be attributed to Critolaus for two reasons. Firstly, the term kakotecnı́a is
identified with him (cf. Sextus, II. 12). Secondly, the term e ntecnoß is Peripatetic (Aristotle, Rhetor-
ica 1355b35–39).
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tively, recalling an additional argument which might fit into this topic and adducing
it as it is, even though the argument opposes the assumptions of the previous argu-
ment.
The third argument (§51) is complex. This is the only argument which seems to
have originated as a Materia Argument, but it is now a conflation of its variations in
all the stages and contexts of the different debates.
The word idion at the beginning of the section reminds us of propria which we
had encountered in Quintilian, and we do indeed find here a parallel to the non pro-
pria criticism in Quintilian, II. 21. 8–9. Furthermore, we now receive the addition
missing in Quintilian, pãn logikòn máXvma. Those who argued against the oratio of
rhetoric appealed to all the arts connected with lógoß. We are in the context of the
external debate. The rhetors responded to the attack by adducing arts such as sculp-
ture and architecture (Quintilian, II. 21. 10–11). However, such an account depends
upon the assumption that the target of the criticism in §51 is the lógoß, and this is
precisely the problem. The only word which might signify the lógoß in this argu-
ment is toũto, and this is possible since the words próß ge mv̀n toı̃ß eirvménoiß at
the beginning of the section could be referring to the beginning of the discussion on
the materia (§48) which of course mentions only the lógoß. However, there is an al-
ternative, that the word toũto refers to what came immediately before it, namely tò
légein appearing at the end of §50. We have already seen that the previous argu-
ment dealt with the benefit in lógoß and rejected the lógoß as the materia of rheto-
ric. §50 is a sort of appendix to §49, in which Sextus expands on the need to distin-
guish between the various types of lógoi. Just as sukofantikv́ and similar
occupations are not automatically considered to be arts simply because they deal
with tò légein (which we must supplement by observing that they are not arts be-
cause they are harmful by means of speech), so too rhetoric is not to be considered
an art simply because katà yilòn tò e kpeponvkénai tv̀n e n tw̃ légein dúnamin e xe-
tazoménv. Sextus adds an incidental remark in §51: próß ge mv̀n toı̃ß eirvménoiß,
ou dè idion r vtorikṽß e sti toũto. That is to say, since we have already mentioned
tò légein, it should be noted that this (toũto) is not the idion of rhetoric.87
The idion is any peculiar characteristic, and need not refer solely to materia. If
toũto does refer to tò légein, are we facing an End Argument which has been con-
verted into a Materia Argument? No we are not, for the simple reason that tò
légein was never treated as an end. Be this as it may, the argument may still origin-
ally have used tò légein instead of lógoß, although the argument was dealing with
lógoß as the materia of rhetoric. The hypothesis would have been simpler were it
not for the last two sentences of the section. There would have been less of a pro-
blem had the section, §51, consisted only of its first third: próß ge mv̀n toı̃ß
eirvménoiß, ou dè idion r vtorikṽß esti toũto, a llà tò koinòn pantòß logikoũ
87 In this way the mén of §49 is answered in §51.
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maXv́matoß. The following two sentences require some philological spadework to
sort out, but it is worth the effort since they add to our understanding of the way in
which arguments were created in that period.
The two sentences are problematic for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the examples
do not suit the argument. We might suppose pãn logikòn máXvma to be exemplified
by such arts as dialectic, grammar and philosophy, or even arithmetic and geome-
try.88 Instead, we find medicine and music. Secondly, the adverb eu is very strange.
We cannot be totally sure what toũto refers to,89 but even if it refers to tò légein,
the addition of eu is uncalled for.
In my opinion, the two problems actually explain each other. The modification of
the idion from tò légein to tò eu légein adapts it to the unsuitable examples. The
unsuitable examples appear in order to exemplify the modified idion. That is to say,
the modification of the idion and the addition of the examples occurred at the same
time, at a stage later than the original argument, with the final candidate being Sex-
tus himself. The sentence kaì gàr iatrikv̀ eu légei perì tw̃n eautṽß Xewrvmátwn
kaì mousikv̀ perì mousikw̃n together with the sentence following it has been trans-
posed from elsewhere.90
The original claim behind this section would have been:
próß ge mv̀n toı̃ß eirvménoiß, ou dè idion r vtorikṽß toũto, a llà tò
koinòn pantòß logikoũ maXv́matoßk
This sentence is fairly coherent, even if it is somewhat brief and very vague. Either
tò légein or lógoß – we have not yet established which – is the thing which cannot
be the idion of rhetoric, since it is common to pãn logikòn máXvma. Although it
makes sense, the sentence is still doubtful. What is meant by the idion? Does it refer
to the materia, or definition, or end? Also, what arts are included in the group desig-
nated by the expression pãn logikòn máXvma? Is there an art and/or máXvma which
does not have in it lógoß?
These doubts, it seems to me, occurred to someone who read the original claim.
We still do not know what he might have considered the idion to refer to, but we do
see how he answered the question about lógoß. He mentions medicine and music.
What was his source for these two arts? A clue is provided by the other element, tò
eu légein, which he would have taken from the same source. This element is of
course the declared Stoic end of rhetoric. The presence of eu did not bother this
88 For the first group, cf. Philodemus, I. 19. 12–18; for the second group, cf. Sextus, II. 5. There
is no doubt that §§2–5 echo the discussion in Plato’s Gorgias 450c6ff., but the confusion is also
manifest.
89 For the purposes of reconstructing the materia this problem is of no concern.
90 The two sentences are a unit as may be seen by the words ekástv toútwn which can refer
only to the examples of medicine and music.
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modifier of the original claim. He does not seem to have been aware of the different
contexts of the original claim and the Stoic nature of his other source.
At the beginning of the present discussion, while considering the referent of
toũto in §51, we rejected the possibility that tò légein had ever been an end. tò eu
légein, however, is the Stoic end of rhetoric. The modifier would have seen the ar-
gument reflected in §51 on the materia of rhetoric as tò légein, and wishing to add
examples turned to what he considered to be a similar argument, on tò eu légein,
without realizing that that argument was actually about the Stoic end of rhetoric.
Thus the modifier allows us to conclude that the earlier version of the Materia Ar-
gument treated the materia of rhetoric here as tò légein. The modifier may have
considered both arguments to be dealing with the end of rhetoric, perhaps even the
Stoic end of rhetoric, since few would not have known about the Stoic end of rheto-
ric.
Support for this thesis comes from Sextus, II. 5, which is clearly parallel to §51.
Both sections deal with the idion, explicitly mentioned at the end of §5 and the be-
ginning of §51. Plato’s definition of rhetoric is the subject from §2 onwards. We
have attributed the first two stages in finding this definition, peiXoũß dvmiourgóß
and the addition dià lógwn, to Critolaus in his treatment of the end of rhetoric.91
The remaining stages begin in §5, and their source appears to be the second stage
whose context is not known. It is this passage which is parallelled in §51. Both pas-
sages seek the idion of rhetoric and therefore do not make do with speech. The addi-
tion of dià lógwn is insufficient because ou c epeì lógoiß peı́Xei, pántwß estì
r vtorikv́. In §51 speech is insufficient because ou dè idion r vtorikṽß e sti toũto
(sc. tò légein).
The two sections, however, differ both in the context of the discussion and in the
character of the examples. In §51 we find the idion in the context of a discussion on
speech, while in §5 the context is persuasion. As for the examples, the reason that
dià lógwn is insufficient in §5 is because v iatrikv̀ kaì aı o moeideı̃ß taútU técnai
dià lógou peı́Xousin. In §51 the reason why speech is insufficient is because it is tò
koinòn pantòß logikoũ maXv́matoß. We shall leave a comparison of the two con-
texts until after an examination of the examples.
The examples in §5 are the group of arts like medicine, while those in §51 are
the logical arts. What is happening here may be explained in part if we continue
reading in §5. The criticism against dià lógwn is not the last. We now find the fol-
lowing examples: epeı́per kaì v gewmetrı́a kaì a riXmvtikv̀ kaì pãsa v tw̃ génei
Xewrvtikv̀ técnv. . . Geometry, arithmetic and other such theoretical arts could well
have served as examples of pãn logikòn máXvma in §51.
§5 is part of the discussion beginning in §2 whose general subject is persuasion
as the end of rhetoric. There were originally two stages:
91 For the discussion, see pp.150–158 above.
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a) tò peı́Xein (=peiXoũß dvmiourgóß)
b) tò dià lógwn peı́Xein (=peiXoũß dià lógwn dvmiourgóß)
Critolaus attacked the rhetors over their advocacy of this end of rhetoric, but some-
one else appears to have continued the process of reducing the field, as we see a
number of versions with even more qualifications.92 At this third stage, what is
being sought is not so much the peculiar end of rhetoric, but a peculiar feature at all,
and this is the idion. It could be the definition of rhetoric, and it could just as well
be its materia. Parts of this idion could be made use of in different contexts, and that
is what has happened in our passage. There were two further requirements to the ex-
pression peiXoũß dià lógwn dvmiourgóß. The first emphasized speech, and the sec-
ond required this speech to be persuasive rather than instructional. The first require-
ment was exemplified by that group of arts which we shall call for the sake of this
discussion “practical”, such as medicine, which also use speech. For the second re-
quirement, examples were adduced from the theoretical group of arts, such as arith-
metic and geometry, which also emphasized speech.
The parallel in §51 omitted the first stage, emphasizing speech with the examples
of medicine and music, and passed straight to the theoretical arts, without detailing
what he meant by pãn logikòn máXvma. The second reader, who may have been
aware of something like the argument found in the parallel in §5, exemplifies the ex-
pression with the aid of arts belonging in effect to what his source had omitted from
the original argument. While only medicine and “similar arts” are mentioned in §5,
we find in §51 medicine and music, where music is the art similar to medicine.93
It is not difficult to see why §51 jumps straight to the theoretical arts. It is be-
cause the context of the idion here is the materia, while in §5 it is the definition. As
part of the definition, speech is common to rhetoric and medicine, but in the context
of materia, rhetoric cannot be compared with medicine, while it can be compared
with dialectic, grammar and geometry.
The last two sentences in §51 may be summarized as a search for the idion which
may be used in a number of contexts. This search was also used against the Stoic
end of rhetoric. The modifier supplements his examples for pãn logikòn máXvma
from what he found in an argument against the Stoic end.
We return to the question whether toũto in §5 referred to tò légein or lógoß.
We have already seen that the former would make the modifier’s confusion more in-
telligible, using a source with the Stoic end, tò eu légein, because of the close simi-
larity. Of course, tò légein itself was never an end of rhetoric, but it was a materia
of rhetoric, despite being a verbal formulation. This being the case, we may detect
three stages in the development of §51:
92 Cf. pp.152–153 above.
93 This is not to say that §51 relies directly on §5. It may be that §5 is an abbreviation of §51. In
my opinion, both derive from a common source, perhaps at some remove.
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a) The argument contained only the first sentence, and its subject was tò
légein.94
b) The examples of medicine and music were added from an argument on
tò eu légein.95
c) Sextus or his source replaces toũto with tò légein, referring to its pre-
vious appearance in §50.
Sextus’ discussion of the materia of rhetoric concludes with an examination of kalv̀
léxiß (§§52–59), which naturally follows on from what appeared to be a discussion
of tò eu légein. Is, however, kalv̀ léxiß the Stoic materia of rhetoric? This is a
question worth asking since tò eu légein is the Stoic end of rhetoric, and because
the following discussion is full of Stoic terminology.96 Is, indeed, kalv̀ léxiß the
materia of rhetoric of anyone? The answer is complex. On the one hand, this pas-
sage appears in a formal discussion of the materia of rhetoric, which would indicate
a positive answer. We could posit a Stoic who held this to be the materia of rhetoric,
just as we have already found two Stoic materiae of rhetoric in Quintilian, II. 21.
3.97 Furthermore, we have not yet proved that the sources at our disposal exhaust all
the various issues raised against rhetoric. On the other hand, there are good reasons
for rejecting the possibility that kalv̀ léxiß was ever considered the materia of
rhetoric by anyone. Firstly, the word uÇ lv does not appear anywhere in the entire
passage (§§52–59). Secondly, Sextus equates kalv̀ léxiß with eu légein in §58 by
making both the object of the verb kataskeuázei. Furthermore, this verb, appearing
also at the beginning of §52 to open the entire discussion (ou dè kataskeuázei
kalv̀n léxin v r vtorikv́), is reminiscent of one of the criticisms of oratio in Quinti-
lian, II. 21. 1: quae si ita accipitur, ut sermo quacumque de re compositus dicatur
oratio, non materia, sed opus est ut statuarii statua; nam et oratio efficitur arte sicut
statua. . .98 In the same way might it be possible to claim that kalv̀ léxiß is no more
than the product of rhetoric (as distinct from the lógoß which is its materia)?
We have found in Quintilian and Sextus three separate lists of materiae of rheto-
ric, and in none of them have we found even a hint of kalv̀ léxiß as a materia. Sec-
ondly, tò eu légein, an almost cognate term, appeared only once in §§48–52, and
94 This sentence may have had a continuation which has been lost in transmission.
95 The expression toũ légein in the last sentence must be emended to include eu . This not only
makes both sentences compatible, but also anticipates the following discussion (§§52–59) on kalv̀
léxiß.
96 §§53–54 are particularly full of Stoic terminology and arguments: the rich man is not the
good man (SVF I. fr. 359, line 21; III. p.36 fr. 151; p.218 fr. 41, lines 35–36); death is not bad (SVF
I. fr. 190, 196; III. p.17 fr. 70; p.60 fr. 256, lines 33–34; p.218 fr. 39; p.261 fr. 14); cf. also the re-
placement of tò aition by tò poioũn (Diogenes Laertius VII. 134), and tò svmeı̃on by tò dvloũn
(Sextus, Math. VIII. 143).
97 See pp.184–185 above.
98 The verb efficitur would be the Latin equivalent of kataskeuázetai.
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we have found it to be an addition from another source. Thus the connection be-
tween the two passages, §§48–51 and 52–59 is clear but extremely tenuous. The
second passage seems to have been added to §51 because of (the Stoic end of rheto-
ric) tò eu légein appearing there which by association was connected with kalv̀
léxiß.
7.5. The Sources for the Arguments
We have as yet not considered the source of any of the arguments we have uncov-
ered in Quintilian and Sextus.99 There are, however, two clues which may point the
way. Quintilian, II. ch. 17 contains what we called the order of argument. This is a
collection of arguments against rhetoric:
a) argumentatio ex materia (§17)
b) nulla ars falsis adsentitur opinionibus (§§18–21)
c) omnes artes habent finem (§§22–25)
d) artes sciunt, quando sint finem consecutae (§26)
e) utitur vitiis rhetorice (§§26–29)
f) rhetorice ex utraque causae parte dicitur (§§30–36)
Quintilian found these arguments in a source which had already collected them; he
only summarizes what had been a longer summary.100 He mentions the names of
Aristotle, Critolaus, Athenodorus of Rhodes, and Agnon.101 Critolaus and Atheno-
dorus are accredited with multa. Aristotle is given first place in the list, perhaps be-
cause Critolaus used arguments appearing in Aristotle’s Grillus, but Critolaus is ac-
tually the most important or relevant person in the list. We have here a summary of
the main arguments against rhetoric in the Hellenistic period.
The arguments are mostly connected with the internal debate. The second argu-
ment uses the Stoic definition of art and turns Stoic epistemology against the Stoics.
The third argument deals with the end and contains both the criticism of Critolaus
and that of Charmadas.102 The response to the fourth argument concerning bene di-
cere is Stoic, while the fifth argument uses the tell-tale Stoic term adfectus.
99 Hubbell (1920) 381: “. . .they can best be classed with that mass of arguments. . .”.
100 The proof is simple: one of the sources for criticism of rhetoric was Agnon about whom
Quintilian says (II. 17. 15): Agnon quidem detraxit sibi inscriptione ipsa fidem, qua rhetorices accu-
sationem professus est. Had Quintilian used the books of the opponents of rhetoric, he would not
have needed to make inferences from the titles of books about their contents.
101 Meaning NAgnwn, a pupil of Carneades. The rough breathing had dropped in Greek by the
time of Quintilian, or simply in the transition from Greek to Latin. He appears in Kleine Pauly 917
s.v. “Hagnon” 3.
102 For a summary of the discussion on the end, see §6.6. above.
206 The Materia Argument
ISBN Print: 9783525252949 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647252940
© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen
Athenodorus was Stoic, and it may be asked why he appears in what seems to be
a list of the opponents of rhetoric. It may be that Quintilian used a source which
contained more arguments, and it is only the part aimed against the Stoics which
Quintilian summarizes since this is what concerns him; but in the introduction to
this passage he includes all the people he found in his source’s introduction. Also, at
least some of the arguments also belong to the external debate, such as the sixth ar-
gument (ex utraque causae parte dicere). Finally, some of the arguments against
the Stoics could have been used without modification against the rhetors, such as
the Knowledge argument, which does use Stoic terminology but could have been
used just as easily against the rhetors as against the Stoics.
We, however, are interested here in the sources for the Materia Argument. The
argumentatio ex materia is the first in the list, even if it is not the main one.103 Cri-
tolaus appears to be the author of this argument. Our analysis showed that §17 con-
tained only the non propria criticism, without any mention of the infinita criticism,
demonstrating that it was against the Stoics. What more can be said about this Mate-
ria Argument attributed to Critolaus?
The acroamatic writings of Aristotle were unread for most of the Hellenistic peri-
od. The term uÇ lv in the sense of “subject-matter” is to be found in these writings;
therefore, it may well not have been known to Critolaus, and the term is certainly
not used or hinted at in the Stoic definition of art.104 If this is the case, how could
Critolaus use any argument ex materia? If he criticized Stoic rhetoric only through
the Stoic definition of art, we would have to infer that he did not use the Materia
Argument.
This may be so, but Critolaus engaged in the external debate as well, although
our evidence for this is somewhat sketchy.105 The fact that our texts concentrate on
the internal debate does not allow us to infer that the external debate was less well
attended than the internal debate. The Stoic definition of art should not be consid-
ered the full extent of the means at Critolaus’ disposal for attacking rhetoric. The
fact that the Materia Argument in Sextus appears separate from the passages more
closely identified in the text with Critolaus does not mean that Critolaus was not the
author of that argument. The reason why the Materia Argument appears as it does is
to do with the sources Sextus used and the way they presented the arguments.
Nor is there a problem with the term uÇ lv. It should be borne in mind that the ma-
teria of rhetoric can be attacked without mentioning the term materia/uÇ lv. There
are many other ways.106 Furthermore, assuming that Critolaus did not read the ac-
103 The main one is of course ex utraque causae parte dicere (§30).
104 The Stoic definition of art contains benefit, end, method (sústvma), but not materia. The
reason for this is extremely interesting, but is beyond the scope of the present study.
105 Cicero, De Oratore II. 160 portrays a great war between the philosophers, headed by Crito-
laus among others, against the rhetors.
106 Cf. Quintilian, II. 15. 15, where two systems present their materia without using the term
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roamatic writings of Aristotle, there is no reason to suppose that the term uÇ lv was
not in a Peripatetic oral tradition; it appears several times in the writings of Theo-
phrastus;107 and other writings of Aristotle were in the public domain, such as the
metarhetorical dialogue Grillus, which Critolaus certainly read.
There is then nothing to prevent Critolaus from being the source for the Materia
Argument in the internal debate. As for the external debate, the infinita criticism ap-
pears only in Quintilian where his text reflects all the types of debates, stages and
targets we have uncovered in this study. His summary is so late that all its elements
have become seriously tangled up in each other. There is no reason to suppose, how-
ever, that Critolaus refrained from the external debate. The first argument in that
context is the non propria, a criticism which first appeared in the questions of Pla-
to’s Socrates to Gorgias, and it is hard to imagine Critolaus not making use of it. As
for the other criticisms, especially the endless series of lógoß arguments from every
possible angle, they seem to have originated in much later sources who must remain
nameless.
7.6. Conclusion
The discussion of materia in Sextus clearly points to the internal debate. Despite the
great confusion in the discussion, many elements are identifiable with the Stoa, such
as tò eu légein, the kakotecnı́a, a term used by Critolaus to denote Stoic rhetoric
(from the point of view of its benefit), and the kalv̀ léxiß and the criticism against
convoluted speech.
Quintilian’s discussion of the materia reflects all four facets of the debate: philo-
sophers against rhetors, philosophers (Academics/Peripatetics) against the Stoa, an
internal rhetorical debate, and an internal Stoic debate. Against the rhetors and their
logos as materia the philosophers used both the non propria and the infinita argu-
ments. In the second stage the infinita argument was used in the internal rhetorical
debate by the rhetors who advocated the civiles quaestiones as against omnes res.
The non propria was used by the Academics/Peripatetics against the Stoa (with the
term propria being the equivalent of the term idion in Sextus, II. 51). In addition to
all this we were given the opportunity to catch a glimpse of an internal Stoic debate
between tota vita or ethice as rhetoric’s materia.
And a last word, if we are right in assuming that non propria and infinita criti-
cisms were first used in the external debate against the rhetors and their materia –
lógoß/oratio, we can perhaps expose a method we have already shown to be of Cri-
tolaus, and thus raise the likelihood that Critolaus is the source of such arguments.
materia. It is sufficient to use the formula circa + acc. Plato’s Socrates in the Gorgias expresses
himself well without using the term uÇ lv. Cf. also p.182 n.35 above.
107 Theophrastus was also a popular lecturer.
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We have shown in previous discussions that Critolaus used to attach various epithets
to the art of rhetoric according to his different attacks. In our discussion of Quinti-
lian’s chapter 21 we came to the conclusion that each attack on the materia of rheto-
ric was accompanied by a term concerning the art. Thus art whose materia is infini-
ta should be named multiplex; art whose materia is non propria should be called
circumcurrens. This method is clearly that of Critolaus. Thus Critolaus was the first
to attack the rhetors’ materia both with non propria and infinita (using Greek terms,
of course). It was only in the second stage (Charmadas?) that these two attacks were
divided for use in the internal rhetorical and internal philosophical arenas.
Unlike other issues discussed in previous chapters, the materia is treated in very
different ways by Sextus and Quintilian. This can be explained by the different mo-
tivation and sources of each author. Sextus, a philosopher, was naturally closer to
sources dealing with the debate between the philosophers and the rhetors, while
Quintilian, a rhetor, was closer to sources on the internal debate among the rhetors
themselves.108 Yet Sextus’ limited treatment of the materia could also be explained
by his being a Sceptic who would have been satisfied the moment he had attained
his refutation of rhetoric. Quintilian, on the other hand, as he tells us in his prooe-
mium, read a great deal of material concerning rhetoric, and this would explain his
much more expansive treatment.
108 It helps to explain why the rhetors’ materia of rhetoric as omnes res subiectae is not even
mentioned in Sextus. He deals only with lógoß, a materia of rhetoric which also appears in Quinti-
lian, where, however, it is removed from the discussion already after the first section of chapter 21.
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8. Summary
This study has tried to reconstruct the dispute over rhetoric in Hellenistic thought.
Although this dispute attracted most of the intellecuals of the time, including philo-
sophers from all schools, rhetors, teachers and educators, it has been almost entirely
forgotten, and only a few testimonia, most of which are wholly confused and frag-
mentary, are left. These testimonia are found mainly in Cicero, Philodemus, Quinti-
lian and Sextus.
The reconstruction has been carried out on two main interrelated axes. Firstly, I
have tried to delineate the exact milieu in which this dispute took place, including
locations, dates and persons, as far as our sources can give us this information. Sec-
ondly, I have tried to reconstruct five main arguments used against rhetoric, all of
which concentrate on rhetoric’s claim to be considered an art. These are: The Exclu-
sivity of Teaching Argument, The Falsa Argument, The Benefit Argument, The
End Argument and The Materia Argument. Clarifying these two axes brings to life
an interesting controversy on an issue which goes back to the beginnings of Attic
rhetoric and philosophy. It also exemplifies the more conscious and complex char-
acter of Hellenistic dispute of issues already debated in earlier periods.
Concerning the milieu of the dispute I have exposed two stages, the first around
the middle of the second century BCE, followed by another towards the end of that
century, leading me to call this phenomenon “the two-staged debate”. The dominant
figures are Critolaus the Peripatetic in the first stage and Charmadas the Academic
in the second, philosophers who attacked the rhetors in what I have called “the ex-
ternal debate”, but also their fellow-philosophers, the Stoics, in what I have called
“the internal debate”.
Most of our material concerning the dispute is heavily imbued with Stoic termi-
nology and lines of thought, the most clear sign of which is the Stoic definition of
art used by the opponents of rhetoric to refute rhetoric’s claim to be considered an
art. Some scholars have assumed that this definition as well as other Stoic concepts
had become common currency, used by all intellectuals. It is my contention, how-
ever, that the usage reflects the internal philosophical debate, with the Peripatetics
and Academics arguing against the Stoa.
Among all the Hellenistic schools who may have dealt with rhetorical studies
and exercises in one way or another, it was only the Stoics who regarded rhetoric as
an art, considering it no less than a retv́. The Stoics were, of course, part of the
whole philosophical movement against the rhetors, but their support of rhetoric per
se played into the hands of the rhetors. The Stoics could explain the difference be-
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tween what they considered rhetoric and what the rhetors taught, but still it did not
prevent the other philosophers from considering the Stoics a fifth column.
The interlinked internal and external debates I have called “the double debate”,
and since this occurred in the two periods around Critolaus and Charmadas, I have
called the phenomenon “the two-staged double debate”, which is in fact the main
characteristic and axis of this interesting controversy. The “two-staged double de-
bate” has helped in sorting out the untidy and confused bulk of fragmentary and tan-
talizing materials found in the works of Cicero, Philodemus, Quintilian and Sextus.
Each chapter in the study ends with a summary of the conclusions arrived at in
that chapter regarding the various settings in which the argument, in one version or
another, was used, and there is no need to repeat all those findings here. Instead, I
would like to focus in the following lines mainly on two subjects: firstly, a few gen-
eral points emerging out of the analyses; secondly, a point of methodology.
A short reference in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy is dedi-
cated to our dispute:
“About 160 BC the debate on the status of rhetoric started by Plato gets
a new impetus . . . The main challenge to rhetoric is that it is not an art
or expertise (técnv). Additional arguments are that it does not make in-
dividuals or states happy and that an orator is often constrained to de-
fend criminals. Moreover, one can be a good orator without formal
training and, conversely, many instructors of rhetoric are poor speakers.
But the chief point of the attack is that rhetoric is not an organized body
of knowledge, so that the rhetorician is not an artist or expert . . .” (CHP
1999, 217).
In this citation we identify most of the arguments we were analysing such as “The
Exclusivity of Teaching Argument” and “The Benefit Argument”. However, what
appears here as “the chief point of the attack”, i. e. “that rhetoric is not an organized
body of knowledge” is actually the axis. This criticism is intended to show that
rhetoric does not meet one of the criteria of the Stoic definition of art: sústvmá
e stin e k katalv́yewn suggegumnasménwn. As we have shown, most of the argu-
ments derive from this definition, and this reflects Critolaus’ dispute against the
Stoics. Critolaus, in fact, divided the Stoic definition of art into its most basic ele-
ments, taking each element as a basis for a different attack. Hence, all the various
arguments mentioned above are part of one complete and well-arranged attack with
a specific target – the Stoics. The first part of the definition – especially the noun
katálvyiß and the adjectives katalvptóß and a katálvptoß – supplied Critolaus
with a double attack which we named “The Falsa Argument”. This included both
“The (self)Deceiving Orator Argument”, and “The Rhetoric as Fraud Argument”.
The second part of the definition – kaì epì téloß eu crvston tw̃n e n tw̃ bı́w lamba-
nousw̃n tv̀n a naforán – provided Critolaus with two more arguments. The adjec-
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tive eu crvston provided “The Benefit Argument”, and the noun téloß provided
both “The End Argument” and the “Exclusivity of Teaching Argument”.
All these arguments, however, share a commom denominator. As we have shown
in our analyses, Critolaus considers rhetoric to be merely dúnamiß (vis), and by tak-
ing this term to denote the ‘essence’ of rhetoric as against those who regard rhetoric
as técnv, he attaches to rhetoric different qualities according to each attack. Thus,
looking at rhetoric through “The Benefit Argument” this dúnamiß should, according
to him, be called kakotecnı́a (pravitas artis); through “The Exclusivity of Teaching
Argument”, this dúnamiß should be called trı́bv (usus); through “The End Argu-
ment” (perhaps originally based on part of “The Falsa Argument”), this dúnamiß
should be called a tecnı́a (nulla ars). Finally, in the context of the Materia Argu-
ment I have exposed a similar method, thus hinting at Critolaus as the source. At-
tacking the rhetor’s materia – lógoß/oratio – as both non propria and infinita, Cri-
tolaus attached to each attack a term concerning the art itself: art whose materia is
infinita should be named nultiplex; art whose materia is non propria should be
called circumcurrens.
Having described Critolaus’ arrangement of his arguments and the structure of
his attacks, it is no less important to notice his main strategy. As we have seen in
our discussions – mainly in “The End Argument” and “The Materia Argument” –
Critolaus actually imposes views on his rivals which they otherwise would not have
accepted: the finis (téloß) as ‘persuasion’, and the materia (uÇ lv) as logos. His strat-
egy is very interesting, and lies heavily on tradition. In the external debate, the rhet-
ors cannot ignore all the rhetorical tradition, beginning with Corax, and deny logos
as rhetoric’s materia. Nor can the Stoics in the internal debate ignore what their
spiritual forefathers, earlier philosophers, thought of rhetoric. Here we encounter an
example of one of the main arguments used against the Stoics on other issues as
well: ita sublato alte supercilio in eadem quae ceteri descenditis mutatis rerum no-
minibus (Seneca, De Constantia Sapientis 3, 1). The Stoics claimed as the end of
rhetoric bene dicere (eu légein). Critolaus, using “The Exclusivity of the End Argu-
ment”, surveyed the most outstanding of earlier philosophers in order to force the
Stoics to accept and defend the more conventional end of rhetoric, tò peı́Xein (per-
suadere); he then attacked them using what we have called “The Exclusivity of At-
taining the End Argument”.
Charmadas has been identified as the leading scholar of the second stage. How-
ever, he should not be taken as simply repeating his predecessor’s arguments.
Although he bases his attacks on previous arguments, he invents new ones, and in
many cases develops the old ones. One case, worth mentioning here, is his treatment
of what we have called “The General Harm Argument”, part of “The Benefit Argu-
ment”. While Critolaus in the first stage focused solely on the harm of rhetoric to
society, in Charmadas’ treatment of the same subject we trace a division between
Social and Individual harm. This in itself is a clear sign of a change developing
within Greek society. When benefit to the individual is now the criterion for judging
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a field of activity as an art, it is no longer sufficient to discredit rhetoric on the basis
of its harm to society. It now becomes necessary for opponents of rhetoric to prove
that rhetoric harms the individual, first and foremost the rhetor himself.
I would like to end with a methodological note. It cannot be emphasized enough
that ancient sources such as Sextus Empiricus or Quintilian, who frequently reflect
various sources and traditions, are not to be used in research without thorough ana-
lysis, which includes, first and foremost, source criticism. Simple and straightfor-
ward citation from these sources is actually worth nothing, to say the least. We are
dealing here with testimonia, and not every witness is immediately reliable; not all
witnesses share the same degree of credibility. In this study much use has been
made of Sextus and Quintilian, but the same is true of other ancient sources such as
Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, Plutarch, not to mention the Christian fathers. Only by
considering all the relevant aspects of a source, his aims, way of thinking, and his
work methods, can one begin to use him intelligently. In cases where there are other
parallel sources, as was the case in the present study, a meticulous examination of
one source against the other is a valuable tool. The reader may judge from my con-
clusions whether it is worth the effort.
I should like to cite a few sentences from the introduction of what should be con-
sidered the first research on our topic – Radermacher’s article from 1896 written as
part of the Introduction to the supplementum volume in Sudhaus’ edition of the
rhetorical writings of Philodemus. In the preface to Radermacher’s article Sudhaus
writes (p. VI–VII):
Das zu zeigen, war der Zweck dieses Büchleins. Denn wenn auch im
einzelnen noch manches zu bessern bleibt, so übersehen wir doch hier
einmal ein beträchtliches Stück lesbaren Textes, das hoffentlich zu wei-
teren Bemühungen um den interessanten Schriftsteller ermutigt.
In spite of all our findings, our material is too complicated and fragmentary to allow
final conclusions to be reached. I join, therefore, Sudhaus’ and Radermacher’s call
for further research. I should like to consider my research as one more contribution,
and definitely not the final one, in a long series of contributions on the subject.
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